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Reformers have promoted mixed- member electoral systems as the “best 
of both worlds.” In this volume, internationally recognized political sci-
entists evaluate the ways in which the introduction of a mixed- member 
electoral system affects the coniguration of political parties. The con-
tributors examine several political phenomena, including cabinet post 
allocation, nominations, preelectoral coalitions, split- ticket voting, and 
the size of party systems and faction systems. Signiicantly, they also 
consider various ways in which the constitutional system— especially 
whether the head of government is elected directly or indirectly— can 
modify the incentives created by the electoral system.
Part I of the book provides an in- depth comparison of Taiwan and 
Japan, both of which moved from single nontransferable vote systems 
to mixed- member majoritarian systems. These cases demonstrate that 
the higher the payoffs of attaining the executive ofice and the greater 
degree of cross- district coordination required to win it, the stronger 
the incentives for elites to form and stay in the major parties. In such 
a context, a country will move rapidly toward a two- party system. In 
Part II, the contributors apply this theoretical logic to other countries 
with mixed- member systems and ind that executive competition has 
the same effect on legislative electoral rules in countries as disparate as 
Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Bolivia, and Russia.
The indings presented here demonstrate that the success of elec-
toral reform depends not only on the speciication of new electoral rules 
per se but also on the political context— and especially the constitu-
tional framework— within which such rules are embedded.
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IntroduCtIon
Legislature- Centric and Executive- 
Centric theories of Party Systems  
and Faction Systems
Nathan F. Batto and Gary W. Cox
Two central tenets of the New Institutional paradigm are that institutions 
shape incentives and that how they do so depends on the speciic context 
in which they are embedded. Building on these tenets, this book argues 
that electoral systems are embedded within constitutional systems and that 
whether the head of government is directly or indirectly elected affects 
how the legislative electoral system shapes politicians’ incentives. Parties 
everywhere care about winning both legislative seats and executive ofices. 
This book keeps both kinds of payoff in view and analyzes how constitu-
tional strictures have mediated politicians’ reactions to new mixed- member 
electoral rules in several countries.
Mixed- Member Electoral Systems
Mixed- member electoral systems have been touted as having the poten-
tial to be “the electoral reform of the twenty- irst century” (Shugart and 
Wattenberg 2001, 1). The basic idea behind such systems is simple. Some 
legislators are elected in single- member districts (SMDs) under plural-
ity rule, while others are elected in multimember districts under some 
version of proportional representation (PR). Ideally, this offers citizens 
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the “best of both worlds,” combining the direct ties between representa-
tives and voters that characterize SMD systems with the proportional-
ity that deines PR systems, and thereby promoting moderate and stable 
politics (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001, chap. 25). Politicians all over the 
world have found these promises enticing, and, in recent years, countries 
opting for new electoral systems have more often than not chosen from 
the mixed- member family. Currently 32 countries use some version of a 
mixed- member system, including such diverse cases as Mexico, Ukraine, 
Andorra, South Korea, Venezuela, Romania, Jordan, Hungary, Mongolia, 
Lithuania, and Germany.1
In this book, we focus most heavily on two prominent East Asian 
examples of mixed- member reform: Taiwan and Japan. However, many of 
the arguments we make are general; and empirically the book considers 
several other relevant cases— including Thailand, the Philippines, New 
Zealand, Bolivia, and Russia. The angle from which we examine mixed- 
member reforms hinges on the distinction between legislature- centric and 
executive- centric theories of electoral systems, to which we turn next.
Legislature- Centric and Executive- Centric Theories
Standard theories of electoral systems often start by assuming that actors 
mainly want to win seats in the national legislature. Such theories then ana-
lyze how different electoral systems push seat- maximizing parties toward 
different strategies in vote coordination, internal party organization, nomi-
nations, collaboration with other parties, and so on. We call such theories 
legislature- centric because they focus on how the electoral rules governing 
pursuit of legislative seats affect strategies. In these theories, the key factor 
driving politicians is their recognition that groups smaller than a certain 
threshold, determined by the legislative electoral rules, will be unable to 
eficiently translate their popular support into seats. In other words, failure 
to coordinate invites punishment in the form of lost legislative seats.
But of course politicians have other incentives to coordinate. In par-
ticular, larger parties may sometimes be essential vehicles for the pursuit of 
executive ofice— both ministerial portfolios and the chief executive posi-
tion (whether prime minister or president). Thus, another way to think 
about coordination, which one might call executive- centric, focuses on how 
eficiently groups of different sizes can convert their ambitions for execu-
tive ofice into reality. In this line of theories, attention centers on the exec-
utive electoral rules. While early contributions to executive- centric theory 
(e.g., Shugart 1995; Cox 1997, chaps. 10– 11) focused on presidential elec-
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tions, Hicken (2009) articulated a broader theory relevant to both nonpres-
idential and presidential regimes. In the executive- centric line of theories, 
failure to coordinate invites punishment in the form of lost executive posts.
In reality, politicians care about both legislative seats and executive 
ofices. Their decisions to form larger parties or split into smaller ones 
should thus relect their calculations about how such maneuvers will affect 
their payoff in both seats and ofices, weighted by their concern for each. 
Because executive posts are generally viewed as more powerful and desir-
able than legislative seats, one might even argue that theories of politi-
cal coordination should be primarily executive- centric. This is consistent 
with work on party linkage or aggregation, such as Cox (1997, chaps. 10– 
11), Chhibber and Kollman (2004) and Hicken (2009), which stresses the 
extent to which cross- district linkage of legislative candidates is inluenced 
by the extent of executive power.
How to Analyze the Electoral reforms in taiwan and Japan
To illustrate how constitutional systems adjust the incentives set up by 
electoral systems, this book starts with a narrow substantive focus. In 
particular, it looks at one of the classic topics in the electoral systems 
literature— the number of competitors— in the context of Taiwan and 
Japan. It then gradually expands outward, both in the range of politi-
cal phenomena covered and in geographical scope. This introduction 
focuses on the evolution of party systems and faction systems after elec-
toral reform in Taiwan and Japan.
Précis
Taiwan and Japan used similar single nontransferable vote (SNTV) elec-
toral systems prior to reform and moved to similar mixed- member majori-
tarian (MMM) systems after it. If one considers the electoral system in 
isolation, the different outcomes in the two countries may seem puzzling. 
In each case, standard theories would predict that moving from SNTV 
to MMM should have induced greater coordination among competitors, 
reducing both the effective number of parties and the internal factionaliza-
tion of the major parties. Yet, these very similar reforms have had notice-
ably different effects. In Japan, the hoped- for reduction in the effective 
number of parties has been rather slow in coming, and the number of fac-
tions has, if anything, actually increased. In Taiwan, in contrast, the party 
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system almost immediately fell into a two- party mold after the reform of 
2005, while the reform has seemed to have very little impact on the num-
ber of factions.
Bringing the constitutional systems into the analysis provides a much 
richer and more satisfying explanation. The different ways in which execu-
tive posts were allotted in the two countries— parliamentary Japan and 
semipresidential Taiwan— provided a much stronger impetus for party 
consolidation in the latter. Factions have also been affected in both coun-
tries, though the most important changes have been in areas other than the 
number of factions.
In the next several sections, we lesh out the argument just sketched. We 
begin by providing a slightly more detailed account of what the electoral 
reforms in Japan and Taiwan entailed.
the Substance of the Electoral reforms in Japan and taiwan
This section provides a quick sketch of the electoral rules before and after 
reform. The rules are reviewed in full detail in chapter 1.
Japan and Taiwan both used SNTV systems to conduct their elections 
prior to reform, and they now both use MMM systems. Japan held its irst 
MMM election in 1996 and Taiwan followed suit in 2008.
There were some modest differences in the countries’ prereform sys-
tems. All seats in Japan were elected by SNTV, and most districts had three 
to ive seats with an average of 3.96. Taiwan’s districts were slightly larger 
on average with an average of 5.68 seats per district. More signiicantly, 
Taiwan also had a party list tier, which elected 22% of the total seats. How-
ever, voters did not vote directly for the list tier; instead, party lists were 
elected on the basis of votes from the SNTV tier.
In Japan’s irst MMM election, 300 seats were elected in SMDs while 
200 were elected in the list tier. In subsequent elections, the list tier was 
reduced to 180 seats. Taiwan’s MMM system featured 73 SMDs, 34 party 
list seats, and six seats reserved for indigenous peoples in two SNTV dis-
tricts. Note that in both countries, SMD seats outnumber list seats by a 
considerable margin. Among the more important differences, Taiwan has a 
single national list where Japan has eleven regional lists, and Taiwan does 
not allow dual candidacies while Japan does.
In sum, while there are some notable differences in the electoral rules, 
readers should not lose sight of the overriding similarities. In both coun-
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tries, politicians and voters who had become accustomed to competing 
under SNTV rules had to adjust to a new set of incentives presented by 
new MMM rules.
A Legislature- Centric View of Electoral reform
As noted above, a legislature- centric perspective draws attention to the 
incentives created by the electoral system used to elect the national legis-
lature. Since both Taiwan and Japan changed their electoral systems from 
SNTV to MMM, new incentives should have reshaped party and faction 
systems in predictable ways.
Parties
The literature on electoral systems suggests that the change from SNTV 
to MMM in Japan and Taiwan should have reduced the number of political 
parties. Since SNTV has multiseat districts and voters can only support 
one candidate, a plurality is not necessary for victory. The more seats there 
are, the lower the threshold for victory is. Moreover, because parties do not 
need to win a plurality, there is no need to compete over the median voter. 
Small parties can build their support bases around nonmedian platforms 
(Cox 1990). SNTV should thus be able to sustain a multiparty system.
In contrast, MMM combines the logic of single- member- plurality 
(SMP) and list PR. Duvergerian incentives toward bipolar competition 
under SMP rules are well known (see Duverger 1954; Rae 1967; Cox 
1997). Since a plurality is necessary for victory, smaller competitors tend 
to be weeded out, either because voters choose not to waste their votes on 
small parties or because, after suffering a string of defeats, small parties 
simply die off. If the two competitors are the same in all districts across the 
country, SMP should lead to a two- party system.
In MMM systems, this Duvergerian logic is mitigated by the existence 
of the list tier. Small parties may not be able to win nominal seats, but 
they can win list seats. However, small parties do not get full proportional 
value for their votes. Because the two tiers are not linked, small parties win 
a proportional number of list tier seats, but this still leaves them under-
represented in the SMDs and thus in the full chamber. Moreover, because 
the nominal tier is so much bigger than the list tier in East Asian systems, 
the proportionality of the list tier is overwhelmed by the majoritarian out-
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comes of the nominal tier. The MMM systems in Japan and Taiwan thus 
put severe pressure on small parties, creating incentives for a shift toward 
a two- party system.
As Chi Huang, Ming- Feng Kuo, and Hans Stockton document (chap-
ter 1), these expectations have been met much more closely in Taiwan than 
in Japan. In Taiwan, the irst MMM election saw the effective number of 
parties2 in the legislature plunge from 3.26 in 2004 to a mere 1.75 in 2008; 
this is exactly what conventional theories would predict. In Japan, how-
ever, the trend has not been so clear. In fact, compared to the 1986 and 
1990 SNTV elections, the irst two MMM elections had a higher effective 
number of parliamentary parties. There has been a slow reduction of par-
ties over the past decade, but this decrease in the number of parties has 
taken ive elections under the new system. Japan’s change has been slow 
and gradual; Taiwan’s has been quick and dramatic.
Factions
A legislature- centric view suggests that electoral reform also should have 
affected the internal factions of the major parties in Japan and Taiwan. It is 
no simple task to deine precisely what a faction is. One set of scholars has 
tried to conceptualize factions by looking at various critical dimensions, 
such as a group’s organization, stability over time, ideological orientation, 
or its propensity toward rent- seeking.3 The problem is that factions often 
evolve and shift across these various lines. A second set of scholars worries 
less about the speciic manifestation of the groups and more about the 
fact that a subgroup exists and contests power. Boucek, building on Zariski 
(1960) and Belloni and Beller (1978), deines factionalism as “the partition-
ing of a political party . . . into sub- units which are more or less institution-
alized and who engage in collective action to achieve their members’ par-
ticular objectives” (2009, 14). One particular advantage of this deinition 
for our project is that the locus of the competition determines the nature 
of the faction. For example, competition over control of local governments 
implies locally oriented factions (Belloni and Beller 1978). However, while 
Boucek’s conceptualization is intentionally broad and inclusive, in this 
book we are only interested in the subset of factions that try to win power 
by nominating legislative candidates and securing executive posts.4
Factionalization of parties has been prominent in both Japan and Tai-
wan, and several authors have argued that the SNTV electoral system 
promoted factionalism. Most accounts are based on the experience of the 
Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and can be summarized as fol-
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lows. A party wishing to win a majority of seats must nominate multiple 
candidates in most districts, and the competition within the party for 
nominations is intense. Factions arise as nominating coalitions, and they 
help their members run credible campaigns by centrally collecting inan-
cial resources. Factions generally avoid supporting more than one person 
in each district, and the ideal situation for a faction would be to nominate 
exactly one candidate in each district (Thayer 1969, chap. 2; Fukui 1970, 
chap. 5; Curtis 1971, chap. 1; Baerwald 1986, 22; Curtis 1988, 82– 86; Cox 
and Rosenbluth 1993).5
Perhaps the clearest exposition of a legislature- centric theory of fac-
tions comes from Kohno (1992), who argues that there were ive major 
factions during the SNTV era because the largest electoral districts had 
ive seats. Supporting his view, Kohno shows that, while the four bigger 
factions nominated candidates in most districts, the smaller Komoto fac-
tion nominated most of its candidates in ive- seat districts.6
In Taiwan, Rigger (1999) tells a similar story about the Democratic 
Progressive Party’s (DPP) factions in the 1990s. One of the factions’ major 
roles is to help members win nominations. For much of the democratic era, 
DPP nominations were decided, at least in part, by allowing party mem-
bers to vote. Factions recruit both candidates and party members, and they 
mobilize their members to vote on behalf of their candidates. District mag-
nitude varies much more widely in Taiwan than in Japan, so factions do not 
always try to nominate their own candidate in each district. Instead, they 
often trade support across district lines. Money does not play as important 
a role in DPP as in LDP factional politics, but the DPP factions do provide 
electoral resources in the form of association with a national igure. Both 
in the nomination contest and in the general election, a DPP candidate 
can brand himself as “the Chen Shui- bian candidate,” for example (Rigger 
2001, chap. 5).
If the SNTV electoral system was, in fact, the critical factor in sus-
taining multiple intraparty factions, we might see changes after electoral 
reform. In MMM, each district has only one seat, so a party should only 
nominate one candidate. The literature suggests that competition for 
nominations is much like competition for seats, in that the decision rule is 
critical in determining how much consolidation to expect. If nominations 
are determined by a plurality rule, standard Duvergerian logic suggests 
that two big factions should form to contest each nomination. However, 
a different rule, such as requiring an absolute majority, may allow smaller 
factions some bargaining space in which to maneuver (Key 1984 [1949]; 
Duverger 1954; Canon 1978; Shugart and Carey 1992).
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What is the decision rule for nominations in Taiwan and Japan? In 
Taiwan, contested nominations are now decided by telephone polls. The 
procedures are less transparent in Japan, where back- room negotiations 
determine most contentious questions (see chapter 5 for more on nomina-
tions in Japan and Taiwan). Telephone polls use a plurality rule, and the 
single- shot contest does not allow runners- up any opportunity to use their 
demonstrated strength as bargaining chips. Japanese back- room negotia-
tions allow smaller factions much more opportunity to trade their support 
in return for other concessions. Thus Taiwan’s nominations can be consid-
ered as using the plurality rule, while Japanese nominations can be seen 
as employing a majority rule. This implies that the pressures toward two 
factions should be stronger in Taiwan than in Japan.
However, the pressure to consolidate the faction system in Japan should 
not be underestimated. The literature suggests that majoritarian systems 
will not support an unlimited number of actors. For example, a runoff sys-
tem will theoretically only support three candidates (Cox 1997). Empiri-
cally, majoritarian systems have, in fact, discriminated against small parties 
(Farrell 2011). In sum, there should be reductive pressure in both coun-
tries, though it should be stronger in Taiwan than in Japan.7
To recap, both the LDP and DPP had four big factions and several 
smaller ones in the SNTV era. If the factions were, in fact, products of the 
electoral systems, the new MMM systems should have brought about some 
consolidation. In Taiwan, the new system should have pushed toward two 
big factions and perhaps a few smaller ones. In Japan, the pressures would 
have been weaker but still clearly reductive.
This, however, is not a good description of the actual empirical record. 
To show this, we shall consider the LDP, DPP and Kuomintang (KMT) 
factions in turn.
The ive major LDP factions have continued to exist in the postre-
form era. They have become less inluential in the area of nominations 
(Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies 1999, 42– 47), but the continued presence of 
so many factions suggests that contesting nominations was not the only, 
or perhaps even the major, reason for their existence. In fact, the LDP 
faction system has actually expanded. In addition to the ive old factions, 
four newer factions have emerged. Rather than consolidating into fewer 
factions, the LDP system has trended in the opposite direction.
The DPP faction system has also undergone signiicant changes, but 
the current system is arguably just as complex as the prereform system. In 
the 1990s, the DPP had four big factions and several smaller ones. These 
factions were formally organized and physically headquartered in legisla-
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tive ofices. Today, factions are all informally organized, and only one of the 
old factions survives. Two other major factions are led by former premiers 
and presidential aspirants. A fourth faction centered on former President 
Chen Shui- bian is waning in strength, while a ifth faction led by the 2012 
presidential candidate is growing and may soon rival the big three fac-
tions. Several smaller factions also continue to operate. This reshufling 
of the faction system is not compatible with legislature- centric expecta-
tions. There were major changes in the early 2000s, long before electoral 
reform, when the factions aligned in the direction of two big coalitions. In 
2006, after the electoral reform had been passed and one might expect a 
two- faction system to emerge, the system was reorganized into multiple 
informal factions.
KMT internal factions have never it the SNTV electoral model very 
well. At the national level, the KMT has had three periods of clear fac-
tional divisions during the democratic era. In the early 1990s, the party 
was often divided into the mainstream and nonmainstream camps, led by 
President Lee Teng- hui and Premier Hau Pei- tsun, respectively (Tien 
1996; Lin and Teddards 2003). In the late 1990s, the KMT was again 
split into two factions, with one led by Lee and his protégé, Vice Presi-
dent Lien Chan, and the other led by Governor James Soong (Diamond 
2001). Finally, in the period before the 2008 election, the party was split 
into supporters of Speaker Wang Jin- pyng and former Taipei City mayor 
Ma Ying- jeou. All three of these splits can be understood as struggles 
between the KMT’s nativist and orthodox Chinese wings. Two of the 
splits occurred during the SNTV era, while the third happened as the 
new electoral system was being drawn up, yet all three featured two big 
factions. District magnitude in the legislative electoral system seems to 
have made no difference.
This impression is strengthened by looking at the KMT’s local fac-
tions.8 The KMT’s local factions are based in a speciic county. Since legis-
lative districts in the SNTV era were counties, an electoral- systems theory 
of factionalism would predict that the number of local factions should 
depend on the number of seats available in each county. In fact, there were 
almost always two local factions. This was true in both small counties and 
big counties. For instance, in Taichung County, which had between six and 
11 seats, the two KMT factions generally each nominated two or three leg-
islative candidates. Moreover, local factions commonly nominated multiple 
candidates in each district for the County Assembly elections, which were 
also conducted under SNTV rules. The KMT’s local factions have not 
seen any dramatic changes since electoral reform.
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Adding an Executive- Centric Perspective
We have reviewed legislature- centric arguments that the electoral reforms 
in Japan and Taiwan should have reduced the number of parties and fac-
tions; and pointed out that the empirical record does not it well with the 
theoretical predictions. In this section, we begin the process of explain-
ing this discrepancy between theory and evidence by adding an executive- 
centric perspective. In this perspective, the pursuit of executive posts drives 
politicians, so the ways in which these posts are allotted is crucial.
Parties
From an executive- centric standpoint, the opening of executive positions 
to competition from opposition parties was an important milestone in the 
development of both countries’ party systems. Both Japan and Taiwan 
experienced a long period of one- party dominance. In Taiwan, one- party 
dominance was legally mandated until 1986. Thereafter, it continued for 
some time because of the KMT’s enormous resource advantages. In Japan, 
one- party dominance was not legally mandated. However, U.S. disapproval 
of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) strongly militated against their participa-
tion in government, as did the LDP’s resource advantages as the party of 
government.
During the period of one- party dominance in Taiwan, the opposition’s 
incentive to coalesce was lessened by the common belief that they could 
not win, even were they better coordinated. Prior to 1986, the opposition 
had no chance of peacefully assuming power. From 1986 until 1991, the 
KMT’s grip on the Legislative Yuan was assured by the presence of main-
land representatives; and the opposition might have doubted the KMT’s 
willingness to hold fair presidential elections or to relinquish power should 
they lose. Similarly, during the period of one- party dominance in Japan, 
the opposition faced a signiicant disincentive to coordination. U.S. oppo-
sition to JSP participation in government both reduced the chance that an 
opposition alliance could win and reduced the value of winning. The struc-
tural barriers to opposition governance in both countries meant that poor 
coordination was not the only, or main, reason the opposition believed 
executive power was unobtainable. Thus, the opposition could fragment 
without paying a penalty in lost executive ofices, as those ofices were 
already beyond its grasp for other reasons.
The period of one- party dominance ended in the early 1990s in Japan 
and in the early 2000s in Taiwan. Once the prime ministership in Japan 
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and the presidency in Taiwan became realistic goals, opposition parties had 
greater incentives to settle their differences and present a uniied front 
in the competition for the top spot and to make compromises necessary 
to bring new segments of voters into their coalition. From an executive- 
centric perspective, the key reforms in both Japan and Taiwan were those 
removing structural barriers impeding opposition competition for execu-
tive ofice. In Taiwan, this meant lifting martial law and legalizing new 
political parties (1987), mandating the retirement of the mainland repre-
sentatives (1991), and directly electing the entire legislature (1992) and the 
president (1996). In Japan, structural barriers lessened as U.S. opposition 
to JSP involvement in government relaxed, especially after the Cold War’s 
end. In both cases, the period of one- party dominance— with its associ-
ated and widespread belief that the opposition could never win power— 
was dramatically shattered by a somewhat unexpected rotation of power. 
Both of these rotations came about because of splits in the old dominant 
party, not because the opposition irst cobbled together a majority in the 
electorate. However, the triumph of the seven- party coalition in Japan in 
1993 and the DPP’s victory with a 39% plurality in the 2000 presidential 
election both made it clear that the executive was now in play.
The Japanese and Taiwanese responded to the onset of competitive pol-
itics for control of the executive quite differently. In Taiwan, the top prize, 
the presidency, could be won only by winning a plurality in the presidential 
election. Competition for the presidency thus drove the system toward two 
main candidates who, in turn, had strong incentives to organize legislators 
behind their candidacies.
Theoretically, politicians may take some time to adapt to the coordi-
nating incentives of plurality elections. Indeed, the recognition that the 
irst two parties to establish themselves as viable routes to the presidency 
will likely be permanent features of the electoral landscape can raise the 
initial stakes and prevent coordination in the short run, as suggested by 
Fillipov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova (1999). The best example of this on the 
Taiwanese scene is the formation of the People First Party after the 2000 
election. After running a rebel campaign in 2000, thereby throwing the 
presidency to the DPP, James Soong found it easier to form a new party 
and contest the leadership of the Blue camp9 from outside, than to try to 
return to the KMT fold and secure its nomination. In the event, Soong 
was not able to establish himself as the consensus candidate and ended up 
accepting the second spot on a joint ticket in 2004. A merger of the two 
parties has been a continual possibility, especially after it became clear the 
People First Party would not displace the KMT as leader of the Blue camp 
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(Fell 2008). A somewhat different hiccup on the way toward bipartism was 
the Taiwan Solidarity Union, formed by former president Lee Teng- hui for 
the explicit purpose of leading his followers from the Blue camp into the 
Green camp (Wu 2002).
All told, then, the emergence of plurality competition for the presi-
dency was the main engine driving a bipolarization of politics into a Blue 
camp/Green camp format with echoes of the French quadrille bipolaire. 
The SNTV system for legislative elections provided space for multiple 
parties to survive within each camp. After the change to MMM, this space 
for small parties shrank dramatically, and the party system quickly reduced 
to the two presidential contestants.
In Japan, things were different. Because the prime minister was elected 
indirectly, by the Diet, there were two viable routes to winning the prime 
ministership and other ministerial positions. One was to organize a large 
enough party (or coalition) to win a parliamentary majority at the legisla-
tive elections and then divide the ministerial portfolios among the victors. 
Call this the electoral strategy. A second option was to win as many seats as 
possible and then, if no other party won a majority, bargain one’s way into 
ofice after the election. Call this the postelectoral strategy.
At this point, one can see why the emergence of close competition for 
the top executive position in Japan might not lead to bipartism in the Diet. 
Indirect election of a cabinet can be like electing a plural executive (M 
seats) using a two- stage electoral process. To the extent this analogy holds, 
one expects up to M+1 viable competitors. To put the point another way, 
if enough competitors for the prime ministership (and other executive 
ofices) pursue a postelectoral strategy, then multiple parties can compete 
in the legislative elections, leaving the inal selection to legislative bargain-
ing. It is only if enough competitors for executive ofice opt for an electoral 
strategy that one expects a reduction in the number of parties (or the emer-
gence of preelection alliances, on which see Carroll and Cox 2007).
By this account, the emergence of real competition for the top execu-
tive post(s), rather than electoral reforms, drove the evolution of the party 
system in both Japan and Taiwan. The responses differed because direct 
election of a powerful president demanded an electoral strategy, whereas 
indirect election of a relatively less powerful prime minister allowed a mix-
ture of electoral and postelectoral strategies.
Factions
What accounts for the various changes or lack of changes in the parties’ 
faction systems? An executive- centric explanation stresses the number of 
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important posts at stake. With a directly elected, nondivisible prize such as 
the presidency, competitors tended to divide into two factions. Where the 
prize was divisible, as with cabinet posts, it was not so important to aggre-
gate into just two big factions. Multiple factions could survive by bargain-
ing for a share of cabinet positions.
An executive- centric perspective makes the persistence of multiple 
LDP factions more understandable. Most accounts of Japanese factions 
cite the electoral system as one reason for the factions’ existence, but also 
stress the importance of bargaining over cabinet positions. Indeed, since 
the 1950s, the LDP’s seniority system has ensured that cabinet positions 
are distributed more or less proportionally among the different factions. 
The factions have also fought for their fair share of other senior posts. 
While the electoral system changed, the parliamentary system and the 
number of important cabinet posts available did not. Since the number of 
cabinet posts is quite high, Japan’s system could theoretically support even 
more factions. In fact, Yoshiaki Kobayashi and Hiroki Tsukiyama (chapter 
3) suggest that the emergence of the four newer LDP factions is due, at 
least in part, to the prime minister’s preference to give important posts to 
smaller rival factions.
KMT factionalism also makes much more sense from an executive- 
centric perspective. All three periods of heightened factionalism at the 
national level were struggles over the presidency. In the latter two, the 
question was which faction would represent the KMT in the presidential 
elections of 2000 and 2008. In the irst case, the question was whether the 
president or the premier would dominate politics in the new democratic 
system. Likewise, local factionalism was based on competition over execu-
tive power. County executives have been directly elected since the 1950s, 
and many local factions can trace their history back to those irst elections. 
Almost all accounts of KMT local factions stress winning the county gov-
ernment and controlling its resources as the most important goal. Winning 
legislative or county assembly seats in SNTV elections is decidedly less 
important.
The shifts in the number of DPP factions require a more complex 
explanation. Before 2000, DPP politicians focused on winning seats in the 
legislature, and a legislature- centric explanation is quite useful. In the late 
1980s and early 1990s, with only a small number of seats open to elec-
tions and not much support in the electorate, the DPP often could only 
nominate one candidates and it had two main factions, a more radical 
New Tide faction and a more moderate Formosa faction. As the number 
of seats up for election increased and the party’s popularity grew in the 
1990s, the DPP nominated more candidates per district. At the same time, 
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two new factions, the Welfare Alliance and the Justice Alliance, arose. In 
2000, Chen Shui- bian won the presidency and the faction system changed 
dramatically. The Formosa faction disintegrated, Chen’s Justice Alliance 
grew dramatically, and the Justice Alliance and New Tide faction forged a 
coalition, creating a clear distinction between those in power and those out 
of power. As Chen’s two terms in ofice neared an end, the faction system 
changed once again, moving away from the nascent bifactional system. The 
DPP formally dissolved its factions in 2006, allowing the main presiden-
tial contenders an opportunity to build new coalitions around themselves. 
However, the DPP has not seen the emergence of a pure bifactional sys-
tem; in addition to the factions built to support President Chen and three 
presidential aspirants, one old faction survived and several smaller ones 
formed. The other factions seem to be operating on the legislature- centric 
model rather than focusing on winning the presidential nomination. They 
organize primarily to win posts in SNTV elections, such as those for the 
legislative party list, city councils, or the DPP’s Central Executive Com-
mittee, and they trade support across district lines to win nominations in 
single- seat elections, such as those for local mayors or seats in the legisla-
tive nominal tier. Thus, DPP factions are currently organized around a 
mixture of executive- centric and legislature- centric logics.
Combining the legislature- centric and executive- centric perspectives 
also provides insight toward another interesting question, why factions 
vary so much in their institutionalization. When factions are mainly vehi-
cles to place their paramount leader in high executive ofice, they can be 
rather kaleidoscopic, rising and falling rapidly with their leaders’ fortunes. 
In contrast, when factions become organizations to provide nomination 
and election assistance to all their legislative members, as well as helping 
them move up a lengthy hierarchy of internal posts, then they will be much 
more stable and institutionalized.
Japanese and Taiwanese factions it this argument quite well. LDP fac-
tions help a legislator advance through every step of his or her career, and 
LDP factions are famously highly institutionalized. The main purpose of 
KMT factions has been to ill the top executive ofice, and KMT factions 
have been more loosely organized. The national factions faded away as soon 
as the contest over the presidency was resolved. Some local factions, such 
as the Taichung factions examined in chapter 4, have had long life spans, 
yet even they are informally organized. Other local factions are much more 
ephemeral and seemingly reorganize whenever a new person is elected 
into the top local ofice. Indeed, the in- power faction in many townships 
is referred to simply as the “town hall faction,” and it is often opposed by 
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“the farmers’ association faction.” The DPP has experienced both sides of 
the spectrum. In the 1990s, when factions were primarily focused on win-
ning seats in the legislature and controlling party posts, DPP factions were 
formally organized and quite stable. When the presidency came into play, 
the factions were formally abolished, factional afiliations became far more 
ambiguous, and factional activities become far less rigidly organized.
Dual Candidacy
An executive- centric perspective may also help us understand why Japan 
allowed dual candidacy while Taiwan did not.
The LDP’s factions had famously resisted electoral reform for decades. 
When they could no longer block reform, they still perceived multiple 
executive prizes for which they might compete. The current occupants of 
these plum posts faced a choice between adopting intraparty rules allowing 
dual nomination or not.
Allowing dual candidacy (and operating them in the way the LDP did) 
improved the liquidity of the market in which the factional chiefs bar-
gained for LDP nominations for their followers. Without dual candidacy, 
the nominations that the factions could trade came in four basic denomina-
tions, ordered from most to least valuable: safe slots on the party list; safe 
districts; marginal slots on the party list; and marginal districts. Allowing 
dual candidacy created a ifth denomination, less valuable than any of the 
others: a marginal zombie slot.10 This allowed iner trades among the fac-
tions, helping them avoid bargaining failures (which would take the form 
of multiple conservative candidates in the SMDs). It is not surprising that 
the LDP chose to implement party rules that allowed zombies, given that 
the Japanese factions had long experience in bargaining over the LDP 
nomination under the SNTV system; that the array of executive ofices 
for which they competed had not changed; and that the cost of bargaining 
failure was higher under the new electoral system.
In contrast to Japan, Taiwan had a much simpler bargaining context 
and did not adopt dual candidacy. When there was one preeminent prize, 
the presidency, that was reasonably attainable, Taiwanese parties tended to 
have two main factions or coalitions vying for that position. These factions 
had less need to create a small- denomination coin (zombie slots) in order 
to ensure that their bargaining over legislative nominations did not break 
down, simply because the bargain between two was simpler than the bar-
gain between many. Moreover, the consequence of bargaining failure was 
less severe. Because the presidency was directly elected, losing a seat in the 
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legislature due to a nomination squabble would not immediately translate 
into a lower probability of winning the chief executive position, as it would 
in parliamentary Japan.
Structure of the Volume
The remainder of this volume will explore and develop the themes laid out 
in this introduction, starting from a narrow focus and moving outward. 
Part I compares the experiences of Japan and Taiwan. The irst four chap-
ters expand directly on the sketches of the party and faction systems laid 
out in the introduction. The next three chapters move to other aspects of 
the political systems in the two countries to show that many other aspects 
of politics can also be fruitfully explored by considering both a legislature- 
centric and executive- centric perspective. Part II moves beyond Japan and 
Taiwan to other countries that have mixed- member electoral systems. In 
countries as diverse as Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Bolivia, 
and Russia, the way the executive is elected has reverberations throughout 
the political system, causing the mixed- member systems to operate quite 
differently in different countries.
Chapter 1 lays out a concrete foundation for all the subsequent chap-
ters. After describing the electoral rules in Taiwan and Japan in detail, Chi 
Huang, Ming- Feng Kuo, and Hans Stockton present the initial puzzle— 
that following electoral reform, the number of parties decreased gradu-
ally in Japan but very quickly in Taiwan. The authors then explore the 
degree to which this difference can be explained by the small variations 
in the electoral rules in the two countries, arguing that electoral rules can 
only account for part of the difference. Methodologically, Huang, Kuo, 
and Stockton present their argument in the framework of a most similar 
systems design and an interrupted time series with electoral reform as the 
interrupting event. This approach is adopted throughout part I of this vol-
ume, though it is implicit rather than explicit in the other chapters.
Chapter 2 takes up the unresolved puzzle from chapter 1. Since electoral 
rules cannot fully explain the numbers of parties, Jih- wen Lin examines the 
impact of the constitutional rules. Lin argues that Japan’s parliamentary 
system provides opportunities for smaller parties to exercise inluence over 
cabinet portfolios. In contrast, since cabinet positions in Taiwan’s semi-
presidential system are determined by the president, there is little incentive 
for politicians to split from the two big parties. Taken together, the irst 
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two chapters provide a fuller explanation for the different party systems in 
Taiwan and Japan after electoral reform.
Chapters 3 and 4 investigate changes in the faction systems in Japan 
and Taiwan. Following electoral reform in Japan, many analysts expected 
the LDP’s factions to wither away and viewed their persistence as a bit of 
a puzzle. The most common explanation is that factions have retained an 
important role in allotting cabinet and party posts. Koshiaki Kobayashi and 
Hiroki Tsukiyama build on this notion by examining how the LDP party 
president has leveraged his institutional power to expand the inluence of 
his own faction. Especially when the LDP president is personally popular, 
he has given his own faction a disproportionate share of nominations and 
posts. However, other factions remain viable because the prime minister 
still needs their support in parliamentary conidence votes. In Chapter 4, 
Nathan F. Batto and Hsin- ta Huang discuss the limited impact electoral 
reform has had on the KMT’s and DPP’s internal factions. For both par-
ties, competition over executive posts and the continuing use of SNTV in 
other elections has been more important to the faction systems than the 
adoption of MMM in legislative elections.
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 move beyond a narrow focus on the numbers of 
competitors to look more broadly at how parties, candidates, and voters 
have adapted to the new electoral systems. In chapter 5, Eric Chen- hua 
Yu, Kaori Shoji, and Nathan F. Batto examine candidate selection. In both 
Taiwan and Japan, parties have responded to the new electoral system 
by adapting new methods for identifying and nominating candidates. In 
Taiwan, polling primaries have become the default system for both major 
parties, while Japanese parties have increasingly turned to the kobo (public 
recruitment) system. Both of these institutions can be seen as attempts to 
select a candidate capable of appealing to pluralities or even majorities of 
voters in the district. Chapter 6 investigates trends in campaign strategies 
under the new electoral regimes. Kuniaki Nemoto and Chia- hung Tsai 
argue that the new electoral system has led to increasingly party- centered 
campaign strategies. Parties have increasingly used list nominations and 
cabinet positions strategically to try to enhance party popularity and fur-
ther broad party goals. They have also reacted to the new system by form-
ing preelectoral coalitions. However, the different institutional rules have 
affected the extent to which parties in Japan and Taiwan have adopted 
these new strategies. Chapter 7 looks at split- ticket voting. T. Y. Wang, 
Chang- chih Lin, and Yi- ching Hsiao argue that split- ticket voting takes 
place mostly within, rather than across, the two big camps. Supporters of 
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larger and smaller parties face quite different strategic contexts. In particu-
lar, smaller parties have a strong incentive to educate their supporters on 
the different ways in which votes are counted in the two tiers, and this is 
relected in patterns of split- ticket voting.
Part II turns outward. While the theoretical logic presented in this intro-
duction is grounded in the concrete realities of Japan and Taiwan, much of it 
can easily be transplanted to other contexts. In chapter 8, Hicken examines 
how the number of parties evolved in two Southeast Asian countries that 
have adopted MMM, Thailand and the Philippines. At irst glance, these 
might appear to be counter- examples, since the presidential Philippines 
retains a fragmented party system while parliamentary Thailand has moved 
to a two- party system. However, Allen Hicken argues that these develop-
ments are, in fact, quite compatible with the logic of executive competi-
tion. In Thailand, reforms have produced highly nationalized politics and 
a dominant prime minister who has little need to compromise with other 
parties or minority factions within his party. In effect, what we have termed 
the postelectoral strategy was simply not viable in Thailand, and the result 
was, predictably, a two- party system. In the Philippines, Hicken argues 
that there are systemic disincentives for presidential hopefuls to engage in 
party- building. This results in a fragmented ield in presidential elections, 
which, in turn, inlates the number of parties in the legislature. In chapter 
9, Matthew S. Shugart and Alexander C. Tan move farther aield, looking 
at the mushrooming number of parties in New Zealand. Once considered 
the quintessential example of Westminster- style parliamentary democracy, 
New Zealand now has a quite fragmented party system, with as many as 
eight parties winning seats in parliament. Shugart and Tan argue that this 
fragmentation is due to both the permissive MMP electoral rules and the 
proitability of postelection strategies. The fragmentation has precluded 
majority party governments, and small parties have consistently been able 
to gain access to the cabinet. The result is a party system with two big par-
ties and many small parties. In chapter 10, Nathan A. Batto, Henry F. Kim, 
and Natalia Matukhno look at how presidential candidates affect voting in 
legislative elections in Bolivia and Russia, two countries very dissimilar to 
each other as well as to Taiwan and Japan. Voters in Bolivia and Russia have 
the option to vote “blank” or “against all,” an option that is exercised far 
more often in the nominal tier than in the list tier. Many parties in these 
two countries are personal vehicles for presidential candidates and have 
dificulty ielding a full roster of credible district candidates. While voters 
might vote for the party list to support the presidential candidate, they are 
less likely to see connections between the larger party and the nominal 
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tier candidate, especially in inchoate parties. That is, they may not vote 
for the nominal tier candidate from their favorite presidential candidate’s 
party, even if they are not attracted to any other district candidate. In fact, 
blank voting in the nominal tier is more common where inchoate parties 
are more popular.
Finally, Chi Huang’s conclusion brings the focus squarely back to the 
interactions between the constitutional system and the electoral system. 
In light of the theoretical and empirical lessons of this volume, Huang 
reminds us that similar institutions embedded within different concrete 
contexts can produce very different outcomes.
n o t e S
 1. Data are from the International IDEA website. http://www.idea.int/esd/ 
(accessed January 29, 2014).
 2. As is the standard practice, we use Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) index to 
operationalize our conceptual variable, coordination. We acknowledge that this 
index does not always accurately measure the degree of coordination in the sys-
tem. For example, a value of roughly two can be obtained with two parties of .51 
and .49 but also with three parties of size .66, .17, and .17. Several authors, such as 
Dunleavy and Boucek (2003) and Gaines and Taagepera (2013), have proposed new 
measures to address this deiciency. Nonetheless, the Laakso and Taagepera index 
has the advantages of simplicity and familiarity to most readers, so we continue to 
employ it while waiting for a consensus to emerge on a new standard.
 3. For example, Duverger considers factions to simply be the product of how 
much internal diversity a party allowed its members (1954). Rose suggests that fac-
tions must be organized and stable over time (1964). Sartori proposes that factions 
be classiied on four dimensions, including organization, motivation, ideology, and 
their position on the Left- Right spectrum (1976). The International Comparative 
Political Parties project, led by Kenneth Janda, operationalized factions by measur-
ing legislative cohesion, ideology, issues, leadership, strategy and tactics, and party 
purges (Janda 1993). For a review of different conceptualizations of factions, see 
Boucek (2009).
 4. In privileging this subset, we follow in the tradition of V. O. Key, who consid-
ers a faction to be any combination of actors who support a particular candidate 
(1984 [1949]).
 5. Factions can also play a role in dividing the vote equally among a party’s sev-
eral candidates in multimember districts (see McCubbins and Rosenbluth 1995).
 6. The Japanese literature pays less attention to the JSP factions but tends to 
view them also as products of the electoral incentives inherent in SNTV.
 7. These pressures might be tempered somewhat by the list tier. Smaller fac-
tions might survive by contesting list seats, though the relatively small list tiers in 
Japan and Taiwan limit the attractiveness of this survival strategy.
 8. On the KMT’s local factions, see Jacobs 2008; Rigger 1999, chap. 4; Chen 
1996; Bosco 1992; and chapter 4, this volume.
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 9. The Blue camp is a loose coalition of pro- uniication parties, including 
the KMT, the PFP, and the New Party. The Green camp is a coalition of pro- 
independence parties, including the DPP and the TSU.
 10. The Japanese media labeled dual candidates who lose in the district race but 
win a list seat as “zombies,” since they have been killed in one tier but brought back 
to life in the other.
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the Consequences of MMM  
on Party Systems
Chi Huang, Ming- Feng Kuo, and Hans Stockton
Electoral systems determine how votes cast in an election are translated 
into seats in the legislature, and thus to a large extent determine who 
wins and who loses in the political arena. The past two decades has seen 
a striking increase in the prevalence of mixed- member electoral systems. 
By combining the advantages of plurality rule and proportional represen-
tation, these mixed systems attempt to strike a balance between the two. 
The intended and unintended consequences of such hybrid efforts have 
attracted considerable attention from scholars (e.g., Jou 2009; Ferrara 
2004; Golder 2005; Huang 2011; Huang and Wang 2014; Huang, Wang, 
and Kuo 2008; Kostadinova 2002; Kohno 1997; Kuo, Huang, and Wang 
2012; Lin 2008; Massicotte and Blais 1999; Moser and Scheiner 2004, 
2012; Nishikawa and Herron 2004; Norris 2004; Reed 1999). Since the 
1990s, democratic countries all over the world, as diverse as Italy, Scotland, 
Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela, Russia, Albania, Hungary, Georgia, Lithuania, 
and New Zealand, have adopted mixed- member electoral systems. This is 
also true for many Asian countries, including Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Thai-
land, and the Philippines.
Despite their considerable differences in forms of government and 
political culture, congruent patterns in the new electoral systems are evi-
dent across the Asian democracies. Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Thailand and the 
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Philippines all opted for mixed- member majoritarian (MMM) variants and 
all of them chose to weight the system heavily in favor of the majoritarian 
element and against the PR list (Reilly 2006, 2007).
This chapter examines legislative elections in two Asian democracies, 
Taiwan and Japan, in order to answer a basic research question: why these 
two countries, having switched from single nontransferable vote (SNTV) 
to similar new MMM systems, displayed such divergent speeds and degrees 
of reaching theoretically expected political consequences. Speciically, we 
examine the change in party systems from multiparty to two- party systems. 
After electoral reform, Japan saw a gradual evolution from a multiparty to 
a two- party system over several election cycles, while the party system in 
Taiwan changed immediately and dramatically in the irst postreform elec-
tion (Huang 2011).
Japan and Taiwan may constitute a no less comparable pair of subjects 
than Giannetti and Grofman’s (2011) choice of Italy and Japan. A com-
parative study of these two East Asian countries, while “controlling” for 
similarities, can shed some light on (1) the differential effects resulting 
from differing constitutional structure, and (2) how seemingly “minor” 
differences in electoral rules can disproportionately inluence political 
consequences (see table 1.1 for a summary of electoral rules in Japan and 
Taiwan). We therefore adopt a quasi- experimental design by treating Japan 
and Taiwan as two nonequivalent but similar countries sharing the same 
sequence of electoral system change yet at different time periods a decade 
apart. When Japan experiences the change in 1996 Taiwan serves as a con-
trol, and when Taiwan later experiences the change in 2008 Japan serves 
as the control. This design allows us not only to evaluate the speed and 
degree of the effects of electoral reform but to isolate potential causes of 
such effects as well.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into ive sections. The irst 
section briely describes the historical context of the formation of major 
parties in Japan and Taiwan, explains why the SNTV system helped to 
sustain the one- party dominant system, and summarizes other negative 
political consequences under SNTV. The second section traces the goals of 
electoral reform from SNTV to MMM systems in Japan and Taiwan. We 
then compare the rules of MMM systems in Japan and Taiwan by focus-
ing on some subtle differences whose political consequences deserve closer 
examination. The third section presents detailed comparative analyses of 
these two countries with aggregate- level data, and furthermore we employ 
a piecewise regression of “interrupted time- series with switching replica-
tions” quasi- experimental design to analyze their differences. The fourth 
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section pinpoints some differences in similar electoral rules that partially 
solve the puzzle. The inal section concludes that a complete solution 
requires a more general theory of electoral systems imbedded within con-
stitutional structures, that is, the executive- centric theory that takes into 
account the political payoffs of the executive ofices and the degree of elite 
coordination required to capture the executive ofices.
Party Politics under SntV in Japan and taiwan
The evolutions of party systems in Japan and Taiwan have mirrored each 
other to a remarkable extent. Over time, these nascent democracies, each 
operating under dominant party arrangements, had transitioned into quite 
vibrant, multiparty systems. This was reversed as a consequence of elec-
toral revisions that then led to the emergence of a two- party system under 
current circumstances. In Taiwan, the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, 
KMT) has retained uninterrupted control of the country’s legislature since 
the transition, although vacillating from single- party majority to majority 
in coalition and back to single- party majority. Japan’s Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) experienced similar vacillation, albeit with a short interrup-
tion after 1993 and again between 2009 and 2012.
The LDP emerged in Japan in 1955 after the merger of two conserva-
tive parties (the Liberals and the Democrats) that shared support among 
business interests and rural areas. The LDP dominated government for 
tABLE 1.1. Electoral rules in Japan and taiwan before and after Electoral reform
 Japan Taiwan
before after before after
Total seats 511 500a 225 113
SNTV seats 511 176 6b
 Number of districts 129 31 2
 Average seats per district 4.0 5.7 3.0
SMD seats 300 73
Party list seats 200a 49 34
 Number of lists 11 2 1
 Average seats per list 18.2a 24.5 34.0
Legal threshold for list none 5% 5%
Dual candidacy allowed? yes no no
Best loser provision?  yes no no
aIn 2000 and subsequent elections, the number of list tier seats and total seats were reduced to 180 and 
480, respectively. The average number of seats per list declined to 16.4.
bReserved for aboriginals.
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38 years until a stunning loss to a coalition of “clean government” parties 
in 1993 (Reed and Shimizu 2009, 5). The LDP quickly returned to power 
in 1996, but not until after the electoral reforms discussed in this chap-
ter were pushed through. Despite the existence of robust opposition par-
ties, such as the Japan Socialist Party, opposition parties were never quite 
strong enough to challenge the LDP’s dominance. This party arrangement 
is commonly known as the 1955 System. Given the LDP’s command of 
approximately two- thirds of the Diet seats from one election to the next, 
this 1955 System is also referred to as a One- and- a- Half Party System 
(Flanagan et al. 1991, 5; Scheiner 2006, 37).1
Founded on the mainland in 1919, the KMT has matured during two 
distinct periods of time. The KMT was the ruling party of the Republic of 
China on the mainland for most of the period from 1919 to 1949. Since 
1949, the KMT’s jurisdiction has been limited to Taiwan and its surround-
ing islands. Competitive party politics emerged after 1986, the transition 
to full democracy was completed in the early 1990s, and the longtime 
opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) even won the presidency 
in 2000 and 2004. However, the KMT has retained continuous control 
of Taiwan’s legislative branch. In the early part of the democratic era, the 
KMT retained a degree of dominance similar to that of the LDP. After 
2001, splinter parties forced the KMT into coalition arrangements, but the 
party returned to a dominant status in the irst postreform election of 2008 
(see, for example, Stockton 2010).
Both countries employed a SNTV electoral system for their national 
legislatures. In SNTV, each district has one or more seats and each voter 
can cast only one ballot for one speciic candidate. There is no provision 
for preference rankings, so if a voter supports a candidate who does not 
win, the vote cannot be transferred to a second- favorite candidate. Simi-
larly, if a candidate wins more votes than she needs, her excess votes cannot 
be transferred to other candidates.
Japan’s SNTV system was fairly straightforward. In 1993, the last elec-
tion before reform, Japan elected 511 seats from 129 districts, an average 
of 3.96 seats per district. Each district had between two and six seats, and 
the great majority had three, four, or ive seats.
Taiwan’s prereform system was more complex by comparison. In the 
2004 election, there were a total of 225 seats. Of these, 176 seats were 
elected in 31 SNTV districts, for an average district magnitude of 5.68 
seats per district.2 Several districts had only 1 seat, while the largest district 
had 13 seats. The median SNTV legislator was elected from a district with 
8 seats.
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In addition to the 176 SNTV seats, there were also 49 seats elected by 
closed list PR on two separate lists. The list designated for national party 
representatives had 41 seats, while the list designated for overseas repre-
sentatives had 8 seats. There was no separate party list ballot for the PR 
seats. Instead, all the votes for the party nominees running in the SNTV 
districts were summed to obtain each party’s national total. For all parties 
with at least 5% of the national vote, these totals were used to apportion 
seats on the two lists using a largest remainders formula. Since there was 
no second ballot for the party list seats, only 22% of the seats were elected 
through the party lists, and each vote mattered so much more in the local 
race than in the national party totals,3 campaigns focused almost entirely 
on the SNTV portion of the election.
As for processes of democratic transition, both Japan and Taiwan have 
experienced similar democratic development paths from a single dominant 
party system to a period of multiparty politics and then inally to a two- 
party system. Scholars have attributed one- party dominance as the reason 
for the implementation of SNTV electoral rules. Under SNTV, political 
parties must coordinate their supporters’ votes within constituencies in 
order to more evenly distribute votes across candidates. Without success-
ful coordination, weaker candidates will get too few votes while stronger 
copartisans will absorb too many votes. If effective, intraparty coordina-
tion can result in political parties gaining an overrepresentation bonus. 
Attempting to beneit from the bonus of seats, a rational political party 
will nominate a bare number of candidates in each constituency in the 
SNTV electoral system if they can overcome the problems of coordina-
tion of nomination and division of votes. Governing parties have a tremen-
dous advantage because they can use the resources of the state to overcome 
these coordination problems (Cox 1996, 1997; Cox and Niou 1994; Cox 
and Rosenbluth 1993, 1996; Patterson and Stockton 2010; Rochon 1981). 
Many studies have found that a key reason for prolonged periods of LDP 
dominance was the LDP’s ability to accomplish strategic nomination and 
vote coordination (Browne and Patterson 1999; Cox 1997; Horiuchi and 
Kohno 2004).4 If governing parties are expected to do well under SNTV, 
so are small parties. Small parties face much milder coordination problems 
since they often only nominate one candidate in any given district. With 
only one candidate, vote division is not a challenge (Taagepera and Shugart 
1989, 28). Under SNTV, there is electoral space for small parties, and this 
should lead to a multiparty system.
Several negative political consequences have been ascribed to SNTV. 
The vote share necessary to win a seat decreases as the number of seats 
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increases. For example, a candidate won a seat in a 16- seat district in Tai-
wan in 1992 with only 2.6% of the total vote. Since candidates can win with 
support from a small minority of voters, they can appeal to nonmedian 
constituencies. Thus, candidates often took more extreme and sensational 
positions and appealed to highly personalized and niche voters (Flanagan 
et al. 1991). Correspondingly, Reed (1994) and Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 
(1997) also found that Diet members in Japan under the SNTV system 
were preoccupied with district service and fund- raising at the expense 
of their work in the legislature. Furthermore, given that party members 
are competing for both nominations and seats, SNTV accentuates intra-
party competition, giving rise to factionalism and hampering interparty 
competition at the decisive election stage. In electoral campaigns, party 
platforms are of limited use since there are usually competing candidates 
running under the same party label. This means that campaigns are usually 
less focused on debates about national public policies. Instead, candidates 
have to emphasize personal qualities, such as local interests and social con-
nections, and they typically build extensive and costly personal organiza-
tions to mobilize voters. This localized, mobilization- based campaign style 
is much more expensive than one based on national debates over public 
policy, and the demand for funds inevitably leads to parties cozying up 
to corporations and systemic corruption (Cox 1997; Cox and Rosenbluth 
1993; Yu Wang 2011).
In summation, both Taiwan and Japan experienced numerous institu-
tional challenges such as fractional politics, extremism, intraparty competi-
tion, money politics, the ineficiency of parliament, and absence of power 
alternation during the development of democracy. Numerous studies 
traced these disadvantages to SNTV (Cox and Rosenbluth 1993; Cox and 
Thies 1998; Richardson 1988; Yeh- li Wang 2011). Because of continuous 
scandals and the ineficiency of parliament, subsequent electoral reform 
enjoyed widespread public support (Shiratori 1995; Yu Wang 2011).
Electoral reform and differences in the MMM Systems
Both Japan and Taiwan abandoned SNTV in favor of a new MMM sys-
tem. In both countries, proponents argued that electoral reform would 
produce a shift from the existing candidate- oriented campaign mode to 
policy- driven party politics and would ultimately improve government 
eficiency by encouraging alternations in government, such as in the adver-
sarial two- party systems prevalent in the United States and the United 
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Kingdom (Sakamoto 1999; Yeh- li Wang 2011). In the following section, we 
briely describe the electoral reform, introduce the new electoral systems 
in Japan and Taiwan, and summarize their similarities and differences. In 
both countries the electoral reforms were initiated by a coalition/minority 
government trying to push for changes for its own sake, but the governing 
parties were eventually forced to compromise with the former dominant 
party maneuvering to stage a comeback.
Although various electoral reform plans had been proposed for decades 
in Japan, it took defeat of the dominant LDP in the 1993 House of Rep-
resentatives (HR) election to realize the reform. The outbreak of a series 
of corruption scandals in campaign inances, especially the Recruit scandal 
involving the Noburo Takeshita administration and Sagawa Kyubin scan-
dal involving former LDP vice president Shin Kanemaru, paved the way 
for internal conlicts inside the LDP. Dissatisied factions splintered off 
from the LDP and formed new parties such as the New Party Sakigake and 
the Japan Renewal Party. After the 1993 HR election, Morihiro Hosakawa 
took ofice by forming an eight- party anti- LDP coalition. The coalition 
government’s bill of electoral reform passed the HR and yet was rejected by 
the House of Councillors in late 1993. Hosakawa chose to negotiate with 
the LDP and abandoned the coalition plan’s single national PR constitu-
ency by establishing eleven regional constituencies, a compromise with the 
LDP’s prefectural PR constituencies. Finally, in January 1994 the Japanese 
Diet passed the electoral law reform bills, abolishing the old SNTV system 
and adopting a new MMM system. This episode is recounted in detail by 
Curtis (1999) and Reed and Thies (2001).
The 1994 electoral reform in Japan and its irst implementation in 1996 
sent a shockwave through neighboring Taiwan where the SNTV system 
had also been blamed for intraparty competition, factionalism, and money 
politics (see, for example, Cox 1996; Cox and Niou 1994). In the late 1996 
National Development Meeting summoned by President Lee Teng- hui of 
the KMT, a consensus was reached to replace SNTV with a mixed- member 
system. However, a proposed constitutional amendment about electoral 
reform attempt failed in 1997 because the then- ruling KMT insisted on 
a Japanese- style MMM system while the then- opposition DPP and New 
Party supported a German- style MMP system. Three years later, the DPP 
won the 2000 presidential election while the Pan- Blue parties maintained 
control of majority seats in the Legislative Yuan and dragged their feet 
over the DPP administration. After winning reelection in 2004, President 
Chen Shui- bian vigorously pushed for electoral reform by championing 
a proposal to “cut the assembly size in half” in order to “end the chaos in 
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the Legislative Yuan.” KMT chair Lien Chan, worrying about public sup-
port in the upcoming 2004 legislative election, threw his support behind 
the reform. The reform was unpopular with the rank- and- ile legislators 
in both major parties, since they were not happy about half the seats in 
the legislature being eliminated. However, both caucuses went along with 
their party leaders and reluctantly voted in late 2004 to send the constitu-
tional amendment proposal to the National Assembly for ratiication. The 
National Assembly ratiied the amendment in June 2005 with support from 
the two big parties. The smaller parties all opposed the reform, fearing a 
bleak future under the new MMM system.
Mixed- member systems have two tiers of seats. In the nominal tier, vot-
ers cast their votes for speciic candidates. Most commonly, the nominal 
tier is conducted using single- member districts (SMDs) and the plurality 
rule, though there are other variants.5 In the list tier, seats are apportioned 
proportionally by party lists. Most mixed- member systems, including both 
the Japanese and Taiwanese variants, have a separate ballot for the list tier. 
In other words, voters cast two votes, one in the nominal tier to elect a rep-
resentative from their local SMD, and one in the list tier to determine the 
apportionment of seats to the various party lists (Shugart and Wattenberg 
2001, 10– 13).6
The Japanese system adopted in 1994 had 500 seats. In the nominal tier, 
300 seats are elected by the plurality rule in SMDs. In the 1996 election, 
there were 200 seats in the list tier apportioned by the D’Hondt rule. In 
2000 and in subsequent elections, the number of list tier seats was reduced 
to 180. The new Taiwanese system has a total of 113 seats. The nominal 
tier includes 73 seats elected by plurality in SMDs and six seats in two 
national SNTV districts for Mountain and Plains Aborigines. The remain-
ing 34 seats comprise the list tier and are apportioned by a largest remain-
der rule. Note that in both Japan and Taiwan, the nominal tier seats far 
outnumber the list tier seats. As such, the incentives created by the nominal 
tier may also be more powerful than those created by the list tier. In par-
ticular, giving such weight to the nominal tier is damaging to smaller par-
ties, since smaller parties often ind winning a plurality in an SMD election 
to be a daunting challenge and rely heavily on seats from the list tier for 
survival. With fewer list tier seats available, smaller parties ind it harder 
to survive. Furthermore, the drastic reduction in average district magni-
tude undoubtedly increases the level of disproportionality and, usually, the 
effective number of parties.
Despite the apparent similarities of the Japanese and Taiwanese MMM 
systems, there are some subtle differences whose political consequences 
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deserve closer examination. Here we concentrate on dual candidacy, the 
best loser provision, the proportion of seats allocated to the list tier, the 
number of PR constituencies, and the electoral threshold.
The MMM system in Japan allows dual candidacy, in which a candidate 
is allowed to register simultaneously in both the nominal and list tiers. 
If the candidate wins the SMD, his name is removed from the party list, 
and all the other candidates on the list move up one rank. A double- listed 
candidate who loses the SMD can still win a list seat. In popular Japanese 
parlance, candidates who are killed in the SMD races but come back to 
life in the list tier are known as zombies. While double candidacy is com-
mon in mixed- member proportional systems around the world, in Japan 
this has proven to be one of the more controversial aspects of the MMM 
system. Table 1.2 shows that most parties in Japan other than the Clean 
Government Party (Komeito, CGP) and the Japan Communist Party take 
full advantage of this dual candidacy rule. In Taiwan, dual candidacy is not 
allowed, and seats are awarded by a strict closed- list rule.
Japan further allows lists to be ordered on the basis of which dually 
nominated candidates prove to be the “best losers” in the nominal tier 
SMDs. Parties present lists in which multiple nominees are ranked at the 
same position. These ties are broken by results in the SMDs. Speciically, 
they are ranked by dividing their own SMD vote by the winning candi-
date’s vote. Losers who get a higher percentage of the winning total are 
ranked higher on the list. As with dual candidacy, parties make heavy use 
of the best loser provision, and this practice is increasing (see Nemoto 
and Tsai, chapter 6, this volume). Dual candidacy and the best loser provi-
sion reduce conlict within the party by avoiding ights over rankings and 
provide an incentive for SMD candidates to win as many votes as possible 
even if they are unlikely to win the SMD seat (Reed and Thies 2001, 383).






















Party of Japan 
(TPJ)
1996 90.3 — 10.4 100.0 — — — 
2000 95.9 98.8 11.3 100.0 38.9 — — 
2003 92.1 98.9 10.3 100.0 0.0 — — 
2005 96.6 98.6 8.0 94.7 0.0 — — 
2009 93.1 98.9 39.5 100.0 0.0 — — 
2012 96.2 100.0 4.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 98.2
Source: Japanese National Diet Library WARP Database, http://warp.ndl.go.jp/search/; http://www.
soumu.go.jp/senkyo/senkyo_s/data/index.html. Asahi Shimbun Company, “Japan’s Lower House Election 
Results, 2012” (CD- ROM) (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Company, 2013).
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Japan allocates slightly more seats to the list tier than Taiwan. In Japan, 
37.5% of seats are in the list tier, while only 30.1% of seats are elected by 
party lists in Taiwan.
Taiwan has a single national list with 34 seats. To win any of these 
seats, parties must win at least 5% of the national list tier vote. This 5% 
legal threshold discriminates against smaller parties, since without a legal 
threshold parties winning at least 2.9% of the vote7 would be able to win a 
seat. In 2008, only the two big parties passed the threshold, and two small 
parties, the New Party (4.0%) and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) (3.5%), 
were denied seats because of the threshold. In 2012, the TSU (9.0%) and 
the People First Party (5.5%) joined the two major parties in passing the 
threshold, and no other party got as much as 2.9%.
In Japan, the 180 list tier seats are further distributed into 11 
regional blocks, ranging from 6 to 29 seats in each PR constituency 













Hokkaido Hokkaido 9 8 8 8.33
Tohoku Amori, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, 
Yamagata, Fukushima
16 14 14 5.00
Kita- Kanto Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, 
Saitama
21 20 20 3.57
Minami- 
Kanto
Chiba, Kanagawa, Yamanashi 23 21 22 3.26
Tokyo Tokyo 19 17 17 4.17
Hokuriku- 
Shinetsu
Niigata, Nagano, Toyama, 
Ishikawa, Fukui
13 11 11 6.25
Tokai Gifu, Aichi, Shizuoka, Mie 23 21 21 3.41
Kinki Wakayama, Nara, Kyoto, 
Osaka, Shiga, Hyogo
33 30 29 2.50
Chugoku Tottori, Shimane, Okayama, 
Hiroshima, Yamaguchi
13 11 11 6.25
Shikoku Kagawa, Tokushima, Ehime, 
Kochi
7 6 6 10.71
Kyushu Kagoshima, Fukuoka, 
Miyazaki, Saga, Ōita, 
Kumamoto, Nagasaki, 
Okinawa
23 21 21 3.41
 Total 200 180 180 4.31b
Source: “Proportional Representation Districts and Seats of Japanese Lower House,” Japanese Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Communications website: http://www.soumu.go.jp/senkyo/senkyo_s/news/senkyo/
shu_teisu/index.html. Senkyoho Kenkyukai (Election Law Study Community), ed. Senkyoho to Seiji shikinho 
tesatsu [The guide of Japanese electoral law and political funds control law]. Nagoya: Shinnippon- Hoki 
Publishing, 1995.
aAccording to Lijphart (1997, 74), given the district magnitude m, the effective threshold is .75/(m + 1).
bComputed based on the average number of seats: 16.4.
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(see table 1.3). Japan has no legal threshold, so the share of the list tier 
vote needed to win a seat is determined by the number of seats in each 
constituency.
After Electoral reform: differences in the Political 
Consequences between Japan and taiwan
The differences in constitutional structures and electoral rules discussed 
above appear to have divergent political consequences in Japan and Taiwan, 
and they deserve careful and detailed comparative analyses. In this section, 
we detect and compare the consequences using electoral data based on 
macro- level patterns of party competition. After exploring the patterns of 
each country’s party system formation, we advance a quasi- experimental 
research design referred to as a “switching replication” to test for any sub-
stantial impact of electoral reform.
Patterns of Party Competition
Researchers often return to Duverger’s classic arguments on electoral sys-
tems and their political consequences. According to Duverger (1959, 217), 
“the simple- majority single ballot system favors the two- party system.” He 
provides two factors to explain why a third party cannot survive in this 
electoral system. Duverger (1959, 224) argues that “the mechanical factor 
consists in the ‘under- representation’ of the third, i.e. the weakest party, its 
percentage of seats being inferior to its percentage of the poll.” The second 
factor is a more ambiguous one. Because supporters of a third party do 
not want to waste their votes, Duverger (1959, 226) argues that it is “their 
natural tendency to transfer their vote to the less evil of its two adversaries 
in order to prevent the success of the greater evil.” Duverger (1959, 205) 
thus asserted that single- member district plurality would tend to gener-
ate two- party competition, and he also proposed that PR systems would 
encourage multiparty competition.
Mixed- member electoral systems are characterized as hybrids of SMD 
and PR tiers. Since the primary feature of the MMM system adopted by 
Japan and Taiwan is the independent relationship between SMD and PR 
tiers, “the typical majoritarian boost received by a large party in the nomi-
nal tier is not likely to be wiped away by proportional allocation from the 
list tier” (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001, 13). Furthermore, the PR portion 
in Japan accounts for only 37.5% of the 480 total seats since 2000 and in 
Taiwan accounts for only 30.1% of the 113 total seats. It seems logical to 
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argue that the gravity force of Duverger’s law will exert pressure on small 
parties and thus push down the number of parties. Indeed macro- level data 
in tables 1.4 and 1.5 seem to conform to Duverger’s law and indicate that 
the impact of electoral reforms on party systems in the two countries is a 
movement toward two- party competition, albeit at different speeds.8
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 present the Laakso- Taagepera effective number of 
electoral parties (N
V
) and effective number of parliamentary parties (N
S
) 
from an SNTV to a MMM system for these two countries (Laakso and 
Taagepera 1979; Taagepera and Shugart 1989). According to Duverg-
er’s law, the number of parties in SMDs would shift toward two due to 
mechanical effects and strategic voting due to psychological effects. But 
Duverger’s hypothesis predicts that multiple parties remain in the PR tier 
of the system because voters have stronger incentives to vote sincerely. 
This is indeed what we see in table 1.4 for Japan’s HR elections over 
time. The effective number of electoral parties in the SMD tier (N
SMD
) 
luctuated between the irst two elections after the 1994 reform as Japan 























1996 3.86 4.28 2.93
2000 3.77 5.15 3.16
2003 2.97 3.42 2.59
2005 2.71 3.72 2.26
2009 2.64 3.66 2.10
2012  3.81 5.79 2.45
Source: Japanese National Diet Library WARP Database: http://
warp.ndl.go.jp/search/; Tokifumi Mizusaki and Mori Hiroki, Sousen-
kyu no tokuhyou bunseki: 1958– 2005 [Japanese general elections: 1958– 
2005] (Tokyo: Bokutakusha, 2007), 26– 27; Asahi Shimbun Company, 
“Japan’s Lower House Election Results, 2012” [CD- ROM] (Tokyo: 
Asahi Shimbun Company, 2013).
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went through a period of party realignment but then dropped sharply 
below 3.0 parties for the three elections in 2003, 2005, and 2009.9 The 
effective number of electoral parties in PR tier (N
PR
) has also declined 
over time, though it has consistently been higher than its SMD coun-
terpart and remained above 3.5 after the 2003 election. With more than 
62% of the HR seats allocated to the SMD tier, it is not surprising that 
the N
S
 dropped below the N
SMD
. In short, throughout the period from 
1996 to 2009 in Japan, partisan politics were largely focused on the con-
test between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the second largest 
party (e.g. the New Frontier Party in 1996 and the Democratic Party of 
Japan since 2000).
As Jou (2009, 2010) points out, during this decade, party competition in 
Japan’s SMD tier witnessed two distinct patterns: urban areas converging 
toward a two- party system while rural constituencies remaining dominated 
by the LDP (see also Yu Wang 2011). The landslide victory of the Demo-
cratic Party of Japan (DPJ) with 64% of the seats in the 2009 HR elec-
tion and the formation of the DPJ- centered coalition government appear 
to have ushered in a new era of government with the alternation of two 
major parties (Arase 2010; Krauss and Pekkanen 2011; Maeda 2010). The 
pendulum swinging back to the LDP with 61.3% of the total seats in the 
2012 HR election is further evidence of this trend. But it also seems that 
MMM can produce extreme one- party dominance and decimate opposi-
tion parties.
The data for Taiwan’s legislative elections are presented in table 1.5. 
These clearly indicate that there was an immediate and dramatic drop in 
all three indicators of the effective number of parties. Whereas the N
SNTV
 















2008 2.29 2.49 1.47
2012  2.32 3.03 1.97
Source: Data for 1992– 2008 elections results from Election Study 
Center, National Chengchi University, website: http://vote.nccu.
edu.tw/cec/vote4.asp?pass1=B; data for the 2012 election result from 
Taiwan’s Political Geography Information System (TPGIS) website: 
http://tpgis.nccu.edu.tw/MainPage/.
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in the 2004 SNTV elections had been 3.76, in 2008 N
SMD
 plunged to 2.29, 
just as Duverger’s Law suggests. Furthermore, the N
PR
 measure was a mere 
2.49. It took Japan a decade and a half and ive HR elections to evolve 
into a true two- party system, but this transformation was realized almost 
immediately in Taiwan. As in Japan, the dominance of the nominal tier led 
to a lower number of parliamentary parties than electoral parties. In 2008, 
the N
S
 was a mere 1.47, which is much closer to one- party dominance than 
one would expect in a democracy. Even with a much stronger performance 
by the DPP and after the People First Party split from the Pan- Blue coali-
tion and ran its own candidates in the 2012 legislative election, the N
S
 rose 
only slightly to 1.97 and N
SMD
 grew only to 2.32 and N
PR
 3.03, respectively.
Evaluating the Impact of Electoral Reform:  
A Quasi- Experimental Design
This study applies the logic of “most similar systems” design (MSSD) in 
the comparative politics tradition (Przeworski and Teune 1970) to the 
“interrupted time series” (ITS) quasi- experiment frequently used in the 
ields of policy evaluation (Campbell and Stanley 1963). Most similar sys-
tems design involves matching two cases that experience different out-
comes while appearing to be very similar in as many respects as possible 
except on key theoretical points. The goal of this design is to identify the 
difference that is responsible for contrasting outcomes. Those similarities 
between two cases can be considered relatively “controlled for” and thus 
ruled out as possible causes. The remaining differences between the two 
cases emerge as the candidates causing their divergent outcomes. MSSD 
thus facilitates causal inference.
Japan and Taiwan are selected following the logic of the most simi-
lar systems design. In other words, they are chosen for this study because 
they are relatively similar in many respects. Both are densely populated 
island countries along the Asian continent without rich natural resources 
and yet have built relatively healthy open economies with broadly distrib-
uted wealth. Both have Confucian and Buddhist cultural heritages as well. 
Although Japan is under a parliamentary system and Taiwan is under a 
semipresidential system, both countries otherwise have similar governing 
institutions led by a longtime dominant clientelistic political party and dis-
ciplined bureaucrats. Indeed, Taiwan was a Japanese colony for 50 years, 
and many of its institutional structures and behavioral habits can be traced 
directly to Japanese sources.
The ITS design, on the other hand, involves one experimental group 
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and repeated observations before and after an intervention (Shadish, Cook, 
and Campbell 2002, 175). The weakness of this single time series design 
is the threat of history to the internal validity of causality. That is, there 
is always the possibility that factors other than the event under investiga-
tion come to inluence the dependent variable at about the same time the 
intervention occurs.
If we can ind two nonequivalent but relatively similar countries, each 
of which has the same sequence of electoral system change yet at differ-
ent times, then a certain degree of control can still be achieved. That is, 
when one country experiences intervention the other serves as a control, 
and when the control nation later experiences the event the original treat-
ment case serves as the control (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2002, 192). 
Applying this “ITS with switching replications” design to this study, it can 
be diagrammed as:
O O O O O X O O O O O
— — — — — — — — — —  — 
O O O O O O O O X O O
where each O represents an observation of the dependent variable (i.e., 
N
S
), and X stands for the occurrence to the event (i.e., shift from SNTV 
to MMM system).
Figure 1.1 displays the evolution of the effective number of parliamen-
tary parties in Japan and Taiwan, respectively. In general, both countries 
experience a rising trend during the SNTV period and then witness a 
decline after adopting the MMM system. However, the decline is more 
abrupt and immediate in Taiwan than in Japan. In terms of a cross- country 
comparison, when Japan irst implemented the MMM system in 1996 and 
started to show a slow decline trend in N
S
, Taiwan showed no such change. 
Similarly, when Taiwan irst implemented the MMM system and experi-
enced a sharp decline in N
S
 in 2008, Japan’s N
S
 had already reached a steady 
state of nearly two. This switching pattern strengthens our conidence in 
making a causal inference from the impact of electoral system change.
Impact Analysis
Box and Tiao’s (1975) ITS analysis is often used to assess the impact of a 
discrete intervention on a social process (see, for example, Box, Jenkins, and 
Reinsel 2008; McCleary and Hay 1980). However, this method requires 
one to identify and estimate a noise model based on the preintervention 
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series as a benchmark for comparison with the entire series. Given the 
limitation of the frequency of legislative elections held in the past half cen-
tury and thus the number of observations available for this study, the ive 
(for Taiwan) to thirteen (for Japan) observations before electoral system 
changes occurred are obviously too few to apply Box and Tiao’s techniques. 
We therefore turn to the piecewise linear regression approach of ITS 
(Greene 2012; Lewis- Beck 1986; Marsh and Cormier 2002), which takes 
advantage of the entire series and is still able to assess the impact of events. 
The method is to regress the dependent variable upon independent vari-
ables representing a trend and events. Each event, in turn, is represented by 
a dummy variable (which captures the drop or jump in intercept change) 
and a postintervention time counter (which captures the slope change).
Based on the piecewise linear regression approach, the equation we use 
to evaluate the impact of shifting from the SNTV to MMM system in 





























fig. 1.1. effective number of parliamentary parties (N
S
): Japan and taiwan
(Note: years with “*” denote legislative yuan elections in taiwan, while years without “*” re-
fer to lower house elections in Japan; “**” denotes general elections held in both taiwan and 
Japan. data from Japanese national diet library warP database: http://warp.ndl.go.jp/search/; 
tokifumi Mizusaki and Mori hiroki, Sousenkyu no tokuhyou bunseki: 1958– 2005 [Japanese 
general elections: 1958– 2005], 26– 27 (tokyo: bokutakusha, 2007); yomiuri online: http://
www.yomiuri.co.jp/election/shugiin/2012/kaihyou/, accessed on March 28, 2013.)
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Y
t




 = a counter for time from 1 to the last observation
D
1t
 = a dummy variable indicating the implementation of the MMM 
system in Japan, that is, D
1t
 = 1 since year 1996
C
1t
 = a postintervention time counter scored 0 before 1996 and 1, 2, 
3 . . . for observations on and after 1996
D
2t
 = a dummy variable indicating the implementation of the MMM 
system in Taiwan, that is, D
2t
 = 1 since year 2008
C
2t
 = a postintervention time counter scored 0 before 2008 and 1, 2, 
3 . . . for observations on and after 2008.
The equation for assessing electoral system change in Taiwan is similar 
to the equation (1.1) for Japan except that its observations start from 1992 
when the island held its irst free and open Legislative Yuan elections and 
thus consists of only seven observations up to the 2012 election. Given this 
extremely short time series and thus small degree of freedom, statistical 
estimates serve only as a supplement to the visual inspection of igures. If 
our hypothesis is correct, that is, if electoral system change causes a gradual 
shift in the party system in Japan while leading to an immediate align-
ment in Taiwan, then we expect divergent patterns of impact in the two 
countries. That is, we expect no abrupt change in intercept D
1t
 but only a 
slow change in slope C
1t
 in Japan. On the other hand, we expect at least an 
abrupt change in intercept D
2t
 and perhaps also in slope C
2t
 in the case of 
Taiwan.
Statistical results for the N
S
 of Japan and Taiwan are presented in table 
1.6. They generally conirm the visual inspection of igure 1.1. For both 
countries, the evolution of the N
S
 changes only when each country shifts 
from the SNTV to the new MMM system. Furthermore, the general pat-
tern of change its our expectation. There is no signiicant change in slope 
since 1996 but only a slight decline in slope (C
1t
 = – 0.120) in the case of 
Japan. In contrast, there is an abrupt drop in level (D
2t
 = – 2.155) in the 
case of Taiwan in 2008,10 albeit no change in slope is detected perhaps 
due to the fact that only two elections have been held after the electoral 
reform. The ITS design uses Taiwan’s reform as a control for Japan and 
Japan’s reform as a control for Taiwan. In the Japan model, the variables for 
Taiwanese reform are not signiicantly different from zero, and a parallel 
result holds in the Taiwan model. This provides an added level of coni-
dence that the changes in the party systems were, in fact, due to the treat-
ment variable, electoral reform. Overall, what both igure 1.1 and table 
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1.6 show is a gradual shift from a multiparty system to a two- party system 
taking place over several elections after reform in Japan, but a sudden and 
abrupt shift in the irst postreform election in Taiwan.
Why different Speeds toward a two- Party System?
The differences between Japan and Taiwan discussed above pose an inter-
esting question. Why did it take Japan almost one and a half decades to 
gradually consolidate toward a two- party system and strategic voting pat-
tern (see Scheiner and Tronconi 2011, 102) while in Taiwan the impact of 
the new electoral system was immediate and extreme? To what extent are 
these different rates of change the result of different electoral rules, such 
as dual candidacy, the best loser provision, the number of party list con-
stituencies, the threshold for list constituencies, and the proportion of seats 
allocated to the nominal and list tiers? We speculate that all these elements 
contribute to the divergent results.
One reason why the number of electoral parties may not have declined 
as precipitously as expected has to do with contamination effects. A num-
ber of studies have noted that in mixed- member systems, in order to lift 
the PR votes, party elites may ield candidates in single- member districts to 
give the party label a human face, regardless of the chance of winning the 
tABLE 1.6. Impact of MMM on N
S
: Japan and taiwan





Coeficient (S.E.) Coeficient (S.E.)
Time Counter T
t
0.042*** (0.010) 0.057 (0.167)
Adopting MMM System in Japan
 (D
1t
 = 1 since 1996)
– 0.367 (0.440) – 0.230 (0.648)
Trend under MMM in Japan
 (C
1t
 time counter since 1996)
– 0.120† (0.056) 0.035 (0.187)
Adopting MMM System in Taiwan
 (D
2t
 = 1 since 2008)
– 0.400 (0.777) – 2.155# (0.707)
Trend under MMM in Taiwan
 (C
2t
 time counter since 2008)
0.195 (0.186) 0.033 (0.151)
Constant 1.978*** (0.202) 2.403 (0.488)
R2 0.651** 0.944
Adjusted R2 0.516 0.663
Number of observations 19 7
†p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
#|t| = 3.05 but is insigniicant (p > 0.1) due to too few observations and degrees of freedom in Taiwan.
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district seat. Electoral incentives in one tier thus “contaminate” those in 
the other tier, complicating the insights from Duvergerian laws (Cox and 
Schoppa 2002; Herron and Nishikawa 2001; Moser and Scheiner 2004). 
This might account for higher than expected N
V
. However, these extra 
candidates are assumed to be sure losers, and they should not affect N
S
. 
Moreover, contamination effects yield no insight into the differences in the 
evolution of the party system in Japan and Taiwan.
Taiwan’s list tier has a legal 5% threshold. In Japan, the average regional 
constituency has an implied threshold of 5.8%. This is marginally higher 
than in Taiwan, so one might conclude that the Japanese system is more 
unfriendly to small parties. However, because the number of seats on each 
regional list varies, so does the threshold. If we look at Lijphart’s (1994, 27; 
1997, 74) estimate for effective threshold,11 small parties in Japan have even 
more opportunities. In Shikoku, with only six seats, the effective threshold 
is 10.71% and is a very high barrier for small parties. In contrast, Kinki has 
29 seats, and small parties might not be intimidated at all by the relatively 
low 2.5% threshold since a party with 2.5% has a reasonable chance to 
win a seat. In fact, six out of the 11 regional constituencies have thresholds 
under 5% (see the last column of table 1.3). In short, there are opportuni-
ties for small parties to win list seats in the larger regions, and small parties 
in Japan can strategically concentrate their efforts on regions in which they 
have a reasonable chance of exceeding the threshold.
The differences in the thresholds imply that small parties should ind 
more opportunities to win list seats in Japan than in Taiwan. Unlike in Tai-
wan, they do not have to cross a relatively high 5% national threshold to 
survive. Instead, they can win one or two seats with a somewhat lower vote 
and build on this foundation in future elections. They can also concentrate 
their resources in the most favorable regions and ignore less promising 
areas. These opportunities are further enhanced by the fact that Japan allo-
cates a slightly higher percentage of seats to the list tier.
We suspect that dual candidacy and the best loser provision also help 
small parties survive in Japan. Candidates who “die gloriously” in their 
SMDs can be “revived” in the PR tier as “zombies” and thus have strong 
incentives to cultivate local connections and campaign hard in their SMDs. 
This hard work, in turn, can result in higher party votes in the list tier 
(though see Maeda 2008 for an opposing view). Kuo, Huang, and Wang 
(2012) analyzed Japanese House elections from 1996 to 2009 and found 
evidence that smaller parties such as the Social Democratic Party and los-
ing major parties such as the LDP in 2009 relied more on dual candi-
dacy’s lifting effects on PR votes. The Social Democratic Party did use 
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the dual candidacy strategy to improve their PR votes and furthermore to 
sustain their seats in parliament. In Taiwan, on the other hand, there is no 
mechanism for such interactions between SMD and PR ballots since no 
dual candidacy is allowed. Huang (2010) evaluated the effects of the TSU’s 
nomination of 13 district candidates on their PR vote shares in the 2008 
elections in Taiwan and indeed found no evidence of interaction between 
the SMD and PR tiers.
Neither Taiwan’s nor Japan’s electoral system is friendly to small par-
ties, but small parties have a better chance of survival in Japan’s system. Yet 
we suspect that these contrasting electoral rules cannot fully explain why 
small parties have fared so much better in Japan than in Taiwan. A more 
complete explanation requires consideration of differences in the constitu-
tional designs of each country, a topic Lin takes up in chapter 2 and others 
develop in the rest of this volume.
Concluding remarks
Institutions do matter, and even seemingly “minor” differences may pro-
duce signiicantly different outcomes. This chapter explores the effect 
on party systems of several such differences between Japan and Taiwan, 
including dual candidacy, the best loser provision, the proportion of seats 
allocated to the list tier, the number of PR constituencies, and the elec-
toral threshold. Whether and to what extent these differences produce the 
divergent consequences discussed above call for further careful compara-
tive studies and rigorous causal analyses.
Japan and Taiwan undertook similar electoral reforms from SNTV to 
MMM, and they both experienced a similar development from a multi-
party system to a two- party system. However, the speeds at which the party 
systems transformed after electoral reform varied signiicantly. We argue 
that the combination of some seemingly “minor” differences in electoral 
systems contributed to these divergent results by providing more oppor-
tunities for smaller parties to survive in Japan than in Taiwan. However, 
we do not argue that differences in the electoral rules can fully account 
for the larger numbers of parties in Japan. Electoral systems cannot be 
delinked from the wider constitutional arrangements in which they occur. 
As Lin argues in the next chapter, analyses of party system change are best 
served when we focus not only on changing rules but also on the constitu-
tional context in which they are embedded. Speciically, researchers should 
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keep both legislative seats and executive ofices in view while analyzing the 
effects of legislative electoral systems.
n o t e S
 1. In the 1955 System, the main debates on national policies between the ruling 
LDP and opposition parties were mainly based on the conservative- progressive 
political ideology spectrum. Their debate was as follows: (1) whether Japan should 
move toward becoming a capitalist or a socialist state; (2) whether or not the 
ninth statement of Japan’s constitution should be amended; (3) whether or not the 
U.S.- Japan Treaty (Ampou) alliance should be maintained; (4) in terms of defense, 
whether military forces in Japan should be enhanced or remain neutral (Yang 2002, 
65).
 2. In all, 168 representatives were elected from 29 geographically deined dis-
tricts. Another eight members were elected from two nationwide districts reserved 
for Plains Aborigines and Mountain Aborigines.
 3. Usually, 40,000 votes were suficient to elect a district candidate, whereas 
each seat on the national party representatives list needed about 200,000 votes.
 4. Some studies further indicates that in “1955 system,” because the LDP usu-
ally took two- thirds of the seats in the Diet, and the opposition parties could not 
cooperate with each other to challenge the LDP- dominant regime, the power 
alternation was only between the main factions inside the LDP, not alternation 
between parties (Reed 2003, 21).
 5. The prereform Taiwanese system was technically a MMM system since it 
had a nominal tier, with voters choosing speciic candidates in the SNTV tier, as 
well as a list tier. However, for the purpose of clarity, this volume will refer to the 
prereform system as an SNTV system. MMM will refer narrowly to the postreform 
systems in Japan and Taiwan with nominal tiers composed of SMDs.
 6. Mixed- member systems are commonly divided into two categories, mixed- 
member majoritarian (MMM) and mixed- member proportional (MMP). The criti-
cal factor is whether the two tiers are linked. In MMM, the tiers are not linked, so 
seats are determined independently in each tier. That is, if a party wins 50% of the 
party list votes, it wins 50% of the list tier seats, regardless of whether it won all, 
some, or none of the nominal tier seats. The plurality formula used in the nominal 
tier can lead to signiicant disproportionality, and the list tier in MMM systems 
merely mitigates rather than erases this disproportionality. In MMP systems, the 
two tiers are linked in order to produce a proportional outcome. Each party’s total 
seat share is determined by the list tier vote, and, depending on the number of seats 
it wins in the nominal tier, it is awarded the appropriate number of party list seats 
necessary to obtain a proportional share of seats in the overall chamber (Shugart 
and Wattenberg 2001, 13– 17).
 7. The theoretical threshold is 1/(m + 1).
 8. By “speeds” we mean the number of elections it takes to reach similar results.
 9. The N
SMD
 remained high (3.77) in Japan’s 2000 House election. This was 
partly because the coalition partnership of the LDP and CGP did not effectively 
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coordinate their nominations. Speciically, the LDP and CGP have formed a coali-
tion to nominate candidates to compete against non- LDP candidates in all elec-
tions since 2000. In most districts, CGP supporters were supposed to vote for an 
LDP candidate, and the LDP gave organizational votes to support CGP’s PR list 
candidates. But in the 2000 election, the coalition did not work very well, as the 
LDP and CGP simultaneously ielded SMD candidates in four districts. Since the 
2003 election, this problem has been overcome. See also Nemoto and Tsai, chapter 
6, this volume.
 10. With ive variables and only seven cases in the Taiwan model, even large 
t- values do not reach conventional levels of signiicance. In the following pages we 
adopt a rule of thumb of a t- ratio above 2 as a rough guideline for interpreting the 
case of Taiwan.
 11. The effective threshold is estimated as .75/(m + 1).
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tWo
the Consequences of Constitutional 
Systems on Party Systems
Jih- wen Lin
Is the Mixed- Member Majoritarian System 
Creating a two- Party System?
For the competitors of a legislative election, winning a seat is only the irst 
step toward sharing political power. How powers are distributed depends 
on the constitutional arrangement of executive- legislative relations, but 
studies on electoral systems are largely legislative- centric. An executive- 
centric theory of electoral systems plays an important role in illing this 
gap. Japan and Taiwan are perfect cases— they traveled a similar path of 
electoral reform but are distinguishable by constitutional systems. The fol-
lowing analysis explains why these two cases are worth comparing.
The irst reason is the similarity of Japan and Taiwan compared with the 
global pattern. From a comparative perspective, the Asian model deserves 
special attention. As pointed out by Reilly (2007a, 2007b), the Asian expe-
rience is characterized by a decrease in proportionality, while the trend in 
the rest of the world is just the opposite.1 If an increase in proportionality 
results from the fragmentation of the party system, the best justiication of 
the Asian model of electoral reform is the expectation of a more eficient 
and stable government. Indeed, the introduction of a majoritarian- leaning 
electoral system is likely to improve government stability as it will reduce 
the number of parties (Duverger 1964; Rae 1971; Lijphart and Grofman 
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1984). Another effect of a majoritarian- leaning electoral system is that it 
facilitates power turnover when an election is competitive: when only one 
winner is to be elected, a party gains no seats at all if it falls one vote short 
of the winning party. By creating a larger seat swing, a majoritarian- leaning 
system makes it easier for the voters to hold the ruling party accountable. 
Within the Asian model, Japan and Taiwan are good cases to compare.2 
Both countries are in East Asia and are embedded in a political culture 
that emphasizes personal connections; both traveled down a similar path of 
electoral reform and saw a decrease in the number of parties.
The second reason is their difference in executive- legislative rela-
tions. As the dependent variable, small parties play a more important role 
in Japan than in Taiwan, and the effective number of parties in Taiwan is 
decreasing faster than it is in Japan (Jou 2009). We thus have two cases of 
the “most similar system design” to compare. The question is how to link 
the party system to the constitutional system, the independent variable of 
this chapter.
As Huang, Kuo, and Stockton detail in chapter 1, small parties— those 
that ranked third or lower in legislative elections— have fared far better 
in Japan than in Taiwan. There are some differences in the Japanese and 
Taiwanese mixed- member majoritarian (MMM) systems, but Huang, Kuo, 
and Stockton conclude that these variations cannot fully account for the 
differences in the fates of small parties in the two systems.
This chapter argues that the differing constitutional systems, not the 
differing electoral systems, are the most important source of the contrast-
ing fates of small parties. If the electoral system determines the winning 
threshold of each electoral district, the rule of portfolio allocation speciied 
by the constitution affects the incentive for legislators elected in different 
constituencies to join a national political party. The major hypothesis of 
this chapter is that MMM does make it harder for weaker candidates to win 
in each district, but whether the winners across all districts are from two 
parties still depends on how the executive ofices are distributed. Given 
Japan’s parliamentary system, prime ministers are elected by the Diet. Leg-
islators can thus bargain with the prime minister by threatening to defect 
from the ruling party— splinter parties are sometimes formed in these 
circumstances. In contrast, Taiwan’s executive ofices are allocated by the 
president without legislative participation, giving legislators elected in dif-
ferent districts a strong motivation to stay in the national parties. Another 
complication is the legislative process: while Taiwan has a unicameral leg-
islature, the Diet of Japan includes the House of Representatives (HR) and 
the House of Councillors (HC), with the latter mandated to approve the 
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policy bills proposed by the prime minister. It has been pointed out that 
bicameralism— especially using different formulas to elect the delegates of 
the two chambers— strengthens the leverage of small parties because inter-
cameral agreement is needed to adopt a bill (Hammond and Miller 1987; 
Riker 1992; Brennan and Hamlin 1992; Tsebelis and Money 1997; Heller 
2001; Druckman and Thies 2002). The inluence of Taiwan’s small parties 
on policy making is limited because its unicameral legislature does not give 
them the chance to reject government bills.
How the head of state, the head of government, and the legislature 
interact with each other in Taiwan and Japan is presented in table 2.1. 
It is clear that the major difference between the two constitutional sys-
tems is the rule of portfolio allocation: Taiwan’s premier and ministers are 
appointed by the president, the de facto supreme leader, without legisla-
tive participation; the Japanese prime minister is designated from among 
the members of the Diet by a resolution of the Diet before he appoints 
his cabinet ministers. Taiwan’s small parties have little role to play in the 
unicameral legislature, whereas Japan’s bicameralism gives large parties an 
incentive to include nonpivotal small parties as coalition partners so that 
the latter can help adopt the government bills in the upper house. How 
these constitutional systems are related to the number of parties will be 
discussed later.
In the next section, we will show how the role of political parties in 
portfolio allocation is deined by the constitutional system and how Riker’s 
size principle can be used to derive hypotheses. Sections three and four 
will examine how party politics interact with the constitutional systems of 
Taiwan and Japan, and how small parties have different capacities in the 
allocation of executive positions. Section ive concludes by addressing the 
tABLE 2.1. the Constitutional System in taiwan and Japan
 Taiwan Japan
Head of state President: de facto leader Emperor: symbolic head
Appointment of head 
of government
Premier is appointed by  
president without legislative 
consent; ministers are 
appointed by president at 
premier’s recommendation.
Before appointing the cabinet 
ministers, prime minister is 
designated by the Diet with the 




Unicameralism. Legislative Yuan 
can pass vote of no conidence 
in premier and veto policy 
proposals.
Bicameralism. The HR can pass 
vote of no conidence in prime 
minister, HC can veto most 
policy proposals.
Source: author’s analysis of the constitutions of the two countries.
 The Consequences of Constitutional Systems on Party Systems 55
general implications of this study and how the number of parties may be 
affected by constitutional designs.
the role of Political Parties in Portfolio  
Allocation in different Constitutions
Political parties coordinate both in elections and in the distribution of 
executive ofices (Shugart 1995; Cox 1997; Hicken 2009). In elections, the 
electoral system is the key determinant of what a party can do. If an elec-
toral system requires the candidates nominated by the same party to com-
pete for the same set of voters, the party should nominate an optimal num-
ber of candidates; if a party nominates only one candidate, coordination 
should take place before the election starts. Thus, the shift from SNTV 
to MMM marks a great transformation in the electoral roles of parties. 
Even so, maximizing its presence in the legislature is just the irst kind of 
coordination work a party has to undertake. Once elected, legislators have 
to think about how to make the best use of their inluence over portfolio 
allocation, which is the real goal of many politicians. In democracies, port-
folio allocation is an important way to make policy changes (Budge and 
Laver 1986). Since the number of ministerial positions to be distributed 
is ixed, the “minimal winning coalition” principle holds: every member 
in the winning coalition should make itself pivotal, so that each can maxi-
mize its share of the portfolios, hence its inluence over the policies to be 
implemented by the ministry (Riker 1962). This principle implies that the 
size of the coalition and the parties in it should both be minimal because 
unnecessary members will reduce the share each can get.
The constitutional system deines what a minimal winning coalition is. 
The Japanese constitution makes every party a potential pivot. The high-
est executive power is held by the prime minister, who is designated by 
both chambers of the Diet— with the HR playing the decisive role— and 
then formally appointed by the emperor.3 The power of Japan’s small par-
ties is enhanced by its bicameralism in two ways. First, it is easier for a 
small party to win a seat in the HC elections because the electoral system 
mixes 48 national PR seats with 73 SNTV seats. Second, Japan’s bicameral-
ism is almost symmetric because the HC can veto most bills proposed by 
the prime minister, which will in turn put the prime minister’s leadership 
at stake. Small parties can thus exchange their legislative veto power for 
political resources. Nevertheless, Japanese prime ministers do not always 
want to invite small parties to join their cabinets because of a trade- off 
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between policy making and portfolio allocation. The prime minister can 
compromise with the small parties without allocating any position to their 
members. Whether a small party wishes to join the cabinet also depends on 
how much the prime minister needs its support to pass legislation.
Taiwan’s constitutional system arranges the allocation of ministerial 
positions differently. Taiwan’s premier is appointed unilaterally by the 
popularly elected president, leaving no role for the political parties to play. 
According to the constitution, cabinet ministers are selected by the pre-
mier, but, in practice, they are handpicked by the president. Although the 
legislators can launch a censure motion against the premier by rallying 
majority support, such a move is quite unlikely because it will put the jobs 
of the legislators at risk. What the president has to keep in mind is whether 
the legislature is controlled by an opposition majority. If this is the case, 
the legislators may use their veto power to prevent government bills from 
being adopted.
Another concern is the electoral system. Under SNTV, major par-
ties nominate multiple candidates in most districts, the legislators tend 
to deliver resources to a particular group of voters, and the parties are 
usually factionalized. Particularist distribution of government resources is 
prevalent in both MMM and SNTV, but the targets of the pork may dif-
fer. It is quite common for single- member district systems to encourage 
pork- barrel bills targeting the undecided voters in the competitive dis-
tricts rather than just a particular set of constituents. Moreover, legislators 
elected under MMM are supposed to represent the whole constituency, 
giving them the incentive to choose policy stances different from those 
of the central government. A shift from SNTV to MMM thus decreases 
the incentives for internal factionalization. Nevertheless, there is a major 
difference between Taiwan and Japan. In Taiwan, the directly elected presi-
dent creates more pressure for Taiwanese legislators to align their cam-
paign appeals with a major national party, but Japanese legislators are freer 
to tailor their messages to the local district, perhaps even to the point of 
representing a third party.
We can now hypothesize how the partisan composition of the Taiwan-
ese and Japanese cabinets is affected by their respective constitutional sys-
tems. First, Taiwan does not have a tradition of coalition government, and 
political parties have a limited inluence on cabinet formation. This affects 
both big parties and small parties. Small parties should be shut out of the 
cabinet almost entirely. However, this does not mean that members of the 
president’s party will monopolize all seats in the cabinet. The president can 
appoint ministers as he sees it, and he may choose to appoint a signiicant 
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number of nonpartisan igures to the cabinet. Tavits (2008, 43) has argued 
that directly elected presidents have a preference to name nonpartisan 
ministers to demonstrate their status as the head of state.4 The incentive 
to appoint nonpartisan ministers is particularly strong when the president 
is leading a minority party. Rather than opting for a single- party minor-
ity cabinet, which might cause gridlock, or a multiparty majority cabinet, 
which might weaken the president’s leadership, the president may prefer 
to appoint nonpartisan ministers to depoliticize the cabinet and convey the 
image of the president as leader of the entire country. Critically, while non-
partisan ministers may help the president dampen opposition from other 
parties in the legislature or appeal to a wider segment of the electorate, 
they are not representatives of or responsible to opposition parties. Alter-
natively, if the primary threat to the president’s power comes from factions 
within his own majority party, he may be more likely to emphasize his role 
as head of the party and prefer to appoint fewer nonpartisan ministers. The 
percentage of nonpartisan ministers can thus give clues to the inluence of 
the president on cabinet formation.
In sum, there is no need to test the number of parties in Taiwan’s cabi-
nets, because ministers are predominantly from the president’s party or 
nonpartisans.5 Rather, nonpartisan ministers play a much more important 
role in highlighting the president’s role in ministerial appointment. Thus, 
we expect that, in Taiwan, the percentage of nonpartisan ministers is higher (1) 
in divided government than in uniied government and (2) when MMM is the 
electoral system than when SNTV was used.
Second, political parties in Japan should exercise a greater inluence 
on cabinet formation than their Taiwanese counterparts, for the Constitu-
tion of Japan requires the prime ministers to be elected by members of 
the Diet. Since most cabinet ministers are concurrently legislators, we can 
examine how the number of parties in the cabinet can be explained by the 
key variables.6 The number of parties in the cabinet should increase when the 
cabinet is not in control of the upper house. Further, if MMM accelerates the 
turnover of parties in power, prime ministers should have less conidence 
that they will be able to maintain a majority in the HC. Thus, we expect the 
number of parties in the cabinet to rise after electoral reform. The logic behind 
these hypotheses is that the bargaining power of small parties is increased 
if the probability of the prime minister encountering bicameral deadlock 
becomes higher. The second test operationalizes the prime minister’s inlu-
ence in cabinet formation in a slightly different way. We expect the percentage 
of ministers from the prime minister’s party to decrease when the party of most 
cabinet members does not hold the upper house majority or when MMM is used, 
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because these factors will weaken the leadership of the prime minister for 
the reasons already discussed.
The difference in constitutional systems permeates other political are-
nas. If legislators play different roles in the allocation of executive ofices, 
the voters’ expectations of them should also diverge. Taiwan’s legislative 
elections have become highly presidentialized and focus on the debate over 
national identity issues between the two largest parties. MMM reduces 
Taiwan’s effective number of parties to less than two because the number 
of presidential candidates is usually two. Japan lacks a centralized national 
leader, and legislative candidates can compete on constituency issues, some 
of which may be related to the national division among the political par-
ties while others are local in focus. Since the constituency cleavage plays 
an important role in Japan, we expect the effective number of parties to be 
higher than in Taiwan.
What we see above are theoretical models with rich empirical implica-
tions. In the next two sections, we will demonstrate how the constitutional 
system affects the portfolio allocation in the two cases, and therefore the 
number and power of small parties. We will discuss Taiwan irst because 
the evolution of its party system shows clearly the power of the consti-
tutional system despite the intervening variables that a young democracy 
usually faces.
How taiwan’s unicameral Semipresidential System 
Intermediates the Impact of Electoral reform
To validate the claim that MMM has reduced the number of parties but 
variations in the constitutional system give political parties different roles 
to play, this section will describe how Taiwan’s unicameral semipresiden-
tial constitution has strongly depressed the inluence of political parties on 
cabinet formation and given the president a great deal of freedom to ill 
executive ofices.
Taiwan’s constitution is parliamentary by design but highly presidential 
in practice.7 The seven constitutional reforms enacted since 1991 endeav-
ored to make the president’s de facto powers constitutional by stipulating a 
popularly elected president; they further enhanced the president’s power by 
removing the Legislative Yuan’s power to conirm the presidential appoint-
ment of the premier. The Legislative Yuan can pass a vote of no conidence 
in the premier but the premier cannot initiate a snap election (Lin 2011).8 
Before 2000, executive congruency gave the president the power to dismiss 
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the premier, making Taiwan a president- parliamentary regime (Shugart 
and Carey 1992; Shugart 2005). The president dominated the appoint-
ment of the premier even when the government was divided (2000– 2008). 
Based on this practice, no popularly elected president has consulted the 
legislature when appointing a premier or his cabinet ministers.
By this design, the president appoints and dismisses the cabinet min-
isters with the latter’s accountability to the legislature in mind. The ways 
in which the legislators hold the cabinet accountable include a vote of no 
conidence— which is rarely considered— and the blocking of executive 
proposals— which is often applied. When explaining the president’s deci-
sion in portfolio allocation, MMM is also an important factor because the 
majorities represented by the president in the whole nation and the legisla-
tors in the MMM districts may be incongruent. To ease the pressure from 
MMM and opposition parties, we expect the percentage of nonpartisan minis-
ters in the cabinet to follow this order: MMM plus divided government > SNTV 
plus divided government > MMM plus uniied government > SNTV plus uniied 
government. We do not make the number of parties in the cabinet as a vari-
able because the cabinets are predominantly composed of the president’s 
party and nonpartisans rather than the nonpresidential parties.
Given the limited inluence of Taiwan’s small parties on cabinet for-
mation, we will directly examine how the aforementioned variables affect 
the president’s role in portfolio allocation. Table 2.2 shows how much the 
president dominates cabinet formation by the percentage of ministers from 
his party.9 Counting the change in electoral systems and the president’s 
majority status, the data include several possible divisions, with the “MMM 
plus divided government” type thus far absent. Since the percentage is a 
continuous variable and the independent variables are categorical, we run 
a one- way ANOVA by the following groupings: (1) whether a president 
leads a uniied or a divided government, (2) electoral systems, and (3) the 
three presidential periods. For (3), a reasonable hypothesis is that Presi-
dent Lee Teng- hui had the highest percentage of ministers from his own 
party because he led a uniied government with legislators elected under 
SNTV; the lowest percentage should be found under the Chen Shui- bian 
presidency, as Chen never assembled a majority cabinet, especially when 
the Kuomintang (KMT) dominated the Legislative Yuan. Standing in 
between, Ma Ying- jeou’s strategy represents the presidentialized uniied 
government that MMM produces.
The results in table 2.3 validate the hypotheses. Overall, the average 
percentage of ministers from the president’s party is 58.55. If the percent-
ages of ministers from the president’s party are compared according to 
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whether the president controls the legislative majority or not, the “yes” 
and the “no” groups have an average of 72.3% and 44.1%, respectively. 
It is evident that divided government forced President Chen to appoint 
more nonpartisan ministers to water down the cabinet’s DPP makeup so 
as to decrease the likelihood of his policies being rejected by the Legisla-
tive Yuan. If the data are compared according to the electoral system, the 
“SNTV” group has 61.6% and the “MMM” group has 49.4% on average. 
Finally, if the average percentages for the three presidents are compared, 
the “Lee period” is 96.6, the “Chen period” is 44.1, and the “Ma period” is 
49.4. All one- way ANOVA tests show the expected sign, and the differences 
between the three presidents are not only statistically signiicant but also 
larger than the other two comparisons.10
The cabinets headed by premiers appointed by President Ma are a 
salient illustration of the dominance of the president— as the head of state 
rather than the chairperson of the ruling party— in cabinet formation. Ma’s 
KMT has held a clear majority of legislative seats throughout his two terms 
in ofice. However, table 2.3 shows that the percentage of ministers from 
the president’s party, already low in 2008 compared to those of President 
Lee, has further decreased in the intervening years.11 Ma’s preference for 
















Lee Teng- hui KMT Hau Pei- tsun KMT 6/1/1990 95.24% KMT = 1
Lee Teng- hui KMT Lien Chan KMT 2/27/1993 98.31% KMT = 1
Lee Teng- hui KMT Siew Wan- chang KMT 9/7/1997 96.30% KMT = 1
Chen Shui- bian DPP Tang Fei KMT 5/20/2000 24.32% KMT = 1
Chen Shui- bian DPP Chang Chun- hsiung DPP 10/6/2000 26.47% KMT = 1
Chen Shui- bian DPP Yu Shyi- kun DPP 2/1/2002 44.74% DPP = 0
Chen Shui- bian DPP Hsieh Chang- ting DPP 2/1/2005 62.16% DPP = 0
Chen Shui- bian DPP Su Tseng- chang DPP 1/25/2006 55.56% DPP = 0
Chen Shui- bian DPP Chang Chun- hsiung DPP 5/21/2007 51.43% DPP = 0
Ma Ying- jeou KMT Liu Chao- shiuan KMT 5/20/2008 66.67% KMT = 1
Ma Ying- jeou KMT Wu Den- yih KMT 9/10/2009 47.22% KMT = 1
Ma Ying- jeou KMT Chen Chun KMT 2/6/2012 34.21% KMT = 1
Source: Yu and Zhu (2001a, 2001b), Guoshiguan Zhengjiaochu (1994, 1998, 2001), Liu (2006), Liu (1994), and 
the United Daily News online database (http://udndata.com/library/), accessed March 19, 2012.
Note: The number of ministers is person- time. Whether a minister comes from a particular party depends on 
whether he/she is (was) a member of the central committee or receives (received) paid jobs from the party, or rep-
resented the party in the elections.
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appointing nonpartisan scholars and civil servants as ministers relects his 
ambivalence regarding the partisan composition of the cabinet. Given the 
KMT’s dominance in the legislature, Ma must have minimized the role of 
political parties when forming his cabinets.
The strong inluence of the president on portfolio allocation extends to 
elections. Two effects can be observed. The irst is that Taiwan’s presiden-
tial elections may have a contamination effect on legislative elections.12 If 
the two elections are held concurrently or within a short period of time, 
voters may use information from the highly prominent presidential race to 
make their decisions in the less salient legislative race. Since the presiden-
tial race encourages supporters of small parties to vote strategically, they 
may apply the same logic to legislative elections regardless of the strength 
of the small party’s local candidate. Presidential elections thus intensify 
the Duvergerian obstacles13 facing small parties in district elections. The 
second effect concerns cleavage structure. Campaigning dominated by the 
presidential race will restrain the capacity of small parties to articulate their 
favorite issues. In Taiwan, small parties are forced to stand with a particular 
camp irst of all and then distance themselves from that camp’s leading 
presidential candidate. In the legislative election of 2012, James Soong, the 
leader of the People First Party, was the only presidential candidate who 
claimed that Taiwan should eventually be reuniied with the mainland. The 
Taiwan Solidarity Union, at the opposite extreme, was quite insistent that 
Taiwan’s independent sovereignty should not be infringed upon. So the 
two small parties could be clearly identiied by their positions on national 
identity. That helped these small parties to consolidate their PR seats, but 
the overall effect was limited. What MMM does is to sharply decrease the 
inluence of the small parties when the campaign issues are set by the large 
parties.
tABLE 2.3. one- Way AnoVA for Partisan Compositions of taiwan’s Cabinets
  Mean Variance Sig.










Compared by presidents 
 
Lee 0.966 0.000
0.002 Chen 0.441 0.024
Ma 0.494 0.027
Source: Author’s calculation.
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How Japan’s Bicameral Parliamentary System Intermediates 
the Impact of Electoral reform
Taiwan can be seen as a baseline when we turn our attention to Japan, a 
country with a longer experience of democracy under a stable constitu-
tional system. When compared with Taiwan, Japan’s cabinet formation is 
dominated by legislative parties, giving electoral systems a more important 
role to play. We expect to see that the number of parties in the cabinet increases 
and the percentage of ministers coming from the prime minister’s party decreases 
after MMM is introduced, especially if the cabinet does not hold the majority of 
seats in the HC.
A review of Japan’s Constitution will be helpful here. Japan’s prime min-
ister shall be designated by the Diet before he appoints the cabinet min-
isters. According to Article 67 of the Constitution, disagreement between 
the two chambers about the designation of the prime minister is eventually 
determined by the HR. According to Article 69, the HR can pass a resolu-
tion of nonconidence in the prime minister or reject a conidence motion 
proposed by the latter— after which the prime minister must resign— but 
the prime minister can also actively dissolve the HR and call for an early 
election. No such relationship exists between the prime minister and the 
HC, but the latter can veto bills passed by the HR— except prime minister 
designation, treaty, and budgetary bills— unless the government can pass 
them a second time by a two- thirds majority in the HR.
In sum, Japan’s bicameral parliamentary system strengthens the bar-
gaining power of the small parties when the prime minister’s party is unable 
to control the HC. Small parties can win seats in the HC and boycott gov-
ernment bills even if they are weak in the HR. Since MMM tends to create 
larger seat swings in the elections of the HR, the prime minister becomes 
less conident that he will control the majorities of both chambers. Never-
theless, it is optional whether the prime minister will expand the coalition 
to control the majority of the HC, for reasons already explained in the 
theoretical section.
We use Japan’s portfolio allocation to test the hypotheses concerning 
the role of the small parties. Table 2.4 displays the partisan composition 
of Japan’s cabinets, including the percentage of ministers from the prime 
minister’s party and the number of parties (nonpartisan included) in the 
cabinets. When determining the size of the cabinet, the denominator is 
the number of ministers rather than their positions because a minister may 
concurrently hold more than one position. Note that we do not count con-
trol of the HC before 1955 because that period saw a tumultuous realign-
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ment of Japan’s party system, making it dificult to measure the partisan 
composition of the cabinets. We should also focus on cabinets formed by 
prime ministers heading the largest party, otherwise the coalition govern-
ments will by nature be oversized.
We will use the screened data to display the role of the small parties. 
Since the dependent variable is continuous, we run two parts of a one- way 
ANOVA to test if the means are different as a result of the categories we 
choose. The irst hypothesis is to see whether the number of parties in the 
Japanese cabinet varies by whether (1) the cabinet parties hold the major-
ity of seats of the HC and (2) the electoral system for the HR is MMM. 
For the second part of the hypotheses, we will use the same categories to 
test how much the average percentage of ministers coming from the prime 
minister’s party makes a difference. This is the opposite dimension of a 
similar variable.
The empirical data are shown in tables 2.5a and 2.5b. The results 
largely conirm our expectation. What we see from the irst half of table 
2.5a is that the number of small parties in the cabinet goes up when the 
cabinet fails to have continuous control of the upper house. The implied 
message is interesting: the more the cabinet is unable to control the upper 
house, the greater the bargaining power of the small parties because they 
can threaten the prime minister and boycott his policy bills. By the same 
logic, the small parties lose their pivotal positions if the ruling party can 
unilaterally control the two chambers. The second half of table 2.5a deliv-
ers a similar message in an even clearer way. Under SNTV, the prime min-
isters would leave a countable number of positions for the nonpartisans 
rather than for the small parties because the latter are dispensable.14 The 
adoption of MMM changed the strategy of portfolio allocation because the 
fear of losing power in an MMM race made the collaboration with some 
small parties inevitable, even if the number of the nonpartisan ministers 
remains the same. The underlying cause is that a majoritarian- leaning elec-
toral system like MMM renders the undecided voters decisive and compels 
the prime minister to be mindful of the parties representing their interests.
For the second part of the hypothesis, we use the percentage of min-
isters from the prime minister’s party to test the effects of the same set of 
variables. Note that Japan’s parliamentary rule requires the prime min-
isters to be elected by the Diet, with the HR playing the decisive role. 
The denominator is therefore “the ministers from the parties of the prime 
minister and the small parties in the cabinet.” The average percentage of 
ministers from the prime minister’s party when the cabinet has continuous 
control of the upper house is 92.9%, which is higher than the 89.1% when 
















*Shigeru Yoshida (I) JLP 5/22/1946 5 32.26% 0 0
*Tetsu Katayama JSP 5/24/1947 4 39.29% 0 0
*Hitoshi Ashita DP 3/10/1948 3 46.67% 0 0
*Shigeru Yoshida (IIa) DLP 10/15/1948 2 77.78% 0 0
*Shigeru Yoshida (IIb) LP 6/28/1950 4 44.26% 0 0
*Shigeru Yoshida (IIb) LP 10/30/1953 3 79.17% 0 0
*Shigeru Yoshida (IIb) LP 5/21/1954 1 93.33% 0 0
Ichiro Hatoyama (a) JDP 12/10/1954 1 85.00% 0 0
Ichiro Hatoyama (a) LDP 11/22/1955 1 90.91% 0 0
Ichiro Hatoyama (a) LDP 11/22/1956 1 94.74% 0 0
Tanzan Ishibashi LDP 12/23/1956 1 95.00% 0 0
Nobusuke Kishi LDP 2/25/1957 1 94.59% 0 0
Nobusuke Kishi LDP 6/12/1958 1 97.73% 0 0
Hayato Ikeda LDP 7/19/1960 1 95.24% 1 0
Hayato Ikeda LDP 12/8/1960 1 98.33% 1 0
Hayato Ikeda LDP 12/9/1963 1 97.30% 1 0
Eisaku Sato LDP 11/9/1964 1 98.55% 1 0
Eisaku Sato LDP 2/17/1967 1 98.04% 1 0
Eisaku Sato LDP 1/14/1970 1 97.78% 1 0
Kakuei Tanaka LDP 7/7/1972 1 95.45% 1 0
Kakuei Tanaka LDP 12/22/1973 1 98.11% 1 0
Takeo Miki LDP 12/9/1974 1 92.11% 1 0
Takeo Fukuda LDP 12/24/1976 1 95.35% 1 0
Masayoshi Ohira LDP 12/7/1978 1 95.45% 0 0
Masayoshi Ohira LDP 11/9/1979 1 91.30% 0 0
Zenko Suzuki LDP 7/17/1980 1 97.56% 1 0
Yasuhiro Nakasone LDP 11/27/1982 1 91.67% 1 0
Yasuhiro Nakasone LDP 12/271983 1 98.28% 1 0
Yasuhiro Nakasone LDP 7/221986 1 95.83% 1 0
Noboru Takeshita LDP 11/6/1987 1 95.35% 1 0
Sosuke Uno LDP 6/3/1989 1 95.45% 1 0
Toshiki Kaifu LDP 8/10/1989 1 95.65% 0 0
Toshiki Kaifu LDP 2/28/1990 1 97.56% 0 0
Kiichi Miyazawa LDP 11/5/1991 1 95.65% 0 0
*Morihiro Hosokawa JNP 8/9/1993 7 18.18% 0 0
*Tsutomu Hata JRP 4/28/1994 6 39.13% 0 0
*Tomiichi Murayama SDP 6/30/1994 3 24.44% 0 0
Ryutaro Hashimoto LDP 1/11/1996 3 54.55% 1 1
Ryutaro Hashimoto LDP 11/7/1996 1 97.56% 0 1
Keizo Obuchi LDP 7/30/1998 3 84.09% 0 1
Yoshiro Mori LDP 4/5/2000 3 80.00% 0 1
Yoshiro Mori LDP 11/7/2000 3 82.35% 0 1
Junichiro Koizumi LDP 4/26/2001 4 79.49% 0 1
Junichiro Koizumi LDP 11/19/2003 2 82.86% 1 1
Junichiro Koizumi LDP 9/21/2005 2 90.91% 1 1

















Yasuo Fukuda LDP 9/26/2007 2 84.38% 0 1
Taro Aso LDP 9/24/2008 3 75.00% 0 1
Yukio Hatoyama DPJ 9/16/2009 3 83.33% 0 1
Naoto Kan DPJ 6/8/2010 2 88.10% 0 1
Yoshihiko Noda DPJ 9/2/2011 2 82.22% 0 1
Source: Toshio (1990), Rei (1986, 1987), Kyofu (1996), and Naikaku seido hyakujunen kinen shi henshu 
iinkai (1996). In addition, the partisan composition of cabinets formed after MMM was introduced can be 
found at the website of the major newspapers.
Notes: (1) Members of cabinet includes ministers, the chief secretary, and commission chairpersons. 
Nonpartisans are seen as one party when counting the non- PM parties. (2) Ministers holding concurrent 
positions are counted only once. (3) Whether a cabinet always controls the HC is determined by the whole 
term of a prime minister. For this reason, “0” may include prime ministers with interrupted majority sup-
ports from the HC. (4) Prime ministers indicated by an asterisk (*) are not from the LDP or the DPJ and 
are excluded from analysis, except the irst cabinet of Ichiro Hatoyama, who became the irst LDP prime 
minister in November 1955. Cabinets resulting from party switching are also not counted. (5) A coalition 
government is deined by whether the cabinet includes at least two parties (nonpartisans excluded).
tABLE 2.5A. one- Way AnoVA for the number of Coalition Parties in 
Japan’s Cabinets
  Mean Variance Sig.
Compared by whether the 
coalition parties always  
control the upper house
No 1.762 0.991 0.050
Yes 1.250 0.303





tABLE 2.5B. one- Way AnoVA for the ratio of Ministers from PM’s 
Party in Japan’s Cabinets
  Mean Variance Sig.
Compared by whether the 
coalition parties always  
control the upper house
No 0.891 0.005 0.160
Yes 0.929 0.010
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it lacks continuous control. This result suggests an interesting dynamic: the 
prime minster’s inluence on cabinet formation declines when the cabinet 
fails to control the upper house. A likely cause is that bicameral deadlock 
weakens the prime minister’s position in his cabinet. If so, electoral reform 
should have a signiicant impact because MMM is supposed to promote 
policy debates among political parties. Indeed, 95.3% of the ministers are 
from the prime minister’s party when SNTV is used; this is reduced to 
82.4% after MMM is introduced. In this sense, electoral reform enhances 
the bargaining power of the small parties on policy making even though 
their representatives are reduced in number.
To highlight the growing inluence of Japan’s small parties, consider 
the example of the cabinet organized by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama 
(2009– 10). Hatoyama’s Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) gained 308 of 
the 480 seats (64.17%) in the HR election of 2009 but still invited the 
heads of two small parties to join his cabinet: Shizuka Kamei from the 
People’s New Party (PNP) as the minister of state for inancial services 
and minister of state for postal reform, and Mizuho Fukushima from the 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) as the minister of state for consumer affairs 
and food safety, social affairs, and gender equality. Especially noteworthy is 
Fukushima, who was a member of the HC at that time. The DPJ chose to 
offer cabinet positions to the two smaller parties and they chose to accept 
them because there was a degree of policy congruence among the three 
parties, making it easier for them to garner support from the upper house 
to form a temporary majority. However, the alliance was fragile, and Fuku-
shima resigned her position in 2010 over the issue of the Marine Corps 
Air Station Futenma.15 When the degree of policy congruence was high, 
the SDP was able to use its position in the upper house to win a cabinet 
seat; when the degree of policy congruence decreased, the SDP decided to 
withdraw from the cabinet and dampen the credibility of the Hatoyama 
cabinet. Thus this example neatly illustrates the opportunities small par-
ties are afforded in Japan’s constitutional system as well as the trade- offs 
among cabinet portfolios, policy positions, and support in the parliament 
that large parties much consider.
Japan’s party system is further fragmented by its parliamentary elec-
tions. Because Japan lacks a central leader, MMM reduces the differences 
between political parties and gives some politicians a reason to establish 
their own parties. For many voters, the party platforms are intangible— at 
least more intangible than real politicians— and contenders in each con-
stituency tend to embody their ideas through their personal image or 
social connections. One trend has been the formation of small parties by 
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politicians who are not very different from their fellows in the parties from 
which they originated. Such a trend is further endogenized by the fact that 
the new electoral system is conducive to regime turnover (at the national 
and local levels). This helps explain why some local potentates have an 
incentive to defect from their parties as long as they have a chance of win-
ning the seat. Thus, the lack of a centralized leader makes some small par-
ties powerful enough to grab the SMP seats.
Nevertheless, MMM is not exactly an SMP system: the latter gives elec-
toral contenders much less motivation to build their own parties, whereas 
the former creates contamination effects that small parties can utilize to 
gain some seats. Taiwan also adopted MMM, but the role of its small par-
ties is much less salient than that of small parties in Japan. As we have seen, 
this difference cannot be fully accounted for by the design of the electoral 
system. It is the constitutional system that explains the varying amounts of 
bargaining power of the small parties.
Conclusion
Few topics can be studied as rigorously and fruitfully as those concern-
ing electoral systems. Concepts like the threshold of winning and effective 
number of parties apply to all electoral systems and are well recognized in 
the literature. MMM, by giving priority to single- member district com-
petitions, is expected to decrease the number of parties. This expectation 
inds support in Japan and Taiwan, both of which shifted their electoral 
systems from SNTV to the majoritarian- leaning MMM systems. Although 
the effective number of parties is smaller when measured in relative terms, 
the absolute number of parties in Japan is always higher than that of Tai-
wan, leaving a puzzle to be explained.
This chapter takes an executive- centered approach to answer this puz-
zle. A theory of portfolio allocation suggests that a constitutional system 
instituted with more players who can veto the appointment of the head 
of government, and hence portfolio allocation, makes small parties more 
inluential. Exogenously imposed, the rule of portfolio allocation gives 
small parties an endogenous interest in breaking away from the large par-
ties in and after the legislative election. This theory explains why Japan’s 
bicameral parliamentary system creates bargaining power for Japan’s small 
parties, and why Taiwan’s unicameral semipresidential system makes the 
small parties much less effective than the president when executive ofices 
are to be arranged. Furthermore, Japan’s parliamentary system gives some 
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electoral competitors the justiication to run a campaign at the district level 
because the party platform is less visible than a real candidate. The chances 
of Japan’s small parties receiving seats are thus higher than those of their 
counterparts in Taiwan.
The partisan composition of cabinets in Taiwan and Japan corrobo-
rates this argument. For Taiwan, we expect the percentage of nonpartisan 
ministers to be increased by MMM and the president’s inability to control 
the Legislative Yuan, for both will increase the likelihood of the executive 
proposals being rejected, and nonpartisan ministers can buffer such pres-
sure. The one- way ANOVA dividing the data by three Taiwanese presi-
dents offers a signiicant count of the percentages of nonpartisan ministers. 
That is, Taiwan’s constitutional system makes the president the paramount 
leader subject to the different degrees of legislative distrust of the exec-
utive oficers, for which electoral reform plays an important role. Small 
parties are almost entirely cut out of cabinet positions, as the semipresi-
dential system denies them any opportunity to negotiate for ministerial 
posts. In Japan’s parliamentary system, the HR approves the appointment 
of the prime minister and the HC can veto most policy bills. Since the 
prime minister should receive majority support from the HR, whether the 
cabinet also controls the HC becomes a major determinant of the cabinet’s 
partisan composition. We expect the number of parties in the cabinet to 
increase and the percentage of ministers from the prime minister’s party 
to decline when the cabinet fails to control the upper house majority. If 
MMM reduces factionalism and speeds up power transitions, we expect 
the electoral reform to increase the number of parties in the cabinet and 
decrease the percentages of ministers from the prime minister’s party. 
These hypotheses are conirmed, and the effects of MMM are especially 
impressive.
Comparing the partisan compositions of the cabinets of the two coun-
tries, we ind Japan to have far more ministers from the prime minister’s 
party than Taiwan has ministers from the president’s party. The weights 
of the other parties are high in Japan while Taiwan’s president tends to ill 
the executive positions by selecting ministers without partisanship or those 
from his party instead of parties with similar ideologies. This result sup-
ports the theory of portfolio allocation.
Taiwan and Japan are speciic cases with general implications. We can 
make a further generalization by considering the two extreme possibilities: 
(1) a unicameral presidential system where the president heads the govern-
ment and is the only agent responsible for portfolio allocation, and (2) a 
multichamber parliamentary system where the appointment of ministers 
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has to be agreed to by the political parties in all chambers. In the irst case, 
the number of nonpartisan ministers should be high; in the latter, political 
parties play decisive roles in cabinet formation and the number of minis-
ters from the prime minister’s party depends on to what extent the prime 
minister controls the chambers. What electoral reform does is to alter the 
number of parties the political leader can choose from rather than the rules 
regulating portfolio allocation. That is why we need to consider the elec-
toral system and the constitutional system together to explain a country’s 
party system.
n o t e S
 1. One should not equate the decrease in proportionality with the shift from 
proportional representation to a majoritarian system (see Reilly 2007a, 1359). In 
Reilly’s cases, Cambodia switched from closed- list PR to the closed- list PR with 
the highest average method, Indonesia changed from closed- list PR to open- list 
PR, the Philippines substituted plurality- block with MMM, and Thailand replaced 
block vote with MMM. Only in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan was there a change 
from the single nontransferable vote (SNTV) to MMM.
 2. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) also abandoned SNTV (two- member 
district) in 1988 and replaced it with MMM, under which the voters could cast only 
one ballot. (The Republic of Korea shifted to a two- ballot system in 2004). Unfor-
tunately for this volume, South Korea’s electoral reform took place at the same 
time that this country transitioned to democracy, making it dificult to untangle 
the effects of electoral reform and democratization. For details, please see Brady 
and Mo (1992) and Mo and Brady (1999). In addition to the three East Asian cases, 
Afghanistan, Vanuatu, and Jordan have also had experience with SNTV for their 
national elections.
 3. Sometimes the ruling party has an effective majority when it is just a few seats 
away from holding the majority of seats and can cooperate with the independent 
legislators to pass bills. If the ruling parties are unable to create an effective major-
ity, the typical solution is to form a coalition government controlling the majority 
of seats in the HR.
 4. There is also empirical evidence showing that presidential regimes are much 
more likely to appoint nonpartisan ministers than their parliamentary counterparts, 
with semipresidential regimes in between (Neto and Samuels 2010, 14).
 5. The number of ministers from parties allied with the president is negligibly 
small. Additionally, Taiwan’s ministers cannot concurrently hold a legislative posi-
tion, which gives the president a strong justiication to handpick the nonpartisans.
 6. Coalition government is a normal practice in a parliamentary system. 
Although some cabinet positions are kept for nonpartisan ministers, most ministers 
are either from the prime minister’s party or the parties of the coalition partners.
 7. The president’s role in the original constitution is close to a symbolic head 
of state. The highest administrative organ, the Executive Yuan, is headed by the 
premier rather than the president (Art. 53). The presidential appointment of the 
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premier should have the consent of the Legislative Yuan (Art. 55); a premier failing 
to veto a legislative resolution “shall either accede to the Legislative Yuan’s view or 
tender his (her) resignation” (Art. 57). The president appoints the cabinet ministers 
on the recommendation of the premier and cannot attend the weekly meetings of 
the Executive Yuan.
 8. These designs did not fully realize the proclaimed goals, as the high threshold 
of constitutional amendments required cross- partisan collaborations.
 9. Due to Taiwan’s authoritarian history, many people formally joined the 
Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) but later allowed their membership to 
lapse. We thus deine party membership by one’s active position in the party hierar-
chy. Party members are those who had a seat in the central committee, held a paid 
job in the party bureaucracy, or represented the party in an election.
 10. The president’s approval rate can be another factor affecting the appointment 
of ministers. Presidents with high popularity are less likely to face obstruction from 
the legislature (Neustadt 1990; Kernell 1997). Both President Chen and President 
Ma saw severe declines in their approval ratings over their time in ofice. The per-
centage of nonpartisan ministers has steadily increased under Ma as his ratings 
declined. Chen appointed a signiicant number of nonpartisan members after he 
was elected in 2000 to ease worries about Cross- Strait stability. As these fears eased, 
the number of nonpartisan members increased, but it decreased during his second 
term as his approval ratings dropped. Relative to his two successors, President Lee 
enjoyed much higher approval ratings, and the percentage of nonpartisan ministers 
in his cabinets was much lower.
 11. Premier Jiang Yi- Huah (2013– ), the successor of Chen Chun, did not renew 
his KMT membership until he was about to be appointed premier. Very few of 
Jiang’s ministers are active KMT members.
 12. Batto, Kim, and Matukhno (chapter 10, this volume) make a similar argument 
about how presidential races contaminate legislative elections.
 13. For detailed examinations of Duvergerian logic, see chapter 1 and chapter 7, 
this volume.
 14. All Japanese cabinets have nonpartisan ministers. Since we count nonparti-
sans as a group, whether they are seen as a constituent part of the cabinets makes 
no statistical difference.
 15. The U.S. base on Okinawa has been controversial because the military base 
is close to a populated area and creates noise pollution. The base is also a reminder 
that, when the Second World War came to an end, Okinawa suffered from the most 
deadly strike launched by the United States.
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LdP Factions under SntV and MMM
Yoshiaki Kobayashi and Hiroki Tsukiyama
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan is notable as one of the 
most factionalized parties in modern democracies. For a long time, many 
scholars have discussed why LDP legislative factions (habatsu) appeared and 
why they are highly institutionalized. The literature offers two different 
explanations for the basis of LDP factions (Kohno 1992; Cox, Rosenbluth, 
and Thies 2000). One stresses the uniqueness of Japanese political culture 
including the afinity for patron- client relationships (oyabun- kobun kankei) 
between senior bosses and young followers (Thayer 1969; Richardson and 
Flanagan 1984; Baerwald 1986); the other stresses the rational incentives 
of LDP members (Sato and Matsuzaki 1986; Kohno 1992; Ramseyer and 
Rosenbluth 1993; Cox and Rosenbluth 1993, 1996; Cox, Rosenbluth, and 
Thies 2000). Over the last two decades, the rational choice school has 
become the dominant explanation.
The rational choice explanation for LDP factionalism particularly 
focuses on the old electoral system of Japan’s lower house, the single 
nontransferable vote system. Under SNTV, multiple seats are open in a 
single district but each voter can cast only a single vote, so parties seeking 
governmental power have to nominate multiple candidates in districts 
and candidates afiliated with the same party have to scramble for that 
single vote. Some scholars argue that LDP factions are nothing more 
than an instrument to help their members in this intraparty struggle. 
Speciically, factions have supplied their members with some electoral 
resources: endorsements, inancial support, and cabinet and party posts. 
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In return, their members have sworn loyalty to the faction leaders in 
the party’s presidential election (Sato and Matsuzaki 1986; Ramseyer and 
Rosenbluth 1993).
In terms of electoral systems, legislative factionalism should be trans-
formed by electoral reform. In the Japanese case, the SNTV system used in 
lower house general elections was replaced with a mixed- member majori-
tarian (MMM) system in 1994. Japan’s MMM is the combination of 300 
seats elected from single- member districts (SMDs) and 180 seats1 elected 
from a closed- list proportional representation (PR).2 Under MMM, which 
centers on a single member plurality system, parties nominate a single can-
didate in each district and they are no longer threatened by friendly ire 
from within the same party, so the electoral presence of factions should fall 
off. Hence, LDP factionalism should theoretically be reduced due to the 
electoral change from SNTV to MMM in 1994.
Unlike the theoretical expectation, however, old factionalism in the 
LDP still exists after the electoral reform. Why didn’t LDP factions imme-
diately fade away? The recent literature suggests that the reason for the 
continuing existence of LDP factions is that they remain inluential in allo-
cating posts, even if they have lost power in selecting candidates and the 
LDP presidency (Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies 1999; Park 2001; Reed and 
Thies 2001b; Krauss and Pekkanen 2004, 2010). We roughly follow this 
argument, but the previous studies have overlooked one side of the close 
relationship between the decay (and persistence) of factions and the leader-
ship of the party headquarters. Our indings suggest that the reasons for 
and consequences of factional decline and persistence must be understood 
in the context of the party president’s leadership within Japan’s parliamen-
tary system.
In this chapter, we examine the long- term transition of LDP factions 
in the lower house under SNTV and MMM. Speciically, we investigate 
the change of two functions of factions from 1973 to 2009: (1) recruit-
ment of new Diet members, and (2) allocation of cabinet posts. Our 
analyses show that the electoral and personnel importance of factions 
have weakened, and that these roles have been centralized in the LDP 
president; but that the power of the president has been unstable depend-
ing on luctuations in his popularity. Finally, we discuss the luidity of the 
president’s leadership in terms of the constitutional system in Japan, a 
parliamentary system in which a prime minister always has to maintain a 
majority in the Diet.
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Previous Studies
LDP Factions under SNTV
We begin by reviewing the previous studies of LDP factions under SNTV. 
The prevailing view of the causes of LDP factionalism is based on the ratio-
nal choice model, which attributes the institutionalization of factions to the 
rational choices of their members. In particular, the electoral incentives 
of both LDP candidates and seekers of the LDP presidency are crucial. 
Under the old SNTV electoral system, the LDP nominated more than one 
candidate in districts. However, their candidates were not supported by the 
LDP itself on a large scale. Hence, factions, rather than party headquarters, 
played a substantial role in national elections. On the other hand, presiden-
tial aspirants had powerful incentives to institutionalize their own factions, 
because the LDP president is elected by votes of LDP Diet members and 
local chapters (Sato and Matsuzaki 1986, 53).
Factions supplied their members with some resources under the old 
electoral system. First, factions had been the inluential actor for the 
endorsement of LDP candidates. “For politician- hopefuls seeking LDP 
endorsement, factional backing is virtually indispensable. Faction members 
get irst priority when the party leadership hammers out its endorsement 
list” (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993, 69). Indeed, each faction competed 
for the endorsement of its own faction members during the long rule of 
the LDP. So- called mainstream factions3 managed the LDP endorsement 
policy for their own candidates (Cox and Rosenbluth 1996).
Second, factions furnished their members with inancial support. Jap-
anese politics is often related to money politics, and the important part 
of LDP fund- raising rested with factions. Whereas faction leaders once 
directly distributed their money to their followers, at the end of the 1955 
System the main function of factions changed to providing “credit” and 
opening inancial networks to their members such as fund- raising par-
ties (Sato and Matsuzaki 1986, 61). Cox and Rosenbluth (1993) argue that 
interfactional differences in electoral fate in the 1960 and 1970s stemmed 
from differences in fund- raising success, but the electoral differences dis-
appeared in the 1980s due to the decentralization of factional fund- raising.
Third, LDP factions won cabinet and party posts from the LDP presi-
dent and allocated them to their members. It is known that cabinet and 
party posts were distributed among factions roughly in proportion to their 
number in the Diet.4 The factional proportionality system for person-
nel management (habatsu kinko jinji) started in the early 1970s— during 
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the third Sato cabinet (Sato and Matsuzaki 1986)— or in the mid or late 
1970s— the Miki or Ohira cabinets (Kawato 1996). When conservative and 
progressive strengths in the Diet became balanced in the 1970s, the LDP 
shifted the personnel system from mainstream overrepresentation to fac-
tional proportionality in order to maintain the interfactional coalition as a 
minimal winning coalition (Kawato 1996).
Under SNTV, LDP factions offered these three resources, which were 
adequate to satisfy the rational needs of members, particularly reelection 
(Mayhew 1974). By outsourcing election campaigns to factional organiza-
tions, the LDP solved the dificult problem of dividing votes (hyo- wari). At 
the same time, by allocating cabinet and party posts to factions fairly, the 
LDP avoided critical splits in the party (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993). 
During the SNTV era, factions persisted by performing these essential 
functions.
LDP Factions under MMM
If SNTV shaped LDP factions, the electoral reform should have reorga-
nized the factional structure. Many scholars of Japanese politics argued 
that Japan’s electoral reform in 1994 would break the importance of fac-
tions. Next, we review the previous studies on the transformation of LDP 
factions under MMM. First, factions clearly lost importance in elections 
after the reform. Under MMM, which centers on a single- member system, 
parties need not engage in intraparty competition within each district nor 
outsource election campaigns to factions. One Diet member interviewed 
by Krauss and Pekkanen (2004) observed changes following the electoral 
reform, explaining that “ultimately things are different than in the multi-
member district system” as “nobody looks after you in elections anymore” 
(15). In the 1996 election, factions already lost visible roles in nominating 
candidates in both SMDs and PR lists (Cox, Rosenbluth, and Thies 1999). 
Asano (2006) inds that the importance of factions has declined in the LDP 
endorsement process under MMM and the discretion of the party head-
quarters has clearly increased as a result.
Second, although the fund- raising activity of factions had already been 
decentralized in the 1970s (Cox and Rosenbluth 1993), the LDP’s inancial 
capacity has become vulnerable following the Political Funds Control Act 
reform. The reform in 1994 also included political inance reform, which 
prohibits politicians, their fund management organization (shikin kanri 
dantai), and other political organizations (including factions) from receiv-
ing contributions from companies. Under the new political inance law, 
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only parties5 can receive contributions from companies, so the inancial 
power is centralized to the headquarters. Reed and Thies (2001b) refer 
to an article in a Japanese national newspaper that said, “LDP Diet mem-
bers have been heard complaining that the new system gives the party 
secretary- general6 too much power because he controls the low of the 
party subsidies” (398). On the subject of campaign funding, some scholars 
report that factions have virtually stopped offering funds to their members 
but the secretary- general has been known to prop up feeble candidates 
with monetary support (Ohtake 2003, 63– 67).7
Third, the voice of factions for allocating posts has weakened after the 
electoral reform; however, compared to its other functions, this change has 
come more slowly. With the declining electoral inluence of factions, the 
party headquarters need not heed the voice of factions as they used to, so 
one can expect that the headquarters will allocate cabinet and party posts 
with less regard to the wishes of factions. We can ind striking evidence in 
the formation of cabinets following the reform. The factional proportion-
ality system for allocating cabinet posts has obviously been shaken under 
MMM. For example, Keizo Obuchi, the prime minister from 1998 to 2000, 
used his own discretion in appointing candidates to four ministerial posts 
in forming his irst cabinet (the so- called sosai- waku). Although Obuchi 
allocated other ministerial posts in proportion to each factional power, he 
partly ignored the recommendation lists of factions (Takenaka 2006, 156). 
Junichiro Koizumi, the prime minister from 2001 to 2006, attempted a 
much more radical change. Koizumi completely ignored the recommenda-
tion lists of factions, and he decided the ministerial personnel on his own 
in forming his irst cabinet (Takenaka 2006, 156). In contrast to the radical 
change in ministerial personnel, however, the literature shows that factions 
remain inluential in allocating other positions after the electoral reform. 
Krauss and Pekkanen (2010, chap. 5) show that the rigid seniority system 
and the discrimination against nonfaction members for posts, for example 
Diet committee executive positions and Policy Affairs Research Council 
executive positions, still exist under the new electoral system, although 
they are now weaker than before. Park (2001) explains the matter in terms 
of organizational management. Indeed, as he pointed out, it is hard for the 
party leader to manage several hundred Diet members as a single uniied 
group. After all, the relationship between the electoral reform and the party 
management is indirect, so the change comes slower than other functions.
Finally, factions have no longer been an indispensable key to decide the 
presidency. Under MMM, elections revolve around interparty competi-
tion, and the fate of the party is directly connected with the talent of party 
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leaders. As a result, not only Diet members but also local members and 
supporters come to have a strong incentive to participate in the presiden-
tial election (Uekami 2010). In fact, seven of eleven LDP presidential elec-
tions from 1994 to 2009 after the reform have involved the popular vote 
from party members (toin tohyo) (Uekami 2010, 29). Recently, the popular 
vote has played an important role in selecting the president. It is symbolic 
that Koizumi, who was not a faction leader at the time, defeated Ryutaro 
Hashimoto, then the leader of the largest faction, due to a huge advantage 
in popular votes in the 2001 presidential election. Moreover, the decay of 
factions has reduced factional loyalty. Faction leaders now cannot always 
control their member votes, as can be observed, for example, in the 2007 
presidential election (Krauss and Pekkanen 2010, 140– 41).
In sum, the recent literature concludes that LDP factions cannot select 
candidates and the LDP presidency as they used to due to the electoral 
reform from SNTV to MMM. However, they can still inluence personnel 
management appointments except ministerial posts, which is one of the 
reasons for the continuing existence of factions.
Hypotheses
The presence of LDP factions in elections has weakened, but they still 
retain their power in personnel management. While we basically follow 
this argument, some questions remain. The previous studies are relatively 
indifferent to the consequence of the decline of LDP factionalism, espe-
cially the reciprocal relation between the decay (and persistence) of fac-
tions and the leadership of the headquarters. If the importance of factions 
has declined and their power has been centralized in the party, then the 
party headquarters should use the power for their own beneit. Because 
the previous studies are aimed at the decline of factions themselves, they do 
not suficiently answer the question how the decay of factions results in 
the ascendancy of the party headquarters, speciically the party president.8
To address this question, we examine the long- term transition of the 
president’s success, especially in the recruitment of new Diet members and 
in the allocation of cabinet posts, two of the central functions of factions. 
We begin with the primitive hypothesis: the power of factions is central-
ized with the president due to the electoral reform from SNTV to MMM. 
Assuming that the president desires the rise of his own faction to enhance 
his power, we can rephrase the hypothesis as follows: the power of factions 
is centralized with the president’s faction due to electoral reform.
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First, one can expect that the faction recruitment of new Diet members 
not only has decreased but also has been centralized to the president’s fac-
tion after the electoral reform. Under SNTV, each faction normally did 
not nominate more than one candidate in each district, so the number of 
factions converged to below the maximum number of seats in multimem-
ber districts (Kohno 1992). This means that the faction recruitment of new 
Diet members would have been carried out roughly equally among the 
main factions before 1994.9 On the other hand, under MMM the LDP 
only has to nominate a single candidate in each SMD, so the president 
would try to ind and support candidates on his own. Furthermore, because 
the new political inance law deprives factions of their inancial resources, 
factions are unable to counter the discretion of the president in selecting 
and supporting candidates. If so, under the new electoral system, the presi-
dent’s faction will get priority for the recruitment of new members. Hence, 
we offer the irst hypothesis as follows:
H
1
: After electoral reform, the president’s faction will be more suc-
cessful than other factions in recruiting new members.
Second, one can expect not only that the factional proportionality system 
for the allocation of cabinet posts has broken down but also that cabi-
net posts have been allocated to favor the president’s faction members. As 
stressed above, the electoral importance of factions should decline due to 
the electoral reform, and this should also cause their inluence over person-
nel management decisions to wane. As can be seen from the cases of Obu-
chi and Koizumi, the president’s discretion for the allocation of ministerial 
posts has obviously increased. If so, it is no wonder that the party president 
uses the discretion in order to beneit his own followers. Hence, we offer 
the second hypothesis as follows:
H
2
: After electoral reform, the party president will appoint a dis-
proportionate number of his own faction members to ministerial 
positions.
data
We built two datasets of LDP members of the lower house: (1) the number 
of new members and all members of all LDP factions from 1973 to 2009; 
and (2) the list of cabinet posts and their faction afiliation from the same 
80 Mixed-Member electoral Systems in constitutional context
period (our data includes 45 cabinets from second Sato to Aso).10 With data 
from the 1970s, when the LDP factional structure became stable, to the 
2000s, when the LDP regime ended, we can examine the changes in the 
LDP factional structure before and after the electoral reform in 1994. The 
data are gathered from various issues of Kokkai Binran (The Diet hand-
book)11 (Nihon Seikei Shimbunsha 1972–20 09).12
results
Recruitment of New Members
To test the irst hypothesis, we examine the long- term transition of the fac-
tion recruitment of new Diet members from 1973 to 2009. We expect that 
the president’s faction would gain the largest number of freshmen mem-
bers among all factions under MMM but not under SNTV. Figure 3.1 
shows the number of new lower house members who joined the president’s 
faction and other major factions.13
As we can see, the recruitment success of the president’s faction under 
the two electoral systems differs widely. Under SNTV, the president’s fac-
tion was not at a distinct advantage over other major factions except for the 
two elections in 1979 and 1980 when Masayoshi Ohira was the president.14 
On the other hand, in all elections under MMM, except the 2009 election 
when the LDP was defeated by the Democratic Party of Japan,15 the presi-
dent’s faction achieved the most successful recruitment by a wide margin. 
The president’s (Obuchi) faction gained double the number of newcomers 
compared to the second most successful (Mori) faction in the 1996 and 2000 
elections,16 and the president’s (Mori) faction gained double or triple the 
number of newcomers compared to the second most successful (Hashimoto) 
faction in the 2003 and 2005 elections. Dividing the recruitment number of 
the president’s faction by that of the other most successful faction, the aver-
age of this rate is 1.22 under SNTV but it is 2.17 under MMM.
We also test the irst hypothesis statistically using OLS estimation. In 
the analysis, we estimate the effect of the factional status in the election at 
period t − 1 on the recruitment just before the election at period t.17 The 
results, which are displayed in table 3.1, demonstrate that the president’s fac-
tion under MMM has a distinct advantage for the recruitment of new Diet 
members even while controlling for the effects of factional size and the over-
all success of the LDP. This advantage is statistically unclear under SNTV.
Figure 3.2 also shows the sizes of the president’s factions and other 
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major factions. As we can see, the faction controlling the party presidency 
clearly succeeded in developing its power under MMM but not under 
SNTV. Although there were some successes under SNTV for the presi-
dent’s faction, such as Ohira in 1979 and 1980, the power of major factions 
(except the smaller Miki- Kono faction) was basically balanced regardless of 
which faction controlled the presidency. In contrast, the president’s faction 
was the consistent winner in developing its power under MMM. The size 
of the president’s faction was distinctly larger than other major factions 
after the electoral reform.
Where did the advantage of the president under MMM come from? The 
keys are in the two changes after the electoral reform: the party endorse-
ment process and the party election strategy headquarters. Table 3.2 is 
reproduced from Asano (2006, 65) and shows the number and rates of LDP 
endorsement under SNTV and MMM.18 Under both systems, almost all 
incumbent candidates were endorsed by the LDP, so the best indicator of 
factional power in the endorsement process is whether the nonincumbent 
candidates supported by each faction were endorsed by the LDP. There is 
fig. 3.1. faction recruitment of new lower house members
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a clear difference in the advantage enjoyed by the president’s faction after 
reform. Under SNTV, the president’s faction won 133 endorsements. This 
number is only 0.94 times as large as that of the secretary- general, 1.27 
times that of the chairman of the general council, and 1.13 times that of 
the chairman of the policy research council. By contrast, under MMM, the 
president’s faction won 62 endorsements. This number is 1.32 times that of 
the secretary- general, 1.82 times the chairman of the general council, and 
2.58 times the chairman of the policy research council. That is to say, the 
advantage of the president’s faction in the endorsement process has grown 
stronger under MMM,19 causing the rise of the president’s faction (Asano 
2006, 90– 94).
In addition, the other key to understanding the centralization of LDP 
recruitment is the change of the election strategy headquarters.20 Table 3.3 
shows the history of the election strategy headquarters members.21
The LDP election strategy is mainly determined by the president, 
secretary- general, and director- general of the election bureau (DGEB). At 
fig. 3.2. faction size: all lower house members
 LDP Factions under SNTV and MMM 83
one point, the LDP had stipulated that the secretary- general could not be 
selected from the president’s faction (so- kan bunri).22 Since the Miki cabinet, 
this rule had only been broken once, by the irst Ohira cabinet. Junichiro 
Koizumi, however, evidently abolished this custom, because he appointed 
fellow Mori faction member Shinzo Abe as secretary- general in 2003– 4. 
Although Koizumi also appointed Yamasaki faction leader Taku Yamasaki 
in 2001– 3 and Yamasaki faction member Tsutomu Takebe in 2004– 6 to the 
secretary- general post, the Yamasaki faction was not one of the ive major 
factions but instead one of the newer factions that had emerged since 1998. 
Moreover, in the Koizumi presidency, the DGEB position was allocated 
to the president’s Mori faction, the smaller emerging Nikai faction, and 
the emerging Yamasaki faction. Probably, Koizumi intended to construct a 
president- centered election strategy headquarters.
Finally, we also examine emerging factions after the electoral reform. 
Figure 3.3 shows the number of new lower house members who joined 
tABLE 3.1. oLS Estimates Predicting Faction recruitment
 
Dependent Variable = Faction Recruitment
i,t
1973– 93 (SNTV) 1996–20 09 (MMM)
 Coef. Robust s.e. t-value  Coef. Robust s.e. t-value  
(CONSTANT) – 5.523 3.353 – 1.94 – 3.605 1.123 – 3.09 *
LDP’s Recruitment
t
0.126 0.078 1.91 0.092 0.020 4.51 **
Factional Size
i,t– 1
0.153 0.035 5.32 ** 0.118 0.027 4.88 **
President
i,t– 1
1.644 1.437 1.20 9.818 2.829 4.06 **
Secretary- General
i,t– 1
0.304 1.145 0.18 0.075 0.942 0.06
Electoral Reform         
 Adj- R2 0.387 0.811
 N- obs 50  28  
1973– 2009 (SNTV- MMM)
 Coef. Robust s.e. t-value  
(CONSTANT) – 5.020 1.113 – 4.45 ***
LDP’s Recruitment
t
0.105 0.025 4.16 **
Factional Size
i,t– 1
0.151 0.028 6.97 ***
President
i,t– 1




Electoral Reform 0.451 0.941 0.51  
 Adj- R2 0.499
 N- obs 78      
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1.
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emerging factions after the electoral reform. As we can see, the Yamasaki 
faction controlling the secretary- general (2001– 3; 2004– 6)/DGEB (2006) 
and the Nikai faction controlling the DGEB (2004– 5) had a relative advan-
tage for the recruitment of freshmen members among emerging factions. 
In particular, the Nikai faction gained a large number of new members in 
proportion to its size after the 2005 election. Figure 3.4 shows the sizes of 








President’s 415 4 419 99.0%
Secretary- General’s 443 4 447 99.1%
General Council Chair’s 379 3 382 99.2%
Policy Research Council Chair’s 358 1 359 99.2%
Other (Including Nonfaction) 1166 15 1,181 99.7%
 Total 2,761 27 2,788 (99.8%)
(average)
Non- Incumbent
President’s 133 36 169 78.7%
Secretary- General’s 141 38 179 78.8%
General Council Chair’s 105 38 143 73.4%
Policy Research Council Chair’s 118 68 186 63.4%
Other (Including Nonfaction) 423 943 1,366 31.0%




President’s 131 0 131 100%
Secretary- General’s 138 0 138 100%
General Council Chair’s 138 1 139 99.3%
Policy Research Council Chair’s 108 1 109 99.1%
Other (Including Nonfaction) 192 50 242 79.3%
 Total 707 52 759 (93.1%)
(average)
Non- Incumbent
President’s 62 1 63 98.4%
Secretary- General’s 47 1 48 97.9%
General Council Chair’s 34 8 42 81%
Policy Research Council Chair’s 24 1 25 96%
Other (Including Nonfaction) 229 255 484 47%
 Total 396 266 662 (59.8%)
(average)
Source: Asano (2006, 65).
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emerging factions. Again, the Yamasaki faction and the Nikai faction suc-
ceeded in steadily increasing their power, while other emerging factions 
(the Kono- Aso faction and the Ozato- Tanigaki faction) relatively failed to 
increase their power. We can see that not only controlling the presidency 
but also controlling the secretary- general and DGEB would be directly 
connected with the fate of emerging factions under MMM. By delegat-
ing power to the smaller emerging factions, Koizumi may have cleverly 
avoided the rise of the other ive major factions.
Allocation of Cabinet Posts
To test the second hypothesis, we examine the allocation of cabinet posts 
from 1973 to 2009.23 We expect to observe not only that the faction pro-
portionality system for ministers has been broken after the electoral reform 
but also that the presidents have come to allocate a disproportionate num-
ber of ministerial positions to their own faction. Thus, in this section, we 
test the two questions: whether or not the faction proportionality system 
exists; and whether or not the president’s faction is overrepresented.
Figure 3.5 shows the faction disproportionality of 44 cabinets during the 
period in question (1973– 2009).24 The value for each cabinet is measured 
as follows: (1) subtracting a seat share of a faction from its cabinet share; 
(2) adding up the absolute values of the share distance of all factions.25 In 
igure 3.5, the faction disproportionality has dramatically increased since 
2000.26 The disproportionality of the reshufled second Mori cabinet is 
37.45, the value of the irst Koizumi cabinet is 52.06, and the value of the 
irst Koizumi cabinet (the irst reshufled) is 69.92, respectively. These val-
ues are clearly higher than previously experienced, because the average of 
the cabinets under SNTV was only 23.74.
Although it is reasonable to suggest that the high disproportionality of 
the Koizumi cabinet was caused by his personnel discretion (as explained 
above), we have to ind another explanation for the rise of the dispropor-
tionality in the reshufled second Mori cabinet.27 There are two causes. 
The irst is the central government reform in 2001. This reform, which 
was approved during the second Hashimoto cabinet, reduced the number 
of ministries and government ofices from one ofice and 22 ministries and 
agencies to one ofice and 12 ministries and agencies. The reshufled sec-
ond Mori cabinet was the irst cabinet after the adoption of this system. 
Because of the reduction of ministerial posts, the disproportionality of the 
reshufled second Mori cabinet increased.
The second cause is the rise of emerging factions. Since 1998, the intra-
tABLE 3.3. LdP Election Strategy Headquarters, 1973– 2009
LDP election strategy headquarters
Ed. Yr. Mo. Cabinet President Sec.- Gen. DGEB
46 1973 2 2nd Tanaka STT- OHT STT- OHT STT- OHT
47 1973 8 2nd Tanaka STT- OHT STT- OHT STT- OHT
48 1974 2 2nd Tanaka (1st R) STT- OHT STT- OHT STT- OHT
49 1974 8 2nd Tanaka (1st R) STT- OHT STT- OHT STT- OHT
50 1975 2 Miki MK- K KNW- KI KNW- KI
51 1976 2 Miki MK- K KNW- KI KNW- KI
52 1976 8 Miki MK- K KNW- KI KNW- KI
53 1977 2 Fukuda.T KFA- MMM IMOM- KHK NON
54 1977 8 Fukuda.T (R) KFA- MMM IMOM- KHK NON
55 1978 2 Fukuda.T (R) KFA- MMM IMOM- KHK FUNADA
56 1978 8 Fukuda.T (R) KFA- MMM IMOM- KHK FUNADA
57 1979 2 1st Ohira IMOM- KHK IMOM- KHK IMOM- KHK
58 1979 8 1st Ohira IMOM- KHK IMOM- KHK IMOM- KHK
59 1979 11 2nd Ohira IMOM- KHK KNW- KI IMOM- KHK
60 1980 2 2nd Ohira IMOM- KHK KNW- KI IMOM- KHK
61 1980 8 Suzuki IMOM- KHK KNW- KI KFA- MMM
62 1981 2 Suzuki IMOM- KHK KNW- KI KFA- MMM
63 1981 8 Suzuki IMOM- KHK KNW- KI KFA- MMM
64 1982 2 Suzuki (R) IMOM- KHK STT- OHT IMOM- KHK
65 1982 8 Suzuki (R) IMOM- KHK STT- OHT IMOM- KHK
66 1982 12 1st Nakasone KNW- KI STT- OHT (Omitted)
67 1983 2 1st Nakasone KNW- KI STT- OHT STT- OHT
68 1983 8 1st Nakasone KNW- KI STT- OHT STT- OHT
69 1984 2 2nd Nakasone KNW- KI IMOM- KHK IMOM- KHK
70 1984 8 2nd Nakasone KNW- KI IMOM- KHK IMOM- KHK
71 1985 2 2nd Nakasone (1st R) KNW- KI STT- OHT STT- OHT
72 1985 8 2nd Nakasone (1st R) KNW- KI STT- OHT STT- OHT
73 1986 2 2nd Nakasone (2nd R)KNW- KI STT- OHT KNW- KI
74 1986 8 3rd Nakasone KNW- KI STT- OHT KNW- KI
75 1987 2 3rd Nakasone KNW- KI STT- OHT KNW- KI
76 1987 8 3rd Nakasone KNW- KI STT- OHT KNW- KI
77 1987 12 Takeshita STT- OHT KFA- MMM KFA- MMM
78 1988 2 Takeshita STT- OHT KFA- MMM KFA- MMM
79 1988 8 Takeshita STT- OHT KFA- MMM KFA- MMM
80 1989 2 Takeshita (R) STT- OHT KFA- MMM KFA- MMM
81 1989 8 1st Kaifu MK- K STT- OHT STT- OHT
82 1990 2 2nd Kaifu MK- K STT- OHT IMOM- KHK
83 1990 8 2nd Kaifu MK- K STT- OHT IMOM- KHK
84 1991 2 2nd Kaifu (R) MK- K STT- OHT KFA- MMM
85 1991 8 2nd Kaifu (R) MK- K STT- OHT KFA- MMM





LDP election strategy headquarters
Ed. Yr. Mo. President Sec.- Gen. DGEB
 87 1992 8 Miyazawa IMOM- KHK STT- OHT STT- OHT
 88 1993 2 Miyazawa (R) IMOM- KHK STT- OHT IMOM- KHK
 89 1993 8 Hosokawa IMOM- KHK KFA- MMM IMOM- KHK
 90 1994 2 Hosokawa IMOM- KHK KFA- MMM IMOM- KHK
 91 1994 8 Murayama IMOM- KHK KFA- MMM IMOM- KHK
 92 1995 2 Murayama IMOM- KHK KFA- MMM IMOM- KHK
 93 1995 8 Murayama (R) IMOM- KHK KFA- MMM IMOM- KHK
 94 1996 2 1st Hashimoto STT- OHT IMOM- KHK IMOM- KHK
 95 1996 8 1st Hashimoto STT- OHT IMOM- KHK IMOM- KHK
 96 1996 12 2nd Hashimoto STT- OHT IMOM- KHK IMOM- KHK
 97 1997 2 2nd Hashimoto STT- OHT IMOM- KHK IMOM- KHK
 98 1997 8 2nd Hashimoto STT- OHT IMOM- KHK IMOM- KHK
 99 1998 2 2nd Hashimoto (R) STT- OHT IMOM- KHK IMOM- KHK
100 1998 8 Obuchi STT- OHT KFA- MMM KFA- MMM
101 1999 2 Obuchi (1st R) STT- OHT KFA- MMM KFA- MMM
102 1999 8 Obuchi (1st R) STT- OHT KFA- MMM KFA- MMM
103 2000 2 Obuchi (2nd R) STT- OHT KFA- MMM STT- OHT
104 2000 8 2nd Mori KFA- MMM STT- OHT STT- OHT
105 2001 2 2nd Mori (2nd R) KFA- MMM IMOM- KHK STT- OHT
106 2001 5 1st Koizumi KFA- MMM Y KFA- MMM
107 2001 8 1st Koizumi KFA- MMM Y KFA- MMM
108 2002 2 1st Koizumi KFA- MMM Y KFA- MMM
109 2002 8 1st Koizumi (1st R) KFA- MMM Y KFA- MMM
110 2003 2 1st Koizumi (1st R) KFA- MMM Y KFA- MMM
111 2003 8 1st Koizumi (1st R) KFA- MMM Y KFA- MMM
Other 2003 9 1st Koizumi (2nd R) KFA- MMM KFA- MMM KFA- MMM
112 2003 12 2nd Koizumi KFA- MMM KFA- MMM KFA- MMM
113 2004 2 2nd Koizumi KFA- MMM KFA- MMM KFA- MMM
114 2004 8 2nd Koizumi KFA- MMM KFA- MMM KFA- MMM
115 2005 2 2nd Koizumi (R) KFA- MMM Y N
116 2005 8 2nd Koizumi (R) KFA- MMM Y N
117 2005 10 3rd Koizumi KFA- MMM Y N
118 2006 2 3rd Koizumi (R) KFA- MMM Y Y
119 2006 8 Abe KFA- MMM KFA- MMM KNW- KI
120 2007 2 Abe KFA- MMM KFA- MMM KNW- KI
121 2007 8 Fukuda.Y KFA- MMM KNW- KI IMOM- KHK
122 2008 2 Fukuda.Y KFA- MMM KNW- KI IMOM- KHK
123 2008 8 Fukuda.Y (R) KFA- MMM KA IMOM- KHK
124 2009 2 Aso KA KFA- MMM IMOM- KHK
Notes: Horizontal lines indicate lower house general elections. Because of the restriction of the information 
source, this table does not include all cabinets and all election strategy headquarters.
fig. 3.3. faction recruitment of new lower house members (emerging 
factions)
(Note: See the appendix for information on ldP factions’ acronyms.)
fig. 3.4. faction size: all members (emerging factions)
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factional strife within LDP factions has become obvious, and this strife 
led to the secession of emerging factions in the LDP. For example, the 
Yamasaki faction seceded from the Watanabe faction in November 1998, 
the Kono group seceded from the Miyazawa faction in December 1999, 
and the Horiuchi faction seceded from the Kato faction in January 2001.28 
With the reduction of allocable cabinet posts, the increase of the num-
ber of factions complicates the observance of the faction proportionality 
system. Because the solidarity of factions has been weakened by MMM, 
it is reasonable to understand the new factions as indirect effects of the 
electoral reform.
Next, igure 3.6 shows the cabinet shares of the president’s faction from 
1973 to 2009. If the faction proportionality system exists, then the cabi-
net share of the president’s faction should correspond to its seat share in 
the Diet. As we can see, the cabinet share of the president’s faction has 
fig. 3.5. faction disproportionality for minister
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been disconnected from that faction’s seat share following electoral reform, 
especially after Koizumi. Under SNTV, the seat share of the president’s 
faction has relatively corresponded to its cabinet share. On the other hand, 
under MMM presidents have more often overrepresented their own fac-
tion members in the cabinet.29
However, it is contrary to our theoretical expectation that the presi-
dents under MMM have not always disproportionally allocated minis-
terial posts to their own faction members. Some presidents failed not 
only to reap a surplus profit but even to secure a proportional number 
of cabinet posts for their faction. If the president’s discretion for per-
sonnel management has been strengthened by electoral reform, why 
doesn’t the president always form the best cabinet for him? To answer 
this new question, we must revise the second hypothesis and reanalyze 
our data.
fig. 3.6. cabinet shares of president’s faction
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Additional Analyses
Hypothesis
Our indings in the preceding section suggest that the faction proportion-
ality system for ministers has been broken and the president’s discretion for 
the allocation of cabinet posts has strengthened, but the president has not 
always executed the overrepresentation strategy for his own faction. This 
runs contrary to our original expectation.
Here, we introduce a new variable to our research: the popularity of 
the president (prime minister). Recently, some scholars have highlighted 
the importance of the popularity of the prime minister under MMM (Ito 
2006; Takenaka 2006). Ito (2006, 28) argues that under MMM the prime 
minister becomes the party’s public face, and Diet members understand 
that a high cabinet approval rating is a public good shared by all members 
of the party. When Koizumi formed his cabinet, most members went along 
with him and even faction leaders refrained from lodging direct criticism 
against him.30 We agree with this sentiment entirely, but the argument has 
not been examined statistically. Therefore, according to the explanation, 
we revise the second hypothesis as follows:31
H
2
*: After electoral reform, the party president with high popularity 
will appoint a disproportionate number of his own faction mem-
bers to ministerial positions.
We employ two control variables to predict the overrepresentation of the 
president’s faction. Kawato (1996, 126) argues that the LDP is more likely 
to employ a proportional system when it is a minimum winning coalition 
than when it is an oversized coalition because the withdrawal of any fac-
tion from the party could cause the LDP to lose its majority in the former 
situation but not in the latter. Thus, we employ two variables: (1) the size 
of the LDP in the lower house, and (2) the effective number of factions.32
Data
Here, we added new data for cabinet approval rates from 1973 to 2009. 
The information source is various issues of Jiji Seron Chosa Tokuho [Jiji pub-
lic opinion poll special bulletin] (Jiji Tsushinsha 1991– 2009) and its compi-
lations (Jiji Tsushinsha 1981, 1992).
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Results
Figure 3.7 shows the transition of the president’s overrepresentation rates 
and the cabinet approval rates in the month when a cabinet is formed. The 
overrepresentation rate is measured by subtracting the seat share of the 
president’s faction from its cabinet share. Both variables are standardized 
in igure 3.7. We can conirm the rough correspondence between both 
variables under MMM, but the relationship is unclear under SNTV. For 
example, in the irst Koizumi cabinet and the irst reshufled irst Koizumi 
cabinet, Koizumi, bolstered by high popularity, formed a bold cabinet that 
clearly advantaged his Mori faction members. In the second reshufled irst 
Koizumi cabinet, however, he came to restrain the overrepresentation of 
his own followers. The change from the irst Abe cabinet to the reshufled 
irst Abe cabinet is a similar case.33
We test the revised second hypothesis statistically using OLS estima-
tion.34 We estimate the effect of the cabinet approval rate on the cabinet 
fig. 3.7. cabinet shares and cabinet approval rates
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share of the president’s faction controlling its seat share.35 The results are 
shown in table 3.4. The results demonstrate that the prime minister with 
the high (low) cabinet approval rate allocates a large (small) number of 
ministerial positions to its own faction members under MMM, but this 
mechanism is not statistically signiicant under SNTV. Moreover, the 
seat share of the president’s faction has a weaker relation with its cabinet 
share under MMM than under SNTV. In general, the electoral reform has 
shifted the resource of the president’s power from his power base within 
the party to his popularity among the nation. The indings in igure 3.7 are 
also examined statistically.
In addition, we also investigate the causes of the faction dispropor-
tionality for ministers statistically using OLS estimation.36 The results in 
the analysis are displayed in table 3.5. The results demonstrate that the 
prime minister with a large number of factions and high popularity is likely 
to deviate from the faction proportionality system under MMM but not 
under SNTV.
tABLE 3.4. oLS Estimates Predicting Cabinet Share
Dependent Variable = Disproportionality for Minister
t
1972–1 993 (SNTV) 1996–20 09 (MMM)
Coef. Robust s.e. t-value  Coef. Robust s.e. t-value  
(CONSTANT) – 13.734 26.767 – 0.51 38.315 13.141 2.92 *
LDP’s Size 
(%) t
0.065 0.280 0.23 – 0.400 0.243 – 1.64
Number of Factions 
t
1.683 2.357 0.71 – 2.633 2.286 – 1.15
Seat Share 
(%) t
0.891 0.200 4.46 *** 0.449 0.226 1.99 †
Approval Rates 
(%) t
0.056 0.105 0.53 0.300 0.057 5.22 ***
Electoral Reform         
 Adj- R2 0.340 0.490
 N- obs 24  20  
1972– 2009 (SNTV- MMM)
Coef. Robust s.e. t-value  
(CONSTANT) 22.582 11.529 1.96 †
LDP’s Size 
(%) t
– 0.312 0.186 – 1.67
Number of Factions 
t
– 1.324 1.419 – 0.93
Seat Share 
(%) t
0.755 0.172 4.39 ***
Approval Rates 
(%) t
0.179 0.057 3.12 **
Electoral Reform 1.567 1.844 0.85  
 Adj- R2 0.358
 N- obs 44     
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1.
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To summarize, the faction proportionality system has not been main-
tained under MMM. The president’s discretion for the allocation of cabi-
net posts has clearly strengthened, especially after Koizumi. The personnel 
power of the president under MMM, however, depends on his national 
popularity at that time.
Ultimately, this effect stems from Japan’s constitutional system. 
Although the importance of factions has declined under MMM, they are 
still latent actors. This is because prime ministers always have to control a 
majority in the Diet and factions can extract some resources from unpopu-
lar prime ministers by threatening to hold a vote of no conidence or to 
leave the party outright.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the transformation of LDP factions under 
SNTV and MMM. Under MMM, in which interparty competition is the 
focus, the presence of factions declines because factions are primarily ori-
tABLE 3.5. oLS Estimates Predicting disproportionality
Dependent Variable = Cabinet Share of the President’s Faction
t
1972– 1993 (SNTV) 1996– 2009 (MMM)
 Coef. Robust s.e.(1) t-value  Coef. Robust s.e. t-value  
(CONSTANT) – 52.055 50.639 – 1.03 – 86.273 21.759 – 3.96 **
LDP’s Size 
(%) t
0.618 0.523 1.18 0.576 0.491 1.17
Number of Factions 
t
8.147 4.771 1.71 11.714 2.657 4.41 ***
Approval Rates 
(%) t
– 0.162 0.192 – 0.85 0.398 0.165 2.41 *
Electoral Reform         
 Adj- R2 0.054 0.485
 N- obs 24  20  
1972– 2009 (SNTV- MMM)
 Coef. Robust s.e. t-value  
(CONSTANT) – 87.013 19.683 – 4.420 ***
LDP’s Size 
(%) t
0.684 0.348 1.960 †
Number of Factions 
t




Electoral Reform 4.693 3.344 1.400  
 Adj- R2 0.451
 N- obs 44    
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1, (1) Newey- West standard errors with one lag.
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ented toward intraparty competition. The diminution of their electoral 
importance also weakens their voice in personnel management. More-
over, the decay of factions leads to the relative ascendancy of the president. 
Indeed, we conirmed that two of a faction’s main functions— recruiting 
new members and allocating cabinet posts— have not only declined but 
also been centralized to the president (or the president’s faction) after the 
electoral reform in 1994.
Under MMM, by controlling the party endorsement policy and the 
election strategy headquarters, the president has succeeded in recruiting 
freshmen members and expanding their power within the LDP. The fall of 
the electoral presence of factions also has indirectly caused the weakening 
of factions’ inluence on personnel management. Although once the LDP 
had adopted the rigid faction proportionality system, the system has bro-
ken down following the electoral reform, especially after Koizumi.
While the president’s discretion over personnel management has 
increased, he cannot always form cabinets at will. Under MMM, there is 
a close relationship between the overrepresentation of the president’s fac-
tion in the cabinet and the national popularity of the president. This can be 
understood in terms of the interaction between MMM and Japan’s parlia-
mentary system. Under a parliamentary system, the prime minister always 
has to control a majority in the Diet. On the other hand, under MMM, 
elections focus on interparty competition, so the popularity of the party 
president becomes directly connected with the fate of the party. While a 
prime minister who enjoys high popularity enjoys considerable discretion 
and can largely ignore factions, factions can draw concessions from less 
popular prime ministers by threatening a vote of no conidence or separa-
tion from the party. MMM has signiicantly reduced the importance of 
factions, but they continue to exist because they remain latent actors, espe-
cially for personnel management, under the parliamentary system.
96 Mixed-Member electoral Systems in constitutional context
a P P e n d i x :  l i S t  o f  l d P  fa c t i o n S ’  a c r o n y M S
 LDP Factions under SNTV and MMM 97
n o t e S
 1. Prior to the 2000 election, there were 200 PR seats.
 2. See Reed and Thies (2001a) on the history of the electoral reform in 1994.
 3. This term simply indicates “factions which had supported the winning candi-
date in the most recent party presidential contest” (Cox and Rosenbluth 1996, 263).
 4. More strictly, Sato and Matsuzaki (1986, 63– 66) distinguish three types of 
LDP personnel systems: (1) faction power proportionality method, (2) factional 
representation method, and (3) all members participation method. Krauss and 
Pekkanen (2010, 113– 14) explain the three systems in English (the English equiva-
lents also follow them). According to Sato and Matsuzaki, for example, the irst 
method is applied to ministers, the second method to deputy secretary- generals, 
and the third method to parliamentary vice- ministers.
 5. Including local chapters of parties and political fund organization (seiji shikin 
dantai), of which each party can establish only one.
 6. The secretary- general (kanji- cho) is the second highest party post in the LDP. 
It administers (1) the raising and distribution of party funds, (2) the allocation of 
party posts and advising the president on the allocation cabinet posts, and (3) deci-
sions on election strategies on the whole (Ohtake 2003, 66).
 7. The inancial distribution within factions, however, has not completely dis-
appeared after the electoral reform. For example, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported 
that the Obuchi faction and Eto- Kamei faction distributed three million yen per 
capita to their members for immediate use in campaigning before the 2000 election 
(Yomiuri Shimbun, May 6, 2000, 4; cited in Asano [2006, 43]).
 8. Our research on faction recruitment, however, was greatly inluenced by 
Asano’s (2006) pioneer work on the changes in the LDP endorsement process fol-
lowing the electoral reform.
 9. In reality, four large factions and one small faction shared candidates of each 
district depending on their size, because only about a third of all districts under 
SNTV were maximum (ive) member districts (Kohno 1992, 390).
 10. Five cabinets from the Hosokawa to the 1st Hashimoto in 1993– 6, however, 
are excluded from our analysis, because four cabinets were not dominated by the 
LDP and one cabinet was the special case of the LDP regime during the party 
realignment period. The irst Mori cabinet (2000) is also excluded, because this 
cabinet is the provisional cabinet that took over all ministers and parliamentary 
vice- ministers from the reshufled Obuchi cabinet (the so- called inuki naikaku).
 11. Kokkai Binran (The Diet handbook) gives information about the factional 
afiliation of all LDP members of the Diet.
 12. We secondarily referred to Hata’s work (Hata 2001).
 13. There are ive major factions in the LDP. They come from the factions of 
ive leaders: Eisaku Sato, Nobusuke Kishi, Hayato Ikeda, Ichiro Kono, and Takeo 
Miki. All leaders except Kono became the prime minister. See the appendix to this 
chapter for information on the series of ive major factions.
 14. It is known that the irst and second Ohira cabinets were faced with ierce 
conlict between mainstream and nonmainstream factions. Ohira’s election strategy 
for the expansion of mainstream factions was strongly criticized by nonmainstream 
factions (for example, Yomiuri Shimbun, October 4, 1979, 2; October 14, 1979, 2). In 
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the 1980 election (Ohira died suddenly just before the poll), the relative advantage 
of the Ohira faction may have been caused by the sudden dissolution of the Diet in 
which most factions were not ready to ind fresher candidates (for example, Yomiuri 
Shimbun, June 3, 1980, 3).
 15. In the 2009 election, the number of LDP newcomers- elect was only ive.
 16. Although the president Yoshiro Mori (the Mori faction) contested the 2000 
election, we coded the Obuchi faction as the president’s faction only in the 2000 
election, because the irst Mori cabinet (April– July 2000) was substantially the pro-
visional government from the sudden death of Obuchi. Of course, in the same way, 
we can understand this election as the special case that the former president’s fac-
tion (which controlled the secretary- general at that time) wielded the power over 
recruitment against the “provisional” president.
 17. The dependent variable is Faction Recruitment (the number of new lower 
house members of the faction
i
) just before the t election. There are ive indepen-
dent variables: (1) LDP’s Recruitment (the total number of new lower house mem-
bers in the whole LDP at period t); (2) Factional Size (the number of all lower house 
members of faction
i
 at period t − 1); (3) President (a dummy variable that is equal to 
1 if faction
i
 controls the presidency at period t − 1); (4) Secretary- General (a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if faction
i
 controls the secretary- general at period t − 1); 
and (5) Electoral Reform (a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the faction contests 
the t − 1 election after 1994).
Our observations are 78 factions (including the same individuals) that existed 
from period t − 1 through period t. We tested the three methods: pooled OLS 
model; ixed effects model; and random effects model, using F test, Breusch- Pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier test, and Hausman test. The results of the three tests sup-
ported a pooled OLS model in all equations. Robust standard errors in table 3.1 are 
adjusted for clustering at the faction level.
 18. We have to be careful about the difference between our and Asano’s data 
coding of the 2000 election. As stated above, we coded the factional status in the 
2000 election based on the data of the reshufled Obuchi cabinet, but Asano coded 
it based on the data of the irst Mori cabinet. However, we can basically obtain the 
same results, even if Asano’s data is modiied according to our data coding.
 19. In the 2005 election the ascendancy of the president’s faction waned because 
Koizumi endorsed a large number of nonfaction candidates as so- called assassin 
candidates (shikaku koho) (Asano 2006, 88– 90). Although our research with this 
chapter has had to omit this effect, it should be understood as an example of party 
centralization.
 20. The LDP’s organization of its election strategy is rather complicated. We 
focus on three positions controlling the election strategy: the president, secretary- 
general, and director- general of the election bureau (senkyo taisaku kyokucho, or 
soumu kyokucho).
 21. See the appendix for information on the LDP factions’ acronyms.
 22. The system started with the Shiina decision (Shiina saitei) in 1974, which 
decided Tanaka’s successor (then president Kakuei Tanaka lost his presidency 
because of a scandal). The party headquarters, including Etsusaburo Shiina, 
the vice- president of the Tanaka cabinet (1972– 74), decided that Takeo Miki be 
appointed as the next president. At the same time, they also “reached a consensus 
 LDP Factions under SNTV and MMM 99
on ive points, including the principle that the secretary general, inance commit-
tee chairman, and accounting bureau chief would not be selected from among the 
party president’s faction” (Masumi 1995,161).
 23. In this chapter, we observe only ministerial positions. Although the allocation 
pattern of parliamentary vice- minister, senior vice- minister, and vice- minister posi-
tions is also an interesting theme, these positions have less importance in elections 
than ministerial positions. For example, it is known that the LDP applies an “all 
members participation” method (the position is allocated to all LDP members who 
achieve two or three reelections) to the parliamentary vice- minister (Sato and Mat-
suzaki 1986, 63– 66). And, here, we do not consider the career pattern and relative 
importance of each ministerial post (Kobayashi 2012; Ono 2012).
 24. We investigated 44 cabinets from the second Tanaka cabinet to the Aso cabi-
net (except the Hosokawa, Hata, Murayama, reshufled Murayama, irst Hashi-
moto, and irst Mori cabinets). Strictly speaking, the second Tanaka cabinet started 
on December 22, 1972, so some igures in this section start from “1972.”
 25. Both include only faction members in the lower house.
 26. The upturn in the reshufled Miyazawa cabinet (1992) was caused by the 
secession of the Hata faction from the Takeshita faction. Because the Hata faction 
failed in gaining positions in the cabinet, it extended the whole of the dispropor-
tionality.
 27. Indeed, at that time, the opposition parties criticized the faction proportion-
ality personnel of the reshufled second Mori cabinet (Yomiuri Shimbun. December 
6, 2000, 4).
 28. Actually, major members of the Kato faction accompanied the Horiuchi fac-
tion, so we coded the Horiuchi faction as one of ive major factions in this paper.
 29. The average of the absolute distances between the cabinet share of the presi-
dent’s faction and its seat share in each cabinet is 3.36% under SNTV, while that is 
6.07% under MMM.
 30. Krauss and Pekkanen (2004) offer a similar view on Koizumi’s discretion in 
forming a cabinet: “Moreover, as Koizumi’s popularity waned, his ability to disre-
gard factions in selecting even cabinet members disappeared” (16).
 31. Taking a similar view, Ono (2012) offers a sophisticated analysis of the LDP 
portfolio allocation. He argues that LDP presidents with a weaker power base 
within the party or lower popularity among the nation had surrendered more cabi-
net posts to other factions from 1960 to 2007, but he inds that the electoral reform 
in 1994 had no effect. In contrast, our analysis demonstrates that the close relation-
ship between the cabinet share of the president’s faction and the popularity of the 
president is statistically unique or more remarkable to the MMM era (at least in 
comparison with the 1970– 90s’ SNTV era when the LDP intraparty system was 
stable).
 32. The effective number of factions is calculated by Laakso and Taagepera’s for-
mula (Laakso and Taagepera 1979).
 33. When Koizumi and Abe formed cabinets that treated other factions more 
fairly, a national newspaper emphasized a stereotype of “party unity” (kyoto taisei) 
(Yomiuri Shimbun, September 23, 2003, 4; August 29, 2007, 4). This phrase demon-
strates one side of the relationship between the prime minister’s leadership and his 
popularity.
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 34. The Breusch- Godfrey LM test indicates the absence of irst- order serial cor-
relation in each model.
 35. The dependent variable is Cabinet Share of the President’s Faction (the cabinet 
share of the president’s faction in the lower house). There are ive independent 
variables: (1) LDP’s Size (the seat share of the LDP in the lower house); (2) Number 
of Factions (the effective number of LDP factions in the lower house); (3) Seat Share 
(the seat share of the president’s faction in lower house faction members of the 
LDP); (4) Approval Rates (the cabinet approval rating in the month when the cabi-
net is formed); (5) Electoral Reform (a dummy variable that is equal to 1 after 1994).
 36. The Breusch- Godfrey LM test indicates the absence of irst- order serial cor-
relation in each model, except the model of the STNV era. Therefore, we report 
the Newey- West standard errors for irst- order serial correlation in this model.
The dependent variable is Disproportionality for Minister (the sum of the abso-
lute distances between the cabinet share and its seat share for each faction in the 
lower house). The independent variables are the same as in table 3.4, except (3).
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Executive Competition, Electoral rules, 
and Faction Systems in taiwan
Nathan F. Batto and Hsin- ta Huang
It is sometimes assumed that politics in Taiwan mirrors politics in Japan. 
Taiwan is a former Japanese colony, and it inherited much of its present 
institutional structure from the Japanese who were largely copying their 
own Meiji- era institutions back home. During the latter half of the 20th 
century, both countries experienced a long period of single- party domi-
nance, electoral reform from SNTV to MMM, the rise of a longtime 
opposition party to power, and fast economic growth. Further, the KMT 
is often assumed to be a mirror of the LDP, and both were longtime ruling 
parties with strong clientelistic proclivities. Thus it is not unreasonable to 
expect KMT factions to operate in a similar manner to the LDP factions 
described by Kobayashi and Tsukiyama in chapter 3 of this volume. How-
ever, the KMT’s internal factions have not mirrored the LDP’s. Instead of 
national factions, the KMT factions are primarily local. Further, instead of 
multiple factions, there are usually two KMT factions in each area. Finally, 
while the LDP factions competed primarily for top party positions and 
parliamentary seats in SNTV elections, KMT factions are focused primar-
ily on winning control of local governments. Surprisingly, it is the longtime 
opposition DPP’s factions that look much more like the LDP’s.
Taiwanese factions have been shaped primarily by executive compe-
tition. However, factions have not necessarily organized to capture the 
national executive. Rather, they have competed over the most desirable 
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post that was attainable to them at the time. KMT local factions have 
always been oriented around control of local governments, and this has 
led to bifactional systems. DPP factions were initially shaped for winning 
control of the national party bureaucracy as well as winning seats in the 
legislature, and multiple factions lourished. Since the presidency became a 
viable goal, DPP factions have undergone signiicant upheavals, and most 
of them have been related to competition over the presidency.
Electoral reform from SNTV to MMM has had a limited impact on 
Taiwan’s factions. For one thing, KMT local factions maintained bifac-
tionalism in spite of SNTV, not because of it. MMM has done little to 
upset the preexisting faction systems. For another, the reform covered the 
national legislature only and did not extend to local assemblies or internal 
party elections. Just as the presidency is not always the critical executive 
post around which factions compete, the rules used to elect the national 
legislature are not necessarily the only pertinent important electoral rules.
In this chapter, we examine the recent evolution of KMT local fac-
tions and DPP national factions. For the KMT, we focus extensively on 
the Taichung County Red and Black factions, which have dominated local 
politics since the 1950s. For the DPP, we retrace the twists and turns of 
the factional struggle, as various factions are born, form alliances, ight bit-
terly, splinter, and disintegrate altogether. The discussion of the KMT is 
informed by extensive interviews with local politicians in Taichung,1 while 
the section on the DPP relies heavily on newspaper accounts.
KMt Local Factions
There are multitudes of local factions in Taiwan, and it is consequently 
extremely dificult to make statements that apply to all of them. However, 
we can make a few generalizations about the characteristics and goals of 
almost all local factions.2 First, local factions are geographically bounded. 
They are formed along local administrative boundaries, and their activities 
are conined within this geographical area. The largest factions operate 
within the boundaries of a single county, while smaller factions appear in 
smaller administrative districts, such as townships. Second, most factions 
grew out of competition among local elites over political posts, such as 
township mayor, county assembly seats, and especially for the county mag-
istrate.3 This competition created two or more local factions that have been 
deined, in part, by their competition with and opposition to each other. 
Third, factions are informal structures. However, factional afiliations for 
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faction bosses and other prominent politicians are usually widely known. 
Interviews reveal very little ambiguity among insiders about who belongs 
to which faction. Fourth, the overriding goal that motivates factions is to 
secure political, economic, and social interests. This can be done by tak-
ing as many political posts as possible and by cooperating with the KMT. 
Fifth, the factions currently compete for political posts in both the public 
and quasi- public sectors. The latter includes farmers, ishers, and irrigation 
associations, which are valuable both for their contacts with large numbers 
of farmers and ishers and also for the inancial clout of their afiliated 
credit unions. However, the single most important prize is the county mag-
istrate’s seat.
The Nature of KMT Factions
There are two distinct understandings of KMT factions. One set of scholars 
sees factions as being constructed in a guided, top- down process through 
patron- client relationships. A second set of scholars understand factions 
as founded on a set of social relationships. In this view, factions form in a 
natural, bottom- up process.
The irst school sees factions as built on a series of unequal and hier-
archical bilateral relationships cultivated from the top down. In a patron- 
client relationship, a patron provides instrumental beneits to a client of 
lower status in return for general support or personal services (Scott 1972, 
92). The relationship is unequal, with a large pool of potential clients 
competing for a small pool of potential patrons. In the KMT factions, the 
KMT sits atop four tiers of hierarchical relationships. The party acts as a 
patron to the faction core, who act as patrons to electoral cadres, who are 
patrons to faction followers. In each tier, the patron provides protection 
and privileges, such as nomination to particular political posts, monopolis-
tic economic interests, or constituency service, to the client in exchange for 
political loyalty and support in elections (Wang and Huang 2010).
In this view, local factions were deliberately created to satisfy the 
KMT’s need for stable government. Local political elites, who had irst 
come onto the scene during the Japanese era, gained increased prominence 
at the inception of KMT rule through local elections for posts in local gov-
ernments or councils. The KMT did not interfere much in local politics 
during these early years, and the elites began to form horizontal and verti-
cal alliances with other local politicians. As the KMT solidiied its rule in 
Taiwan, it began to cultivate these local elites to ensure long- term stability 
under the guiding principles of localizing political participation, balanc-
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ing competing forces, and offering economic privileges (M. Chen 1995, 
150; N. Wu 1987, 301– 34). The new local factions were thus absorbed into 
the KMT’s political structure, relying on the KMT for their existence and 
operation. The KMT resided at the top tier of this structure as the sole 
patron to all local factions. They could compete with each other only for 
the patronage of the KMT. If they went against the will of the KMT, they 
could be shoved aside or even be put out of existence.
In this structure, the faction bosses (or core members) were usually local 
gentry or members of prominent families. They typically held more eco-
nomic resources and had stronger motives to be politically involved. Both 
attributes made them desirable targets for the KMT. Faction bosses acting 
as patrons handled political and economic resources, distributing them to 
the faction’s electoral cadres, their clients. Electoral cadres intermediated 
between local politicians and their supporters, mobilizing supporters to 
vote in elections in return for local political and economic resources such 
as low- level political posts or uncompetitive contracts for small public 
works projects. Electoral cadres patronized their own followings. These 
faction followers traded their votes for help in dealing with the govern-
ment. Moreover, faction followers were generally alienated from politics 
due to the prevailing authoritarian political environment and did not have 
strong opinions about which candidate deserved their votes. At election 
time, they often deferred to a trusted electoral cadre for guidance, and the 
election cadre, as a savvy and connected observer of local politics, served 
as an opinion leader.
The second school sees factions as the political manifestation of social 
relationships (Chao 1997; Kao 2004). These relationships can be based on 
a variety of relationships, including blood, marriage, language, local prox-
imity, religious, education, occupation, or other ties. These ties are col-
lectively known as “guanxi,” which is individualistic, speciic, and nonideo-
logical (Jacobs 1979, 81). In this relationship of mutual loyalty, there is no 
master or servant. Rather guanxi relationships relect interpersonal trust 
and deine the lines of friendships or enmity (Kao 2000, 57). These social 
networks extend to different parts of the political arena. Chen Chieh- 
Hsuan sees three distinct levels arranged in concentric circles. Core faction 
networks form among those most clearly identiied with and participating 
in local politics. They, however, cannot mobilize followers without a wider 
network of electoral cadres, who are often motivated by symbolic and eco-
nomic factors in addition to naked politics. Election cadres, in turn, mobi-
lize votes from a civil network (C. Chen 1997, 33– 48). Jacobs also notes the 
role of guanxi in mobilizing votes. He observes that voters tend to vote for 
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candidates who are closest to them. Indeed, guanxi even underlies practices 
such as vote- buying (Jacobs 1979).
The vision of factions as an expression of social relationships implies 
limits and challenges to the factions. If a faction grows too large, the rela-
tionships that undergird it may be weaker. There is a limit to the number of 
intense social relationships that any single person can maintain, and a suc-
cessful faction almost necessarily has to be based in a speciic geographic 
location to ensure suficient density of these guanxi networks. Moreover, 
any societal change that shakes guanxi networks is a direct threat to the 
survival of local factions. For example, economic development, deepen-
ing urbanization, the passing of the traditional agricultural lifestyle, and a 
generational shift from one set of faction bosses to the next all constitute 
serious challenges to faction structures built on interpersonal relationships 
(Huang 2010, 232– 33; Wang 2004).
Bifactionalism
All local factions have been conined to a single county. This is partially due 
to the limitations imposed by social networks. In addition, the KMT did 
not want any political force to grow large enough to challenge its rule. As 
the top- tier patron, it could and did cut off the lifeline of patronage bene-
its lowing to any politician who tried to expand his network across county 
lines. Moreover, there was little incentive for faction politicians to try to 
construct wider networks. During the authoritarian era, the highest level 
positions open to elections were all elected at the county level. There were 
no elections for provincial governor, much less president, so no politician 
ever had a need to appeal to the national electorate. Some local politicians 
were recruited into the central government, but these promotions were 
always based on the politician’s personal performance and never on his 
factional identity. Once a faction politician was promoted into the central 
government, he was expected to leave his factional priorities behind and 
work for the KMT regime. Central- local faction linkages were not allowed 
during the authoritarian era.
If the KMT was careful to limit factions’ power by limiting their geo-
graphic scope, it also limited their power by preventing them from monop-
olizing power within that area. In almost all counties, the KMT cultivated 
a bifactional system and ensured the stability of this system with a rotation 
of power policy. After one faction had held a particular post for two terms, 
the KMT nominated a politician from the other faction. Moreover, dif-
ferent posts were distributed among the two factions. The key position is 
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the county magistrate, which controls far more resources than the other 
positions. In Taiwan’s centralized political system, the county assemblies 
have very little legislative power. Assemblies can supervise the county bud-
get, but they cannot demand increases in spending. Assembly members 
have access to a small pool of resources through each county’s Small Pub-
lic Works Projects Coordinated Fund, but all expenditures from this fund 
require the assent of the county magistrate.4 Overall, the county magistrate 
had more resources at hand and more leeway in distributing them than 
any other local oficeholder. As a result, factions wanted irst and foremost 
to win control of the county government. The KMT was always careful 
to make sure that neither faction could hold this post for more than two 
four- year terms. The bifactional system with rotation of power beneitted 
the factions by preventing the rise of new factions, giving them periodic 
access to the county magistrate, and ensuring a steady, if smaller, stream 
of resources even when they were out of power. It beneitted the KMT 
because the factions checked each other’s power and no single faction could 
stay in power long enough to achieve absolute local dominance (Jen 2006).
Taichung County is a nice example of this bifactional system. Prior to 
its incorporation into Taichung City in 2010, Taichung County’s politics 
had been dominated by the Red and Black factions since the beginning of 
the ROC era.5 In the 1950s, the two major competitors for county magis-
trate, Lin He- nian and Chen Shui- tan, organized the Red and Black fac-
tions, respectively, to support their political ambitions.6 In some counties, 
faction systems reorganize when founders fade from active politics. For 
example, each new county magistrate in Yunlin County tends to build a 
new faction. In other counties, like Taichung, the old factions are durable 
enough to survive a leadership transition.7
In table 4.1, we can see that neither the Red faction nor the Black fac-
tion ever held the county magistrate for more than two terms. The faction 
out of power usually held the speaker’s chair. In fact, the KMT tried to give 
the faction out of power the speaker’s seat regardless of whether or not 
that faction had more assembly members than the other faction. During 
the authoritarian era, the KMT’s dominant position made it unwise for fac-
tions to challenge the system. The most notable failure came in 1997, after 
democratization had weakened the KMT’s absolute control. The Black 
faction magistrate had somewhat neglected grassroots operations during 
his two terms in the 1980s. The Red faction further starved Black faction 
politicians while they held power over the next two terms. By 1997, the 
Black faction had been signiicantly weakened, and the Red Faction did not 
want to yield power. Both factions ran a candidate for the county magis-
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trate and threw the race to the DPP. Chastened by four years out of power, 
the two factions cooperated in 2001 to elect a Black Faction politician.
Interestingly, the bifactional system was challenged during this period 
by a third contender, the Yang faction. The Yang faction was led by busi-
ness tycoon Yang Tien- sheng, who had risen as part of the Red faction. 
However, Yang was always on the periphery of the Red faction, and in the 
early 1990s he and his allies (who came from both major factions) began to 
call themselves the Third Force. The Yang faction reached its high point 
in 1994 when his son was elected vice- speaker of the Provincial Assem-
bly. However, in 1998 the Provincial Assembly was abolished, and Yang’s 
son moved over to the legislature where he was just one of 225 members. 
Moreover, in making this move, he displaced the Yang faction’s other major 
source of power, a two- term incumbent who had to yield his seat. The 
Yang faction lost this seat in 2004, and it subsequently faded away as a 
political force. When the Black faction waned in strength in the 1990s, the 
KMT stepped in to nominate a Black faction member for county magis-
trate in 1997 and 2001 and thus ensure the continuing viability of the fac-
tion. In contrast, the KMT did nothing to help the Yang faction survive.8 
tABLE 4.1. rotation of Power between Factions in taichung County
Taichung County Magistrate Taichung County Council
Year Magistrate Party Faction Year Speaker Party Faction
1951 Lin He- nian KMT Red 1951 Li Chen- chung KMT Red
1954 Chen Shui- tan KMT Black 1953 Li Chen- chung KMT Red
1956 Liao Wu- hu KMT Black 1955 Chiu Hsiu- sung KMT Black
1957 Lin He- nian KMT Red 1957 Wang Ti KMT Red
1960 Ho Chin- sheng KMT Black 1961 Wang Tzu- kuei KMT Black
1964 Lin He- nian KMT Red 1964 Wang Tzu- kuei KMT Black
1968 Wang Tzu- kuei KMT Black 1968 Tsai Chiang- yin KMT Red
1972 Chen Meng- linga KMT Red 1973 Hsieh Yu- ho KMT Black
1978 Chen Meng- linga KMT Red 1978 Hsieh Yu- ho KMT Black
1981 Chen Keng- chin KMT Black 1982 Huang Cheng- yi KMT Red
1985 Chen Keng- chin KMT Black 1986 Huang Cheng- yi KMT Red
1989 Liao Liao- yi KMT Red 1990 Lin Min- lin KMT Red
1993 Liao Liao- yi KMT Red 1994 Lin Min- lin KMT Red
1997 Liao Yung- lai DPP New Tide 1998 Yen Chin- piao IND Black
2001 Huang Chung- sheng KMT Black 2002 Chang Ching- tang KMT Red
2005 Huang Chung- sheng KMT Black 2005 Chang Ching- tang KMT Red
2010 Jason C. Hub KMT none 2010 Chang Ching- tang KMT Red
aChen Meng- Ling was nominated in the irst stage of the KMT’s faction replacement policy (Chen 1995, 185). 
But after he was elected, he cooperated closely with the Red faction. We here mark him as Red faction.
bJason C. Hu had been the mayor of Taichung City from 2001 to 2010 prior to the merger of Taichung County 
and City in 2010.
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The faction never was able to secure the resources of a township govern-
ment or farmers association, much less the county government. Even with 
the inancial backing of Yang’s corporation, it simply could not maintain a 
viable third faction with the resources from one legislative seat. The Yang 
faction example is a vivid illustration of just how high the barriers to entry 
were in the bifactional system.
SNTV Elections and Faction Competition
A variety of assemblies have elected seats under SNTV rules in Taiwan, 
including the Legislative Yuan, National Assembly, Provincial Assembly, 
county assemblies, and township councils. Factions competed for all of 
these posts, though in the democratic era the legislative and county assem-
bly seats have been the most important positions. These ofices are criti-
cal to a faction’s ability to commandeer resources from various levels of 
government and provide constituency service to supporters, especially for 
the faction out of power. Factions also use these elections to maintain their 
mobilization machinery. However, the SNTV elections are not as crucial 
as those for the county magistrate.
With multiple seats available, the KMT could choose from several dif-
ferent nomination strategies depending on the strength of the local fac-
tions and the strength of other parties. In districts where the factions were 
strong and the KMT’s grip was irm, the KMT might nominate a full 
slate of candidates, one for each seat available. The nominations would 
be apportioned to each faction according to their relative strength. In 
other districts, the KMT might leave one or two seats open for friendly 
independents who often were faction members. In those districts in which 
the opposition parties had more support than the KMT, the KMT might 
nominate candidates for only half the seats and then also support friendly 
independents (C. Wu 2002, 89). This strategy aimed at “sandwiching” the 
anti- KMT politicians, with various candidates each taking a bite out of 
the anti- KMT candidates’ support. In some contests in which the fac-
tions could not internally determine who should receive a nomination, the 
KMT would open the race up so that the contestants could have a free 
ight. However, these free ights were generally carried out when the fac-
tion could be sure that one of the two would win; factions were wary of 
allowing free ights that might harm the faction’s overall interests. Overall, 
the KMT frequently nominated multiple candidates from the same fac-
tion in a particular district. To put it another way, the county magistrate 
elections shape the bifactional system; the two factions then nominate the 
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best they can in SNTV elections. This is quite unlike the Japanese LDP’s 
factional system, which has taken shape according to the logic of SNTV 
competition and the need to control a majority in the national legislature 
in order to form a government.9
The two factions in Taichung County usually nominated multiple can-
didates in county assembly elections. Table 4.2a shows nominees and seats 
won for each faction in 2005 and 2010. If we look only at the eight dis-
tricts with two or more seats, the Black faction ran multiple candidates in 
nine of the sixteen races while the Red faction was represented by multiple 
candidates in all sixteen races. In fact, it was not unusual for a faction to 
have three or four candidates in a single race. Table 4.2b shows the party 
afiliations of the candidates in 2005. From this table, we can see that the 
factions are afiliated with but also a bit separated from the KMT. All 29 of 
the KMT winners in 2005 belonged to one of the factions. However, there 
were also 10 other faction members who ran and won as independents. 
Table 4.2c shows that the same pattern appears in 2010. Ten of the 13 KMT 
winners were faction members, and nine of the 19 winning faction mem-
bers ran as independents in 2010. Some of these ran with the tacit approval 
of the KMT, but others were not nominated and ran on their own. During 
the democratic era, faction members have become increasingly likely to 
defy party orders. One speciic manifestation of this is that the KMT has 
a harder and harder time controlling the number of candidates competing 
for the Pan- Blue pool of voters. The local KMT is still dominated by the 
factions and the factions are still associated with the KMT, but the KMT 
can no longer demand absolute obedience to party discipline.
Table 4.3 shows the relevant data for legislative elections. Taichung 
County was a single election district, electing 11 seats in the three SNTV 
elections in 1998, 2001, and 2004. In these, we also ind that each faction 
regularly nominated multiple candidates and won multiple seats. The Red 
faction ran four candidates in each of the three elections, while the Black 
faction had ive, six, and three. Seventeen of the 26 candidates from the 
two big factions were KMT members, but four were independents, two ran 
(unsuccessfully) under the banner of the People First Party, and one Black 
faction member even went over to the Green camp, running (and losing) 
twice under the Taiwan Solidarity Union label.
If the number of candidates indicates that factions were not organized 
to nominate optimally for SNTV elections, there is also another way in 
which the Taichung experience demonstrates the primacy of competition 
over the local executive seat. The Red faction has arguably been Taiwan’s 
most successful faction in terms of producing speakers. A Red faction mem-
tABLE 4.2A. 2005 and 2010 taichung County Assembly Election results by Faction Afiliation
District
2005 (2010)
Total Seats Black faction Red faction Yang faction

















District 4 (1) 5 (11) 3 (9) 3 (3) 0 (3) 2 (2) 2 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0)
District 5 (2) 7 (13) 5 (10) 3 (4) 1 (5) 3 (3) 3 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0)
District 6 (3) 7 (13) 5 (11) 3 (3) 2 (5) 3 (3) 2 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0)
District 1 (4) 8 (17) 5 (10) 1 (2) 0 (2) 2 (2) 1 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0)
District 2 (5) 9 (18) 6 (11) 1 (1) 1 (2) 5 (5) 2 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0)
District 8 (12) 6 (13) 4 (7) 1 (1) 0 (1) 3 (3) 2 (3) 0 (0) 0 (1)
District 7 (13) 9 (20) 6 (16) 1 (1) 1 (1) 4 (4) 1 (4) 1 (1) 0 (2)
District 3 (14) 4 (7) 2 (6) 1 (1) 0 (1) 1 (3) 1 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0)
District 9 (15) 1 (2) 1 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
District 10 (16) 1 (3) 1 (3) 1 (1) 0 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Total Sum. 57 (117) 38 (86) 15 (17) 5 (21) 23 (25) 14 (27) 1 (1) 0 (3)
% winners   88.2% 23.8% 92.0% 51.9% 100.0% 0.0%
Note: The 2005 Taichung County Assembly had 57 seats elected from 10 districts. The 2010 Taichung Municipal Council had 63 
seats elected from 16 districts. Of these, 38 were in the former Taichung County, and 25 were in the former Taichung City. The district 
boundaries were unchanged in 2010, but the districts were renumbered and each district was apportioned fewer seats. The local factions 
held 68.42% (39/57) of the seats prior to the merger and 30.16% (19/63) of the total seats, or 50% of the seats from the former Taichung 
County, after it. Blank cells indicate that no candidates ran. Districts in the former Taichung City are not shown.
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ber, Tsai Hung- wen, was speaker of the Provincial Assembly from 1972 
to 1981, when that position was commonly considered the highest posi-
tion open to elected politicians. His protégé, Liu Sung- pan, was speaker of 
the Legislative Yuan from 1992 to 1999, by which time the legislature had 
surpassed the Provincial Assembly in importance. With such prominent 
igures, if any local faction were to reorganize itself to support a leader 
running in SNTV elections, it arguably should have been the Red faction. 
However, even Tsai and Liu had to contend with other Red faction nomi-
nees.10 Tsai and Liu had tremendous national prestige, but the Red faction 
county magistrates of the 1970s and 1990s, with their control of the local 
treasury, were arguably the real faction leaders.
The Effect of Electoral and Administrative Reform
In 2008, the MMM system was used for the irst time in legislative elec-
tions. This proved to have very little effect on the KMT’s local factions. On 
the one hand, we have already seen that the KMT’s factions are organized 
around county magistrate elections, not legislative elections. Further, only 
the legislature used the new system. The county assembly and township 
council elections continued to be elected under SNTV rules. On the other 
tABLE 4.2B. 2005 taichung County Assembly Election results by Party Afiliation
District













District 4 5(11) 3(3)R2B1 0(2) 2(6)B2
District 5 7(13) 3(5)R2B1 0(2) 0(1) 4(5)R1B2
District 6 7(13) 5(6)R2B3 1(2) 1(5)R1
District 1 8(17) 3(5)R2B1 3(3) 1(1) 1(1) 0(7)
District 2 9(18) 5(8)R4B1 3(4) 0(1) 0(1) 1(4)R1
District 8 6(13) 3(4)R2B1 2(3) 0(1) 0(1) 1(4)R1
District 7 9(20) 5(6)R4Y1 2(4) 1(1) 0(1) 1(8)B1
District 3 4(7) 2(4)R1B1 1(1) 0(1) 1(1)
District 9 1(2) 0(1) 1(1)
District 10 1(3)     1(3)B1
Total 57(117) 29(42)
R19B9Y1
12(21) 3(6) 1(5) 12(43)
R4B6
% winners 69.0% 57.1% 50.0% 20.0% 27.9%
Seats share  50.9% 21.0% 5.3% 1.8% 21.0%
Notes: abbreviations = B: Black faction; R: Red faction; Y: former Yang faction. The table should be read 
as follows: in District 4, “3(3)R2B1” means the KMT nominated 4 candidates and won 3 seats; of the 3 
winners, 2 belong to the Red faction and 1 belongs to the Black faction. “0(2)” means the DPP nominated 2 
candidates and won no seats. “2(6)B2” means 6 candidates ran with no party afiliation, and 2 of them won. 
More important, the winners both belong to the Black faction. Blank cells indicate that no candidates ran.
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hand, the single- seat districts available to the local factions under MMM 
should push toward bifactionalism.11 Since the KMT already had a bifac-
tional system in most counties, it would be strange to expect the new elec-
toral system to bring about signiicant change.
Taichung County was apportioned ive seats under the new system. 
Instead of competing for each nomination, the factions decided to con-
tinue the collaboration they had practiced since the 2001 county mag-
istrate election. The six faction incumbents divided up the ive districts 
among themselves. The KMT cemented this bargain by giving the sixth 
incumbent a place on the KMT party list and by agreeing not to nominate 
a candidate against the Black faction incumbent running as an independent 
in District 2. The candidates even traded support across district lines by 
exchanging election cadres (Huang, Wang, and Wang 2009). This strategy 
was a complete success, as the factions won all ive districts. In a certain 
sense, the new electoral system seemed to strengthen the local factions by 
placing all of Taichung County’s legislative seats in their hands. In 2012, 
the DPP managed to take two of the ive seats, but the blame for these 
defeats should go primarily to the KMT, not to the factions. In District 1 
the Red faction incumbent retired, and the factions were unable to come 
to a consensus on a new candidate. A local high school principal loosely 
associated with the Black faction was the only person to register for the 
tABLE 4.2C. 2010 taichung Municipal Council Election results by Party Afiliation
District













District 1 3(9) 1(2)R1 1(1) 1(6)R1
District 2 5(10) 1(2)B1 1(2) 3(6)R3
District 3 5(11) 3(3)R1B2 1(2) 1(6)R1
District 4 5(10) 1(4)R1 2(3) 1(1) 1(2)
District 5 6(11) 3(4)R2 2(3) 1(4)B1
District 12 4(7) 1(3)R1 2(2) 1(2)R1
District 13 6(16) 0(4) 3(3) 1(1) 2(8)R1B1
District 14 2(6) 1(2)R1 1(1) 0(3)
District 15 1(3) 1(3)
District 16 1(3) 1(3)     
Total 38(86) 13(30)
R7B3
13(17) 1(1) 1(1) 10(37)
R7B2
% winners 36.4% 76.5% 100.0% 100.0% 27.0%
Seats share  34.2% 34.2% 2.6% 2.6% 26.3%
Note: For instructions on how to read this table, please refer to the note in table 4.2b.
In the full Taichung Municipal Council (including the former Taichung City), the KMT won 27 seats, 
the PFP won 1 seat, the DPP won 24 seats, the TSU won 1 seat, and independents won 10 seats.
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KMT’s nomination. The factions did not take him seriously and continued 
to negotiate, but to everyone’s surprise the principal managed to pass the 
threshold of approval in the KMT’s noncompetitive telephone surveys12 
and was duly nominated. The DPP thrashed this very weak nominee. In 
District 7 (formerly District 3), the 2008 winner was convicted of vote buy-
ing and stripped of his seat. The DPP then won the seat in a by- election. 
In 2012, the KMT chose to parachute in a candidate from Taipei with no 
local connections. She was beaten soundly by a DPP candidate with deep 
local roots. In the other three districts, however, the factions proved their 
continuing strength.
Overall, factions have adapted to the new legislative electoral system 
tABLE 4.3. taichung County Legislative Election results, 1998– 2012
Year
(Blue : Green) KMT DPP New PFP TSU Others
1998 (9:2)       
Nominees 8(R3,B4,Y1) 4(N1,ND1,nf2) 1 R1
Seats won 7(R3,B3,Y1) 2(N1,ND1) 1 R1
2001 (7:4)       
Nominees 6(R3,B2,Y1) 5(N3,ND1,NE1) 1 4(R1,B1,nf2)1(B1) B2
Seats won 5(R3,B1,Y1) 5(N3,ND1) 0 1(nf1) 0 B1
2004 (7:4)
Nominees 5(R4,B1) 6(N3,W1,GFA1,nf1) 1(nf1) 2(B1,nf1) B1
Seats won 5(R4,B1) 4(N2,W1,nf1) 1(nf1) 0 B1
2008 (5:0)
District 1 1(R1) ● 1(N1)
District 2 0 1(B1) ●
District 3 1(R1) ● 1(N1)
District 4 1(R1) ● 0 1(nf1)
District 5 1(R1) ● 1(N1)
2012 (3:2)
District 1 1(B1) 1(N1) ● 1(nf1)
District 2 1(nf1) 1(B1) ● 
District 7(3) 1(nf1) 1(nf1) ● 1(nf1) 1(nf1)
District 8(4) 1(R1) ● 1(N1) 1(nf) 2(B1,nf1)
District 3(5) 1(R1) ● 1(nf1)   Na 1(F1)
Notes: abbreviations for KMT factions are B: Black faction; R: Red faction; Y: former Yang faction; abbrevia-
tions for DPP factions are N: New Tide; W: Welfare; ND: New Dynamic; NE: New Era; GFA: Green Friend-
ship Alliance; for Others, nf: no faction afiliation. Blank cells indicate no candidate nominated.
The table should be read as follows: the cell “8(R3,B4,Y1)” means the KMT nominated 8 candidates, includ-
ing 3 Red faction members, 4 Black faction members, and 1 Yang faction member.
Under SNTV, Taichung County was one electoral district and elected 11 seats. After the shift to MMM in 
2008, Taichung County was divided into 5 single- seat districts. The mark “●” shows the winning candidate in 
MMM elections. The district boundaries were not altered in 2012, but they were renumbered. For example 
“District 7(3)” indicates that the 2012 District 7 was District 3 in 2008.
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with a minimum of disruption. Administrative reform is a much more seri-
ous threat to the KMT’s local factions.
In 2010, Taichung City and County were combined to form Taichung 
Municipality, one of four new direct municipalities.13 Direct municipalities 
differ from counties and county- level cities in a number of ways. Munici-
pality mayors have much larger budgets with much more discretionary 
spending, and they can appoint many more positions within the munici-
pal government. Counties have elected township mayors and councils. In 
direct municipalities, townships are converted into administrative districts, 
and the executives and councils are appointed14 and politically irrelevant. 
From the perspective of local factions, there were far fewer ofices avail-
able,15 and, to win the biggest prize, the municipal mayor’s seat, they had to 
compete not only with each other and the opposition party but also with all 
the politicians and factions from the other city or county.
Since the only useful positions left, other than the ive legislative seats, 
were in the municipal council, the 2010 election was particularly intense. 
With fewer seats available, many incumbents were unable to secure a 
nomination from the KMT. Rather than accept the death of their politi-
cal careers, many faction members ran as independents. The result was a 
bloodbath. The KMT did terribly, with only 13 of its 30 nominees win-
ning. The Red faction had a miserable performance, as only 14 of its 27 
candidates won. The Black faction was devastated; only 5 of its 21 members 
won. To put this in perspective, in 2005 the two factions had elected 38 of 
their 42 candidates. The main reason for the electoral disaster of 2010 was 
that the factions simply had too many candidates running. Another reason 
is that they now needed to win more votes. Compared to 2005, success-
ful candidates in 2010 needed 70– 100% more votes. Many politicians had 
built their machines focusing on particular areas or constituencies to it the 
old system. Their networks were the right size to deliver the old number 
of votes, but when factions are built on personal relationships, it is no small 
task to scale up to a meet the new, higher threshold.
With no township governments and without control of the municipal 
government, both factions are left without direct control over any local 
government resources. They are not entirely powerless, of course. Since 
the mayor came from Taichung City, the KMT helped Taichung County 
win control of the municipal council. The new speaker is from the Red 
faction, while the vice- speaker is from the Black faction. Moreover, while 
the two factions have less than one- third of the total seats, this should be 
suficient for them to guide the council’s agenda if they cooperate. Within 
the KMT, the two factions have 10 of 27 seats, but if one looks at the 
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broader Blue camp, the two factions combine for 19 of 38 seats. However, 
it remains to be seen if the factions will try to cooperate with each other, 
look for allies from the former Taichung City, or simply fade from promi-
nence as they are starved of patronage resources.
KMT Local Factions: Summary
In the KMT’s authoritarian regime, elected politicians were effectively 
locked out of competition for national power. In a sense, whether the 
national executive was presidential or parliamentary was irrelevant to 
KMT local factions. Instead, factions organized around the most desirable 
post within their grasp, in this case local executive ofice. As these posts 
were elected by the plurality rule, competitors had to form preelectoral 
coalitions, and these formed the basis of two stable factions. The KMT 
reinforced this structure by actively intervening to ensure that two, and 
only two, factions remained viable. These factors were suficient to main-
tain bifactionalism even when all assembly seats were elected under SNTV 
rules. The shift to MMM in legislative elections does little to change this 
calculus. In fact, the factions have collaborated more often than they have 
competed, yielding seats to one another instead of directly ighting one 
another for each seat. Looking forward, the factor with the greatest poten-
tial to shake up the system is administrative reform, which has deprived the 
local factions of most of their patronage resources.
dPP national Factions
In contrast to the KMT’s factional structure, the DPP’s internal factions 
are structured more similarly to those of the Japanese LDP. Throughout 
the democratic era, the DPP has usually had around four major factions, all 
of them national in scope. Until 2006, the factions were formal organiza-
tions, with bylaws, regular meetings, and membership rosters. In 2006, the 
DPP formally abolished its factions, and the factions have been informally 
organized since then.
The DPP’s factional system arose in the era before the presidency 
became a reasonable goal. When the presidency did eventually come into 
play, it placed considerable pressure on the factional system to evolve. 
Indeed, most of the major upheavals of the past 15 years have been directly 
related to presidential politics, as factions have allied and reshufled to try 
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to win the presidential nomination and risen or fallen with their leaders’ 
prospects.
Arenas of Competition
While KMT factions are designed to capture and distribute patronage 
resources at the county level, the major goal of DPP factions is to help 
their members gain control of the national party machinery and national 
elected ofices. While the presidency has become a focal point of competi-
tion in recent years, factions originally competed in three primary are-
nas. Even with the increasing focus on the presidency, these three arenas 
remain important in shaping the DPP factional system. First, they compete 
for nominations to elected ofice. Like the KMT’s local factions, DPP fac-
tions try to win local executive ofices. However, since they are national 
in scope, there is not simply one big prize. DPP factions can win some 
nominations while losing others without facing an existential crisis. In fact, 
DPP factions place a higher priority on winning large numbers of legisla-
tive seats, and the size of a faction’s legislative delegation is the clearest 
measure of a faction’s strength and inluence. Factions can help members 
win nominations and elections by providing inancial or human resources, 
coordinating among aspiring candidates, and mobilizing party member 
or regular voters in primaries. The DPP’s nomination rules have changed 
considerably over the years (see chapter 5), but factions have always played 
a central role in deciding nominations.
Second, the factions compete for positions within and control of the 
party machinery. The most important of these positions are seats in the 
Central Standing Committee (CSC), the body that makes most of the criti-
cal decisions. The CSC is indirectly elected. Party members elect represen-
tatives to the National Party Congress, which meets only once a year. The 
National Party Congress elects 30 of its members to the Central Executive 
Committee (CEC), and the Central Executive Committee elects 10 of its 
members to the CSC.16 All of these elections are conducted by SNTV. 
Needless to say, a well- organized group can do quite well in this three- 
stage indirect election. Indeed, factions often house their members in spe-
ciic hotels for the weekend, with each faction based in a different hotel. 
This allows the faction leaders to give members voting instructions and, 
more important, to keep them away from other factions who might seek to 
poach their votes. Factions try to maximize their power by enrolling party 
members, directing them how to vote, and using extra votes to support 
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allies. No faction has held a majority of seats in the CSC since the earliest 
years of the party. Instead, the factions form postelectoral coalitions within 
the CSC. Until 1996, these coalitions elected the party chair. The chair has 
been directly elected since 1998, and even though this yields some inde-
pendent stature, party chairs have had to come to an accommodation with 
a majority in the CSC in order to lead the party effectively.
The third and least important arena of competition is for the three loor 
leaders of the DPP legislative caucus. The DPP elects new loor leaders for 
each six- month session, and these elections have generally been contested 
along factional lines. Again, these elections use SNTV, so it is not necessary 
to have a majority to win a caucus leader position.
Prior to electoral reform, nominations to the legislature, elections to 
the CSC, and loor leader elections were all conducted under SNTV. With 
multiple seats available, multiple factions could survive. After electoral 
reform, CSC and loor leader elections continue to be held under SNTV. 
Moreover, the CSC remains an arena in which coalitional, not majori-
tarian, politics hold sway. In addition, multiple factions can compete for 
two or three legislative seats each in the party list tier. While the electoral 
reform has eliminated one of the major institutional foundations of the 
multifactional system, it has not eliminated all of them.
Characteristics of the Individual DPP Factions
When the DPP was founded in 1986, it had two major factions: Formosa 
and New Tide. Formosa members tended to be bound together by per-
sonal, rather than ideological, ties, and they tended to be quite pragmatic, 
interested irst and foremost in winning ofice (Rigger 2001, 72; Cheng 
and Hsu 1996). With only one exception, all other DPP factions also 
adopted a similarly pragmatic orientation. DPP factions are not noted for 
clear positions on speciic issues or distinct ideological positions. Factions 
tend to focus on maximizing power and leave the policy decisions to indi-
vidual oficeholders. Perhaps because the glue holding them together is 
relatively weak, the factions tend to have loose discipline. Members usually 
vote with their faction, but often they do not. When they defect, there 
are few repercussions. Because of this weak discipline, faction leaders have 
weak bargaining power. The leader may make a promise, but he cannot 
always commit the full strength of his faction to that promise.
The New Tide faction is the exception. New Tide is highly organized 
and highly disciplined. It is organized along Leninist lines and considers 
itself a vanguard organization (Cheng 2004, 149). Members are carefully 
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screened before being accepted into the faction, and they participate in 
regular training and education meetings. During elections, the faction pro-
vides campaign staff and funds for its candidates. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
New Tide was considered to have clear ideological stances favoring Taiwan 
independence and social welfare, though these distinctions have become 
murkier over the last decade. New Tide members also take militant posi-
tions against corruption. The faction practices democratic centralism, and 
all members are expected to obey faction decisions. Violators are almost 
always expelled from the faction. New Tide’s discipline allows it to exert 
much more inluence than its numbers imply. Faction leaders are cred-
ible negotiators, since counterparts know they can deliver on their prom-
ises. Moreover, New Tide can make standing commitments of support not 
just today on a particular question but also in the future on unspeciied 
questions. This makes New Tide particularly attractive as a coalition part-
ner. However, New Tide’s discipline and disproportional inluence arouse 
powerful emotions among other DPP members. Other factions can be 
jealous of New Tide’s power, they grumble about New Tide’s voting bri-
gades, and they have at times worried that New Tide’s militant political 
positions might hurt the DPP at the ballot box. No other faction arouses 
such passions, and New Tide always has to worry about the potential of an 
“everyone- against- New Tide” coalition.
The Welfare State Alliance and Justice Alliance formed in the early 
1990s. With democratization, all the seats in the legislature were up for 
election, creating space for more than two factions. Justice was centered on 
Chen Shui- bian and included a few of his political allies. In the early 1990s, 
Justice was the smallest of the four main factions. Welfare was nominally 
led by Frank Hsieh, but it was more accurately understood as a coalition of 
everyone not in Formosa, New Tide, or Justice. Welfare had several promi-
nent leaders, and they were not likely to follow orders from each other.17
A Brief History of DPP Factional Politics  
in the Presidential Election Era
In this subsection, we present a rough history of DPP factional politics 
over the past decade and a half. During this period, the DPP’s factions 
underwent substantial changes, and most of these changes can be traced, at 
least in part, to conlicts over the presidency.
If the 2000 presidential election was the irst one that the DPP had a 
chance of winning, then the irst major change to the factional system in 
the era of competitive presidential politics was the splintering of the For-
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mosa faction. Formosa’s leader and presidential aspirant, Hsu Hsin- liang, 
argued that if the DPP wanted to win power, it should be more open to 
economic integration with China. This stance put many Formosa mem-
bers in an uncomfortable position with their supporters (UDN, December 
20, 1998). Taking advantage of dissatisfaction with Hsu’s leadership, his 
top lieutenant, Chang Chun- hung, usurped control of the faction. By the 
July 1998 CEC and CSC elections, the Chang faction and the Hsu faction 
had effectively split, with each organizing its own vote rationing scheme. 
Most of the Formosa faction ended up in Chang’s new group, New Era.18 
Hsu’s supporters renamed themselves New Dynamic. Already small, New 
Dynamic was further crippled by a lack of leadership, as Hsu withdrew 
from the DPP to focus on his unsuccessful presidential bid (UDN, June 7, 
1999). New Era and New Dynamic continued to exist until about 2004, but 
neither was able to exert much inluence in the party. With no charismatic 
leaders and no patronage to offer, both slowly dwindled in size. Around 
2004, a small new faction, the Green Friendship Alliance, absorbed most of 
the remnants of New Era and New Dynamic. However, in terms of inlu-
ence, the Green Friendship Alliance was merely an echo of the old For-
mosa faction. The disintegration of Formosa was a direct result of Hsu’s 
unsuccessful pursuit of the presidency.
Chen Shui- bian won the presidency in March 2000, and his faction, Jus-
tice, grew quickly (see tables 4.4 and 4.5). In the past, pragmatic politicians 
who wanted to be on the winning side might have joined Formosa; now 
they joined Justice. Justice moved quickly to try to put together an even 
bigger coalition. In April and May, leaders of the Justice, Welfare, New 
Dynamic, and Taiwan Independence Alliance factions had meetings to dis-
cuss cooperation and even merger. On May 20, they announced they would 
form the Mainstream Coalition, which included around 40 legislators from 
all factions except New Era and New Tide (UDN, April 19, 2000; UDN, 
May 5, 2000; UDN, May 13, 2000; UDN, May 20, 2000). This Mainstream 
Coalition certainly looked like the irst step in reorienting the system into 
a bifactional system, but it was not to be. The Mainstream Coalition never 
expanded its activities from within the legislative caucus to other arenas, 
such as competition for nominations or CSC seats. Moreover, many of the 
members, especially those from Justice, quietly withdrew from Mainstream 
Coalition activities, and the coalition quickly became a small, marginalized 
group dominated by Welfare members.
Instead of Welfare, President Chen chose the larger and more reliable 
New Tide as the main coalition partner for his Justice faction. Chen put 
several New Tide leaders into important positions in the executive branch. 
tABLE 4.4. Size of Each dPP Faction in the Legislative Yuan
 1995 1998 2001 2004 2008 2012
Formosa 14
New Tide 11 15 19 22 4 7
Welfare 13 12 15 12
Justice 11 13 34 20
TIA 4 5 4 1
New Era 14 5
New Dynamic 6 4






No faction 2 4 6 29 9 19
Total DPP delegation 55 69 87 89 27 40
Note: Factional afiliations for 1995, 1998, and 2001 are taken from Cheng (2004, 563– 76). Fac-
tional afiliations for 2004, 2008, and 2012 were compiled by the authors from newspaper reports.
tABLE 4.5. Size of Each dPP Faction in the Central Standing Committee
 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Formosa 4 3
New Tide 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 3
Welfare 3 3 2 4 3 1 1
Justice 1 2 3 3 2 1 2
TIA 1
New Era 1 1
New Dynamic 2 1 2
GFA 2 2 1 1
Su 1 1 1 1




No faction/other   1   1 1 1 2
Total CSC seats 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 10 10
Note: Factional afiliations for 1994– 2002 are taken from Cheng (2004, 214– 17). Factional afiliations 
for 2004– 2010 were compiled by the authors from newspaper reports. Only directly elected seats are in-
cluded; seats automatically awarded to mayors and legislative loor leaders are not included in this table.
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In fact, because Justice members were relatively junior and not yet qualiied 
for such important posts, New Tide was more successful than Chen’s own 
Justice faction at placing its members into the government bureaucracy. 
The Chen- Justice– New Tide axis dominated the DPP throughout Chen’s 
irst term. While Justice had more members, its internal discipline was dis-
mal, and Chen often had to rely on New Tide to get what he wanted.
Chen’s choice of coalition partners was likely the most important rea-
son that the DPP maintained a multifactional system. If Chen had sup-
ported the Mainstream Coalition and encouraged its various members to 
merge into one new faction, he likely would have been able to reshape 
the system into a bifactional Mainstream vs. New Tide system. Instead, 
he chose to cooperate with New Tide. The very internal cohesiveness that 
made New Tide such an attractive coalition partner also ensured that it 
would remain a separate entity outside of Chen’s direct control. Moreover, 
because New Tide retained its independence, it had the capacity to termi-
nate the coalition.
New Tide began to distance itself from Chen in the early months of his 
second term. As public outrage at Chen’s mounting corruption scandals 
grew, New Tide moved into open attacks on President Chen. By June 2006, 
Chen had been so severely weakened19 that he was forced to announce he 
would step back from the irst line of politics and devolve power to Premier 
Su Tseng- chang. New Tide continued to apply pressure. When the DPP 
declined to ask Chen to resign or to recommend sending his case to the 
government anticorruption agency, two New Tide leaders resigned their 
seats in the legislature, an action they claimed was designed to shock the 
DPP into self- relection (CT, November 14, 2006). By the end of 2006, 
New Tide was in open revolt against President Chen.
As Chen stumbled toward the end of his tenure, the battle to succeed 
him as president intensiied, and this contest reshaped the DPP’s factions. 
The two leading candidates, Su Tseng- chang and Frank Hsieh, both had 
roots in the Welfare faction, but Welfare had ceased to be a coherent orga-
nization by Chen’s second term. Within weeks after Chen’s reelection, the 
media started referring to the Su faction and the Hsieh faction. At irst, 
these were merely a few of Su or Hsieh’s closest political allies, and many 
of them maintained membership in one of the traditional factions. The Su 
and Hsieh factions would quickly grow into larger groupings, and these 
factions would contest power in multiple arenas. Unlike the traditional fac-
tions, the Hsieh and Su factions were never formal organizations. They 
might have eventually moved to formalize their networks, but another 
major shock rocked the DPP’s factional ecology.
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In July 2006, the DPP’s National Party Congress voted to dissolve all 
factions.20 This was not a new proposal; it had been discussed at several 
previous party congresses but had never won much support. In 2006, how-
ever, conditions were ripe for the motion to pass. Once again, many of the 
tensions were directly related to presidential politics. The motion was an 
attack on New Tide, which had grown steadily in size and inluence over 
the past decade. Most people in the party felt that New Tide beneitted 
most from being organized so it would lose the most if it were forced to 
disband. Moreover, anti– New Tide passions were running high. New Tide 
had proited from its alliance with President Chen in his irst term and 
had then turned on him. This could not help but infuriate other people 
in the party who remained loyal to Chen. The motion may also have got-
ten a boost from the upcoming presidential race. New Tide had formed 
an alliance with Su, and Hsieh was beginning to form an anti– New Tide 
coalition. Because of this, Hsieh’s supporters were enthusiastic about the 
motion not only because it hit directly at New Tide, but also because it 
indirectly weakened their principal rival for the presidential nomination 
(CT, July 3, 2006).21
Cheng argues that, in addition to injuring New Tide, the DPP may 
have had two other reasons for dissolving its factions. First, President Chen 
may have been trying to avoid blame for his own myriad woes by focusing 
attention on the DPP’s factions. Second, electoral reform had just passed, 
and the DPP may have felt that multiple factions were no longer needed 
for legislative elections using single- member districts (Cheng 2010). This 
latter point is especially relevant to our purposes. However, the electoral 
system did not play a prominent part in the actual public debates over the 
merits of dissolving the factions. If factions simply were not useful under 
the new electoral system, they would simply have faded away. Alternatively, 
the multiple factions might have simply consolidated into two factions. 
There would have been no need to actively abolish them. In fact, multiple 
factions were still useful in contests for CEC, CSC, party list, and city and 
county council seats. Electoral reform is not a convincing explanation for 
the dissolution.
Factions did not cease to exist simply because the motion passed.22 
There had been some worries that New Tide might collectively quit the 
DPP if such a motion passed, but all factions announced that they would 
comply with the letter of the new rules. Within a short time, it became 
apparent that the other factions had been the primary victims of the 
motion. Without formal ofices, rules, and meetings, the other factions had 
very little to hold them together and quickly withered away. New Tide, in 
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contrast, was bound together with much stronger glue and continued to 
operate as a relatively coherent faction. The names of the other factions 
disappeared almost immediately from media reports following the party 
congress. In contrast, the media reported regularly on the activities of the 
“former New Tide” faction.23
With the dissolution of all the traditional factions except for New Tide, 
most DPP members were suddenly free to form new alliances, and they 
coalesced around the two major presidential contenders and the incumbent 
president. After the 2006 party congress, the Su and Hsieh factions grew 
quickly in size and inluence. The Su, Hsieh, and Chen factions were not 
simply a renaming of the old factions. For one thing, while many of the 
former Justice members now identiied as Chen loyalists, several took this 
opportunity to switch their allegiance to Su or Hsieh. For another, Su and 
Hsieh had both originally belonged to the Welfare faction, so there were no 
obvious cues that might help the old faction members switch en masse to 
one side or the other. Instead, there was a fairly thorough reshufling of alle-
giances. Because this reshufling occurred in the context of a ierce battle for 
the presidential nomination, the new factions consolidated rather quickly.
By the end of President Chen’s second term in 2008, a new faction sys-
tem had taken shape. In addition to the old New Tide faction, there were 
three other major factions, the Su, Hsieh, and Chen factions. There were 
also a few smaller factions organized around somewhat less prominent 
leaders. These new factions were different from the old factions in that 
they were not formally organized. They did not have formal rosters, rules, 
or meetings. Membership was not clearly deined, and a particular indi-
vidual might have good relations with multiple faction leaders. Moreover, 
they were much more centered around a single leader than the previous 
factions had been. Where the old factions had been physically centered in 
a legislative ofice and measured by the size of their legislative delegations, 
the new factions were more focused on presidential contenders than on 
legislative delegations. However, the new factions continued to organize 
their members to contest nominations and party ofices, just as the old 
factions had.
The factional system has seen relatively minor changes during Ma 
Ying- jeou’s presidency. A new faction may be starting to form around Tsai 
Ing- wen. Tsai, who was not afiliated with any faction, served as party chair 
during Ma’s irst term and eventually became popular enough to win the 
2012 presidential nomination. During Ma’s irst term, she received support 
from all the major factions. However, after losing the presidential election 
and resigning as party chair, she established a think tank and has begun 
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cultivating allies in the legislature and the party. If Tsai’s inluence is rising, 
former president Chen’s is waning. There has been quite a bit of pres-
sure for the DPP to draw a clear line between Chen and itself, and the 
Chen faction has fought to resist this. Chen’s faction had some success in 
the 2010 city council elections, conducted under SNTV rules, but far less 
in the 2012 single- seat legislative races. Moreover, in the 2010 CEC and 
CSC elections, the Chen faction was unable to win any CSC seats.24 With 
Chen’s health deteriorating in prison and the battles of Chen’s presidency 
fading from the present, the Chen faction faces a struggle to retain its size 
and inluence within the DPP.
Throughout this discussion, one can see again and again how competi-
tion over the presidency has molded the DPP’s system of factions. The 
most important events, including the splintering of Formosa, the forma-
tion and dissolution of the alliance between Justice and New Tide, the 
formal abolition of all factions, and the emergence of the Su and Hsieh 
factions, were all results of competition to control the presidency or efforts 
by the president to reshape the factional system.
Number of Faction Nominees per District
Masaru Kohno argues that the number of LDP factions was heavily inlu-
enced by the SNTV electoral system. As a general rule, factions only nomi-
nated one candidate per district. Because the LDP nominated multiple can-
didates in almost all districts, this created space for multiple factions. Ideally, 
a faction would grow large enough to nominate one candidate in every dis-
trict nationwide. In practice, they did not grow quite that large, and there 
were four large factions that nominated in most districts and one smaller 
faction that nominated candidates only in larger districts (Kohno 1992).
Almost all Japanese districts have between three and ive seats, so the 
LDP factions faced a fairly similar challenge across districts. Taiwan’s dis-
tricts vary much more, ranging from 1 to 17 seats. Moreover, Taiwan’s fac-
tions have also competed for 30 Central Executive Committee seats, 10 
or 11 Central Standing Committee seats, around 15 party list seats, and 
around 3 Overseas Representatives seats. These very different challenges 
make it much harder to construct factions of exactly the right size such that 
a faction can always nominate one and only one candidate.
Even so, DPP factions have exhibited tendencies to avoid multiple nom-
inees. To illustrate this, we irst considered all DPP district nominations 
worth ighting for in SNTV legislative elections from 1995 to 2004 (table 
4.6).25 The DPP nominated 304 candidates in these districts, of whom 256 
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were afiliated with a faction. Of these faction candidates, 176 (68.8%) did 
not have to run against another nominee from their faction. However, this 
overall number hides differences across district sizes. As might be expected, 
multiple nominees from a single faction were much more common when 
the DPP nominated more candidates. When the DPP only nominated one 
or two candidates, 95.3% of the faction nominees did not run against a fel-
low faction member. When the DPP nominated three or four, this percent-
age fell to only 74.4%. In districts with ive or more DPP nominees, half 
had to face at least one other nominee from their faction. There were also 
signiicant differences among the various factions. Multiple nominations 
were almost exclusively the province of the three biggest factions. Among 
tABLE 4.6. number of dPP Faction nominees in SntV Legislative Elections
 
Number of faction nominees
nominees %solospots districts 0 1 2 3 4
All factions 1– 2 203 161 41 1 43 95.3
3– 4 227 125 87 15 117 74.4
5+ 110 44 48 9 6 3 96 50.0
total 540 330 176 25 6 3 256 68.8
New Tide 1– 2 37 34 3 3 100.0
3– 4 41 9 26 6 38 68.4
5+ 20 3 11 2 4 27 40.7
total 98 46 40 8 4 68 58.8
Welfare 1– 2 37 25 12 12 100.0
3– 4 41 19 18 4 26 69.2
5+ 20 3 15 2 19 78.9
total 98 47 45 6 57 78.9
Justice 1– 2 37 21 15 1 17 88.2
3– 4 41 17 20 4 28 71.4
5+ 20 3 7 5 2 3 35 20.0
total 98 41 42 10 2 3 80 52.5
Formosa, TIA
New Era, New 
Dynamic, GFA
1– 2 92 81 11 11 100.0
3– 4 104 80 23 1 25 92.0
5+ 50 35 15 15 100.0




1– 2 37 30 6 1 8 75.0
3– 4 41 24 10 6 1 25 40.0
5+ 20 9 8 2 1 15 53.3
total 98 63 24 9 2  48 50.0
Note: These data cover the 1995–20 04 legislative elections. The following districts are excluded: Taitung 
County, Penghu County, Jinmen County, Lienchiang County, Plains Aborigines, Mountain Aborigines, 
Party List, and Overseas Representatives. Factional afiliations for 1995, 1998, and 2001 are taken from 
Cheng (2004, 563– 76). Factional afiliations for 2004 were compiled by the authors from newspaper re-
ports.
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Formosa, Taiwan Independence Alliance, New Era, New Dynamic, and 
Green Friendship Alliance, there was only one case of a multiple nomi-
nees. However, among Welfare, New Tide, and Justice, 21.1%, 41.2%, and 
47.5% of nominees, respectively, had to run against a fellow faction mem-
ber. It is especially striking that in the biggest districts, a majority of New 
Tide (59.3%) and Justice (80.0%) nominees had to deal with challenges 
from other faction members.
In general, factions usually nominated a single candidate, but the larger 
factions were not afraid to nominate multiple candidates in larger districts. 
Even so, there is anecdotal evidence that they viewed nominating mul-
tiple candidates as a challenge. For example, in the 2004 election, New 
Tide originally had multiple candidates in Taipei County 2 and Taichung 
City. However, four months before the election, it held a meeting in which 
the extra candidates were encouraged to withdraw from the faction (CT, 
August 11, 2004). It is probably no coincidence that the two factions that 
were able to grow large enough to consistently nominate multiple candi-
dates and navigate the resultant coordination problems were New Tide 
and Justice. The former is famous for its internal discipline, and both had 
ample resources from the executive branch. This last point brings us back 
to the importance of the executive. If the electoral system created pressures 
for factions to remain small enough that they would not need to nominate 
multiple candidates in a district, competition over the executive created 
both the incentive for bigger factions and the resources to sustain them.
DPP National Factions: Summary
This section draws attention to important parallels between the DPP and 
LDP factions. Like the LDP, the DPP has multiple factions competing for 
control of the national party. Even though the DPP party chair is directly 
elected, chairs need to forge a working majority in the CSC to be effec-
tive. Since no faction has had an outright majority since the very early days 
of the party, this has required building a coalition of multiple factions. To 
use the terminology of the introductory chapter, a postelectoral strategy 
is viable, so there is no need to consolidate into two big factions. Like the 
LDP, the DPP’s factions were born in a SNTV environment, and multi-
factionalism helped both parties nominate multiple candidates with differ-
entiated power bases. However, neither the LDP’s nor the DPP’s factions 
were completely dependent on the SNTV system, and both managed to 
adapt and survive after electoral reform.
If there are similarities between the LDP and DPP factions, there are 
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also notable differences. The LDP is a party of power, while the DPP has 
traditionally been an opposition party. The LDP’s factions collect and dis-
tribute enormous sums of money, and this money is often used by individ-
ual MPs to sustain a koenkai (personal support organization). These sorts of 
resources have generally not been available to the DPP, and collecting and 
distributing money plays an extremely limited role in the DPP’s factional 
politics. The koenkai help LDP politicians reach out to ordinary voters to 
win general elections; DPP factions connect politicians with party mem-
bers to win primaries.
Overall, the theories constructed to understand LDP factions are far 
more useful for understanding DPP factional politics than for deciphering 
KMT factions.
Conclusion
Our discussion of both KMT and DPP factions points to the centrality of 
executive competition. However, this was not necessarily competition over 
the national executive. For KMT local factions and DPP factions until the 
late 1990s, the presidency was not a viable goal. Rather, the factions orga-
nized themselves around the most attainable executive positions. KMT 
local factions are designed to win control of the local government, and the 
result is bifactionalism. DPP national factions were originally formed to 
win control of the national party, and building a minority faction and then 
constructing a coalition with other minority factions proved a viable strat-
egy. When the presidency became a possibility, the DPP’s faction system 
also changed. All the major changes of recent years, including the disin-
tegration of the Formosa faction, the push toward a bifactional system in 
the early years of the Chen presidency, and the evolution from legislative- 
centered factions to factions centered on presidential contenders, were all 
intimately related to competition over the presidency. The introduction 
reminds us that executive competition plays an important role in shaping 
party and faction systems. This chapter builds on that notion by point-
ing out that the critical competition may not always be over the national 
executive but may instead be over a local executive post, a party leadership 
post, or some other post that is both desirable and attainable.
Another lesson is that the electoral system used for the national leg-
islature may be less important than we previously believed. The change 
from SNTV to MMM forced factions to rethink their legislative electoral 
strategies, but it did not affect them in other critical arenas. After elec-
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toral reform, KMT local factions continued to place most of their focus 
on the single- seat- plurality county magistrate elections. Their secondary 
arena was arguably in the county assemblies, which continued to be elected 
by SNTV. Legislative elections were more central to the DPP’s nation-
ally oriented factions. However, all the DPP’s party positions as well as 
elections for the legislative caucus loor leaders continue to be elected by 
SNTV. With multiple arenas of competition, it is simplistic to expect that 
reforming the electoral system in just one arena will completely transform 
the factional system.
Finally, the different paths of the KMT and DPP draw attention to the 
historical context during the period of faction development. The KMT 
local factions were created in an authoritarian context in which they were 
not allowed to compete for national power or espouse controversial politi-
cal ideas. The KMT used factions to co- opt local elites and prevent them 
from coalescing into a force that could threaten its grip on national power. 
The result was locally oriented factions aimed at distributing patron-
age. DPP factions grew up in a very different context. Coming out of 
the democratization movement, DPP politicians were always focused on 
national politics. Even if winning power was not a viable short- term goal in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the DPP leaders who formed factions were 
nationally oriented politicians who forged alliances with similar colleagues 
from different areas. This led to a party with multiple power centers and 
a collective leadership. Today’s environment is different still from either 
the authoritarian era or the period of transition to democracy. The fac-
tions have evolved to meet current challenges, but the legacy of yesterday 
remains powerful.
n o t e S
 1. These data are based on a research project subsidized by the National Science 
Council research program entitled “The Relationship between Local Factions and 
Political Parities after the Consolidation of Taichung County and Taichung City.” 
Project No. NSC 99-2410-H- 029- 061.
 2. For more detail on the theoretical foundations, historical evolution, and 
everyday operations of Taiwan’s local factions, see Chao (1997); C. Chen (1997); 
M. Chen (1995); Huang (2010, 2011); Wang and Huang (2010).
 3. Administratively, Taiwan is divided into direct municipalities, counties, and 
county- level cities. For simplicity, we will often simply refer to both counties and 
city- level counties as counties. The executives for these are commonly called may-
ors and magistrates, respectively. For simplicity, we call them all magistrates. Below 
the cities and counties are a group of administrative districts including cities, towns, 
villages, and districts that we will collectively call townships. Township executives 
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will be called mayors. All these executive posts are elected by the single- member- 
plurality rule.
 4. Similarly, members of the Provincial Assembly and national legislature had 
access to funds for subsidies to local governments. However, even if the assembly 
members or legislators could help secure these funds, the money was dispersed by 
the provincial or central governments instead of the politicians themselves.
 5. There are other factions in Taiwan called the Red and Black factions. How-
ever, the Taichung County Red and Black factions are not allied with these other 
Red and Black factions. When Taichung County Red faction members enter the 
national legislature, for example, they do not necessarily cooperate with Changhua 
County Red faction legislators or Kaohsiung County Red faction legislators. All 
three Red factions are independent entities conined to speciic counties, and there 
is no national Red faction.
 6. The faction names are drawn from the colors used for campaign materials 
in the 1950s. Lin He- nian favored red lags, lealets, and name cards, while Chen 
Shui- tan used black or dark blue (Hung 1996). These colors may have been chosen 
to indicate the candidates’ social status and perhaps even their attitudes toward tra-
ditionalism. In those early days, many of the elites were doctors or teachers. Doc-
tors wore Western- style black suits, and were often considered to be more western-
ized. Teachers tended to be more conservative and often dressed in red. Chen was a 
prominent doctor, while Lin was an intellectual from the famous Wufeng Lin clan, 
which had produced several degree holders (see Meskill 1979).
 7. The Red and Black factions do not have any clear policy differences. Individ-
ual members may take different positions on particular policies, but these stances 
do not represent the entire faction.
 8. In fact, the KMT actively hastened the decline of the Yang faction. Yang 
Tien- sheng found himself on the wrong side of the power struggle between Lee 
Teng- hui and James Soong in the late 1990s, and Yang’s business interests suddenly 
found that government regulators became very hostile.
 9. Conventional accounts of the LDP’s factions almost never mention local 
executive races, focusing heavily on legislative races and competition over party 
leadership and cabinet positions. See Thayer (1969); Curtis (1988); Fukui (1970); 
Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993); and Kobayashi and Tsukiyama (chapter 3, this 
volume).
 10. Even the common story about money does not it. The usual legislature- 
centric story involves the legislator building up support by bringing large amounts 
of public money back to the district. In contrast, Hung and Liu were not particu-
larly noted for their ability to extract pork from the provincial or central govern-
ments. Rather, both were famous for their ability to penetrate local farmers asso-
ciations (Hung 1996). Controlling a farmers association does not necessarily mean 
that a politician is especially pro- farmer. While the conduit to farming votes is 
useful, the main advantage to controlling farmers associations is being able to com-
mand the inancial assets of their afiliated credit unions. However, it is important 
to remember that local governments offer far more discretionary resources than 
farmers associations and have always been considered a far bigger prize.
 11. For an explanation of this logic, see Batto and Cox, introduction, this volume.
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 12. For an explanation of telephone primaries, see Yu, Yu, and Shoji, chapter 5, 
this volume.
 13. The name of the new direct municipality is actually Taichung City. To avoid 
confusion with the old, smaller, county- level Taichung City, we call the new entity 
Taichung Municipality.
 14. Appointees must meet the civil service employment qualiications. Most local 
politicians do not meet these qualiications, so a municipal mayor cannot simply 
stuff these posts with faction cronies.
 15. Taichung County lost 21 township mayor positions, 19 county assembly seats, 
and 282 township council seats. Taichung County also effectively lost its executive 
seat, since the new Taichung Municipality mayor was the incumbent from Taic-
hung City. In all, 323 elected positions were eliminated.
 16. In addition, the party chair, any mayors of direct municipalities, and the three 
legislative caucus loor leaders are automatically members of the CSC. Mayors of 
county- level cities and counties are automatically members of the CEC, and they 
may choose one of their members to sit on the CSC. This system has been used 
since 2002. Prior to 2002, there were no automatic seats, and there were 31 mem-
bers of the CEC who elected 11 members of the CSC.
 17. In addition to the four major factions, there were also some smaller and less 
inluential factions in the 1990s. The most famous of these was the Taiwan Inde-
pendence Alliance, which had its roots in the overseas independence movement 
during martial law.
 18. Press reports differ, but New Era was generally reported with 15 or 16 legis-
lators, while New Dynamic only had about 8 or 9 (see CNA, January 6, 1990; CNA, 
June 7, 1990) .
 19. Not all the pressure came from New Tide. For example, Vice President 
Annette Lu publicly mooted the possibility of Chen’s resignation, and some in the 
Justice faction urged Chen to hand over power before his term expired. However, 
New Tide led many of the attacks, and defenders of the president focused their rage 
on New Tide.
 20. The motion ordered factions to dissolve and including ive clarifying provi-
sions: (1) factions could not maintain ofices; (2) factions could not recruit new 
members; (3) factions could not accept dues from members or raise money; (4) 
factions could not hold oficial faction meetings or hear reports from government 
oficials; (5) all party members holding public or party ofices should publicly 
announce they have withdrawn from any factions (LT, July 12, 2006).
 21. Money may also have played a role, an interesting possibility given the Japa-
nese experience. Raising money has been stressed as one of the main functions of 
Japanese LDP factions, and one of the main thrusts of 1994 Political Funds Con-
trol Act was to prohibit individual factions from directly seeking corporate funds 
(Reed and Thies 2001; Kobayashi and Tsukiyama, chapter 3, this volume). In the 
DPP, there was concern that New Tide had been absorbing a disproportionate 
share of money. Critics pointed to a New Tide leader’s position as chair of the Tai-
wan Stock Exchange Corporation and the leverage over the inancial system that 
this position bestowed on him. However, there are reasons to doubt that money 
was really the crucial factor. The other factions also had rainmakers, and many of 
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them were among the motion’s most ardent supporters (CT, July 7, 2006). More-
over, New Tide allies proposed an alternate motion that would have prohibited 
raising money but allowed the factions to continue to exist. The fact that New Tide 
was willing to sacriice its fund- raising capacity and that opponents rejected this 
alternative suggests fund- raising was not the central point.
 22. Somewhat comically, immediately after the motion dissolving factions passed, 
the party congress turned to the last item on the agenda: electing the new CEC 
and CSC. These elections featured factional politics in all their glory, with factions 
organizing vote rationing schemes. Of course, the media reported these elections 
in terms of which factions did well and which ones did not.
 23. This does not mean that the dissolution did not affect New Tide at all. Over 
the inal two years of Chen’s presidency, observers began to differentiate between 
the Northern Tide and the Southern Tide. The Northern Tide was far more criti-
cal of President Chen and far more vocal about the need for a reform movement 
within the DPP. Some New Tide members blamed this internal divergence on the 
fact that they were not able to hold regular meetings and hammer out a common 
position as they had in the past (CT, May 18, 2007). New Tide only fully reestab-
lished an organizational foundation in October 2008 when it founded the New 
Society for Taiwan think tank.
 24. However, two CSC seats were won by factions that are loosely allied with the 
Chen faction, the Grandparents faction and former Premier Yu Hsi- kun’s faction.
 25. The DPP has historically not been competitive in several districts, and we 
considered nominations in these districts to be far less valuable. As such, we do not 
consider nominations in the following districts: Taitung County, Penghu County, 
Jinmen County, Lienchiang County, Plains Aborigines, and Mountain Aborigines. 
Party List and Overseas Representatives are also excluded from this table.
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FIVE
Innovations in Candidate  
Selection Methods
Eric Chen- hua Yu, Kaori Shoji, and Nathan F. Batto
This chapter focuses on how major parties adjusted their candidate selec-
tion methods (CSMs) to meet the challenges brought about by the new 
electoral regimes in Taiwan and Japan, respectively. Speciically, it inves-
tigates two innovative ways to select district- level candidates adopted by 
the major parties in each country.1 In Taiwan, the polling primary became 
the default system that the two major parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and 
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), used to nominate their candi-
dates for the Legislative Yuan elections. In Japan, both of the major par-
ties, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP), have turned to the kobo (public recruitment) system to select 
candidates. The new CSMs were designed to address different concerns. 
The polling primary was intended to identify the strongest candidate and 
resolve intraparty competition. In contrast, the initial purpose of the kobo 
system was not to resolve intraparty clashes among ambitious and powerful 
contenders. Rather, in the late 1990s and early 2000s the DPJ used kobo 
for the purposes of party- building. In more recent years, both the DPJ and 
LDP have increasingly used it to legitimize party decisions.
Candidate Selection Methods, Electoral reform,  
and Constitutional Systems
The determinants of CSMs is an important topic for scholars interested in 
political parties (Ranney 1981; Gallagher and Marsh 1988). Recent work 
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on the extent to which electoral systems affect the choice of CSMs has 
not pointed to a consensus. While some comparative case studies argue 
that electoral institutions should have substantial impacts on choices of 
CSMs, particularly in terms of ballot structure and district magnitude 
(Norris 1997; Kasapovic 2001), other recent large- N studies show that the 
empirical evidence is meager at best (Lundell 2004; Shomer 2012). From 
the perspective of level of analysis, Hazan and Voerman (2006) point out 
that electoral systems are a country- level variable that may not account 
for intracountry, cross- party variation in CSMs. Gallagher and Marsh 
(1988) are perhaps correct in positing that electoral systems do not, by 
themselves, completely determine CSMs, yet it is certainly possible that 
electoral systems exert some degree of inluence. Decades of research on 
electoral systems has clearly indicated that parties do, in fact, vary their 
strategies according to the different incentive schemes produced by dif-
ferent electoral systems. CSMs are an important element of overall party 
electoral strategies, and we should expect to see some impact of the elec-
toral incentives on the choice of CSMs. In the particular cases of Taiwan 
and Japan, although both the polling primary and kobo had been initiated 
prior to the introduction of electoral reforms, we argue that the electoral 
and constitutional systems helped facilitate the consolidation of both inno-
vative institutions.
Changing from SNTV to MMM may push parties to adjust their 
CSMs. For one thing, such a change increases the importance of managing 
intraparty competition in the nomination stage (Wu and Fell 2003; Krauss 
and Pekkanen 2004). Under SNTV, much of the intraparty competition 
takes place in the general election stage, as parties routinely nominate mul-
tiple candidates in the same district. While the optimal strategy is for a 
party to nominate the “right” number of candidates and then distribute its 
support evenly among them (Cox and Rosenbluth 1993; Cox and Thies 
1998; Cox and Niou 1994; Browne and Patterson 1999), overnomination 
is not always a disaster. If more than the appropriate number of candidates 
insists on running and no compromise can be found, the party can some-
times simply let them all run and let the electorate decide which is the 
weakest. That is, the party can opt for a less optimal solution in which no 
candidate is unfairly denied a nomination. Sometimes this will lead to a 
worse outcome, but sometimes the party will still manage to avoid losing a 
winnable seat. In contrast, in single- member districts (SMDs), parties must 
nominate a single candidate to have any chance to win. A second candi-
date in an SMD race almost always portends disaster. Thus, any intraparty 
clashes that appear during the nomination process have to be dealt with at 
that stage and cannot be pushed off until the general election.
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Another way in which the shift to MMM could affect nominations 
involves the increased number of districts. Under SNTV, each district elects 
multiple seats. Any party wishing to give every voter a chance to support it 
has merely to nominate one candidate in every district. With the change to 
MMM, the number of districts increases markedly, and parties wishing to 
give all voters an option to support them have to nominate a much larger 
number of candidates. Even for established parties, this is not an easy task. 
For smaller and newer parties without deep pools of potential candidates, 
simply inding enough competent candidates to run in every district can be 
a daunting challenge. Especially in weaker districts, newer and smaller par-
ties have to struggle to present a roster of credible candidates.
Japan’s parliamentary system creates a different set of problems than 
Taiwan’s semipresidential system does. Batto and Cox (introduction, this 
volume) and Lin (chapter 2, this volume) argue that executive posts are 
the ultimate goal for many politicians. In Japan, cabinet posts are deter-
mined by negotiations among party leaders in the House of Representa-
tives. Almost all of the key igures, including the party leaders and the MPs 
who receive ministerial posts, are legislators who have accumulated years 
and years of seniority. The typical career path is well documented. An MP 
is elected at a young age and slowly works his way up through a series of 
posts. After being reelected several times, he or she might inally accumu-
late suficient seniority and experience to be eligible for a ministerial post. 
Party leaders are generally drawn from this same group of senior MPs. In 
short, seniority is a prerequisite for securing powerful posts. Taiwan’s semi-
presidential system works differently. Cabinet posts are allotted unilater-
ally by the president, not negotiated by legislative leaders. Moreover, since 
a legislator must resign his or her seat to assume a post in the executive 
branch, presidents are reluctant to appoint legislators to the cabinet. Ambi-
tious legislators must thus look elsewhere if they hope to hold executive 
power. In fact, ambitious legislators typically seek to win local executive 
seats as city mayors or county magistrates. National leaders generally have 
proven their mettle by winning a highly competitive mayoral race and suc-
cessfully administering a city government for several years. The legislators 
who remain in the legislature and accumulate seniority are generally less 
energetic, charismatic, and politically talented than those who move on 
to other challenges. The result of this is that legislative seniority is much 
more important in Japan than in Taiwan. Most important Japanese politi-
cians are senior legislators, while few Taiwanese leaders are.
The differing importance of seniority has signiicant implications for 
nomination strategies. Consider a district in which a party is very strong. 
The nomination in this party is a very valuable commodity, since nomina-
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tion almost certainly means winning in the general election. Such a valu-
able commodity is certainly worth ighting over, even if it means taking on 
an entrenched incumbent. In Japan, all of the senior igures in the party 
have accumulated seniority, and they all have an interest in protecting that 
precious asset. To this end, Japanese parties have written the rules to favor 
incumbents. In particular, Japanese parties typically automatically renomi-
nate incumbents. In Taiwan, the decision makers in the party do not usually 
have strong personal interests in protecting seniority. They would gener-
ally prefer to see the strongest candidate emerge. In fact, party leaders may 
actually prefer to see energetic challenges to ensure that incumbent legisla-
tors work hard and actively stay in touch with their constituents.
As a result, Taiwanese and Japanese CSMs have evolved to address very 
different challenges. For Taiwanese parties, the most important problem 
is how to choose nominees in the strongest and most desirable districts. 
The polling primary has emerged as the best solution for this task. As par-
ties cannot always easily resolve intraparty clashes, they have an incentive 
to delegate the power to the general public to make the decision. Public 
opinion surveys are seen as an objective test of strength in which everyone 
gets a fair shot. Surveys have the added advantage of communicating a 
quantiiable measure of strength and weakness to the general public. Voters 
who support the loser not only have to face evidence that their favored can-
didate has lost in a fair process but also that if he ran a renegade campaign 
in the general election he would have to face the prospect of widespread 
strategic voting toward the party nominee.
Japanese parties have a different problem. The most desirable districts 
are almost all occupied by incumbents, and intraparty challenges for these 
nominations are simply disallowed. Instead, Japanese parties worry about 
nominating candidates for districts without incumbents. Many of these dis-
tricts are hopeless and undesirable to ambitious politicians. Nevertheless, 
big parties generally wish to run candidates in all or almost all districts, so 
they try to ind someone to represent the party.2 In the years just after the 
electoral reform, this was a particular challenge for the DPJ. The old pri-
mary opposition, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), disintegrated in the new 
electoral system as it was unable to win pluralities in many districts. The 
DPJ rose to ill this void, but, as a new party, it did not have deep pools of 
candidates ready to run in every district. The DPJ turned to kobo to recruit 
new politicians and ensure that it could run a full slate of candidates. At 
irst, the DPJ used kobo primarily as a party- building mechanism. As the 
DPJ matured and inding enough candidates to run nationwide became 
less of a problem, the nature of kobo began to shift. Many districts with no 
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incumbents were worth ighting for. Local power holders or national fac-
tion leaders might maneuver to nominate their most favored candidate into 
these spots, but concerns over fairness spurred them to try to cloak their 
inluence. Increasingly kobo was used to publicly legitimize decisions made 
by party leaders. That is, kobo was presented to the public as an open and 
fair decision- making process. In practice, it was anything but open. Even 
the LDP, a well- established party with an entrenched local party organi-
zation, shared some similarities to the DPJ in the incentives for adopting 
kobo. Below, we look into the development of new CSMs in each country.
the Polling Primary in taiwan
The Evolution of Taiwanese CSMs and the  
Emergence of the Polling Primary
The KMT implemented an authoritarian regime after retreating to Tai-
wan in 1949 and institutionalized different types of elections in order to 
facilitate its control at the grassroots (Cheng 1989; Wu 2001). To solidify 
its authority in elections, the KMT adopted a top- down CSM. During 
the authoritarian era, local party members were informally consulted in 
the candidate selection process, but the overall CSM was characterized by 
centralization.
During the transition to democracy in the mid- 1980s, Taiwan saw a 
series of important political markers, such as the establishment of the main 
opposition party, the DPP, in 1986, the dismantling of martial law in 1987, 
and the death of President Chiang Ching- kuo in 1988. These events sig-
naled the decline of the KMT’s authoritarian rule and the emergence of 
competitive party politics (Wu 2001). In response to the inevitable trend of 
democratization, the KMT adopted and started transforming its Leninist 
party structure to compete in the new democratic structure. One of the 
starting points was to open and decentralize its CSM.
In 1989, the KMT adopted a closed primary system. This was the irst 
time that the party’s rank- and- ile members could formally participate in the 
candidate selection process and marked a major decentralization of author-
ity. While the central party headquarters continued to retain the right to 
make the inal decisions, it generally respected the primary results. How-
ever, this new system did not produce an entirely favorable outcome. One 
of the KMT’s goals was to reduce the power of local factions, and this new 
system led to more nominees who were not associated with local factions 
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(Huang 1996). The KMT share of elected seats fell by 9.5% from 1986, and 
the new CSM, which many argued had produced a weak slate of candidates, 
was commonly cited as one of the reasons for this poor performance.
The KMT revised its CSM for the 1992 elections to include party 
member primaries followed by evaluations from party cadres. While this 
new system was somewhat less decentralized than the 1989 system, the 
KMT did not return to a fully centralized CSM. Rather, the 1992 system 
conirmed the power shift from the center to localities, and local party 
members and party oficials have exercised signiicant inluence in deter-
mining nominations in all subsequent elections.
In the 1993 county magistrates and city mayoral elections, the KMT 
further adjusted its CSM to include three factors: party member opinion 
responses, evaluations by cadres, and public opinion polls (Wu 2001). This 
marked the irst time that the KMT incorporated polling results in its can-
didate selection process. However, the results from these three processes 
were not binding, as higher party oficials reserved the right to make the 
inal nomination decisions.
Although the KMT was the irst party to use polls to assess aspirants, 
the DPP was the irst party to incorporate polling results into a binding 
formula to determine nominations. In the early years after its founding in 
1986, the DPP’s leadership was not composed as a uniied group but came 
from various anti- KMT individuals or factions that occupied ofices at the 
local representative bodies. This unique preparty history gave the DPP a 
decentralized pattern of power distribution that was relected in its CSM. 
Negotiations and compromises among party factions became the major 
tool for nominating candidates. If party leaders were unable to reach any 
consensus, party members were to be asked to cast votes to determine inal 
nominations. In practice, the leadership of the DPP tried to reach consen-
sus through compromise, and it was rare to see party members voting in 
the 1980s. The above two- stage process characterized the DPP’s candidate 
selection from its founding until the early 1990s, though it was not ofi-
cially codiied until the 1992 legislative election.
In 1995, the DPP revised its CSM to give party cadres more power.3 If 
the party failed to settle on a consensus, votes of party members and party 
cadres each accounted for 50% of the inal decision. The introduction of 
voting for party cadres signaled the increasing importance of local party 
branches and a deemphasis on party members in the nomination process. 
One reason for this was to address an increasing tendency for aspirants to 
register large numbers of new party members. The aspirant would typi-
cally pay the party dues and control the votes of these “head voters” (rentou 
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dangyuan), and many DPP leaders and supporters saw this as a growing 
form of corruption or vote buying (Wang 2006). Others worried that DPP 
factions were becoming too powerful, and it was increasingly impossible 
for aspirants not afiliated with a faction to win a nomination. In fact, the 
addition of party cadres did little to reduce the inluence of factions, as 
most of the cadres were themselves deeply embedded in the faction system.
The DPP strategy for avoiding these negative repercussions was to 
decentralize their nominations. Instead of relying on the small number of 
formal party members or an even smaller number of party leaders to make 
decisions, the DPP attempted to empower the much larger number of party 
supporters and sympathizers in the general public. Aspirants could manipu-
late the outcomes inside the party by registering easily controlled “head 
voters” or by factional maneuvering, but the hope was that these strategies 
would not be feasible in the much larger population of party supporters. 
This new strategy was irst attempted in the contest for the 1996 presiden-
tial nomination. The DPP used a closed primary to winnow the ield to the 
top two contestants, and then these two toured the country in a series of 
debates in which the general public was allowed to vote to determine the 
nominee. Unfortunately, the attendance at these open primary events was 
still fairly low, so the DPP continued to look for a better process.
This led to the incorporation of telephone polling in the 1998 legisla-
tive nomination process. The DPP scrapped voting by party cadres and 
instead gave 50% weights to both party member votes and telephone poll 
results. This marked the irst time that either of the two major parties had 
included polling results in the nomination process in a binding, not merely 
an advisory, role.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the two main parties’ CSMs evolved in 
very different ways. The KMT’s main concern was to devolve power from 
the center to localities in order to compete more effectively in the new 
democratic system, while the DPP moved from an elite- dominated CSM 
to one that drew on a much larger selectorate in an attempt to mitigate 
manipulation of its internal party processes. However, once the polling 
primary was introduced and its advantages became apparent, the 2000s saw 
the two parties converge on relatively similar CSMs.
In the 2001 Legislative Yuan election, the KMT imitated the DPP 
by adopting polling results in its nomination process. The KMT’s CSM 
included two parts: voting by local party members and telephone polling, 
each given equal weights. Local party branches tabulated and combined 
the results of the two parts and forwarded them to the central party head-
quarters, which generally respected the local results.
tABLE 5.1. Evolution of CSMs for Legislative Yuan Elections, 1969 to 2012
Year KMT DPP
1969 Candidates produced by consultations with 
local party members, then reviewed by  
the provincial party headquarter, and  
inally decided by the central party 
headquarters
N/A
1972 Candidates produced by consultations with 
local party members, then decided by the 
central party headquarters
N/A
1975 Same as 1972 N/A
1980 Candidates produced by consultations 
with local party members and reviews of 
local party oficials, then reviewed by the 
provincial party headquarter, and inally 
decided by the central party headquarters
N/A
1983 Candidates produced by consultations with 
local party members and reviews of local 
party oficials, then the provincial party 
headquarter doubled the number of 
nominee, and inally decided by the  
central party headquarters
N/A
1986 Same as 1983 N/A
1989 Candidates produced by party member 
primary, then decided by the central  
party headquarters
Candidates produced by consensus; 
otherwise by party member vote
1992 Candidates produced by party member 
primary (50%), and reviews of local party 
oficials (50%), then decided by  
the central party headquarters
Candidates produced by consensus; 
otherwise by party member vote
1995 District candidates produced by  
consultation with local party members,  
or by opinion polls, or by reviews of  
local party oficials, then decided by the 
central party headquarters
Candidates produced by consensus; 
otherwise by party member vote (50%) 
and party cadres vote (50%)
1998 Same as 1995 Candidates produced by compromises 
(consensus), otherwise by party member 
vote (50%) and opinion polls (50%)
2001 Candidates produced by party member 
primary (50%), and opinion polls (50%)
Candidates produced by compromises 
(consensus), otherwise by party member 
vote (30%) and opinion polls (70%)
2004 Candidates produced by party member 
primary (30%), and opinion polls (70%)
Same as 2001
2008 Same as 2004 Same as 2001
2012 Candidates produced by opinion polls Candidates produced by opinion polls
Source: Data before 2012 were adopted and revised from Wang (2008, 143– 70).
Note: The nomination of party list candidates is not included. All nomination decisions, even those after parties 
began using polling primaries, had to be ratiied by the national party headquarters.
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The importance of polling results continued to increase. The DPP 
adjusted its formula to make telephone polling account for 70% of the inal 
outcome, with party members voting reduced to only 30%. The KMT fol-
lowed suit in 2004, and both parties used the 70– 30 rule to determine their 
district- level nominees for the 2004 and 2008 Legislative Yuan elections.4 
In 2012, both parties completed the evolution toward the polling primary 
by eliminating voting by party members and determining nominations 
solely by the results of telephone polls.5
While the polling primary evolved in the SNTV era, it arguably is 
even better suited to nominations for the single- seat districts employed in 
MMM. In a large SNTV district, a party wishing to nominate four candi-
dates might have to adjudicate between its fourth and ifth strongest aspi-
rants. These aspirants might not be strong enough to cause problems if 
not nominated, and the party always has the option to simply overnomi-
nate. In MMM, the clash is between the two strongest aspirants and over-
nomination is not a feasible option. Resolving the conlict in a fair way 
is imperative. Moreover, SNTV elections are characterized by intraparty 
competition, so inding a balanced roster of nominees that appeal to vari-
ous factions within the party is important. Internal party processes, such as 
a closed primary, are useful for ensuring that no single faction monopolizes 
nominations. In contrast, internal party balance is less urgent in MMM. 
Single- seat elections are characterized more by interparty competition, 
and the strongest candidates are those that appeal to broad swaths of the 
population. Polls are particularly adept at identifying these politicians. In 
fact, while this chapter focuses on legislative nominations, both parties 
have used polling primaries extensively for single- seat executive elections. 
It is thus not surprising that the parties responded to electoral reform by 
intensifying their use of the polling primary.
The Mechanics of the Polling Primary
This section describes the CSMs used by KMT and DPP in the 2012 leg-
islative election. Both the KMT and DPP started their candidate selection 
procedure with candidate registration. All aspirants had to register, includ-
ing incumbents. In general, incumbents were not given any special sta-
tus in the competition for nominations, and sitting legislators often faced 
competition from challengers within the party. Even when only one candi-
date registered, he or she still needed to demonstrate electability through 
public opinion polls. The KMT required that unopposed aspirants must 
pass a 30% threshold of support to win a nomination, while the DPP head-
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quarters reserved the right to reject weak aspirants and search for stronger 
alternatives.
If more than two aspirants registered for nomination selection, the pro-
cess proceeded into the second phase— negotiation. Both parties preferred 
to resolve conlicts behind closed doors rather than by engaging in open 
and potentially explosive intraparty competition. During the negotiation 
period, parties sometimes did nonbinding polling to see who had a bet-
ter chance to win and who should be encouraged to yield. Additionally, 
the party headquarters sometimes sent a senior party oficial to handle the 
negotiation process. In some cases, such negotiation processes was suc-
cessful and the party was able to nominate a candidate without intense and 
direct intraparty conlict. For example, in 2012 in New Taipei City 4th 
District, the KMT’s incumbent Lee Hung- chun faced a challenge from 
Hsu Bing- kuan, who had a strong local organization and signiicant grass-
roots support. Lee and Hsu had known each other for 30 years and were 
close friends. In the beginning of the negotiation process, Lee expressed 
a willingness to withdraw and let Hsu represent the KMT in the general 
election. Yet, the KMT leadership favored Lee due to both his perfor-
mance in the legislature and his broad popularity in the very competitive 
4th District. Thus, at the end of the day, Hsu agreed to withdraw and wait 
on the sideline for future opportunities.6
Most negotiations did not go as smoothly as the previous example. 
Quite often, contenders refused to step aside and the negotiation pro-
cess broke down. For example, in New Taipei City 2nd District, the DPP 
incumbent Lin Shu- fen was challenged by Huang Chien- hue, a former 
legislator who had lost to Lin in the 2008 DPP primary. Soon after the 
deadline for registration, the DPP headquarters sent a senior party leader 
to initiate the negotiation process. Yet, the negotiations fell apart quickly 
as Huang, who was strongly supported by one of the DPP’s major fac-
tions, made it clear that he would never withdraw from the competition.7 
In short, although Lin seemed to be a very strong DPP incumbent candi-
date, a polling primary was still necessary since a quality contender insisted 
on challenging her.
When negotiations broke down, the process moved into one of two 
third phases. In stronger districts, parties held a polling primary, while in 
weaker districts the party headquarters tended to directly select a nominee. 
In weaker districts, the party had little chance of winning and the challenge 
was more commonly to simply recruit any quality candidate rather than 
to mediate between multiple competent aspirants. In these more dificult 
districts, the party headquarters sometimes unilaterally decided who the 
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nominee would be. For example, the DPP deemed all districts in which it 
had received less than 42.5% of the vote in 2008 as “dificult,” and the party 
headquarters was given the authority to unilaterally decide nominations in 
these districts.
Where parties were stronger, the nominations were more valuable, 
intraparty conlict was potentially more explosive, and parties were more 
likely to end up with the polling primary. Table 5.2 shows that in nine of 
the 11 districts in which the KMT held a polling primary in 2012, it even-
tually won the seat. The DPP was only slightly less successful when it held 
polling primaries, winning nine of 13 districts.
Incumbents were not immune from challenges. Twelve incumbents were 
forced to face a polling primary, and three lost. Fifty KMT and DPP incum-
bents were eventually nominated without resorting to a polling primary. 
However, this should not be interpreted as 50 unchallenged nominations. 
In many cases, other aspirants registered or considered registering but were 
eventually persuaded to yield before or during the negotiation phase.
There were many similarities and a few clear differences in the protocols 
tABLE 5.2. use of Polling Primaries in the 2012 Legislative Yuan Election
 
KMT DPP
Number of seats % of total Number of seats % of total
Total single- seat districtsa 73 100.0% 73 100.0%
Districts nominated 71 97.3 71 97.3
Districts won in 2012  
election
44 60.3 27 37.0
Districts held prior to the 
2012 electionb
50 68.5 19 26.0
Districts using a polling 
primary
11 15.1 13 17.8
Polling primary winners  
who also won the seat
9 12.3 9 12.3
Incumbents nominated 
without a polling primaryc
39 53.4 11 15.1
Incumbents participating  
in a polling primary
7 9.6 5 6.8
Incumbents winning a  
polling primary 5 6.8 4 5.5
aOnly single- seat districts are considered in this table.
bThis is slightly different from the 2008 election result because there were several by- elections between 
the two general elections.
cFor this table, an incumbent is deined as a legislator who won the district in the 2008 election or an 
intervening by- election. Legislators who won their seat in a different district or on the party list are not 
considered incumbents.
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used by the two parties (table 5.3). Both parties contracted with outside 
polling companies to do random sample surveys. The DPP had a list of 
eligible polling organizations, including its own internal survey unit, and 
randomly selected three of these for each different race. The KMT adopted 
a more decentralized method, allowing any two polling organizations to be 
selected in any race upon the aspirants’ agreement. The two parties applied 
different scheduling of the surveys, and the KMT employed in- house sam-
pling8 while the DPP did not. These two differences relected the different 
priorities of the two parties. The KMT placed the highest priority on get-
ting an accurate reading of public opinion, and its protocols were designed 
to ensure a representative sample. The KMT prescheduled its surveys to 
be held over three days, usually including both weekdays and weekends, 
and it further used in- house sampling rather than simply asking whoever 
answered the phone in order to eliminate as much as possible any distor-
tions in the sample. The DPP, in contrast, saw the polling primary as a 
way to test the mobilization capacity of its contenders.9 Rather than try-
ing to eliminate any distortions, the DPP encouraged its contestants to try 
everything possible to affect the outcome. The scheduling, in particular, was 
designed speciically to test mobilization. The headquarters only presched-
uled a period of time for a list of district primaries without specifying the 
order. Thus, no one knew which primary would take place on what particu-
lar date. Then every morning during the primary period, the headquarters 
randomly selected one district from the list for a polling primary that night. 
The contenders were immediately informed, usually around 10:00 a.m. 
Once the primary date was announced, contenders rushed to mobilize their 
supporters, encouraging them to be in their homes between 6:00 and 10:00 
p.m. that night to wait for possible phone calls. The DPP did not adopt in- 
house sampling for the same reason. In households with split preferences, 
tABLE 5.3. Key Features of KMt and dPP Polling Primaries in 2012
 KMT DPP
Overseen by: Local party branch National party headquarters
Method: Telephone survey Telephone survey
Days to complete survey: 3 1
Survey organizations: 2 3
Interviews completed by each 
organization:
At least 1,068 About 1,200
Questionnaire: Interparty matchup: 85%
Intraparty matchup: 15%
Default: Interparty matchup
(can be changed by consensus)
Date: Prescheduled Random
In- house sampling: Yes No
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who answered the phone became an important factor in determining the 
results. Contenders had just a few hours to phone, text, or otherwise contact 
as many people as possible to ensure that a disproportionate number of 
their supporters were at home ready to answer the phone.
Finally, the questions put to respondents varied across parties. The 
DPP’s default question in strong districts was an interparty comparison.10 
For example, if there were two DPP contestants (A and B), respondents 
were typically asked a pair of questions, whether the respondent preferred 
A or the KMT candidate and whether the respondent preferred B or the 
KMT candidate. However, if the contestants agreed on some alternate for-
mat or if the KMT candidate had not yet been determined,11 the DPP was 
willing to allow other question formats. Unlike the scheduling, which the 
party headquarters kept under tight control, the question format was open 
to revision. One common complaint about the interparty comparison was 
that it did not allow sincere party loyalists to express their preferences for 
one or the other contestant. Since many loyalists prefer any DPP candi-
date to any KMT candidate, sincere respondents would express support for 
both A and B and thus have no impact on the outcome. Only those who 
strategically answered that they would support the KMT candidate over 
the less favored DPP contestant affected the outcome, and this led to com-
plaints that the system forced respondents to lie if they wished to have any 
impact. The KMT system addressed this concern by including both inter-
party and intraparty comparisons. In addition to pitting the contestants 
against the DPP nominee,12 respondents were further asked which of the 
KMT contestants they preferred. The interparty comparison was still the 
more important, accounting for 85% of the inal score, but the 15% weight 
given to the intraparty comparison allowed KMT supporters to show their 
preference for a speciic KMT contestant.
Table 5.4 shows an example of a polling primary. In 2010, the DPP had 
won the seat in Taitung County in a by- election, and the incumbent, Lie 
Kuen- cheng, wanted to run for reelection. He was opposed by the for-
mer deputy head of the county government, Liu Chao- hao. Negotiations 
did not yield any compromises, so a polling primary was conducted. Since 
the KMT had already settled on a candidate, Yao Ching- ling, the standard 
interparty questions were used. On the morning of April 6, 2011, the DPP 
headquarters randomly drew the Taitung County district for that day’s 
polling primary. At the same time, it randomly drew three survey organiza-
tions to carry out the polls. Between 6:00 and 10:00 that night, each orga-
nization conducted 1,200 interviews. The DPP issued a press release on 
the morning of April 7 announcing that Liu had defeated Lie and would be 
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nominated. Liu’s nomination was conirmed later that week at the weekly 
meeting of the DPP’s Central Standing Committee. Two points about the 
results are worth noting. First, the results from the three organizations 
were very similar. This was almost always the case, and similar results from 
different organizations helped to assuage any suspicions of manipulation. 
Second, no consideration was given to ideas about margin of error. Results 
were reported with an unrealistic degree of precision, and there was no 
requirement that the margin of victory be over a certain threshold.
Discussion
There are several reasons that the two main parties have turned to the poll-
ing primary as the default CSM. First, the polling primary controls costs 
for parties. Commissioning several polls costs money, but it is cheaper than 
organizing party member primaries.13 Second, polling primaries identify 
the candidate who is the most popular among the general public and thus 
most likely to win in the general election. Previous CSMs relied on more 
narrow segments of the electorate to decide nominations, and this left them 
open to the charge that they were not selecting the best candidates. For 
example, in the early 1990s the KMT leadership “parachuted” several can-
didates with no local ties into districts, and these were often attacked as out-
siders and easily defeated. With the polling primary, parachute candidates 
whose national fame did not translate into local popularity were rejected 
while those who did enjoy substantial local support were legitimized.
Third and most important, the polling primary is seen as a much fairer 
system than any other alternative. Polls produce hard numbers and a clear 
decision rule: candidates with support from more respondents win. The 
fact that the poll results are usually very similar across multiple survey 
organizations gives them added credibility. Moreover, poll results are much 










Candidate DPP Yao DPP Yao DPP Yao DPP Yao
Liu .4175 .2368 .4195 .2481 .4487 .2332 .4286 .2394
Lie (incumbent) .3823 .2799 .3905 .2913 .4198 .2876 .3975 .2863
Source: DPP website (http://www.dpp.org.tw/news_content.php?&sn=4844), accessed July 2, 2013.
Notes: The surveys were conducted on April 6, 2011. Results were announced on April 7. Respondents 
were asked a pair of questions, whether they preferred Liu or Yao (the KMT candidate) and whether they 
preferred Lie or Yao.
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harder to manipulate than closed primaries or negotiations by party elites 
behind closed doors.
The KMT was particularly worried about the inluence of local factions 
in its nomination process. Factions were extremely effective in closed- room 
negotiations and could often control the recommendations forwarded to 
the national party by local party branches. This ability to control the pro-
cess was seen as somewhat illegitimate by the general public, as the factions 
appeared to simply be dividing up spoils among themselves, and opportu-
nities for regular people to inluence nominations were limited. By moving 
the locus of competition from party elites to the general public and forcing 
contestants, including faction members, to compete in a transparent pro-
cess, the KMT was able to credibly claim that faction- afiliated contestants 
had no unfair advantages.
The DPP was also concerned about the inluence of its factions, which 
were also seen as somewhat illegitimate by many party supporters. In the 
DPP, the question of faction power was closely related to the number of 
phantom party members. Most powerful DPP igures controlled a certain 
number of “head voters,” and they relied on these votes both in internal 
party elections and in nomination ights. Indeed, DPP factions all had large 
numbers of head voters in their pockets. Since the formal membership of 
the DPP was relatively small, factions or individual politicians could decide 
the outcome of closed primaries by recruiting more head voters, and this 
was widely seen as a perversion of democracy. The polling primary ren-
dered the “head voter strategy” obsolete. More generally, one can see these 
phantom party members as a type of vote- buying strategy, and, by dramati-
cally increasing the size of the selectorate, the polling primary made vote- 
buying extremely ineficient. In fact, given the low payoff, the negative 
consequences resulting from being publicly exposed as a vote- buyer, and 
the high probability that one’s opponents would uncover and expose any 
such activity, the polling primary arguably transformed vote- buying from a 
beneicial strategy into a harmful one.14,15
There are some criticisms of the polling primary (Wu 2008, 115– 45). 
One popular normative argument is that parties have a responsibility to 
nominate good people, and by adopting the polling primary and delegating 
decisions to the general public, parties are abdicating this duty.16 A related 
argument is that allowing the general public to make the decision leaves 
no important role for ordinary party members. Why should a person for-
mally join a party if he or she has no say in its most important decisions? 
According to this argument, the polling primary could negatively affect 
party- building.
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Another criticism is that the polling primary encourages politicians 
to be overly concerned with public opinion. Some Taiwanese commen-
tators have suggested that the polling primary makes potential aspirants 
(including incumbent candidates) care more about their public image than 
anything else. As such, politicians expend too much effort seeking media 
exposure and building name recognition and not enough energy working 
on mundane but important policy questions.
A quite different line of criticism is more technical, arguing that survey 
results may not accurately relect popular opinion. On the one hand, it 
takes quite a bit of expertise to conduct a random sample survey. Surveys 
include many different components, such as sampling technique, question-
naire wording and ordering, data processing, and so on. Each component 
is subject to manipulation, and slight variations may produce different out-
comes. In the worst case scenario, an unrepresentative sample or an inten-
tional distorted outcome might give a victory to the wrong person. Less 
dramatically, surveys produce estimates with statistical errors. Any victory, 
no matter how small, is suficient to win the nomination. In close races, the 
margin of victory may be within the statistical error, but the parties do not 
consider this.
On the whole, however, the polling primary is generally viewed as a 
positive innovation. Even if it is not perfect, it has produced substantial 
beneits to the DPP and KMT by institutionalizing a system that resolves 
intraparty conlict in a fair and transparent manner.
the Kobo System in Japan
The Evolution of Japanese CSMs and the Emergence of the 
Kobo System
The Japanese term kobo literally means public advertisement of a post. The 
opening of a position is publicly announced, and anyone who is interested 
and qualiied can apply. The term only suggests that the entry to the selec-
tion process is open to public, but other important aspects could vary (and 
are often left unspeciied), such as what level in the party organization 
will make the decision, how much outside participation will be allowed, 
and what the criteria for the decision will be. This method, which merely 
declared that anyone could enter the nomination race, was regarded as an 
innovative CSM only in comparison to the closed and informal traditional 
Japanese nomination practice.
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Prior to the appearance of kobo in the 1990s, there was no formal struc-
ture for candidate selection adopted by major political parties in Japan. 
Each party would recruit its candidates through its internal networks, the 
opening was never oficially announced, and the entry to the selection was 
never made open to the public. For example, prior to the 1994 electoral 
reform, the LDP typically delegated recruiting candidates to each of its 
factions (chapter 3, this volume; Krauss and Pekkanen 2011). The supply 
of human resources came mainly from local and national electable ofice-
holders, national- level bureaucrats, and the heirs of MPs. For other smaller 
parties, it was the norm to recruit candidates from afiliated organizations, 
such as trade unions, or from within the hierarchy of party organizations.
By the early 1990s, the prevalence and evils of seshu (hereditary suc-
cession of electoral turf within bonds of kinship, typically from a father 
to his son) under the LDP regime became widely criticized (Inada 2009; 
Uesugi 2009). The media repeatedly questioned the quality of the MPs of 
the ruling parties, claiming that Japanese politics was hopelessly chaotic 
largely because it was illed with hereditary MPs, and the path to the Diet 
was closed to talented people who would have been able to offer solutions.
With the electoral reform from SNTV to MMM in 1994, the parties 
faced new challenges in their nomination strategies. Under the old system 
where factions took responsibility for candidate recruitment (chapter 3, 
this volume), conservative contestants who failed to win an LDP nomina-
tion often ran in the general election as independents. If they were able to 
win, the LDP usually allowed them to join the party. In effect, the LDP 
deferred dificult coordination decisions to the general election, allow-
ing the electorate to sort things out. In the SMDs used in MMM, this 
strategy was no longer an option, since having two conservative candidates 
in the same district was a recipe for disaster. Thus, nominations became 
more critical, and party leaders were legitimized to take a more active role 
and exert more power in determining who would be nominated. The new 
opposition parties faced a different problem, that of inding enough quali-
ied candidates to run in every district. The electoral reform increased the 
number of nominal districts from 129 to 300. Moreover, under the old 
system, even a locally weak party could hope to win one seat in most dis-
tricts, and the possibility of winning attracted quality candidates. Under 
the new system, many of the districts were hopeless and thus unappealing 
to ambitious politicians. The dificulty in inding enough qualiied candi-
dates was exacerbated by the fact that opposition parties had never done 
well in prefectural assembly elections and did not have large numbers of 
established local politicians trying to move up to the national legislature 
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(Scheiner 2006). Electoral reform thus created a need for opposition par-
ties to explore new strategies to ind new pools of talent.
With many vacant seats to ill, the opposition parties naturally were the 
pioneers to try out kobo.17 In 1990, the JSP, then suffering from a shortage 
of candidates, was the irst of the major national parties to recruit candi-
dates for elected positions through kobo, although the practice was limited 
to the city/ward levels. It is widely recognized that the irst political party 
to adopt kobo for national elections was the Nihon Shinto (People’s New 
Party, 1992– 94). It ielded three candidates recruited through kobo in the 
1993 HR election. One of them was Yukio Edano, who later became a 
leading igure in the DPJ. The Shinshinto (New Frontier Party, 1994– 97) 
used kobo extensively for candidate recruitment and managed to ield can-
didates in 235 SMDs in the irst election under MMM in 1996. It was the 
irst time the largest opposition party ielded candidates for over half of 
the district seats in an HR election since the JSP did so in the 1958 general 
election. The DPJ was the irst major party to conduct kobo repeatedly 
over an extended period of time. The party conducted large- scale national 
kobo ive times from 1999 to 2009. The LDP also tried out kobo on a 
much smaller scale as early as in 1994, but it did not fully embrace kobo 
until after the party’s defeat in 2009.18
The precise institutional design of kobo differs from party to party, but 
they can be broadly grouped into two categories: centralized and decen-
tralized. The national headquarters of the party manages the centralized 
type, and the prefectural branches and the district chapters play dominant 
roles under the decentralized type. The former became well known for its 
use by the DPJ, mainly for the elections for the HR from 2000 to 2009. 
Other relatively new third parties, such as the Minna no To (Your Party, 
2009– ), the Genzei Nippon (Tax Cut Japan, 2010– ), and the Nohon Ishin 
no Kai (Japan Restoration Party, 2012– ) also adopted similar forms of cen-
tralized kobo. The latter was implemented widely by the LDP for the 2012 
HR election. While the LDP adopted the decentralized version because 
it was more conducive to its entrenched local organization, parties with 
relatively short histories and less developed organization typically had no 
choice but to employ the centralized form.
The initial goal of adopting kobo was to recruit potential candidates 
who the parties could not reach to through their traditional internal net-
works and to ind candidates to run in weak districts. This was especially 
the case with the DPJ. Gradually, however, insider aspirants started to 
use the DPJ kobo path to take advantage of its legitimacy. The LDP also 
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used kobo to ill in weak districts, but its decentralized version of kobo, its 
entrenched local organization, and its more uniform application of kobo to 
open seats led the system to develop into a mediating device for intraparty 
competition.
The DPJ Kobo System
The current DPJ was formed in 1998 by absorbing three smaller parties19 
into the old DPJ, which had been established in 1996. The members of 
the new DPJ came from different backgrounds: some of its leading igures 
originally belonged to the LDP, while others came from the Democratic 
Socialist Party, which had been established by the conservative wing of the 
old JSP. Right before the 2003 HR election, another major conservative 
force, the Liberal Party, dissolved, and joined the DPJ. As a relatively new 
and small party with underdeveloped local organizations, the DPJ suffered 
from an inadequacy of candidates, and this was the background for the 
adoption of kobo.
Within the DPJ, incumbents were given priority over others and were 
renominated automatically in most cases. Candidates who lost in the previ-
ous election were renominated once, but those who lost two elections in 
a row were not nominated for a third time. Only when the district had no 
incumbent or held- over candidate from the previous election did the party 
look for a new candidate. In such a case, the regular candidate selection 
process was initiated at the district level. The HR district chapter worked 
with the kenren (prefecture branch) in inding a candidate via the tradi-
tional internal network. The kenren then asked the national headquarters 
for the endorsement of their choice. The national headquarters reserved 
the inal say. When the district chapter and the kenren failed to ield or 
agree on a candidate, the headquarters sent in a kobo- selected candidate. 
The SMDs where this happened were typically very weak. However, the 
party also attempted to use kobo as a public relations tool for enhancing its 
image by putting lashy ads in major newspapers with national circulation.
The DPJ kobo was not conducted independently for each vacant dis-
trict. Instead, the party held nationwide general kobo ive times between 
1999 and 2009.20 All of these were conducted in a similar manner, and each 
kobo supplied candidates to districts all over the country for the ive HR 
elections for the Diet from 2000 to 2012.21 There were 74 kobo- selected 
candidates who debuted between 2000 and 2012 under the DPJ banner 
(table 5.5). The DPJ kobo for the Diet elections were directly managed by 
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the national headquarters. The headquarters had to take charge because 
the party used kobo to ind candidates to run in vacant districts when the 
kenrens could not ind anyone on their own.
A kobo applicant had to pass three hurdles in order to become an ofi-
cial DPJ candidate: passing the kobo screening at the headquarters (Stage 
1), securing an informal nomination for a speciic district from the district 
chapter and the kenren (Stage 2), and getting this district- designated nomi-
nation oficially approved by the national headquarters (Stage 3). Tech-
nically, the kobo system covered only the irst stage, and both kobo and 
nonkobo candidates had to go through the latter two stages.
The Stage 1 screening was handled by the national headquarters ofice. 
The applicants submitted curricula vitae and essays, and those who passed 
the initial document screening advanced to the in- person interview ses-
sions. A few MPs joined the party staff in interviewing each applicant for 
about 20 minutes on what he or she wanted to do as an MP and in which 
district he or she wished to run. Interviewers focused on personality rather 
than policy orientation because the DPJ, being a hodgepodge of groups 
with different backgrounds, had no oficial policy positions it could enforce 
on its candidates. The total number of applicants for the DPJ national kobo 
increased from 564 in 1999 to nearly 2,000 in 2009. However, the odds of 
passing this irst stage of screening remained constantly about one to nine.
Those kobo- screenees who passed Stage 1 were eligible to advance to 
Stage 2— seeking district nomination. The headquarters served as an inter-
mediary by matching these screenees and the kenrens with vacant districts. 
During the matching process, the applicants’ personal roots in the districts 
or prefectures counted heavily. Finding districts to run in was often the 
toughest hurdle for the kobo screenees. Most of the better seats had been 
already taken, and the remaining seats often looked hopeless. Less than 
tABLE 5.5. number of Kobo Candidates Who ran 
and Won in Hr Elections
Year
DPJ LDP
Ran Elected Ran Elected
2000 17 3 0 0
2003 9 3 0 0
2005 18 1 26 22
2009 29 28 6 0
2012 1 0 83 76
Total 74 35 115 98
Source: Compiled by authors from party records.
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20% of these district- seekers were eventually embraced by district chapters 
and the kenrens and ran in elections as oficial party candidates.
Stage 3, approval by the national headquarters, was not an automatic 
rubber stamp process. The person was not oficially regarded as a DPJ 
candidate until after obtaining inal endorsement from the headquarters. 
Although the national headquarters normally tried to respect local selec-
tions and most of the local choices were endorsed, the headquarters would 
suspend approval or even replace candidates if kenren- chosen candidates 
looked too weak in the polls or did not seem to be campaigning hard 
enough.
Overall, only 2% of the initial kobo applicants ended up running in the 
HR elections. We should note, however, that it is dificult to determine 
the quality of the applicants because the party never released any detailed 
information about the kobo applicants except for those who were oficially 
nominated. The names of competitors had to be kept secret because run-
ning for a public ofice in Japan almost always meant that one had to quit 
his or her current job before the election. No one wanted to quit before 
knowing whether he or she would get the party’s nomination and could 
actually run in an election. Few people would apply for kobo if their names 
were not kept conidential.
The use of kobo helped the DPJ prepare to take over power in 2009 
by inding nontraditional outsider types of candidates to run in the weak 
districts. However, the party gradually started to ask those who used to be 
recruited through traditional paths to apply for kobo, as well, in order to 
add legitimacy to their nominations. For example, those members of pre-
fecture assemblies who used to join the selection process at Stage 2 were 
often considered to have “stolen” the nomination by disgruntled kobo- 
qualiied applicants. By the 2009 election, in order to avoid the impression 
of manipulation, the DPJ encouraged all candidates, including those from 
traditional career paths, to apply for kobo.
Even though it was increasingly used to confer legitimacy on nominees, 
the kobo system was still fundamentally a nontransparent process. Deci-
sions at each stage were made behind closed doors. The general public did 
not know exactly how the kobo selection process worked, who the kobo 
applicants were, which of them passed the screening stage or the match-
ing stage, or what the bases were for the decisions at each stage. No ofi-
cial records were kept for the decision making at the matching stage. The 
only way the voters knew that the candidates were selected through kobo 
was through the label of kobo attached to them when they were presented 
as the nominated candidates. This opaque process allowed national and 
156 Mixed-Member electoral Systems in constitutional context
local faction bosses to exert inluence behind closed doors during the selec-
tion processes. As a result, the DPJ kobo came to function more as a black 
box convenient for various actors within the party in contrast to its public 
image as an open and fair CSM (Shoji 2013).
The LDP Kobo System
The earliest kobo practice by the LDP was observed in 1994 by the 
Ishikawa kenren for the 1995 House of Councillors election. After the 1994 
electoral reform, several kenrens tried kobo in some districts in preparation 
for the 1996 HR election. Yet the LDP did not widely conduct kobo for 
national ofices until it suffered heavy losses in the 2003 House of Council-
lors election. Encouraged by a few kobo successes in special elections, the 
LDP conducted kobo in about 20 districts before it conducted a special 
emergency national kobo right before the 2005 HR election. For the latter, 
868 applications were submitted in four days. Twenty- four kobo- selected 
candidates ran in the 2005 HR election, and twelve won in the SMDs. A 
further nine lost their district race but were elected on the PR list (Asano 
2006). For the 2009 HR election, the LDP nominated only six candidates 
through district- level kobo.22 After the defeat in the 2009 HR election, the 
LDP attracted fewer candidates, and the party started to use kobo exten-
sively to ill in the vacant districts.
Facing new challenges as an opposition party and continuing pub-
lic complaints over seshu, the LDP made it mandatory to conduct kobo 
for any open HR district. Right after the 2009 HR election, the then- 
opposition LDP was no longer as attractive to ambitious new politicians 
and had some dificulties in recruiting satisfactory candidates through its 
traditional paths. In response, the LDP once again turned to kobo. As the 
popularity of the party recovered, the competition for LDP nominations 
intensiied, and the LDP responded by further institutionalizing the use of 
kobo. In this section, we focus on the LDP’s practices in preparation for 
the 2012 HR election.
The party heavily protected its incumbents and renominated them 
automatically, as it had done throughout its history. After the 2009 HR 
election, the candidates who lost were automatically renominated if they 
were 65 years old or younger and had lost in the SMD but won at least 
70% as many votes as the district winner. The party only began the can-
didate selection process when there was neither an incumbent nor a held- 
over candidate in the district.
Although the national headquarters had the inal say, the candidate 
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selection processes of the LDP were bottom- up, starting at the district 
level. A district chapter worked with its kenren in recruiting and selecting 
a candidate. Because the party made it a rule to hold kobo for any open 
district nomination after the 2009 HR election, kobo was conducted not 
just in weak districts but also in strong districts such as those where strong 
incumbents had just retired. During this period, the party attempted to bar 
the seshu practice, but it had to give up after facing strong resistance. The 
party justiied this by insisting that anyone, seshu or not, who was selected 
through kobo was fairly chosen and thus qualiied. The LDP ielded 83 
candidates through kobo for the 2012 HR election.
The largest difference from the DPJ kobo was that the LDP kobo was 
always conducted at the prefecture or district level. In most cases, each 
kobo was held speciically for a certain district, and the kenren would 
determine the speciic kobo procedures. Thus, there was a wide variety 
in the LDP kobo practices observed across the country. Typically, a selec-
tion committee of 20 or fewer people was set up at the district or kenren 
level for each kobo. Outside experts or prominent local igures represent-
ing the interests of local industry were often invited into the committee. 
The selection processes normally entailed paper- screening and interview 
sessions. Applicants were always asked to submit essays, and, in a majority 
of cases, the public announcement listed some connection to the district 
as a prerequisite or at least as highly desirable. Complete outsiders with 
no connection to the district or the prefecture were usually not welcome.
In some cases, the selection committee required applicants to ill in 
survey sheets on policy preferences. The LDP witnessed the DPJ’s tra-
vails stemming from the lack of policy coherence within the party and 
attempted to avoid the same problem by screening the ideological lean-
ings of kobo candidates. The party occasionally asked applicants to sign a 
pledge that they would not run against the LDP nominee if they were not 
nominated. While most of the kobo selection took place in closed- door 
meetings, there were some instances in which the applicants were asked to 
compete by giving speeches in public or in which the party used opinion 
polls to identify the most attractive candidate. There were even some kobo 
cases where party members voted to decide the outcome. These closed 
primaries did not necessarily lead to more open or fair selections, however, 
since the competitors with a longer history of local party activities had usu-
ally cultivated more supportive members and the newcomers were put at a 
severe disadvantage.
Broadly speaking, there were three observed patterns in the actual com-
petition under the LDP kobo. The irst was districts with a single likely 
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winner, such as those that would previously have been determined by 
seshu. Under this category, kobo functioned to justify the predetermined 
outcome. The second category included districts with two or three major 
contestants. Those contestants were often well- established local politi-
cians in the district, and the party had a hard time mediating a compromise 
among them. Kobo helped to justify the inal outcome and persuade the 
losers to accept the result. In this case, kobo worked as a vehicle of conlict 
resolution. The third category included districts with no strong competi-
tors known prior to kobo. These cases typically involved districts where 
the party was extremely weak and potential quality candidates were reluc-
tant to run. The party had to recruit complete amateurs from outside the 
internal network who would dare to run against the strong incumbents of 
another party.
Discussion
Although they were called with the same name, kobo, and they shared a 
similar function at the early stage of ielding candidates in the weak dis-
tricts, the centralized and decentralized versions adopted by the DPJ and 
the LDP, respectively, evolved in very different ways. The contrast is sum-
marized in table 5.6. The headquarters- led DPJ kobo process remained 
extremely nontransparent in its selection criteria and the decision- making 
protocol. At the district assignment stage, where the negotiation process 
remained completely informal and hidden, anything was possible.
Not unaware of these drawbacks, many DPJ staff and MPs testiied 
they never perceived kobo as an ideal CSM. The centralized form of kobo 
left parties vulnerable to collapse in more dificult times. New parties had 
to use it because they had underdeveloped party organization and suffered 
an inadequate supply of candidates. In turn, this dependence on kobo led 
to negligence in building internal recruitment and training systems. The 
tABLE 5.6. Characteristics of dPJ and LdP Kobo
 DPJ kobo LDP kobo
Unit of kobo At- all (national) Mostly by district
Implementation of kobo Headquarters Prefectures/districts
Scope of participation Very limited Relatively broad
Final say Headquarters Headquarters
Period of intensive kobo practice For 2000– 2009 HR elections For 2012 HR election
State of party Opposition Opposition
Primary initial motivation Filling vacancy Improving public image
Use of closed primary None Several
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DPJ kobo was used by ambitious aspirants who wanted to become MPs 
while bypassing an unappealing apprenticeship in local politics. These can-
didates had no loyalty to the party and were prone to leave the party when 
they did not like the policy decisions made by the leaders. The number of 
kobo applicants plummeted as the popularity of the party dropped, which 
revealed that how well kobo functioned depended heavily on whether the 
party’s electoral prospects looked promising. The quick rise and fall of the 
Japan Restoration Party, which was completely dependent on the charisma 
of a single leading igure and an extensive use of centralized kobo, illus-
trates both the advantages and dangers of this CSM. The structure of cen-
tralized kobo left the parties with little space for improvement in terms of 
intraparty democracy. It merely opened the door to the smoke- illed room 
to outside aspirants, but the decision- making processes were left exclusive 
and nontransparent.
The decentralized kobo that the LDP experimented with presented 
different possibilities. The kenrens tried different ideas, and good examples 
were copied by others. Some examples of policy debate in public, formal 
use of polling surveys, and even closed primaries were observed in the 
course. While many kenrens preferred to remain secretive and exclusive 
about nomination processes when possible, the LDP experience suggests 
that kobo might serve as a venue for CSM democratization if implemented 
by a party with strong local party organization. Although much of the 
decision- making processes of the LDP kobo remained nontransparent to 
most voters, the institutionalization of kobo that took place at the prefec-
ture and district levels helped improve the fairness and legitimacy of the 
nominations. The LDP kobo reform is even showing some signs of being 
nonreversible. With an increase in the kobo practices, it has become harder 
for the party to reject holding kobo when demanded by competitors.
While it is hard to measure the impact of kobo on factions within the 
DPJ, which started to use kobo right after its inception, it should be fair 
to say that kobo did not help factions within the LDP. If the introduction 
of SMD had already made things harder for the factions (chapter 3, this 
volume), opening competition to outsiders in each district made it almost 
impossible for the factions to coordinate across districts and prefectures.
Some studies investigate the impact of kobo on the type of candidates 
who won nominations. Smith, Pekkanen, and Krauss (2013) examined DPJ 
nominations through the 2009 HR election and found that kobo nomi-
nees tended to be lower quality on average than nonkobo nominees. DPJ 
kobo candidates tended to have less connection to the district, and aside 
from the female- only kobo in 1999, kobo was actually less likely to recruit 
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female candidates. Overall, the kobo candidates had a higher probability of 
winning, but the impact of kobo disappears after controlling for the party 
strength in the district and candidate quality.
As for the LDP kobo, speciically in the run- up to the 2012 HR election 
when kobo became the default CSM for the party, Smith (2013) argues that 
it did not signiicantly change the backgrounds of candidates who were 
nominated. Kobo helped to push down the average age of irst- time nomi-
nees, but the backgrounds of those kobo candidates remained largely simi-
lar to the traditional pools: local politicians, MP aides, and national- level 
bureaucrats. We should also note that, although decreasing in number over 
time, seshu was not wiped out by kobo.
Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed new innovations in CSMs for legislative elec-
tions in Taiwan and Japan. While the origins of the polling primary in 
Taiwan and kobo in Japan both predate electoral reform, we argue that the 
shifts from SNTV to MMM created pressures for parties in both coun-
tries to intensify the use of these two institutions. Further, the effects of 
the changing electoral rules on CSMs need to be addressed in the con-
text of the different constitutional systems of the two countries. Specii-
cally, Taiwan’s semipresidential system deemphasizes legislative seniority 
while Japan’s parliamentary system always relies on senior MPs to form the 
government. Such contextual variance leads to the different purposes and 
scopes of the CSM reforms adopted by major parties in the two countries.
In Taiwan, where seniority is less valuable and incumbents are not pro-
tected, the parties converged on the use of the polling primary in strong 
districts. The polling primary has proven useful to the parties by success-
fully mediating intraparty conlict, and it is also beneicial to the general 
public to the extent that it is a disincentive to corruption. In Japan, where 
seniority is more valuable and incumbents are heavily protected, both 
major parties adopted kobo in weak districts. This allowed them access to a 
wider pool of potential candidates and helped to defuse charges that insid-
ers were illegitimately monopolizing nominations.
Of course, the CSMs continue to evolve. In Taiwan, many worry that 
the polling primary harms intraparty democracy and party- building by 
leaving no role for party members to inluence nominations. After the 2012 
elections, there was discussion in both parties about reinstating some mix 
of closed primaries and polling primaries. Though neither party has opted 
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for a change from the 2012 rules as of this writing, the parties continue 
to search for a CSM that will give party members a bigger role while still 
resolving conlict and discouraging corruption. In Japan, there are serious 
concerns about the effects of centralized kobo, which has proven useful for 
young and popular parties but has also hindered efforts to develop party 
institutions that can survive when a party’s fortunes decline. The decentral-
ized version may prove more sustainable. It shows signs of taking root and 
has demonstrated some potential for intraparty democratization.
n o t e S
 1. In the new electoral regimes in both Taiwan and Japan, the nominal tier plays 
the dominant role in shaping incentives. In both countries, a relatively large pro-
portion of seats are determined in single- member districts. Further, in Japan the 
practice of dual candidacy results in SMD candidates taking up most of the space 
on PR lists, thus leaving relatively few spots for PR- only candidates. This chapter 
thus focuses on the linkage between electoral rules for the nominal tier and CSMs. 
Nemoto and Tsai take up the topic of list tier nominations in chapter 6, this volume.
 2. This has been less of a problem in Taiwan than in Japan for three main rea-
sons. First, Taiwan has only 73 SMDs compared to Japan’s 300. Parties simply have 
fewer districts to worry about. Second, as part of Taiwan’s electoral reform, the 
total number of seats was cut in half. That meant that Taiwan had large numbers of 
incumbents chasing a relatively small number of seats. Third and most important, 
like the LDP and unlike the DPJ, both of Taiwan’s major parties were well estab-
lished and had already amassed reservoirs of ambitious potential candidates within 
their ranks.
 3. DPP cadres include party members of the Legislative Yuan, National Assem-
bly, Taiwan Provincial Assembly, as well as Taipei and Kaohsiung city councils.
 4. Both parties utilize more centralized methods to determine their candidates 
for party list vote. For more on party list nominations, see chapter 6 by Nemoto 
and Tsai in this volume.
 5. Oficially, the KMT nomination rules still include the clause allowing party 
members’ votes to account for 30% of the decision. However, aspirants may agree 
to skip this stage, and in 2012 all KMT aspirants chose to use only polling results 
to determine nominations.
 6. Interview with Lee Hung- chun, November 16, 2011.
 7. Interview with Lin Shu- fen, November 16, 2011.
 8. In- house sampling refers to a protocol used to determine which member of 
the household should respond to the survey. Typically, the interviewer determines 
how many adult males and females live in the residence. Based on these numbers 
and a predetermined schedule, the interviewer will ask to speak to, for example, the 
second- oldest female. On in- house sampling, see Hung 1996.
 9. Interview with deputy secretary general Hung Yao- fu, November 14, 2011.
 10. The interparty comparison was used when the DPP candidate’s support was 
higher than the KMT candidate’s. Where the KMT candidate was more popular 
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than any of the DPP candidates, an intraparty head- to- head question was used. 
However, most of the districts that required a polling primary were those in which 
the DPP was more popular, so we consider the interparty comparison to be the 
default.
 11. The DPP inished its nomination process before the KMT, so the KMT can-
didate was not always known. However, because of the KMT’s landslide victory in 
2008, most districts, including many of the DPP’s stronger districts, had a KMT 
incumbent that the DPP assumed would be renominated in 2012.
 12. The KMT intentionally waited until the DPP had completed its nomination 
process so that it could choose the best candidate to match up with that speciic 
DPP opponent. (Interview with a member of the KMT’s think tank, Dr. Hsieh 
Hsian- chin, November 16, 2011.)
 13. Interview with deputy secretary general Hung Yao- fu, November 14, 2011.
 14. The fear over vote- buying was an important factor in the DPP’s decision to 
move to a 100% polling primary in 2012. In November 2007, the KMT- dominated 
legislature revised the election law and made it illegal to buy votes in party prima-
ries, not just in the general election. The DPP worried that the KMT would use its 
control over the bureaucracy to subject its nominees to intense scrutiny and might 
be able to disqualify some of them. Rather than ight the election with a roster of 
tainted candidates, the DPP simply eliminated the party- member voting section of 
its CSM.
 15. Many people also worry that their party’s CSM is vulnerable to manipula-
tion by the other party. For example, KMT supporters might participate in the 
DPP’s polling primary and express support for the weakest DPP candidate. These 
fears are probably overblown, and DPP deputy secretary general Hung Yao- fu even 
identiied the low vulnerability of the polling primary to manipulation from the 
other party as one of its major advantages (interview, November 14, 2011). On the 
one hand, the closed party primaries were probably more vulnerable since the other 
party could strategically launch a registration drive and send large number of its 
supporters to vote in the other party’s primary. In contrast, since polls are random, 
this action would need to be individually undertaken by large numbers of other- 
party supporters who would further have to agree on who the weakest contestant 
was. The polling primary simply makes the coordination costs very high. On the 
other hand, anecdotal evidence suggests that the same people who are worried 
about the other party manipulating their nominations tend to be disinterested in 
manipulating the other party’s nominations.
 16. A common sarcastic jab is that DPP no longer stands for Democratic Pro-
gressive Party (minjindang); now it stands for Democratic Polling Party (mindi-
aodang).
 17. A nonpartisan civic movement emerged in 1990 to use kobo to cultivate and 
promote fresh candidates without party stigma for local executive ofices. The 
movement originated in the mayoral election in Asahikawa City, Hokkaido, and it 
gradually spread to other prefectures around the country over the next few years. 
The popularity of this movement and the media attention it drew might have had 
some impact on the decision of parties to try kobo.
 18. No party has used kobo for the selection of PR- only candidates.
 19. The three smaller parties were Minsei To (Good Governance Party, 1998), 
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Shinto Yuai (New Fraternity Party, 1998), and Minshu Kaikaku Rengo (Demo-
cratic Reform Party, 1989– 98).
 20. In addition to these general ones, the DPJ headquarters conducted a female- 
focused kobo in 1999 and a district- speciied kobo in 2005. The latter was special 
in the sense that vacant districts were listed in advance; they had remained available 
because they were all extremely dificult for the DPJ.
 21. We located in newspapers nine cases of kobo conducted by the DPJ kenrens 
at the prefecture level for the HR elections between 2000 and 2009, and there 
might have been more. However, these cases were not recognized by the national 
headquarters, and no systematic records have been kept for them. For this paper, 
we focus on the national kobo conducted by the headquarters.
 22. The number of kobo candidates differs across studies due to the way of count-
ing. More than a few cases of kobo were observed that were called kobo by the ken-
rens but were not recognized by the national headquarters. Here in this chapter, we 
focus on those that were oficially recognized by the national headquarters.
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SIx
Post Allocation, List nominations, and 
Preelectoral Coalitions under MMM
Kuniaki Nemoto and Chia- hung Tsai
A theory of electoral systems (Shugart 2001) predicts that the move from 
SNTV to MMM should produce a trend away from personal politics and 
toward party- centered politics. The literature on the recent elections in 
Japan suggests that party labels and the leadership’s popularity now signii-
cantly inluence candidates’ electoral fortunes (McElwain 2012; Patterson 
and Maeda 2007) and clientelism is now being replaced by programmatism 
(Rosenbluth and Thies 2010). Furthermore, in 2009 Japan had a govern-
ment turnover through elections for the irst time in more than 60 years, 
because the combination of the DPJ’s potential and disillusionment with 
the LDP government’s policy performance convinced most swing voters: 
a poll on the 2009 turnover, for example, showed that 61.2% of voters 
thought party reputations were important in making voting decisions, 
compared to 29.0% who considered individual candidates’ personal traits 
as important (Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyōkai 2010). Reed, Scheiner, and 
Thies (2012) argue that the swings in Japan’s recent elections are built 
on coherent party images and in particular parties’ programmatic policy 
manifestoes, showing that “candidates’ party afiliation mattered more for 
their chances of victory than their individual résumés” (373).
This record high importance attached to party label is a lip side of 
the fact that the importance of individual candidates has been declining 
over time. Surveys conducted in the mid- 1960s found 60.4% of the vot-
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ers in Japan voted on the basis of the candidate, compared to 43.3% in 
the United States, 32.5% in Canada, 23.8% in Germany, and 5.4% in the 
United Kingdom (Rochon 1981). This candidate- based voting was domi-
nant until the 1993 elections, the last elections before the electoral reform, 
with nearly a half (49.1%) of the voters still voting based on the candidate 
(Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyōkai 2010).
Against this background, this chapter investigates how parties strategi-
cally adapted themselves to the new electoral environment. Speciically, it 
compares what parties do between and during election periods in order to 
maximize votes and seats, how this has changed compared to the prereform 
SNTV period, and how the two countries differ. A simple prediction is that 
parties should concentrate their efforts on appealing to voters with their 
policymaking abilities and attractive public policy pledges.
Beyond this simple prediction, however, there should be many more 
vote mobilization strategies that parties can adopt. Their choice from 
among these strategies should depend on the institutional contexts in 
which parties compete and the institutional resources available for the 
party leadership to utilize. The basic argument throughout this chapter 
is that, as articulated by Batto and Cox in their introductory chapter, the 
transition from SNTV to MMM should simplify the intraparty bargaining 
process for leaders to utilize such resources. This is because, compared to 
SNTV, which systematically generates intraparty fragmentation and fac-
tionalism (Grofman 1999), MMM increases the importance of party repu-
tations, policy platforms, and leaders’ popularity in electoral competition 
(Shugart 2001). Consequently, MMM centralizes the power of the party 
leadership against intraparty factional bosses, to the extent that parties 
should use available tools and resources more strategically to maximize 
votes and seats.
Among the many strategies, we focus on three areas: post allocation, list 
nomination, and candidate coordination. Along with the main argument 
briely articulated above, party leaders should be now expected to (1) allo-
cate cabinet positions and other privileges more autonomously from intra-
party factions to members; (2) nominate candidates with clean and fresh 
images at the top of party lists, such as women and professionals who are 
widely known across the country; and (3) form preelectoral coalitions in 
the nominal SMD tier to solicit small party supporters. We generally ind 
that parties in both Japan and Taiwan are moving toward these expected 
directions, suggesting that they are indeed strategically adapting them-
selves to the new electoral environment.
However, we also argue that nuanced but very important rules— 
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the constitution and the dual candidacy with the best loser provision— 
institutionally constrain parties’ strategies to the extent that these naïve 
expectations do not hold under certain contexts. First, compared to a par-
liamentary system, where appointing legislators to cabinet positions serves 
as institutional bonding for the cabinet to maintain the conidence of the 
legislature, semipresidentialism implies much more independence between 
the president and ruling party members. Therefore in Taiwan, promoting 
and demoting legislators cannot be as effective as in parliamentary Japan. 
Second, Japan’s somewhat unique “best loser provision”— dually nominated 
candidates can have the same ranks and their actual ranks are determined 
by their performance in their SMDs— makes it dificult for leaders to give 
favorable positions to quality candidates. Rather, leaders now simply put 
almost all the SMD candidates on a level playing ield. Meanwhile, the 
absence of such a provision enables Taiwanese leaders to be more strategic 
in selecting and rank- ordering list candidates. Third, the presence of the 
list tier, on which small parties rely for their electoral survival, makes can-
didate coordination rather complicated in mixed- member systems. Large 
parties in parliamentary Japan can credibly commit not to exploiting small 
parties by appointing ministers and forging coalition agreements, but the 
presence of presidential coattails and interbranch independence in Taiwan 
can make coordination between parties for candidate entry rather dificult.
This chapter is organized in three sections. First, we will discuss how 
parties allocate posts for electoral purposes in Japan and Taiwan. Second, 
we will discuss how they nominate candidates on the list tier, where par-
ties’ images and reputations matter greatly. Third, we will investigate how 
they coordinate candidates and form preelectoral coalitions to maximize 
the chance of winning SMD seats.
Post Allocation Strategy
This section focuses on how parties strategically allocate posts in the gov-
ernment to incumbents for electoral purposes. As Kobayashi and Tsuki-
yama show in chapter 3, prior to reform SNTV’s intraparty fragmentation 
effects made the bargaining process for post allocation rather complicated. 
Since factional heads vied for the limited number of lucrative positions in 
the government, the prime minister needed to allocate cabinet positions 
proportionally to each of the factions according to their sizes (Ramseyer 
and Rosenbluth 1993). In addition to this norm of the factional balance 
(habatsu kinko), promotion of backbenchers to legislative committee chairs, 
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vice ministers, and ministers was strictly determined based on seniority 
(nenko joretsu). These party rules were effective methods to contain ambi-
tious factions and keep the party united (Nemoto, Krauss, and Pekkanen 
2008), but signiicantly constrained the leadership.
The transition to MMM should simplify this intraparty game for 
two reasons: irst, factional heads’ inluence should become weaker; and 
second, the leadership can exercise greater inluence based on the ever- 
increasing importance of party labels and leaders’ image. Thus, the lead-
ership should more freely and strategically target certain members when 
giving out the government’s privileges. Thus Kobayashi and Tsukiyama 
show that the prime minister’s faction now receives disproportionately 
more posts in the cabinet.
This section further explores how this centralized control over posts 
now enables the leadership to utilize post allocation for electoral pur-
poses, in line with Pekkanen, Nyblade, and Krauss (2006). They show that 
marginal members, such as zombies who were defeated in SMDs but still 
elected by PR, were more likely to assume posts connected to private and 
particularistic goods, so that they could improve name recognition in their 
districts and return to the Diet in the next election. They also show that 
senior and famous igures were assigned to high- policy posts, such as min-
isters for security and treasury, so that the party could improve its policy- 
making reputations.
However, the temporal trend shown in igure 6.1 suggests that parties 
give fewer positions to electorally marginal members (i.e., zombies) over 
time. Rather, being elected on the SMD tier has become nearly a necessary 
condition for a member to become a full minister since 2005. Zombies and 
PR members are now less likely to assume lower- level positions (vice min-
isters and legislative committee chairs) than in 1996, 2000, and 2003. The 
DPJ governments avoided electorally marginal members in assigning new 
Diet committee chairs and party posts after the 2009 election: the then 
secretary- general of the DPJ, Ichiro Ozawa, prioritized SMD winners and 
made it clear that the party wouldn’t give important posts to those elected 
on PR (Asahi Shimbun, October 15, 2009, 4). Rather, he ordered irst- term 
members and zombies to go back to their local districts often and expand 
their supporter bases (Asahi Shimbun, October 30, 2009, 4). This appears 
to be somewhat incompatible with what Pekkanen, Nyblade, and Krauss 
(2006) ind, especially given that now Japanese parties make the most use 
of dual candidacy and there are more and more zombies that the leadership 
needs to take care of.
We suggest that Pekkanen, Nyblade, and Krauss (2006) might have 
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ignored two things. One is a counterintuitive consequence from their 
model: if you want to increase the chance of getting good positions, you 
need to lose in the nominal tier. Thus, appointing marginal members to 
good positions should result in the problem of moral hazard, although it is 
somewhat unrealistic to assume that some SMD candidates might want to 
lose. The second thing is the change that the electoral reform could bring 
about: the decline of particularism and clientelism (Noble 2010). Thus, 
over time, the idea of having backbenchers use posts to allocate subsidies 
and other private goods to their districts should have become untenable, 
especially given the shrinking budgets of the Japanese government.
These factors combined lead us to suspect the leadership gradually 
changed its appointment patterns from posts as “carrots to marginal mem-
bers” to posts as “sticks to tame backbenchers.” We argue that, as party 
reputations become more important than ever, the leadership now needs 
able and eficient ministers to lead bureaucrats, respond to tough questions 
from the opposition in the Diet, and implement the party’s policy plat-
forms. The LDP leadership gradually appointed loyal and able lawmak-
ers, while intentionally ignoring the factional balance and seniority norms 
(Nihon Keizai Shimbun, September 19, 2006, 14; also see Nemoto, Krauss, 
fig. 6.1. lower- house members in government and diet posts by different 
types
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and Pekkanen 2008). Therefore, it could be hypothesized that, as long as 
posts in the government and the Diet are valued by members in getting 
attention from the media and exerting inluence over the policy- making 
process, the leadership can encourage backbenchers to work harder in 
their local districts by appointing more SMD winners to these posts. This 
whipping strategy should look more appropriate under MMM than the 
compensation strategy.
As one rough test for this hypothesis, we divided LDP members in 
2000– 2009 into four groups according to their SMD performance in two 
consecutive elections (1996– 2000, 2000– 2003, and 2003– 5): (1) those who 
won SMDs in the irst elections but won in the second as zombies (SMD- 
Zombie); (2) those who won as zombies for the two consecutive elections 
(Zombie- Zombie); (3) those who won as zombies in the irst but won SMDs 
in the second (Zombie- SMD); and (4) those who won SMDs continuously 
(SMD- SMD). If Pekkanen, Nyblade, and Krauss’s (2006) compensation 
story is correct, we should ind more members promoted in the SMD- 
Zombie category. Meanwhile, if the leadership instead uses promotion to 
whip lazy members and reward hard workers, then those who lost their 
seats (SMD- Zombie) should be punished and those who regained their 
seats (Zombie- SMD) should be promoted. Here, in line with the literature 
(Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993, 86), we coded a member’s promotion as 
his/her moving up the career ladder of (I) no post; (II) vice minister; (III) 
Diet committee chair; (IV) minister; and (V) second- time (or higher) min-
ister.1 A note of caution is required in interpreting the results in igure 
6.2, as by its nature the sample here excludes those who didn’t run in the 
nominal tier for the two consecutive elections, and most (87.0%) of the 508 
observations are concentrated in the upper- left “SMD- SMD” cell.
Interestingly, the igure suggests that, contrary to the compensation 
story, the “SMD- Zombie” category in the upper- right cell is the least likely 
to get promoted. This implies that they are punished for losing their seats. 
On the other hand, consistent with the whipping story, the “Zombie- SMD” 
category in the lower- left cell is the most likely to get rewarded, suggesting 
that those who ousted opposition district incumbents were seen as making 
the biggest contributions to the party. The lower- right “Zombie- Zombie” 
cell looks slightly puzzling as nearly half of them were promoted, but six 
out of the 11 in this entry were in fact “favorably ranked” (discussed in the 
next section) hopeless candidates who continuously challenged invincible 
opposition party leaders. Excluding these loyal hard workers, only one 
(20%) of the ive in the “Zombie- Zombie” category was promoted.
Moving on to the case of Taiwan, we expect that in contrast to parlia-
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mentary Japan, the same logic should not hold under the semipresiden-
tial regime, as Lin shows in chapter 2. In parliamentary Japan, the stakes 
are high for backbenchers to win their seats and expand the party’s size in 
the legislature, as it will directly increase their chance of becoming ruling 
party members and getting promoted in the government. In other words, 
legislative conidence results in a much closer alignment between appoint-
ments and vote- seeking incentives. Meanwhile, even though the Taiwanese 
president may be able to appoint legislators as ministers, he or she does not 
really have to do so, as he or she is independently elected by the people and 
his or her survival does not rely on legislative conidence. And legislators’ 
reelection incentives should only be weakly tied to their ofice- seeking 
incentives— when they are appointed as ministers, they have to resign their 
legislative seats, which are won independently from the president.
However, some recent anecdotes suggest that a somewhat similar story 
applies to the Taiwanese context. For example, a former cable TV news 
anchor, Chen Yi- chen, was picked directly by the KMT’s central headquar-
ters to run in Chiayi, one of the DPP’s strongholds in southern Taiwan 
fig. 6.2. ldP members’ promotion, 2000– 2009
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(Taipei Times, August 8, 2011, 3). She also helped President Ma Ying- jeou 
organize his campaigning ofice in the south (Taipei Times, August 21, 2011, 
3) and reportedly, rather than winning seats in the Legislative Yuan, Chen 
and the other KMT candidates running in the opposition’s strongholds 
were expected to shore up support for Ma in the presidential election to be 
held on the same day (Taipei Times, September 20, 2011, 3). Although Chen 
lost, Ma still valued her efforts highly, as they helped the party deepen its 
ties with supporters (China Post, January 20, 2012), and he appointed her 
to be National Youth Commission minister after the election (China Post, 
February 1, 2012). In total, after the 2012 legislative elections, the KMT 
used cabinet positions as carrots when it rewarded ive losers who had run 
against very strong opponents by appointing two as ministers, one as a 
deputy minister, one as head of a party branch, and one as spokesperson for 
the Executive Yuan.
In addition to compensating losers with positions in the cabinet, the 
KMT is also using these positions to develop winnable candidates to com-
pete with the DPP, especially in southern Taiwan. Reportedly the Executive 
Yuan was to restructure the administration by the end of 2012 and planned 
to have Chen Yi- chen, the aforementioned minister appointed right after 
the 2012 elections, lead a regional branch ofice in Chiayi City (Taipei 
Times, June 26, 2012, 1). The DPP criticized the KMT government over 
the move, as she was rumored to be preparing to run for the 2014 mayoral 
election in the city, a Pan- Green stronghold. The DPP even speculated 
that she might leverage the regional administration position to improve 
her local name recognition for the upcoming election (Taipei Times, July 
14, 2012, 3). Similarly, when Lin Yi- shih had to step down as minister 
because of corruption charges, the media reported that it was a major loss 
for President Ma, who had been grooming Lin, a southern Taiwan native, 
as the KMT’s candidate in the next Kaohsiung mayoral election. Lin had 
been given him the positions of head of the party’s youth corps, vice chair 
of the party, chief executive of the party’s Policy Coordination Committee, 
and cabinet secretary- general (China Times, June 30, 2012, 4).
The lip side of all this is that the leadership can use cabinet appoint-
ments as sticks: it can demote members when they do not conform to its 
expectations. For example, in the 2008 elections, Wang Yu- ting repre-
sented the KMT in Tainan’s 1st District, one of the DPP’s strongholds, 
and lost. In exchange for her campaigning efforts, the president gave her 
the cabinet- level position of chairperson for the National Youth Commis-
sion, with an eye toward using the Tainan native again in future elections 
to expand the party’s support bases in the south. The chance came in 2011, 
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when a seat in Tainan was made vacant and a by- election was scheduled, 
but she chose not to accept the KMT’s request. The KMT’s secretary- 
general, King Pu- tsung, said, “[She was] nurtured by the party, but refused 
to step up when needed. . . . A warrior does not have the right to choose 
the battles” (China Post, January 18, 2011), implying the party would punish 
Wang for her insubordination. Together with another KMT cabinet mem-
ber, Kao Su- po, who also declined to go back to his district and run in the 
by- elections, Wang was summarily ired from her cabinet post.2
These anecdotes about cabinet appointments present an interesting 
contrast to the SNTV period. When SNTV was in place, the president 
chose to appoint his own followers inside the party, while not considering 
the optimal use of right talents with appropriate skills in the right places. 
For example, when President Chen Shui- bian reshufled his cabinet in Jan-
uary 2002, the media reported that, by assigning his own people and some 
political moderates to key posts, Chen eliminated all DPP leaders who had 
made contributions to his presidential election victory, to the extent that 
the newly appointed ministers lacked professional expertise (China Post, 
January 25, 2002, 19). The DPP’s intraparty factional struggles went on 
and resulted in a series of party reform attempts to eliminate factionalism 
(Taipei Times, June 21, 2004, 4).3
But a crucial difference from Japan should be noted. Despite the epi-
sodes above, which suggest that the Taiwanese party leadership can some-
times strategically use cabinet positions for electoral purposes, it is still rare 
that former legislators are appointed to the cabinet, as igure 6.3 shows. Of 
the 503 ministers appointed since the late 1990s, only 11.3% had experi-
ence serving in the legislature,4 suggesting that only on rare occasions were 
cabinet posts used as carrots for hard workers. Instead, as in other presi-
dential democracies, cabinet posts usually went to technocrats, academics, 
and others from nonlegislative backgrounds, whereas in Japan it is rather 
rare to appoint nonlegislators to the cabinet.5
Party members using cabinet positions as stepping- stones for elec-
toral positions are also still rare. For example, of the 68 cabinet members 
appointed by President Ma between 2008 and 2012, only ive (7.4%) ran 
for election, and their performance was not impressive. Four of them ran 
in the 2012 Legislative Yuan elections: Yang Chih- liang and Yin Chi- ming 
were unsuccessful list- tier candidates, while Chiang Chi- chen and Su Jun- 
pin ran for SMDs in Taichung and Tainan, respectively, with only Chiang 
being successful. Chu Li- lun stepped down as deputy premier in 2010 to 
defeat the DPP’s eventual 2012 presidential candidate, Tsai Ing- wen, in the 
New Taipei City mayoral election.
174 Mixed-Member electoral Systems in constitutional context
Ultimately, these differences are the result of the constitutional dif-
ferences between Japan and Taiwan. In contrast to parliamentary Japan, 
where cabinet appointments are much more closely aligned with a party’s 
vote- seeking incentives, the president’s survival in semipresidential Taiwan 
does not rely on legislative conidence, and therefore the incentive to stra-
tegically use government positions to tame backbenchers is substantially 
weaker. Indeed, the Taiwanese president can appoint anyone to the cabi-
net, including an opposition party member. For instance, President Chen 
appointed a retired air force general and KMT member Tang Fei as his 
irst premier in 2000. In 2008, President Ma chose a former Taiwan Soli-
darity Union (TSU) legislator, Lai Shin- yuan, as the chair of the Main-
land Affairs Council, even though KMT backbenchers demanded that the 
president give priority to the party’s loyal members when making cabinet 
appointments (Taipei Times, April 30, 2008, 5).
In sum, the evidence we offer here suggests that parties in both Japan 
and Taiwan are now gradually making the strategic use of positions in the 
government for electoral purposes. This stands out in contrast with the 
SNTV period, when the leadership had a much smaller voice in allocating 
posts because of the intraparty factional constraints. By promoting those 
fig. 6.3. Proportion of former legislators as cabinet ministers in taiwan, 
1997–20 09
(Note: Percentage is the number of incumbent district or party- list legislators divided by the 
total number of cabinet ministers. because the premiers may appoint more than one person to 
a cabinet post, the denominators could be different from period to period. the KMt formed 
the cabinets between 1997 and 2000, and from 2008 to present.)
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who are loyal and demoting those who are disloyal, parties use government 
posts as carrots and sticks, although the decline of particularism caused by 
MMM seems to have made cabinet appointments less attractive as carrots. 
Nevertheless, the constitutional difference explains why Taiwanese presi-
dents’ use of these important governmental resources is still limited.
List nomination Strategy
Candidate selection and nomination is also one of the party strategies to 
win more votes, as the nature of electoral systems systematically deter-
mines what types of candidates are more popular. Therefore, we should 
observe how parties adjust their candidates accordingly (Hazan and Rahat 
2010; Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008). As discussed by Yu, Shoji, and Batto 
in chapter 5, under Japan’s SNTV incumbents were given endorsements as 
long as they wanted to run, as they were proven to be electorally powerful 
enough to win seats. When a member announced his or her retirement and 
an open seat was created, factional heads would engage in some bargain-
ing but most often the retiring member’s close relative (most often his or 
her son) was picked up to ill the vacancy for that faction (Ishibashi and 
Reed 1992). This is because koenkai were very costly to maintain and it was 
very dificult for the other factions to challenge those inherited seats from 
scratch. Thus, beyond giving nominations to incumbents or second- (or 
even third- or fourth- ) generation hereditary candidates, parties’ roles in 
the candidate recruitment and selection process were very minimal.
The change to MMM should be expected to simplify this intraparty 
bargaining process among factions and therefore bring about some changes 
in parties’ nomination strategies. One such change is the diminished inlu-
ence of factions. As Kobayashi and Tsukiyama show in chapter 3, now the 
leadership exercises more centralized power in nominating candidates in 
favor of its faction members. Another consequence is that the leadership 
can more strategically select those who would it best into the new institu-
tional environment. For instance, as Yu, Shoji, and Batto show in chapter 
5, Japan’s major parties now utilize the public recruitment (kobo) system 
to select attractive candidates on the nominal tier. In this section, we pri-
marily focus on the list tier on which voters cast party votes. We expect 
that parties will try to nominate new candidates with fresh images, such as 
women or professionals who are well known nationwide, on the PR list in 
order to mobilize more party votes.
In Japan, there are some signs that parties try to entice the voter with 
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attractive PR lists. When the LDP lost in the 1993 elections, it started 
discussing the introduction of an age limit for list candidates so that its PR 
lists would have a new image that could appeal to voters (Asahi Shimbun, 
September 8, 1993, 8). Although it took a couple of years for the leadership 
to convince veteran members, the party inally decided in 1995 to impose 
an age limit of 73, although when to actually impose it was made unclear 
(Asahi Shimbun, May 24, 1995, 2). After rounds of discussions, the LDP 
imposed this age limit beginning in the 2000 elections to all the candidates 
desiring to run on the list tier, except for the two former prime ministers— 
Yasuhiro Nakasone and Kiichi Miyazawa— who were guaranteed the top 
ranks in the list tier for life (Asahi Shimbun, January 28, 2000, 6). In 2003, 
these exceptions were inally dumped by Prime Minister Junichiro Koi-
zumi, as the LDP needed to appeal to voters with “how the party was try-
ing to transform itself” (Asahi Shimbun, October 15, 2003, 4). According 
to opinion polls, a great majority (77%) of voters supported this abolish-
ment of the exceptions (Asahi Shimbun, November 2, 2003, 2). The DPJ 
followed the move in 2004, when it decided to impose the age limit at 70 
to show the voters that it was more reform- minded than the LDP (Asahi 
Shimbun, February 16, 2004, 2). At the same time, the DPJ also decided to 
demote candidates’ ranks in the list if they lost two consecutive elections in 
the nominal tier, while banning any relative within the third degree from 
inheriting a retiring member’s district (Asahi Shimbun, May 2, 2004, 1),6 as 
this seat inheritance practice looks to the Japanese voter very undemocratic 
and unfair.
Introducing the age limit was also designed to replace top- rank PR 
candidates with more attractive ones, as who sits atop a party’s PR lists 
symbolizes whom the party is really meant to represent. In 2005, the LDP 
nominated 10 eye- catching female candidates with diverse career back-
grounds at the top in most of the lists (Asahi Shimbun, August 30, 2005, 2). 
Described as “lipstick ninjas” armed with “blood- red lipstick and a killer 
smile” by the foreign media (Washington Post, September 3, 2005, 28), most 
of them were political amateurs without previous experience in the Diet. 
They were picked directly by Prime Minister Koizumi and his aides, so 
that they could give the voter the impression of change in the traditionally 
male- dominated party. Most of them (8 of 10) were also dually nominated 
at the nominal tier to compete with those who defected from the LDP to 
oppose Koizumi’s postal reform agenda, giving the voter a choice of the old 
LDP vs. the new LDP.7
But some important institutional settings— dual candidacy and list rank-
ing based on margins with the winner (sekihai ritsu)— somewhat constrain 
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the leadership’s list nomination strategies in Japan. The dual candidacy in 
Japan is unique in that candidates can be listed on the PR list at the same 
rank and their actual rankings are determined by how they perform in their 
SMDs, or, to be more precise, their vote margins with SMD winners. This 
dual candidacy at the same rank, or what is usually called the “best loser” 
provision, gives candidates the incentive to win as many votes as possible 
in their local SMDs, which is also compatible with parties’ collective goal 
of seat maximization. But this provision makes it dificult to decide who 
should be prioritized in the list, as list- only candidates at safe ranks looked 
to SMD candidates as though they were free riders on the party (Asahi 
Shimbun, March 14, 2003, 4). For the same reason, it is also dificult to 
recruit high- proile professionals and celebrities as top- rank list candidates 
or to have a wide variety of list candidates recruited from different regions, 
different professions, and different genders, compared to Taiwan.
Let us illustrate this problem with a typical party list shown in table 
6.1. In this Tohoku PR bloc, the LDP won six seats. Four of the 28 can-
didates were given favorable positions, while 23 candidates were given the 
same ifth rank. Note that eight candidates lost in their SMDs. However, 
of the eight losers, three were revived as zombies: Tokuichiro Tamazawa 
was favorably ranked in fourth place so that he got a sure win, even though 
he was unpopular in his district, having secured less than 40% of the votes 
relative to the invincible opposition leader, Ichiro Ozawa. Koji Futada and 
Atsushi Watanabe were also revived as they were close enough to the SMD 
winners compared to the other SMD losers from the LDP: for example, 
Masami Saito was also close, but unfortunately, his sekihai ritsu, or his votes 
relative to the winner, was lower than Futada’s.
This combination of a few favorably ranked candidates with a clump 
of same- rank candidates was a typical LDP strategy until the early 2000s. 
However, now this practice is increasingly rare, as it is dificult to convince 
other LDP candidates why, in the example shown in table 6.1, the four 
(Sakamoto, Nakano, Sato, and Tamazawa) should be prioritized over the 
rest. Now it is less common to give discrete ranks near the top of the list, 
where a party can guarantee a sure win to the candidates without their 
having to perform well in the nominal contest.8 As shown in igure 6.4, 
by 2005 and 2009, large parties’ nomination and list- ranking strategies 
seemed to converge, as SMDs became more competitive.
In Taiwan, the prohibition of dual candidacy on the single nationwide 
list tier with a district magnitude of 34 allows parties to more strategically 
use list candidates. The irst strategy can be called a “regional reach- out 
strategy”: parties can compensate for SMD outcomes with candidates from 
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certain regions, given the regional divide between the KMT- dominant 
north and the DPP- dominant south. Figure 6.5 shows that 48% of list 
legislators the DPP nominated were from the KMT’s strongholds in the 
north: Taipei City, New Taipei City, Keelung City, Taoyuan County, Hsin-
chu City and County, and Miaoli County, where the DPP expected uphill 
battles with the KMT. Although the DPP’s party list in 2008 included only 
one former legislator from northern Taiwan (Ker Chien- ming), in 2012 
its list included, in addition to Ker, Tuan Yi- kang, Wu Ping- jui, and Yu 
Tian, all of whom had been elected in the districts of northern Taiwan and 
therefore had some supporters in the region. Yu was the highest- ranked 
loser, while the other three all won list seats. In addition, Su Tseng- chang, 
the former premier, was listed at the marginal rank of 18, and party ofi-
tABLE 6.1. LdP’s List for tohoku Bloc, 2005, as a typical Party List
Won Rank Name Incumbent Gender
Dually nominated /  
Best loser’s ratio  
(where applicable)
Yes 1 Goji Sakamoto Yes Male
Yes 2 Masashi Nakano Yes Male
Yes 3 Tatsuo Sato Yes Male
Yes 4 Tokuichiro Tamazawa Yes Male Yes / 38.6%
Yes 5 Atsushi Watanabe Male Yes / 92.7%
Yes 5 Koji Futada Yes Male Yes / 88.8%
Yes (in SMD) 5 Akinori Eto Yes Male Yes
Yes (in SMD) 5 Tadamori Oshima Yes Male Yes
Yes (in SMD) 5 Taro Kimura Yes Male Yes
Yes (in SMD) 5 Shun’ichi Suzuki Yes Male Yes
Yes (in SMD) 5 Toru Doi Male Yes
Yes (in SMD) 5 Ken’ya Akiba Yes Male Yes
Yes (in SMD) 5 Akihiro Nishimura Yes Male Yes
Yes (in SMD) 5 Shintaro Ito Yes Male Yes
Yes (in SMD) 5 Itsunori Onodera Yes Male Yes
Yes (in SMD) 5 Nobuhide Minorikawa Yes Male Yes
Yes (in SMD) 5 Toshiaki Endo Yes Male Yes
Yes (in SMD) 5 Takehiko Endo Yes Male Yes
Yes (in SMD) 5 Koichi Kato Yes Male Yes
Yes (in SMD) 5 Yoshitami Kameoka Male Yes
Yes (in SMD) 5 Takumi Nemoto Yes Male Yes
Yes (in SMD) 5 Masayoshi Yoshino Yes Male Yes
5 Masami Saito Male Yes / 87.6%
5 Atsushi Oikawa Male Yes / 68.5%
5 Hidenori Hashimoto Male Yes / 68.1%
5 Takaki Ono Male Yes / 66.1%
5 Susumu Hasumi Yes Male Yes / 45.9%
 28 Takao Sato  Male  
 Post Allocation, List Nominations, and Preelectoral Coalitions 179
cials said that the very inluential igure inside the party was strategically 
placed just outside the safe zone because he was expected to mobilize his 
supporters in New Taipei City, where he had previously headed the local 
government (Taipei Times, June 30, 2011).
To further explore how (dis)proportionally the two major parties nomi-
nate regional candidates on the list tier, we group the KMT’s and DPP’s 
list members in 2008 and 2012 by six regions and then put them in a scat-
ter plot shown in igure 6.6. It is apparent that both parties did not recruit 
their list members in proportion to the population, with the exception of 
Taipei City and its suburban area. The DPP drew six list members from 
the least populated area— Yilan, Hwalien, and Taitung— while the KMT 
found 12 list members in Kaohsiung, Pingtung and Penghu, part of south-
ern Taiwan. Compared to igure 6.5, which counts all of the list members 
after 1992, the result implies that the KMT has targeted southern Taiwan 
since the electoral reform.
In contrast to this regional strategy, a party can also choose what can be 
called a “group reach- out strategy”: it can step up efforts to attract votes 
from a wide range of social segments by nominating a variety of represen-
tatives from disadvantaged and special interest groups. Compared to 2008, 
when the KMT’s list candidates were mostly those incumbents who had to 
ind places to run because of the downsizing of the Legislative Yuan (Taipei 
Times, November 8, 2007), the party in 2012 ambitiously tried to reach 
out to different minority groups. Seeing how the DPP reserved the second 
fig. 6.4. favorably ranked candidates from the ldP and dPJ
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spot for Chen Chieh- ju, president of the Yu- Cheng Social Welfare Foun-
dation, and the third spot for Wu Yi- chen, a women’s rights lawyer, the 
KMT reserved the second, third, and fourth spots for Wang Yu- min (the 
executive oficer of the Child Welfare League Foundation), Tseng Chu- wei 
(a well- known public inance scholar), and Yang Yu- hsin (the secretary- 
general of the Taiwan Foundation for Disadvantaged Patients), respec-
tively. The media and even the DPP’s presidential candidate Tsai Ing- wen 
fig. 6.5. Percentages of KMt’s and dPP’s list members from their own 
strongholds, their rival’s strongholds, or special groups, 1992– 2012
(Note: list members who have run in elections or served in the party organizations in the city/
county, or have been associated with the place, are considered inluential in their own locale. 
the KMt’s strongholds are deined as the city/county where the dPP’s vote share is lower than 
the dPP’s average national vote share. the dPP’s strongholds are deined as the city/county 
where the dPP receives a higher vote share than its national one. Special groups refer to mili-
tary, teachers, judges and social groups. N = 157.)
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highly praised this aggressive recruitment: for example, the China Post 
(November 18, 2011) reported Tsai as saying: “It is good to see the [KMT] 
come up with a more diverse list of candidates for the at- large legislative 
seats, including activists representing underprivileged groups. . . . We do 
hope that the KMT nominations are more than just an election gimmick. 
Let’s hope that it really marks a change of the party’s mentality.”9
Note that these ambitious list nomination strategies cannot be expected 
to occur in Japan now, where major parties simply dually nominate on their 
lists SMD candidates, most of whom are from their local districts. One 
clear illustration of this is how parties treat women in Japan and Taiwan. As 
most of the list candidates are dually nominated now and male candidates 
are still dominant in the nominal tier, signiicantly fewer female candidates 
are nominated in Japan than in Taiwan: between 1996 and 2012, females 
accounted for only 5.1% and 11.3% of the LDP’s and the DPJ’s list can-
fig. 6.6. number of two parties’ list members clustered by regions, 2008 and 
2012
(Note: circles are in proportion to the population of each region, 2010.)
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didates, respectively. Meanwhile in Taiwan, even before the Constitution 
was amended in 2005 to require that half of list legislators must be women, 
political parties attempted to increase the share of female party- list legisla-
tors to improve their image. In the 2004 election for instance, the DPP 
allocated six out of 16 seats to women.10
In sum, with the transition to MMM, parties now have strategic reasons 
to offer attractive sets of candidates in the list tier. In light of this, Japanese 
parties started adopting age limits and installing fresh- image candidates 
and widely known professionals at the top. But with the best loser provi-
sion, Japan’s parties now just choose to use the list tier only as a safety net 
for SMD candidates, by dually nominating almost all of them simply at the 
same rank so that they can maximize votes and seats on the nominal tier. 
This has resulted in the declining number of favorably ranked candidates. 
In contrast, parties in Taiwan can strategically nominate females, nationally 
well- known igures, and even candidates from the main opponent’s strong-
holds to boost votes across the country.
Candidate Coordination Strategy
The third among various party strategies for vote mobilization that we 
discuss in this chapter is about candidate coordination, or preelectoral 
coalitions. Under SNTV, it is usually dificult for preelectoral coalitions 
to emerge for two reasons. First, if M is large enough— say, ive— then all 
a party needs to do to maintain one seat is to secure a small fraction of the 
votes (16.7%), so even a small party winning only 10– 15% of the votes 
has a good chance to be competitive and will not easily give up running 
candidates. Second, intraparty factionalism accentuated by SNTV nec-
essarily increases the interparty bargaining complexities. This is because 
even if a leader chooses to withdraw a candidate from a district, the leader 
needs to convince one of the factional bosses to give up running. Thus, we 
expect that, with the transition to MMM, the mechanical and psychologi-
cal effects of Duverger’s Law and the simpliied intraparty bargaining pro-
cess for candidate nomination should help party leaders to directly bargain 
with the other parties over candidate entry. Large parties take advantage 
of the majoritarian nature of MMM to nominate candidates in almost all 
the SMDs while convincing smaller parties to join preelectoral coalitions.11 
Therefore the effective number of electoral parties in each district should 
converge to two over time. This is our general expectation.
However, there are several theoretical caveats to this general expecta-
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tion. One is about the presence of the list tier. If joint lists are not allowed, 
then preelectoral coalition partners would need to compete on the list tier. 
LDP candidates, for example, usually ask their own personal supporters to 
cast their list votes for the party’s coalition partner, the Clean Government 
Party (Komeito, CGP), to make sure that CGP supporters would vote for 
them in exchange (Asahi Shimbun, September 7, 2000, 4). However, this is 
nothing more than lip service. Because joint lists are not allowed in Japan, 
unlike in Taiwan, there is really no way to go about ordering voters to split 
their tickets at the booths: the exit polls in 2003, for example, suggest that 
only 6% of LDP supporters voted for the CGP on the list tier (Asahi Shim-
bun, November 10, 2003, 3). One former CGP legislators lamented: “The 
coalition should be ‘give and take’ but we only give in to the LDP” (Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun, August 27, 2005, 2). This is consistent with the empirical 
evidence presented in chapter 7 by Wang, Lin, and Hsiao.
In addition to this fear of being exploited by large parties, minor parties 
want to improve their performance on the list tier by using hopeless SMD 
candidates and “contaminating” the list tier (Herron and Nishikawa 2001). 
In Japan, the Communists nominated hopeless SMD candidates in almost all 
the SMDs except in 2009, even though it could win only a couple of SMD 
seats back in 1996. In addition to this extreme case, the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP) in 2009 also had to compete with the DPJ in nearly half of the 
31 SMDs where it ran candidates.12 This limited coordination is partially the 
result of the SDP’s reliance on the list tier for its survival: “The SDP was 
agonized over how to distance itself from its larger partner, because it might 
end up encouraging more voters to cast PR votes for the DPJ by supporting 
the DPJ’s SMD candidates” (Asahi Shimbun, August 30, 2009, 2).
Thus, in a mixed- member system, preelectoral coalition partners face a 
commitment problem: smaller parties fear that their larger partners might 
exploit votes, while larger parties cannot be sure if their smaller partners’ 
activists will be really collaborative in local districts. Of course, this com-
mitment problem should be omnipresent under any single- member sys-
tem, but the presence of the list tier, on which small parties rely for their 
electoral survival, somewhat aggravates the problem. Thus, there must be 
some credible commitment mechanisms, and we argue that Japan’s insti-
tutional arrangements— parliamentarism and bicameralism— somehow 
helped to solve, if not perfectly, the commitment problem. That is why we 
see the gradual convergence of the effective number of electoral parties to 
two, as shown in igure 6.7, although the case of the 2012 elections looks 
very anomalous.
As shown by Lin in chapter 2, parliamentarism can help coalition part-
184 Mixed-Member electoral Systems in constitutional context
ners become united as a single team by taking mutual hostages. Small par-
ties can offer support for the conidence vote and the government’s survival 
on the one hand, while they can inluence policy making and implemen-
tation through positions in the government on the other. Thus, in every 
cabinet after Obuchi’s second reshufle in 1999, the LDP appointed one 
minister and several vice ministers from the CGP, and when it did so, it 
incorporated the CGP’s demands for positions (Asahi Shimbun, Septem-
ber 28, 2004, 3). Another solution is to forge detailed policy agreements 
before the election to make sure everyone signing the agreement will join 
the government after a turnover. Before the 2009 elections, the DPJ had 
rounds of policy negotiations with two potential coalition partners (the 
SDP and the People’s New Party [PNP]) to develop common policy plat-
forms (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, May 28, 2009, 2). In an interview before the 
2012 elections, the CGP’s leader, Natsuo Yamaguchi, emphasized that, 
although his party and the LDP might have had some policy differences, 
“the two parties share the history of forming coalition governments. . . . So 
we can reach policy agreements that the people can rely on” (Asahi Shim-
bun, November 30, 2012, 4).
Bicameralism in Japan also helped to make these coalitions more stable. 
fig. 6.7. effective number of electoral parties in each district in Japan, 1996– 
2012
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Japan’s upper house, the House of Councillors (HC), has equal lawmak-
ing power with the lower house except over the budget and the investi-
ture vote. The HC features a more proportional and therefore fragmented 
MMM, in which the list tier uses a nationwide open- list PR district with 
M around 50. No party has won a single- party majority in the HC since 
1989. Thus, even when the LDP retained a single- party majority in the 
lower house from 1997 to 2009, it always needed legislative support from 
the CGP. Similarly, the SDP and the PNP had a considerable bargaining 
advantage with their 11 seats in the HC.
Therefore, except in 2012, small parties strategically coordinated can-
didates where possible with two of the major parties (the LDP or the DPJ), 
resulting in the Duvergerian convergence shown in igure 6.7. The LDP 
and the CGP irst formed a coalition government in 2000, and this coali-
tion spread to district- level cooperation. Although the two coalition part-
ners competed against each other in some of the districts in the 2000 elec-
tions, they stopped doing so after 2003 in any of the 300 SMDs. Where the 
LDP is traditionally strong, the CGP refrained from running candidates, 
and the LDP’s SMD candidates can expect votes from a large majority of 
the CGP supporters (Asahi Shimbun, June 26, 2000, 3). Meanwhile, the 
LDP avoids sending candidates to the CGP’s strongholds, where the CGP’s 
loyal supporters, based on a religious group Soka Gakkai, are geographi-
cally concentrated.13 Beginning with the 2007 upper- house elections, the 
DPJ also coordinated candidates with some minor parties (the SDP and 
the PNP) to maximize the possibility of a government turnover through 
elections. Unlike the LDP- CGP coalition, this opposition coalition could 
not perfectly coordinate candidates as described above, but it was still suc-
cessful in gradually reducing the number of contested districts from 41 
(13.7% of 300 SMDs) in 2003 to 30 (10.0%) in 2005, and then down to 
14 (4.7%) in 2009. Where the DPJ decided not to run in 2009, it oficially 
backed the smaller partner’s candidates (Asahi Shimbun, July 22, 2009, 4).
It is still yet to be seen whether the fragmentation in 2012 will continue 
or not. In a sense, this is something one should expect under a parliamen-
tary regime: as Batto and Cox’s introductory chapter in this volume argues, 
a party might choose to independently run as a third party and try to join 
the cabinet by engaging in postelectoral bargaining with one of the major 
parties if no party wins a majority. In line with this view, the results of 2012 
were mainly caused by the rise of minor parties, the so- called third forces 
(daisankyoku) seeking votes by disassociating themselves from the exist-
ing parties and attracting nonpartisan voters disillusioned with the very 
unsatisfactory performance of the three- year DPJ administration. One of 
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them, the Japan Restoration Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai, JRP), was quite 
successful with 54 seats (11.3%), while others were moderately successful: 
The Your Party (Minna no To) and the Tomorrow Party of Japan (Nippon 
Mirai no To) won 18 (3.8%) and 9 seats (1.9%), respectively. Many of the 
SMDs were marked by three- and even four- way competition, disturbing 
the trend toward the Duvergerian equilibrium as shown in igure 6.7.
But we would also like to note that, although the parliamentary post-
election bargaining story as posed by Batto and Cox may explain well the 
rise of third parties in 2012, it has some dificulties in explaining the grad-
ual decline in the number of parties until 2009. In fact, most of the third 
parties, except the ideologically extreme Communists, were merged into 
one of the two major camps led by the LDP and the DPJ by 2003.14 And, 
even in 2012, the minor parties themselves stepped up their efforts to form 
the united front against the LDP- CGP coalition: in fact, the JRP and the 
Tomorrow Party of Japan were born when even smaller parties decided 
to merge,15 while the JRP and Your Party tried to coordinate their candi-
dates in as many districts as possible until the last minute (Asahi Shimbun, 
December 1, 2012, 4). So it might be the case that the 2012 elections were 
just a temporal outlier. Several of the minor parties might be merged or 
join either of the two large camps before too long, but as of this writing it 
is still very unclear.
Let us move to the case of the MMM system in semipresidential Tai-
wan, which similarly indicates that in most of the districts, Duverger’s Law 
is working: the average effective number of candidates stood at 2.09 and 
2.18 in 2008 and 2012, respectively. However, this masks how preelectoral 
coalitions work in reality. In 2008, the small parties in the Pan- Blue coali-
tion refrained from nominating SMD candidates, but the TSU competed 
with the DPP in 13 districts (17.8% of the 73 districts) although no candi-
date from the TSU could win. In 2012, it was the opposite: The Pan- Blue 
coalition was split, as the People’s First Party nominated SMD candidates 
in 10 districts (13.7%) to challenge the KMT, and no candidate could win 
seats, just like the TSU in 2008. This stands out in stark contrast to Japan, 
where, at least until 2009, the two large camps were successful in coordi-
nating candidates so that less than 5% of the districts observed intracamp 
competition.
This could be because of the heavy regulations on which parties can run 
for the list tier,16 but we argue that this is because of the presence of (nega-
tive) presidential coattails: as the presidency is the most important political 
prize in presidential and semipresidential democracies, the media and the 
general public pay the greatest attention to the presidential race and presi-
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dential candidates’ performance signiicantly affects legislative elections as 
well (Golder 2006). Without viable presidential candidates to start with, 
the small parties have a very strong incentive to associate themselves with 
a major party in the same coalition when it has a very winnable candidate.
This scenario happened in 2008, when the KMT’s Ma Ying- jeou looked 
like a sure winner well before the 2008 elections (Chu 2008; Tan 2009). 
The People First Party (PFP) readily formed a preelectoral coalition with 
the KMT and had a joint PR list— four PFP members were placed in the 
KMT’s party list and three of them were ranked high enough to win seats. 
At the same time, the PFP was very collaborative on the nominal tier as 
well, as it did not run candidates in any SMDs (Chu 2008, 126). Similarly in 
2012, the TSU was very collaborative with the DPP: learning from 2008, 
the TSU this time decided not to run on the nominal tier and instead yield 
to its Pan- Green alliance partner (Taipei Times, May 29, 2011). The TSU’s 
spiritual leader, Lee Teng- hui, even called on voters to cast their ballots for 
the DPP’s SMD candidates and give their party votes to the TSU (Taipei 
Times, December 26, 2011). This was because a series of opinion polls sug-
gested that the DPP’s presidential candidate, Tsai Ing- wen, was running 
neck and neck with Ma. As late as December 10, 2011, about a month 
before the election, a TVB super channel poll showed Tsai and Ma tied 
with 39% each. Another poll by a Taiwan think tank showed Tsai leading 
by 35.9% to 35.4% (Taipei Times, December 10, 2011). Riding the coattails 
of the popular presidential candidate from the same camp, the TSU won 
three PR seats, a breakthrough from its zero seats in the previous election.
On the other hand, small parties similarly have a very strong incentive 
to dissociate themselves from the major party when the coalition’s pres-
idential candidate is unpopular, and this happened to the TSU in 2008 
and the PFP in 2012. Before the 2008 election, Chen Shui- bian was very 
unpopular as president and leader of the DPP, with the ever- worsening 
economy, increasing cross- strait tensions with mainland China, and a series 
of corruption scandals. Even the DPP leadership predicted devastating 
defeats in the 2008 elections (Chu 2008; Tan 2009). This created a schism 
in the Pan- Green coalition, with Lee Teng- hui explicitly criticizing the 
DPP as “incompetent, preoccupied with winning the presidential election” 
(Taipei Times, February 14, 2007). In an interview, Lee went on to charac-
terize President Chen as having “no concept of democracy” and worried 
that Taiwan was being held hostage politically by the two main political 
parties (Taipei Times, December 29, 2007). As the TSU tried to dissociate 
itself from the unpopular president, TSU chairman Huang Kun- huei did 
not like the idea of withholding its candidates on behalf of the DPP (Taipei 
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Times, July 20, 2007). The schism in the Pan- Green coalition was never 
resolved despite the common belief that “the Pan- Green Coalition will 
lose the elections if there is no cooperation with each other” (Taipei Times, 
August 4, 2007). DPP chairman Yu Shyi- kun often attempted to convince 
the smaller partner to “only nominate the most promising candidates for 
the next legislative election based upon public opinion survey results,” 
describing the two parties as “brothers in a family” (China Post, January 31, 
2007), but to no avail.
After its landslide victory in 2008, the KMT faced a similar problem. 
One of the key events was Typhoon Morakot in August 2009, which sig-
niicantly undermined the perception of the administration’s ability to pre-
pare for a natural disaster and Ma’s credibility as a leader (Gold 2010). As 
Ma’s popularity steadily decreased over time (Taipei Times, April 21, 2011), 
the KMT began losing votes and seats. For example, the mayoral elections 
in November 2010 showed that its vote share decreased by 7.6% compared 
to that of 2005– 6. Even though the KMT maintained some major city 
mayoral positions, this poor performance was an ominous bellwether for 
the coming presidential race (Tien and Tung 2011). Sensing the worsening 
situation around the Pan- Blue coalition, PFP chairman James Soong said 
that his party would nominate at least 10 candidates for the legislative elec-
tions as early as June 2011 (Taipei Times, June 11, 2011). Time after time 
the KMT tried to convince the PFP to collaborate on candidate coordina-
tion (Taipei Times, July 27, 2011) and even suggested PFP candidates could 
run where the KMT had not yet completed its nomination process (Taipei 
Times, July 30, 2011). But ultimately the PFP decided to run its own candi-
dates for presidential, SMD, and party- list elections.
In sum, with the transition to MMM, in theory we should observe how 
small parties will try to form preelectoral coalitions in the nominal tier in 
order to survive. But coordination cannot go smoothly unless there is a 
commitment mechanism, because small parties fear exploitation by larger 
partners and want to maximize list votes with the contamination effects. 
Thus, Japan’s larger parties (the LDP and the DPJ) offered cabinet posi-
tions to and forged coalition agreements with small parties (the CGP, the 
SDP, and the PNP) to make preelectoral coalitions stable. Consequently, 
the number of candidates at the district level gradually declined at least 
until 2009. Lacking such mechanisms, semipresidential Taiwan, by con-
trast, was marked by limited coordination. Rather, small parties (the TSU 
in 2008 and the PFP in 2012) challenged their larger partners when they 
sensed that their odds of winning improved by distancing themselves from 
their camps’ presidential candidates.
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Conclusion: Constitution, dual Candidacy, and Beyond
In this chapter we investigated how parties have strategically adapted them-
selves to the new electoral environment in Japan and Taiwan by focusing 
on three different issues: post allocation, list nomination, and candidate 
coordination. The main argument is that the simpliied intraparty bargain-
ing process over posts and candidates under MMM allows the leadership 
to use available tools and resources more strategically for electoral pur-
poses than it could during the SNTV period. More speciically, in terms of 
post allocation, ruling parties should make more strategic use of positions 
in the government as carrots and sticks to control candidates. In terms of 
nominations, parties should strategically nominate attractive candidates on 
the list tier to boost party votes. And in terms of candidate coordination, 
parties should strategically form preelectoral coalitions to minimize wasted 
votes. In general, parties in both Japan and Taiwan are moving toward 
these expectations.
However, throughout this chapter we also ind the institutional differ-
ences between the two countries— parliamentarism versus semipresiden-
tialism and the dual candidacy provision— are so signiicant that they can 
outweigh these naïve predictions driven by the theory of electoral systems 
alone. First, mutual dependence between the cabinet and the legislature for 
survival in parliamentary Japan results in a much closer alignment between 
the vote- seeking incentives and cabinet appointment patterns: now the 
prime minister appoints fewer and fewer zombies to important positions 
in the government so that candidates can win more SMDs. But in Taiwan, 
although some signs suggest that the president rewards hard workers with 
cabinet positions to develop quality candidates in the opposition’s strong-
holds, they are still rare, because constitutionally the president really does 
not depend on the party or the legislature for support.
Second, to maximize the strategic use of the best loser provision, Japan’s 
parties now use the list tier only as a safety net for SMD candidates. This 
is because the leadership can expect to maximize its nominal- tier winners 
by dually nominating SMD candidates at the same top rank and letting 
them engage in laissez- faire competition on a level playing ield. Now par-
ties nominate very few favorably ranked candidates. In Taiwan, the single 
nationwide list tier without dual candidacy allows for more strategic nomi-
nating and list- ranking of candidates. Therefore party lists in Taiwan tend 
to include a wider variety of candidates from different regions, genders, 
and career backgrounds than in Japan.
Third, parliamentarism can effectively address the credible commit-
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ment problem that could otherwise make candidate coordination dificult. 
Japan’s larger parties (the LDP and the DPJ) offered cabinet positions to 
and forged coalition agreements with small parties (the CGP, the SDP, and 
the PNP) to make preelectoral coalitions stable. Therefore Japan observed 
the gradual convergence to the Duvergerian equilibrium as evidenced 
by the declining number of candidates at least until 2009. Lacking such 
mechanisms, semipresidential Taiwan was, by contrast, marked by limited 
coordination. Rather, small parties (the TSU in 2008 and the PFP in 2012) 
challenged their larger partners when they did not like their camps’ presi-
dential candidates.
All of these ideas imply that the effects of electoral rules are mediated 
by contextual factors. It is important to look beyond district magnitude, 
ballot types, and seat allocation methods when understanding parties’ vote 
mobilization strategies. Although this chapter’s primary focus is on the two 
main institutional differences between Japan and Taiwan, one could point 
to other contextual differences, including but not limited to, ethnic and 
linguistic heterogeneity, the degrees of democratic consolidation, and the 
presence of a second chamber (cf. Moser and Scheiner 2012). While we 
did not delve into how these different contextual factors could affect par-
ties’ mobilization strategies, we believe these will open up new research 
opportunities for comparing Japan, Taiwan, and any other mixed- member 
systems from different perspectives.
n o t e S
 1. To this ladder one could add vice chair and chair of a Policy Affairs Research 
Council subdivision between (II) and (III), as the literature does (Ramseyer and 
Rosenbluth 1993, 86), but we do not do this since the Policy Affairs Research 
Council became less and less important, especially after Koizumi took power in 
2001. In addition, since Japan has no clear notion of demotion, unlike in other 
parliamentary democracies, we focus on only promotion here.
 2. The KMT inally nominated a party- list legislator from Tainan, Chen Su- 
hui, to run in the by- election against the DPP nominee, former mayor of Tainan 
City, Hsu Tian- Tsair. Hsu defeated Chen by a margin of 61% to 38%.
 3. Also see chapter 4 by Batto and Huang in this volume for a much more 
detailed account of the DPP’s factional struggles, especially between the New Tide 
faction and the other factions over cabinet positions, and its attempts to reform 
itself.
 4. This may sound a bit contradictory with Lin’s evidence in chapter 2, but here 
we look at whether ministers have served as legislators before.
 5. On average, the Japanese cabinet has only one or even no nonlegislator, with 
some exceptions including Koizumi’s irst cabinet (2001– 2), which had three non-
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legislators (16.7%) in 18 cabinet positions, and Fukuda’s irst cabinet (2007– 8), 
which had two.
 6. This means that a retiring incumbent cannot designate as a successor can-
didate his/her child (irst degree), sibling or grandchild (second degree), or niece/
nephew or great- grandchild (third degree). In order to differentiate itself from the 
LDP, the DPJ in 2012 applied this strict rule to any candidate hoping to run in 
SMDs, including Yuichiro Hata, who showed an interest in succeeding his retiring 
father, former prime minister Tsutomu Hata. Denied an endorsement from the 
party, the younger Hata chose not to run (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 18, 
2012, 2).
 7. Of the eight dually nominated candidates, three won their SMDs, while the 
other ive were elected on the PR list thanks to their high rankings.
 8. Favorably ranking some candidates near the top of the list is more of a legacy 
of the old SNTV system (see Reed 1995). As the same district had more than one 
incumbent under SNTV and the leadership needed to deal with them under the 
new system, those who could not win nominations for the SMD race were given 
favorable ranks in the list.
 9. There are two main reasons why the KMT’s list was praised more than the 
DPP’s list. The irst reason is that many of the younger nominees on the DPP list 
had been either former cabinet ministers or legislators, while the KMT recruited 
many new faces from different ields and areas. Although Tsai argued that those 
former legislators or ministers could more effectively represent the interests of 
minority groups, it was a tough sell for the mass media. The second reason is that 
the KMT’s list was completely different from the conservative- looking 2008 list. 
In that list, the KMT illed the irst 20 spots with 17 incumbent legislators, two 
cabinet ministers, and one businessperson.
 10. Prior to the 2005 constitutional reform, any party winning at least ive seats 
was required to reserve at least one seat for a woman.
 11. This also means that under a much more proportional MMP system, where 
list votes determine parties’ seat shares in the parliament, preelectoral coalitions at 
the district level are not likely to occur. On this point, see chapter 9 by Shugart and 
Tan in this volume on New Zealand’s MMP.
 12. In these 15 districts where the DPJ and the SDP competed, the DPJ won 14 
seats. In one district where the LDP won, the DPJ could not win even if hypotheti-
cally the SDP gave up running a candidate.
 13. Except in 2009, when none of the CPG SMD candidates survived, the party 
has been remarkably successful in SMDs for a relatively small party: in 45 districts 
where the CPG ran candidates between 2000 and 2012, it won 33 seats (73.3%). 
This is because the party has been very good at predicting the size of its supporter 
bases and optimizing candidate entry accordingly, using its religious- group net-
work (Lee 1970, 507).
 14. They were mainly the remnants of the second largest party in the 1996 elec-
tion, the New Frontier Party, which was suddenly dissolved in 1997 into several 
minor ones: the New Fraternity Party (Shinto Yuai), the Good Governance Party 
(Minsei To), the Liberal Party (Jiyu To), and others joined the DPJ, while the Con-
servative Party (Hoshu To) and others chose the LDP.
 15. The JRP was born in September 2012 when the populist Osaka mayor, 
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Toru Hashimoto, extended his Osaka- based regional party, the Osaka Restoration 
Association, into a nationwide one. In addition to about a dozen MPs individually 
switching to the JRP, some other tiny parties tried to join the force, including the 
Tax Cut Japan (Genzei Nippon) and the Sunrise Party (Tachiagare Nippon), and 
the latter inally merged in November after rounds of negotiations. The Tomor-
row Party of Japan was born in late November when several DPJ splinters— the 
Kizuna Party (Shinto Kiduna), People’s Life First (Kokumin no Seikatsu ga Dai-
ichi), Green Wind (Midori no Kaze), and Tax Cut Japan, which was rejected by the 
JRP— merged into a single party.
 16. More speciically, a party can run its list if any of the following four conditions 
hold: (1) its presidential candidate got at least 2% of the votes in the most recent 
election; (2) it won at least 2% of the list votes in the previous three elections; (3) it 
has at least ive legislators; or (4) it nominates at least 10 SMD candidates.
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Split- ticket Voting under MMM
T. Y. Wang, Chang- chih Lin, and Yi- ching Hsiao
Split- ticket voting has generated substantial interest in the discipline as 
demonstrated by the voluminous publication on the subject (Alesina and 
Rosenthal 1995; Bawn 1993, 1999; Beck et al. 1992; Born 1994; Brandy 
1993; Cox 1990, 1997; Cox and Schoppa 2002; Duverger 1959; Feigert 
1979; Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Fiorina 1996; Fisher 1973; 
Gallagher 1998; Garand and Lichtl 2000; Gschwend, Johnston, and Pat-
tie 2003; Herron and Nishikawa 2001; Huang 2001; Huang, Chen, and 
Chou 2008; Jacobson 1991; Jesse 1988; Karp et al. 2002; Kohno 1997; 
Lewis- Beck and Nadeau 2004; Reed 1999; Roscoe 2003). With a focus 
on electoral behavior in the United States where elections on executive 
and legislative bodies are held simultaneously, ticket- splitting is generally 
deined as a voting behavior where voters cast two or more than two bal-
lots in an election to candidates of different parties competing for differ-
ent positions. For instance, when elections for the presidency and for the 
House of Representatives in the United States take place at the same time, 
voters may choose to vote in the manner of a straight ticket by casting both 
ballots for candidates from the same party, or to split the ticket by voting 
for candidates from different parties on different ballots.
Split- ticket voting can also occur in countries with mixed- member sys-
tems for legislative elections (Choi 2006; Gschwend, Johnston, and Pattie 
2003; Huang 2008a, 2008b; Huang, Wang, and Kuo 2008; Karp et al. 2002; 
Kohno 1997; Moser and Scheiner 2004, 2009; Reed 1999; Schoen 1999). 
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Characterized as hybrids that combine both proportional representation 
(PR) and single- member district (SMD), mixed systems have been adopted 
in many countries including Germany, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, and 
more recently, Taiwan. Depending on whether there is a linkage between 
votes acquired from the PR and from the SMD tier, the institutional 
designs can be further categorized as “nonparallel” mixed- member pro-
portional (MMP) and “parallel” mixed- member majoritarian (MMM) sys-
tems (Bawn 1993, 1999; Cox 1997, 81– 83; Cox and Schoppa 2002; Fisher 
1973; Gschwend, Johnston, and Pattie 2003; Karp et al. 2002; Shugart and 
Wattenberg 2001, 13– 14). In nonparallel MMP systems, as in Germany 
and New Zealand, votes acquired from the PR tier are used to balance the 
overall representation of parties in the legislature so that weaker parties 
receive a number of seats proportionate to their general performance in 
the election. The majoritarian boost received by a large party from the 
SMD tier is likely to be reduced by the proportional allocation from the 
party list. Because the PR votes are used to compensate for the SMD votes, 
the nonparallel MMP is also characterized as “compensatory” mixed sys-
tem (Karp et al. 2002; see also chapter 9 by Shugart and Tan, this volume). 
In MMM systems, as in Japan and Taiwan, seats in the SMD and PR are 
allocated independently and separately with no linkage between the two 
tiers. They are thus characterized as “parallel” systems. Despite these dif-
ferences, both types of mixed systems feature electoral rules that provide 
voters with two ballots. One ballot determines which candidate wins seats 
in SMD under plurality and the other decides which party acquires seats 
under PR rules. Voters in such hybrid systems are offered an opportunity 
to split their votes for different political afiliations. Ticket- splitting in 
countries with mixed- member systems is thus different from that which 
occurs in the American context.
Both Japan and Taiwan abandoned the time- honored single nontrans-
ferable vote electoral rules in favor of the MMM systems in 1994 and 2005, 
respectively. The new institutional setting of both countries provides citi-
zens with two ballots.1 Voters in both countries may thus behave strategi-
cally as the new institutions offer voters an opportunity to split their votes 
for candidates of different political afiliations. Parties of similar political 
positions may also plan their campaigns collectively in order to maximize 
their overall seat shares. This study examines how voters are expected to 
behave under the new systems, and, in particular, how they respond to 
political parties’ strategic moves of maximizing electoral votes.
To examine voters’ electoral behavior under the new electoral rules, 
survey data collected in Japan and in Taiwan are employed, which include 
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data of the 2008 Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study (hereaf-
ter TEDS2008L),2 ifteen waves of preelection rolling surveys conducted 
prior to Taiwan’s 2012 combined elections,3 and Japan Election Studies 
(JES) III.4 This study proceeds in three parts. The next section reviews the 
literature on split- ticket voting, which offers a theoretical framework for 
analysis. In the ensuing sections, descriptive and multivariate analyses are 
conducted, with conclusions in the inal section. The indings support the 
conventional wisdom that party identiication is the primary determinant 
of electoral behavior. The institutional design of mixed- member systems, 
however, mitigates the effects of partisan loyalty as identiiers of minor 
political parties are more likely to be ticket- splitters, but they tend to sup-
port candidates of the same political coalitions/alliances. Voters’ ticket- 
splitting behavior may be further induced by coordinated nomination 
strategies of political parties with similar political positions.
Split- ticket Voting in MMM System
More than half a century ago, Angus Campbell and his associates (1964) 
stated that:
Few factors are of greater importance for our national elections 
than the lasting attachment of tens of millions of Americans to one 
of the parties. These loyalties establish a basic division of electoral 
strength within which the competition of particular campaigns takes 
place. . . . Most Americans have this sense of attachment with one 
party or the other. And for the individual who does, the strength and 
direction of party identiication are facts of central importance in 
accounting for attitude and behavior. (67– 68)
Generally characterized as the “Michigan model,” its characterization of 
party identiication as the primary determinant of political behavior has 
subsequently dominated the academic research in the discipline (e.g., 
Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Miller and Shanks 1996). Although 
a number of studies have noted an increase in “independent voters” along 
with split- ticket voting over the subsequent decades (Burnham 1970, 123; 
Keith et al. 1992; Pomper 1967), more recent analysis has shown that the 
argument for the “decline of parties” in American politics was exagger-
ated. Bartels (2000), for instance, demonstrates that the impact of partisan 
loyalties on presidential and congressional voting was strong in the elec-
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tions held between 1952 and 1996 in the United States. Other recent stud-
ies (Hetherington 2011; Stanley and Niemi 2010) have also shown that 
straight- ticket voting by Americans has increased. Although the effect of 
party identiication on electoral choice varies by candidates’ social char-
acteristics (Campbell, Green, and Layman 2011), over time (Bartels 2000; 
Lewis- Beck et al. 2008), and across types of elections (Bartels 2000), party 
identiication continues to play an important role in American electoral 
politics. In elections between candidates from competing parties, individu-
als afirm their partisan loyalties by casting ballots for the candidates who 
share their party labels. While this conclusion is primarily based on ind-
ings in an American setting, empirical analysis shows that it is also appli-
cable to other democratic countries such as Taiwan (Chu 1996; Fu 1996; 
Ho 1994; Liu 1994; Sheng 2002; Sheng and Chen 2003; Shyu 1991, 1992; 
Tsai 2008; N. Wu 1999; Yu 2004) and Japan (Akuto 1971; Kohei 1972; Kuo 
2011; Richardson 1988; Rochon 1981).
Although party labels serve as an important cue for individuals’ voting 
decisions, the institutional framework within which an election operates 
may determine how much partisanship matters. In this context, the semi-
nal work by Duverger (1959) becomes relevant. He argues that the SMD 
and the PR systems, in their pure forms, each provide different incentives 
to party elites and to voters. In a pure SMD election, the simple mechan-
ics of the plurality rule create an effect of “underrepresentation” of the 
weaker parties because a larger party can win 100% of the seats available 
by winning half or even less than half of the votes cast in each district. As a 
result of this mechanical effect of the plurality rule, the percentage of seats 
of minor parties tends to be disproportionate to their percentage of the 
poll. Such a mechanical effect further introduces a psychological effect in 
voters’ minds. As they realize that backing trailing candidates has a higher 
chance of becoming “wasted votes,” supporters of these candidates in the 
SMD context are likely to transfer their votes to more viable candidates of 
major parties.
In a similar vein, party elites behave strategically in the SMD system 
by not wasting resources on candidates who have little chance of winning. 
Recognizing the mechanical and psychological effects of the SMD system, 
minor parties or parties of similar political positions may also strategically 
choose not to nominate candidates in some or all of the SMDs lest they 
divide the pool of support and thereby lose the election. Such strategic 
decisions of nomination mean that the voters’ choice menu in any given 
SMD tier is typically more limited than the one in the PR tier, further 
aggravating the effects of the SMD system. This logic leads to Duverger’s 
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classic argument that “the simple- majority single ballot system favors the 
two- party system” and thus the number of parties will settle at two in a pure 
SMD electoral system (1959, 217). In a pure PR electoral system, however, 
there is little incentive for parties of similar political tendencies to fuse 
because the division does little or no harm to them. As the PR system puts 
a “powerful brake” to any tendency toward a two- party system, Duverger 
concludes that “proportional representation encourages a system of parties 
that are multiple, rigid, independent and stable” (1959, 204– 5).
The SMD and the PR systems in their pure forms thus offer differ-
ent incentives to voters. Because an MMM system is a hybrid of both PR 
and SMD, voters in this system may behave strategically, leading to split- 
ticket voting. Various studies show ticket- splitting in such hybrid systems 
as evidence of voters’ strategic reaction to electoral rules because they cast 
a greater number of votes for large parties in SMD races than in the PR 
tier (Bawn 1999; Cox 1997; Huang and Hsiao 2009; Reed 1999; Roberts 
1988).5 As a result, identiiers with major parties tend to cast sincere votes 
in both SMD and PR segments by voting for their most preferred can-
didates and parties. Supporters of minor parties may act strategically in 
district races by voting for the more viable candidates of major parties but 
cast a sincere PR vote for their preferred minor parties. While partisan 
identiication inluences individuals’ vote choice, the electoral context may 
mitigate its effects.
The tendency of ticket- splitting on the part of voters may be further 
induced by the strategic moves of party elites. In addition to ielding can-
didates in SMDs in order to boost party votes in the PR tier by generat-
ing the so- called contamination effect (Cox and Schoppa 2002; Ferrara 
and Herron 2005; Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005; Herron and 
Nishikawa 2001; Huang 2007; Mizusaki and Mori 1998; Reed 2003),6 an 
approach frequently adopted by political parties in Japan and in Taiwan 
has been to coordinate candidate nomination in district races with other 
parties. Because there are no linkages between the SMD and the PR tiers 
in MMM systems, victory in district races directly changes the number of 
seats won by parties. Such electoral rules thus provide incentives to par-
ties of similar political positions to coordinate their candidate nomination 
in SMDs lest they divide the pool of support (Ferrara and Herron 2005). 
Coordinated district races can also boost parties’ PR votes as voters receive 
a clear voting cue from the electoral coalitions. Thus, parties of electoral 
coalitions can collectively maximize their seat shares through preelectoral 
pacts. Indeed, political parties in both Japan and Taiwan have coordinated 
their campaigns since electoral reforms were passed. In no district did 
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the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Clean Government Party 
(Komeito, CGP) of Japan both nominate candidates in SMD races in 2003 
and 2005. Similarly, Taiwan’s two major political parties, the Nationalist 
Party (Kuomintang, KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 
also collaborated with their junior partners in the 2008 and 2012 legislative 
elections.7
The above discussion thus yields the following theoretical expectations 
to be examined in the subsequent sections. Speciically, it is hypothesized 
that partisan identiication remains the primary determinant of vote choice 
in mixed- member systems but the framework of the electoral institutions 
mitigates its effect. Identiiers of major political parties are more likely to 
cast straight tickets while supporters for minor parties tend to split their 
ballots by casting a sincere PR vote and conine their defection to SMD 
races. As political parties may coordinate their campaign strategies, voters’ 
ticket- splitting behavior may be further induced by such preelectoral pacts.
Split- ticket Voting in Japan and taiwan
Since MMM systems were adopted in the two countries, the 2003 and 
2005 legislative elections were the third and fourth such contests held in 
Japan, whereas the 2008 and 2012 elections were the irst and second held 
in Taiwan. The vote and seat shares by political parties in the elections are 
presented in tables 7.1a and 7.1b.
Data in table 7.1a show that the LDP in Japan, the ruling party since 
1955, was able to continue its domination in the legislative elections. In 
2003, the party garnered about 44% of the electoral support in SMD races 
and 35% of the PR votes, which were translated into a total of 237 legisla-
tive seats. The opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) also acquired 
a substantial numbers of votes in both tiers and became the second largest 
political party in the Diet with 177 seats. The LDP advanced its politi-
cal domination in the 2005 elections with a landslide victory by winning 
296 of the 480 total legislative seats. Along with its political partner, the 
LDP- CGP governing coalition commanded a two- thirds majority in the 
lower house. The DPJ suffered a devastating loss in 2005, acquiring only 
113 seats but continuing to be the largest opposition party. Overall, the 
party system in Japan in the mid- 2000s can be characterized as heading 
toward a two- party system dominated by the LDP and the DPJ, or more 
precisely, a “governing coalition vs. opposition coalition” system. Indeed, 
observers have noted that the effective number of parties in Japan has 
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shown a downward trend during the postreform era but has never reached 
two. Smaller parties have been able to keep a presence in the Diet even 
though they cannot thrive (Jou 2009; Maeda 2008) and major political par-
ties have maintained collaborative relationships with them. For instance, 
the CGP continued to be the partner of the LDP- dominated governing 
coalition even after the LDP’s landslide victory in 2005. The DPJ has also 
maintained a loosely deined political alliance with the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP) through collaborative campaigns in some, but not all, SMDs. 
The only exception to this pattern is the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), 
which has continued its adherence to an unwavering political ideology and 
“going it alone” (Ferrara and Herron 2005) by ielding a large number of 
candidates in SMDs regardless of the chances of winning.8
tABLE 7.1A. Vote and Seat Shares by Political Party in Japan
 
2003 2005
Vote % Number of Seats (%) Vote % Number of Seats (%)
SMD PR SMD PR SMD PR SMD PR
LDP 43.9 35.0 168 (56.0) 69 (38.3) 47.8 38.2 219 (73.0) 77 (42.8)
DPJ 36.7 37.4 105 (35.0) 72 (40.0) 36.4 31.0 52 (17.3) 61 (33.9)
JCP 8.1 7.8 0 (0.0) 9 (5.0) 7.3 7.3 0 (0.0) 9 (5.0)
CGP 1.5 14.8 9 (3.0) 25 (13.9) 1.4 13.3 8 (2.7) 23 (12.8)
SDP 2.9 5.1 1 (0.3) 5 (2.8) 1.5 5.5 1 (0.3) 6 (3.3)
NCP 1.3 — 4 (1.3) — — — — — 
PNP — — — — 0.6 1.7 2 (0.7) 2 (1.1)
NPN — — — — 0.2 2.4 0 (0.0) 1 (0.6)
NPD — — — — 0.1 0.6 0 (0.0) 1 (0.6)
Others 5.7 0.0 13 (4.3) 0 (0.0) 4.8 0.00 18 (6.00) 0 (0.0)
Data source: Revised from Kuo (2011, 20– 21).
tABLE 7.1B. Vote and Seat Shares by Political Party in taiwan
 
2008 2012
Vote % Number of Seats (%) Vote % Number of Seats (%)
SMD PR SMD PR SMD PR SMD PR
KMT 53.5 51.2 57 (78.1) 20 (58.8) 48.1 44.6 44 (60.3) 16 (47.1)
DPP 38.7 36.9 13 (17.8) 14 (41.2) 44.5 34.6 27 (37.0) 13 (38.2)
NP — 4.0 — 0 (0.0) 0.1 1.5 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
PFP 0.1 — 0 (0.0) — 1.1 5.5 0 (0.0) 2 (5.9)
TSU 1.0 3.5 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) — 9.0 — 3 (8.8)
NPSU 2.3 0.7 2 (2.7) 0 (0.0) 1.1 — 1 (1.4) — 
Others 4.6 4.4 1 (1.4) 0 (0.0) 4.9 4.9 1 (1.4) 0 (0.0)
Data source: Central Election Commission, Taiwan.
Note: The six Aboriginal seats are not included in this table.
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Taiwan’s political landscape has been roughly divided into two politi-
cal camps: the Pan- Blue alliance and the Pan- Green alliance, which are 
divided on the issues of national identity and cross- strait policy (Hsu and 
Lin 2009; Niou 2004; Wang and Liu 2004; Y. Wu 2004). The Pan- Blue 
alliance consists of the now ruling KMT, the People First Party (PFP), 
and the New Party (NP), while the Pan- Green alliance includes the oppo-
sition DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). In the irst legisla-
tive election in 2008 since the MMM system was adopted, parties of the 
Pan- Blue alliance entered an electoral pact to coordinate their campaign. 
Also included in the agreements was the Non- Partisan Solidarity Union 
(NPSU). The two political parties of the Pan- Green alliance, however, 
failed to reach an agreement. They ielded their candidates separately in 
both the SMD and PR tiers and competed with each other for the support 
of Pan- Green identiiers. As the data in table 7.1b show, the KMT and the 
DPP, the two largest political parties in Taiwan, garnered almost all of the 
legislative seats in 2008 and none of the minor parties passed the required 
5% threshold to receive apportioned PR seats.
In the 2012 combined presidential and legislative elections, the KMT 
again collaborated with the NP and the NPSU in the legislative campaign. 
With a coordinated nomination strategy, the NP presented a party list 
in the PR tier and nominated only one SMD candidate while the NPSU 
nominated two SMD candidates without competing in the PR segment. 
The KMT ielded candidates in the remaining 71 SMDs and presented 
a complete party list. The PFP did not enter the 2012 Pan- Blue pact and 
ran its legislative campaign separately mainly due to the presidential bid by 
its chairman, James Soong, who ran against the incumbent president, Ma 
Ying- jeou of the KMT. On the part of the Pan- Green alliance, the DPP 
ielded 69 candidates for district races while the TSU only presented a 
party list in the PR tier without running any candidates in SMDs. Although 
the two parties did not enter a formal agreement, it appeared that the TSU 
and the DPP reached a tacit understanding on their campaign strategies 
as leaders of the TSU repeatedly called on Pan- Green identiiers to sup-
port DPP candidates in SMD races but back the TSU with their party 
votes. The DPP chairwoman, Tsai Ing- wen, also indicated publicly that she 
would like to see the TSU garner more than 5% of the party votes so that 
the party could receive apportioned PR seats (Lee 2012). Similar to the 
2008 electoral outcome, the KMT and the DPP had a lion’s share of the 
legislative seats with the former as the biggest winner. While the PFP and 
the TSU were able to pass the 5% threshold and acquired two and three 
seats in the PR tiers, respectively, the electoral results of 2008 and 2012 
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demonstrate that minor political parties in Taiwan have dificulty winning 
SMD races without collaborating with major parties.
Interestingly, as both Japan and Taiwan are in the process of consoli-
dating their two- party systems, the vote shares of major and minor par-
ties in SMD races are generally different from their PR vote shares. The 
divergent patterns of vote distributions at the aggregate level seem to show 
that some electorates in both countries split their tickets in the elections. 
Survey data from the JES III and the TEDS appear to conirm this inding. 
By cross- tabulating SMD and PR votes at the individual level, table 7.2a 
shows that, in the 2003 elections, 37.8% of the Japanese electorate cast a 
straight- ticket vote for the LDP in both PR and SMD tiers, while 26.6% 
of them voted sincerely for the DPJ in both segments. Even after other 
minor parties are included in the calculation, less than 70% of Japanese 
citizens were straight- ticket voters. Similar patterns can be found in the 
2005 electoral results as a total of 68.5% of JES respondents supported 
candidates of the same political party in both the PR and SMD tiers. This 
means that roughly 30% of Japanese citizens were ticket- splitters in these 
two legislative elections. By comparison, the proportions of straight- ticket 
voters were higher in Taiwan’s 2008 legislative elections as 77.7% of the 
TEDS respondents indicated that they supported the same political par-
ties in both the PR and SMD tiers. Speciically, 55.2% and 22.5% of the 
electorate, respectively, were KMT and DPP straight- ticket voters in 2008. 
The 2012 elections, however, witnessed a 10% increase in ticket- splitters 
and less than 70% of the country’s citizens cast straight tickets. While some 
of these ticket- splitters may be “nonopportunity voters”9 due to a lack of 
SMD nominations of their preferred political parties (Benoit, Giannetti, 
and Laver 2006; Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005, 87), roughly 20% 
to 30% of Japanese and Taiwanese voters split their tickets between their 
preferred parties in the PR list and candidates of other political afiliations 
in SMD races.
tABLE 7.2A. Straight ticket Voters in the Electorates (in percentages)
Japan Taiwan
 2003 2005  2008 2012
LDP 37.8 38.0  KMT 55.2 50.6
DPJ 26.6 26.4  DPP 22.5 17.0
CGP 0.8 0.7  TSU 0.0 — 
SDP 0.8 0.2  PFP — 0.4
JCP 3.2 3.2  NPSU 0.0 — 
All Straight Tickets 69.2 68.5  All Straight Tickets 77.7 68.0
Data source: JESIII, TEDS2008L, TEDS2012- T, Huang (2011), and Yu (2011).
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Comparing with ticket- splitting under the MMP systems in Germany 
and New Zealand, the patterns of split- ticket voting in Japan and in Tai-
wan are not unique. Indeed, the proportion of German ticket- splitters 
has increased from 4.3% in 1953, when the country adopted the MMP 
system, to 22.1% in 1998 (Gschwend, Johnston, and Pattie 2003; Kinge-
mann and Wessels 2001). New Zealand also witnessed 37% of its voters 
splitting their ballots in the country’s irst parliamentary election under 
the MMP rules (Johnston and Pattie 2002; Barker et al. 2001). The extent 
of ticket- splitting in Japan and in Taiwan is thus comparable with that in 
other countries that employ mixed- member electoral systems.
It is important to note that ticket- splitters in both countries tend to 
vote for ideologically proximate candidates. As table 7.2b shows, more than 
75% of CGP and 44% to 60% of SDP supporters in the PR tier, respec-
tively, voted for Japan’s LDP and DPJ candidates in SMD races. About 
90% of the NP’s and 60% to 80% of the TSU’s PR supporters in Taiwan 
tABLE 7.2B. Vote Choices between Pr and SMd Ballots
Japan
2003/2005 SMD Ballot
LDP DPJ CGP SDP JCP n
2003
PR Ballot
LDP 82.7 6.5 2.4 0.5 0.8 660
DPJ 15.2 72.2 0.6 4.1 2.6 532
CGP 76.6 10.2 8.8 0 0.7 137
SDP 18.8 43.8 0 25.0 8.3 48
JCP 8.8 20.6 0 2.9 67.7 68
2005
PR Ballot
LDP 83.5 8.2 3.6 0.2 0.9 563
DPJ 11.6 82.3 0.3 0 1.3 396
CGP 78.8 6.6 6.6 0 1.5 137
SDP 16.7 60.4 0 6.3 12.5 48
JCP 9.7 16.1 0 1.6 64.5 62
Taiwan
2008/2012 SMD Ballot




KMT 89.8 4.3 0 — 2.7 625
DPP 7.2 86.7 0.8 — 0.4 264
NP 90.0 1.7 0 — 1.7 60
TSU 21.9 62.5 0 — 3.1 32
NPSU 33.3 16.7 16.7 — 0 6
2012
PR Ballot
KMT 89.9 6.1 — 0.6 1.4 1,953
DPP 14.3 81.6 — 0.4 0.6 723
NP 89.7 5.1 — 1.3 0 78
PFP 62.3 25.2 — 4.3 1.3 320
TSU 14.2 80.9 — 0.3 0 325
Data source: JESIII, TEDS2008L, TEDS2012- T, Huang (2011), and Yu (2011).
Note: Cells are row percentages; igures are listed for selected political parties.
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cast their SMD ballots for KMT and DPP candidates, respectively. These 
indings indicate that ticket- splitting in Japan and Taiwan tends to occur 
within coalitions rather than across coalitions. Indeed, party identiication 
represents a psychological attachment to a political group and manifests 
individuals’ political ideologies and positions on a host of issues. To be con-
sistent with their partisan loyalty, ticket- splitters thus tend to back those 
within the partisan coalition.
That said, one cannot ignore the fact that there are a signiicant number 
of voters in Japan and Taiwan that split their tickets across coalitions. Table 
7.2b shows that about 6% to 8% of LDP and 12% to 15% of DPJ support-
ers in the PR tier, respectively, voted for DPJ and LDP candidates in SMD 
races. Similarly, 4% to 6% of the KMT’s supporters and 7% to 14% of the 
DPP’s supporters cast their SMD ballots for candidates of the other major 
party. These indings show that strategic thinking is not the only factor 
involved in ticket- splitting. Voters may support a candidate due to personal 
ties or the candidate’s service record to the constituency regardless of his/
her partisan afiliation. The tendency to cast a personal vote is particularly 
strong in Japan and in Taiwan because both countries previously employed 
the single nontransferable vote system for legislative elections, which is 
notoriously characterized by personal ties between candidates and voters. 
The parallel institutional features of the MMM system discussed in chap-
ter 1 also provide incentives for parties to encourage their district candi-
dates to launch more personalistic campaigns (Moser and Scheiner 2004). 
Despite these historical and institutional factors contributing to personal 
votes, the overall voting patterns in both Japan and Taiwan lend support 
for the proposition that partisan identiication is the primary determinant 
of vote choice but electoral institutions mitigate its effect.
Our theoretical expectations are that identiiers with major parties tend 
to cast sincere votes in both SMD and PR segments for their most pre-
ferred candidates and parties. Supporters of minor parties may act strate-
gically by casting a sincere vote in the PR tier but then transferring their 
support to more viable SMD candidates. To test these hypotheses, tables 
7.3a and 7.3b cross- tabulate individual respondents’ PR and SMD votes 
after their partisan loyalty is identiied. The empirical results support the 
above theoretical expectations. Speciically, 56% to 60% of LDP support-
ers and about 66% of DPJ identiiers in both the 2003 and 2005 elections 
cast straight tickets for their preferred parties and the afiliated candidates, 
whereas 59% to 67% of CGP supporters and 23% to 30% of SDP identi-
iers were ticket- splitters. While supporters of major parties in Japan had 
a greater tendency to cast straight tickets, identiiers with minor parties 
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are more likely to vote sincerely in the PR tier for their most preferred 
parties but back more viable SMD candidates of the major party of the 
same political coalition. Apparently, the psychological effects discussed by 
Duverger were in operation in the mind of Japanese voters.
The analysis of TEDS data yields similar indings in Taiwan. Because 
both the NP and PFP— two minor parties of the Pan- Blue alliance— 
entered a preelectoral pact with the KMT in the 2008 elections, and thus 
they either did not nominate any candidates in district races or had their 
candidates run under the KMT banner. While almost all of the NP identi-
iers continued to be nonopportunity voters in the 2012 election and split 
their tickets in the PR and SMD tiers, some of the PFP identiiers had the 
opportunity to be straight- ticket voters as the PFP nominated 10 candi-
dates in district races. Nevertheless, 35% and 15% of PFP identiiers in 
tABLE 7.3A. Vote Choices between Pr and SMd Ballots by Party Identiication in Japan
Voter’s  
party ID PR vote
2003 SMD vote 2005 SMD vote
LDP DPJ CGP SDP JCP LDP DPJ CGP SDP JCP
LDP LDP 56.0 3.8 1.7 0.2 0.4 60.2 4.3 2.2 0.2 0.5
DPJ 5.2 11.7 0.1 0.5 0.4 4.5 8.5
CGP 5.5 0.2 0.4 0.1 6.8 0.5 0.3 0.2
SDP 0.4 0.6 0.3
JCP 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.2
CGP LDP 3.5 3.9 1.3
DPJ 1.1 2.3 1.2 5.1
CGP 59.3 9.3 8.1 66.7 6.4 7.7
SDP
JCP 1.2
DPJ LDP 3.9 1.8 0.3 7.5 2.8 0.9 0.3
DPJ 7.7 65.8 0.3 3.9 1.2 4.4 66.9 0.3
CGP 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.3
SDP 0.3 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.6 4.1 0.3 0.3
JCP 0.3 1.2 0.3 1.2 1.3 0.3 0.9
SDP LDP 3.9 1.9 6.1 3.0
DPJ 3.9 19.2 1.9 1.9 27.3 3.0
CGP 1.9
SDP 7.7 23.1 11.5 1.9 3.0 30.3 6.1 6.1
JCP 1.9 3.9 6.1
JCP LDP 3.5 1.8 7.4 1.9
DPJ 1.8 15.8 3.5 11.1 1.9
CGP 1.8
SDP 1.9 5.6
 JCP 1.8 5.3  1.8 56.1  3.7   48.2
Data source: JESIII.
Note: Figures given in the cells are total percentages. Percentages are presented only for selected political par-
ties, thus the sum of percentages does not equal 100%.
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2012 decided to cross the party line and supported KMT and DPP can-
didates in SMD races, respectively. As in Japan, the psychological effect 
appeared to be in place at least in some of the PFP identiiers.
Probably the most instructive inding is the voting patterns of TSU 
identiiers. Recall that Pan- Green parties failed to reach a preelectoral 
pact ahead of the 2008 elections. As a result, the TSU ielded a number 
of SMD candidates with a complete PR list to compete with the DPP for 
the support of Pan- Green identiiers. The electoral outcome in 2008 was 
disastrous for the party as it did not win any district race and failed to pass 
the 5% threshold in the PR tier. Recognizing the mistake they made, TSU 
leaders decided to collaborate with the DPP in the 2012 elections. This 
tABLE 7.3B. Vote Choices between Pr and SMd Ballots by Party Identiication in 
taiwan
Voter’s  
party ID PR vote
2008 SMD vote 2012 SMD vote
KMT DPP TSU KMT DPP PFP
KMT KMT 82.2 3.6 78.6 3.9 0.5
DPP 0.4 0.8 1.0 2.1
NP 4.1 0.2 2.5 0.1 0.1
PFP — — — 4.5 1.0 0.1
 TSU  0.2  0.4 0.6  
NP KMT 28.6 52.1 2.1
DPP
NP 50.0 25.0 4.2
PFP — — — 2.1 2.1
 TSU  3.6   2.1  
PFP KMT 50.0 6.3 14.3 1.4
DPP 0.7 3.4
NP 18.8 2.0
PFP — — — 34.7 15.0 6.1
 TSU 6.3   2.0 6.1  
DPP KMT 3.1 0.9 5.3 1.9 0.1
DPP 3.1 82.5 0.5 5.8 52.7 0.2
NP 0.5 0.2
PFP — — — 1.7 2.3
 TSU  2.2  2.7 20.1 0.1
TSU KMT 17.4 4.4
DPP 21.7 6.7 28.9
NP
PFP — — — 4.4
 TSU 13.0 17.4  8.9 46.7  
Data source: TEDS2008L, TEDS2012- T, Huang (2011), and Yu (2011).
Note: Figures given in the cells are total percentages. Percentages are presented only for selected politi-
cal parties, thus the sum of percentages does not equal 100%.
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strategy appeared to be working for the TSU. By not competing with an 
ideologically proximate major party in district races, the TSU successfully 
consolidated the party votes from its own followers. Interestingly, the TSU 
leaders’ call on Pan- Green identiiers to support DPP candidates in SMD 
races but back the TSU in the PR also drew 20% of the DPP identiiers 
who transferred their party votes to the TSU. Party elites’ explicit mes-
sage of encouraging such ticket- split voting may be responsible for DPP 
identiiers’ support for the TSU in the PR tier. Taiwan’s single national 5% 
threshold also makes this type of strategic voting likely by comparison as 
voters can more easily igure out if a small party is close to the threshold.10 
As a result, the TSU garnered about 9% of the party vote and received 
three seats in the PR tier.
As shown in table 7.3b, 29% of TSU identiiers cast a straight party 
vote for the DPP in the 2012 election. Unlike other minor party iden-
tiiers who split their ballots by casting sincere PR votes for their most 
preferred parties but voting for viable candidates in the district races, the 
psychological effect appeared to be in full swing here. Close to one- third 
of TSU identiiers worried that their votes would be wasted in the SMD 
as well as in the PR tiers if they supported a minor party. These voters’ 
strategic calculation was probably due to the 5% legal threshold of Tai-
wan’s PR segment. The TSU’s disastrous outcome in 2008 might have also 
reinforced the Duvergerian gravity in both SMD and PR segments of the 
2012 elections. Similarly, the same logic seems applicable to NP identiiers 
because more than half of them cast a straight party vote for the KMT in 
the 2012 election while only 25% of NP identiiers split their ballots and 
cast a sincere vote in the PR tier. The voting patterns of TSU and NP iden-
tiiers lend additional support for the hypothesis that the effect of partisan 
identiication on electoral choice may be moderated by the institutional 
framework of MMM systems. More important, such a mitigation effect is 
more apparent to identiiers of minor parties than to those of major parties.
That said, it is important to note that some citizens in Japan’s and in 
Taiwan’s legislative elections were nonopportunity voters. As table 7.4 
shows, almost all of the political parties in the two countries’ elections pre-
sented a party list to compete in the PR tier. None of them, however, made 
nominations in all district races, except the JCP in Japan’s 2003 election. 
The lack of district candidates was particularly acute for such minor parties 
as the CGP and the SDP in Japan and the NP, the PFP, the NPSU, and the 
TSU in Taiwan. While all voters in mixed- member electoral systems have 
the option of ticket- splitting, voters in these districts were forced to do so 
because their most preferred party failed to provide a choice on both PR 
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and SMD ballots. To avoid overestimating ticket- splitting, a proper analy-
sis of electoral behavior in Japan and in Taiwan thus requires attention to 
the voting patterns of these nonopportunity voters.
In general, the above analysis shows that 20% to 30% of voters split 
their tickets in the respective elections in Japan and in Taiwan. The voting 
patterns in both countries seem to be consistent with the theoretical expec-
tations that partisan identiication continues to be the primary determinant 
of vote choice in MMM systems but the electoral institutions mitigate its 
effect. Thus, identiiers of major political parties tend to cast straight tick-
ets while supporters for minor parties are likely to be sincere in their PR 
votes but vote for viable candidates in SMD races. When they cross the 
party line and vote for candidates of different political afiliations, split- 
ticket voting in both countries tends to occur within coalitions rather than 
across coalitions. As political parties may coordinate their campaign strate-
gies, voters’ ticket- splitting may be further induced by such preelectoral 
pacts. Because some of these ticket- splitters were nonopportunity voters 
due to a lack of SMD nominations of preferred political parties, a multi-
variate analysis of JES III and TEDS survey data is in order to ensure that 
the above indings are not spurious.
Data and Methods
To conduct the multivariate analyses, the dependent variable, Vote Choice, is 
created based on voters’ responses if they cast a straight- ticket or split their 
ballots in the elections. Due to the different political landscapes of Japan 
and Taiwan, the variable is coded with different labels but each has ive 
tABLE 7.4. “nonopportunity” Voters: number of districts with a Party nominee
Japan Taiwan
2003 2005 2008 2012
 SMD PR SMD PR  SMD PR SMD PR
LDP 277 11 290 11 KMT 69 Yes 69 Yes
CGP 10 11 9 11 NP 0 Yes 1 Yes
DPJ 267 11 289 11 PFP 1 No 10 Yes
SDP 61 11 37 11 NPSU 5 Yes 2 No
JCP 300 11 273 11 DPP 69 Yes 69 Yes
     TSU 13 Yes 0 Yes
Data source: Central Election Commission, Taiwan; Elections and Citizen Participation website: http://
www.asianelections.org/cubekmcht/ezcatiles/cust/img/img/144/196798271.pdf; http://www.asianelec 
tions.org/cubekmcht/ezcatiles/cust/img/img/144/467755124.pdf.
Note: Japan has 300 SMDs and 11 PR districts. Taiwan has 73 SMDs and one PR district.
 Split-Ticket Voting under MMM 209
categories. Because the Japanese political system can be roughly character-
ized as “governing coalition vs. opposition coalition,” citizens’ vote choices 
in Japan include (1) governing coalition straight- ticket, (2) opposition 
coalition straight- ticket, (3) governing coalition split- ticket, (4) opposi-
tion coalition split- ticket, and (5) other forms of split- ticket voting.11 To be 
consistent with Taiwan’s “Pan- Blue vs. Pan- Green” political landscape, the 
categories of the island citizens’ vote choice consist of (1) Pan- Blue alliance 
straight- ticket, (2) Pan- Green alliance straight- ticket, (3) Pan- Blue alliance 
split- ticket, (4) Pan- Green alliance split- ticket, and (5) other forms of split- 
ticket voting. Table 7.5 presents the frequency distributions of each voting 
type in Japan and in Taiwan, respectively. As indicated earlier, the voting 
behavior of Japanese citizens appears to be more stable because there are 
few variations in the distributions of various vote choices. Taiwanese citi-
zens’ voting patterns appear to be more volatile as there is a 10% shift from 
straight- ticket to split- ticket voting. Such changes are particularly visible 
in the support for the Pan- Green alliance, which, as indicated earlier, was 
attributed to the coordinated electoral campaigns of the DPP and the TSU.
While data from Japan and Taiwan are analyzed separately, several 
common independent variables are created so that cross- country compari-
sons can be made. Because partisan attachment is considered the primary 
determinant of an individual’s vote choice, a series of dummy variables of 
respondents’ party identiications are created separately for each country. 
To assess Japanese citizens’ partisan loyalties, the following variables are 
coded with 1s for respondents in the relevant categories and otherwise with 
0s for nonpartisan voters as the baseline group: Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP), Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), Clean Government Party (CGP), 
Social Democratic Party (SDP), and Japanese Communist Party (JCP). Corre-
sponding variables of Taiwanese citizens’ party identiication are National-
tABLE 7.5. distribution of Citizens’ Vote Choices typologies
Japan Taiwan
 2003 2005  2008 2012
Governing straight 38.6 38.8 Pan- Blue straight 55.3 51.0
Opposition straight 30.6 29.9 Pan- Green straight 22.6 17.0
Governing split 9.3 10.4 Pan- Blue split 7.3 8.7
Opposition split 5.3 5.3 Pan- Green split 2.2 7.6
Other split 16.2 15.8 Other split 12.6 15.7
Total (n) 1,445 1,236 Total (n) 1,014 3,466
Data source: JESIII, TEDS2008L, TEDS2012- T, Huang (2011), and Yu (2011).
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ist Party (KMT), Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), New Party (NP), People 
First Party (PFP), and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU).
As indicated earlier, not all political parties in Japan’s and in Taiwan’s 
past legislative elections nominated candidates competing for SMD seats. 
Voters in such districts where their most preferred parties did not nomi-
nate candidates would not even have the opportunity to cast straight tick-
ets. In Taiwan’s 2008 legislative elections, for instance, the DPP did not 
nominate candidates in four districts while the TSU did not do so in 60. 
In Taiwan’s 2012 legislative elections, the TSU did not ield any candidates 
in district races. Similarly, in Japan’s 2003 and 2005 elections the LDP 
coordinated its nominations with the CGP and did not make nominations 
in those districts where the CGP candidates ran. The DPJ and the SDP 
also coordinated their nominations in some SMDs lest they compete with 
each other. The only political party that did not enter into electoral pacts 
with other parties was the JCP as its candidates ran in all 300 SMDs in the 
2003 elections and in 273 SMDs in 2005. To avoid overestimating ticket- 
splitting, three dummy variables are incorporated to control the effect of 
“nonopportunity” supporters in Japan: nomination for DPJ, nomination for 
LDP, and nomination for SDP. Similarly, three corresponding dummy vari-
ables are included to control the effect of “nonopportunity” supporters in 
Taiwan: nomination for KMT, nomination for DPP, nomination for TSU, and 
nomination for PFP.12 These dummy variables are coded as 1s if the relevant 
political parties nominated candidates in the SMDs and 0s if the parties did 
not ield candidates.
Several demographic factors are included as control variables. Previous 
studies ind that education increases an individual’s ability to understand 
abstract and intangible subjects like politics. Such abilities heighten indi-
viduals’ interest in politics, equip them with better knowledge of demo-
cratic norms and procedures, give them greater skills in working with com-
plex rules, and offer them the capacity of identifying local and national 
leaders (Huang, Yu, and Hsiao 2011; Karp et al. 2002; Nie, Junn, and 
Stehlik- Barry 1996; Wolinger and Rosenstone 1980). Well- educated vot-
ers are more likely to possess the political awareness and ability to under-
stand the institutional design of MMM systems and the strategic payoffs 
of each menu choice in the PR and the SMD tiers. They are more likely to 
split their votes for candidates of different political afiliations due to their 
political sophistication. To tap respondents’ education attainment, the fol-
lowing dummy variables are included: university degree (and above), junior 
college degree, and senior high school degree. They are coded as 1s for those 
who are in the relevant category and 0s otherwise, with respondents having 
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a junior high school degree and below as the reference group. To control 
the effects of gender and age, two variables are created: Male is a dichoto-
mous variable, which is coded as 1 according to respondents’ gender, and 
Age is measured by the number of years since birth.
Because the dependent variable, Vote Choice, has ive nonordered cate-
gories, a multinomial logit model is used (Glasgow and Alvarez 2008; Long 
1997; Long and Freese 2006). Speciically, the regression model takes the 
form of












= β for m = 1 to J – 1,
where b is the base category for comparison; lnΩ
m|b
(x) is the conditional 
odds of having other responses relative to the base category; x is a vector of 
independent variables; β is a vector of regression parameters; and J is the 
number of categories in the dependent variable.
Multivariate Analysis of Split- Ticket Voting  
in Japan and Taiwan
Using “governing coalition straight- ticket” and “Pan- Blue alliance 
straight- ticket,” respectively, as the baseline for comparison in analyzing 
Japanese and Taiwanese citizens’ voting behavior, the variable of Vote Choice 
is regressed on the aforementioned independent variables in a multivariate 
context. The results in tables 7.6a to 7.6d show that most coeficients asso-
ciated with partisan identiication, especially those of major political parties 
(the LDP and DPJ in Japan and KMT and DPP in Taiwan), are statistically 
signiicant. These indings show that partisan loyalty is the most important 
factor in determining citizens’ electoral choice in both Japan and Taiwan 
even after the effects of nonopportunity voters and citizens’ demographic 
characteristics are controlled for. Most important, data in the tables con-
irm the previous inding that identiiers of major parties are more likely to 
cast sincere straight- tickets whereas those of minor parties tend to engage 
in ticket- splitting voting within their respective coalitions/alliances. To 
illustrate, table 7.7 presents the predicted probabilities for Japanese and 
Taiwanese voters, respectively, with selected conditions. As table 7.7 shows, 
an average LDP or DPJ male identiier’s predicted probabilities of casting 
a straight- ticket for candidates of his own coalition are between 0.7 and 
0.8 when his most preferred party ielded SMD candidates in the 2003 and 
2005 elections. The likelihood for this voter to split the ticket was rather 
small with a probability of less than 0.1. However, an identiier of minor 
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political parties like the CGP and SDP has a higher tendency of splitting 
the ticket within the coalition, with a probability between 0.3 and 0.7 in 
both elections with or without SMD nominations by his most preferred 
parties.
Table 7.7 reveals a similar voting pattern in Taiwan, and it is instructive 
regarding the effects of preelectoral pacts among political parties. First, 
like Japanese voters, an average male KMT or DPP identiier in the 2008 
elections had a rather high probability (about 0.85) of casting a straight- 
ticket but a miniscule likelihood of splitting his ballots when the most pre-
ferred parties had candidates in district races. Identiiers of minor parties 
like the NP, which engaged in a preelectoral pact, or the PFP, which had its 
candidates run under the KMT banner, had higher probabilities of either 
splitting the ticket within the alliance or casting a Pan- Blue straight- ticket. 
Parties of the Pan- Green alliance did not coordinate their campaigns in 
2008 and TSU identiiers apparently had a dificult time making a decision 
as their predicted probabilities of voting were evenly spread across various 
options. In the 2012 elections, the PFP dropped out of the Pan- Blue pact 
and PFP identiiers, like their CGP and SDP counterparts in Japan, had 
a higher probability of splitting the ticket with or without SMD nomina-
tions by the party as the majority of them cast their SMD ballots for KMT 
candidates. Probably due to the coordinated campaign by the Pan- Green 
alliance in 2012, an average TSU identiier had a higher probability of 
splitting the ticket and voting for the TSU in the PR tier and for DPP 
candidates in district races. For the same reason, an average DPP supporter 
had a lower likelihood of casting a Pan- Green straight- ticket in 2012 than 
in 2008 as they split their support for DPP district candidates and for the 
TSU in the PR tier. Along with the indings in table 7.3b, the empirical 
evidence thus shows that the coordinated campaign strategy in the 2012 
elections by the Pan- Green alliance consolidated TSU identiiers’ support 
in the PR tier and also drew party votes from DPP supporters. Apparently, 
voters’ ticket- splitting behavior can be further induced by the campaign 
strategies of political parties.
Conclusions
Characterized as hybrids that combine both PR and SMD rules, mixed- 
member systems have been adopted in many countries during the past two 
decades. Because the institutional arrangements of such electoral systems 





tABLE 7.7. Predicted Probability of Vote Choice for a Male Voter with “Average” Characteristics
Japan 2003 2005
Voter’s party ID LDP DPJ CGP SDP JCP LDP DPJ CGP SDP JCP
SMD nomination yes no yes no na yes no yes yes no yes no na yes no na
Governing straight .682 .227 .044 .099 .160 .045 .031 .056 .695 .308 .092 .086 .227 .101 .078 .078
Opposition straight .157 .259 .839 .291 .034 .478 .063 .840 .090 .085 .736 .217 .050 .546 .126 .732
Governing split .090 .323 .003 .006 .742 .063 .038 .000 .046 .262 .008 .000 .581 .000 .000 .000
Opposition split .012 .035 .063 .348 .022 .341 .482 .081 .008 .010 .038 .056 .000 .278 .507 .107
Other Type split .060 .156 .052 .256 .043 .073 .386 .023 .161 .335 .126 .642 .142 .075 .289 .083
Taiwan 2008 2012
Voter’s party ID KMT DPP NP PFP TSU KMT DPP NP PFP TSU
SMD nomination yes no yes no no no yes no yes no yes no no yes no no
Pan- Blue straight .856 .000 .023 .144 .296 .535 .172 .192 .810 .000 .071 .188 .542 .218 .199 .061
Pan- Green straight .093 .037 .876 .000 .000 .000 .257 .211 .016 .021 .590 .000 .000 .028 .035 .309
Pan- Blue split .052 .559 .003 .016 .562 .224 .000 .000 .091 .806 .029 .130 .305 .448 .368 .000
Pan- Green split .003 .012 .033 .120 .054 .000 .236 .164 .004 .000 .186 .000 .015 .043 .070 .392
Other Type Split .079 .392 .065 .721 .089 .241 .335 .433 .080 .174 .195 .682 .138 .263 .329 .238
Note: The “na” of SMD nomination means this variable is not controlled in multinomial logit model.
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different political afiliations, there is considerable scholarly interest in the 
degree and nature of ticket- splitting in such systems. The electoral reforms 
adopted in recent years by Japan and Taiwan provide an opportunity to 
examine electoral behavior in mixed- member systems.
This study hypothesizes that partisan identiication remains the pri-
mary determinant of citizens’ voting behavior in both countries but the 
effect of partisan loyalty is mitigated by the institutional design of the new 
electoral rules. The empirical evidence of this study supports this hypoth-
esis. The mechanical and psychological effects characterized by Duverger 
have important effects on citizens’ electoral behavior in both Japan and 
Taiwan. While supporters of major political parties tend to cast sincere 
straight- tickets, identiiers of minor political parties have a higher likeli-
hood of becoming ticket- splitters with the worry that their votes for trail-
ing candidates may be wasted. To be consistent with partisan loyalty, iden-
tiiers of minor parties tend to be sincere in their PR votes but back viable 
district candidates of major parties. Their defections in the SMD tier are 
generally limited to candidates of the same coalitions/alliances. Thus, par-
tisan loyalty continues to exert an important impact on electoral choice in 
mixed- member systems, but the institutional design of the electoral sys-
tems still matters. The fact that consistent indings are identiied across 
four legislative elections in two different countries suggests the robustness 
of these conclusions.
Moreover, the above indings show that the rules applying to the PR or 
the SMD tier do indeed shape the results in that tier. The effects of each set 
of rules, however, can be manipulated through the party elites’ campaign 
strategies in one or both tiers. Through coordinated nominations and cam-
paigns, parties of similar political positions can provide a clear voting cue 
to their supporters lest they compete with each other and divide the pool 
of support. The net effects are that political coalitions/alliances may maxi-
mize their collective seat shares and provide minor parties with a chance 
of survival in an otherwise rather competitive environment. Coordinated 
campaigns by party elites thus may generate another form of “contamina-
tion or “interaction” effect. Though mixed- members systems are hybrids 
of two sets of rules, they are more than the sum of their two parts. As a 
result, MMM systems are internally distinct in that they are characterized 
by sets of incentives different from the pure forms of PR and SMD.
n o t e S
 1. For a detailed discussion of mixed- member systems and the new electoral 
systems in Japan and in Taiwan, see chapter 1 by Huang, Kuo, and Stockton.
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 2. The survey data of the 2008 Legislative Yuan elections in this paper are 
from “Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study, 2008: Legislative Election 
(TEDS2008L) (NSC 96- 2420- H004- 002- 025). The coordinator of the multiyear 
project TEDS is Professor Chi Huang of National Chengchi University in Taipei. 
The TEDS2008L project focuses speciically on the 2008 legislative elections in 
Taiwan, and its principal investigator is Professor Yun- han Chu of Academia Sinica. 
More information on TEDS projects can be accessed at http://www.tedsnet.org.
 3. The three datasets, which are composed of pre- 2012 election rolling surveys, 
include (1) “Taiwan Election and Democratization Study: Telephone Interview of 
the Presidential and Legislative Elections, 2012” (TEDS2012- T) (NSC100- 2420- 
H- 002- 030). The principal investigator of TEDS2012- T is Professor Chi Huang; 
(2) “Causal Inference: Methodology and Application to the Study of Contamina-
tion Effect in Mixed- Member Electoral Systems (2/3)” (NSC99- 2410- H- 004- 
036- MY3). The principal investigator is Professor Chi Huang (hereafter Huang 
2011); (3) “Citizen’s Knowledge of New Legislative Electoral System in Taiwan” 
(NSC100- 2410- H- 004- 090- MY2). The principal investigator is Professor Ching- 
hsin Yu (hereafter Yu 2011).
 4. The Japan Election Studies III Research Project (Participants: Ken’ichi Ikeda, 
University of Tokyo; Yoshiaki Kobayashi, Keio University; and Hiroshi Hirano, 
Gakushuin University) is a part of “The Nationwide Chronological Studies on Vot-
ing Behaviors in the Early 21st Century” supported by Grants- in- Aid for Scientiic 
Research 2002– 2006 from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and 
Technology of Japan. More information on JES projects can be accessed at http://
www.coe-ccc.keio.ac.jp/data_archive_en/data_archive_jesIII.html. The authors 
thank the aforementioned institutions and individuals for making the data avail-
able, but the authors alone are responsible for the views expressed herein.
 5. It is important to note that ticket- splitting voting and strategic voting are 
two different concepts. Strategic voting arises when voters adjust their vote choices 
based on the considerations that their most preferred candidate is not viable and 
their votes are likely to be wasted. Thus, strategic voting can occur in the pure 
SMD system in which voters are offered only one ballot. In mixed electoral sys-
tems, the psychological effect of the “wasted vote” may also lead to such strategic 
considerations leading to ticket- splitting.
 6. Other studies have disputed the indings on the “contamination effect.” It is 
argued that parties tend to nominate candidates in districts where they have strong 
support. For instance, Maeda (2008) employs a treatment- effects model and inds 
that ielding SMD candidates does not help a party to receive additional PR votes. 
We have no intention to settle the dispute since there are no available data to test 
the relevant hypothesis but instead to examine the effects of electoral coordination 
on voters’ electoral choice.
 7. As it will be explained below, Taiwan’s KMT entered an electoral pact with 
the People First Party (PFP) and the New Party (NP) in 2008. However, the PFP 
dropped out of the pact ahead of the 2012 elections. See also Nemoto and Tsai, 
chapter 6, this volume.
 8. The Japanese political landscape has undergone further changes since the 
2005 elections as the ruling LDP coalition has started losing hold. The then oppo-
sition DPJ won a smashing victory in the 2009 election and organized a coalition 
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government with the SDP and the People’s New Party (Nihon Shinto). Hampered 
by the issue of Futenma U.S. Marine Base in Okinawa, a sluggish economy, a series 
of scandals, and perceived incompetence in dealing with the Fukushima nuclear 
disaster, the approval rating of the DPJ ruling coalition has slid since 2009. In the 
2012 elections, Japanese voters returned governing power to the LDP, which won 
294 of the 480 seats— arguably the biggest electoral victory ever for the party. The 
LDP soon formed a coalition government with its long- time political partner— the 
CGP— that has yielded a 320- seat veto- proof “supermajority” in Japan’s House of 
Representatives (Pekkanen 2012; Rosenbluth 2012).
 9. “Nonopportunity voters” are also characterized as “frustrated voters” because 
they are forced to split their ticket due to the failure of their most preferred party 
to offer a choice on both PR as well as SMD ballots (Benoit, Giannetti, and Laver 
2006).
 10. In Japan, since each regional PR bloc has a different number of seats and thus 
a different implied threshold (see chapter 1), voters have a much more dificult task 
in trying to igure out which parties are at the point of winning.
 11. The JCP is categorized as a member of the opposition coalition in this study 
because it has never been in any ruling coalition and its political position is closer to 
that of the DPJ and the SDP. Thus, when both SMD and PR ballots were cast for 
the JCP, the coding is “opposition coalition straight- ticket.” An “opposition coali-
tion split- ticket” is registered if a voter cast one ballot for the JCP and the other 
ballot for the DPJ or the SDP, while an “other forms of split- ticket voting” is coded 
if one ballot was for the JCP and the other ballot for parties other than the DPJ and 
the SDP.
 12. Note that there is no dummy variable for CGP nomination because the CGP 
and the LDP coordinated their nominations in both elections. In no district did 
the LDP and the CGP both nominate candidates in SMD races in 2003 and 2005. 
Adding a dummy variable for CGP nomination will thus cause multicollinearity. 
The lack of a dummy variable to register the PFP nomination in Taiwan’s 2008 
elections is due to the fact that the PFP only made one SMD nomination in Lien-
chiang, a district that the TEDS did not cover.
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thailand and the Philippines under MMM
Allen Hicken
This volume centers on the puzzle arising from the cases of Taiwan and 
Japan. The two have used very similar electoral systems that nonetheless 
produce very different outcomes— particularly in relation to the number 
of political parties. In their introduction Batto and Cox build on exist-
ing theory to argue that the reason the Taiwan and Japanese cases may 
seem puzzling is that, essentially, we have been looking in the wrong place. 
Scholars have focused overly much on the effects of electoral systems at the 
constituency level and the competition for legislative seats. While this type 
of competition is a crucial determinant of a country’s party system, it is not 
the only determinant— nor is it necessarily the most important one. The 
electoral system gives us clues about the incentives of candidates, voters, 
and parties to coordinate within a given electoral system, but it tells us little 
about the incentives of these groups to coordinate across districts to form 
a modest number of large, national parties. These cross- district coordina-
tion incentives are shaped by assessments of the value of, and competition 
for, executive ofice (Cox 1997; Hicken 2009). The potential reward for 
forming a large national party to compete for the executive relects the 
power the executive wields vis- à- vis subnational governments (Chhibber 
and Kollman 2004), the concentration of power within national level polit-
ical institutions (e.g., the power of the president vis- à- vis the legislature) 
(Hicken 2009; Hicken and Stoll 2011, 2013), and the chance that the larg-
est legislative party will be able to capture executive power (Hicken 2009).1
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Drawing on these executive- centric theories Batto and Cox argue that 
the differences in the nature of competition for executive ofice in presi-
dential Taiwan versus parliamentary Japan account for differences in the 
number of parties under similar electoral systems. Competition for the 
presidency in Taiwan travels down the ticket and drives party competi-
tion toward two large parties allied with the two presidential front- runners 
(see also Hicken and Stoll 2011). By contrast, the indirect selection of the 
prime minister and cabinet in Japan, combined with the speciic norms 
about which legislative parties are able to form the government, under-
mine incentives for bipartism.
Given this argument the cases of Thailand and the Philippines appear 
to present us with an additional puzzle. Both countries have adopted 
mixed- member systems similar to those found in Japan and Taiwan. And 
yet it is parliamentary Thailand that has moved closest to a two- party 
system, while the party system in presidential Philippines remains highly 
fragmented. In remainder of this chapter I explain this variation using an 
executive- centric approach, but I draw on elements of this approach that 
focus as much on the differences within regime types as between them. In 
the next section I briely review the legislative and executive institutions in 
Thailand and the Philippines, focusing on the adoption of mixed- member 
systems in 1997 and 1987, respectively. I then compare each case to its 
East Asian counterpart, focusing on why presidential institutions produce 
two parties in Taiwan but many in Philippines, and why the parliamentary 
systems of Thailand and Japan consolidated at different rates after reform.
Legislative and Executive Systems
Thailand is a parliamentary system.2 For most of its history the parliament 
has consisted of two chambers, the House of Representatives and the Sen-
ate. Prior to 1997 the Senate was a fully appointed body. Between 1997 and 
2007 the Senate was directly elected, and since 2007 half of senators are 
elected and the other half appointed.3 Thailand has used two basic sets of 
electoral systems for electing the House of Representatives. Prior to 1997 
the vast majority of Thailand’s prereform elections for the House of Repre-
sentatives used the block vote electoral system. This relatively uncommon 
electoral system combines multiseat constituencies with multiple votes and 
the plurality rule. In the Thai case the country’s 76 provinces were divided 
into 142– 156 electoral constituencies, almost all containing two or three 
seats. Voters in each constituency could cast as many separate votes as there 
were seats in that constituency (e.g., two votes in a two- seat constituency, 
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three votes in a three- seat constituency). Voters cast their votes for individ-
ual candidates (not parties) and were allowed to split their votes between 
candidates from different parties and to partially abstain (i.e., not cast all 
of their votes). However, they were prohibited from cumulating multiple 
votes on a single candidate. Political parties wishing to contest a constitu-
ency were required to ield a full team of candidates (e.g., three candidates 
in a three- seat constituency).
The 1997 constitution dramatically overhauled Thailand’s electoral 
system for the House. The block vote system was replaced by a mixed- 
member majority system with 400 seats elected from single- seat constitu-
encies via the plurality rule and 100 seats elected from a single nationwide 
constituency via proportional representation. Voters cast two separate 
votes— one for a candidate in their single- seat constituency, and one for a 
party for the national list tier. Neither the votes nor seat allocation between 
the tiers were linked in any way and, unlike in Japan, candidates had to 
choose between running in the constituency or running on the party list— 
they could not do both. Parties who received fewer than 5% of the party 
list votes received no list tier seats.
In 2006 the military launched a coup against the government of Thak-
sin Shinawatra and subsequently crafted a constitution (adopted in 2007) 
designed to undermine the capacity of future political parties and elected 
leaders to challenge Thailand’s conservative forces (Hicken 2007, 2013). 
First, the single- seat electoral constituencies were replaced with the old 
multiseat, block vote system. Second, the single national party list elec-
tion was scrapped and replaced with eight regional party lists, with parties 
allowed to run in just some of the lists. The consequence of this reform 
was that the party list campaign no longer served as a national referendum 
on each party’s platform and prospective prime minister since each region 
voted on a separate slate of party list candidates, and potentially, a different 
set of parties.4
In 2011 the electoral system was once again amended back to a more 
standard mixed- member system, with 375 single- seat constituencies and 
125 seats illed via PR party list elections in a single nationwide district.
The Philippines uses a presidential system with a directly elected presi-
dent, and two legislative chambers: the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, both directly elected.5 During the premartial law period (1946– 72) 
the House was elected from single- seat districts. After the fall of Marcos in 
1986 a new constitution was passed that included provisions for an unusual 
mixed- member system. However, while the provision for a mixed- member 
majority system was included in the 1987 Constitution a law fully imple-
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menting the measure was not passed until 1995 and not used in an election 
until 1998. In the Philippines MM system the party list seats make up to 
20% of the total House and are allocated using proportional representa-
tion. Both political parties and sectoral organizations can compete for the 
seats, save the ive largest parties from the previous election, which are 
barred from competing. To obtain a seat parties (or sectoral organizations) 
must receive at least 2% of the PR votes. For every 2% of the vote a party 
is awarded a seat, with an upper limit of three seats in the list tier (Hicken 
and Kasuya 2003). The remainder of the House seats are illed from single- 
seat districts.
Explaining Variation
In both Thailand and the Philippines legislative- centric explanations fail to 
fully account for the size of the legislative party system and variation over 
time. That is not to say that legislative- centric explanations have no power. 
Quite the contrary. The average effective number of parties competing at 
the district level in both countries is about what we would expect given the 
electoral system (table 8.1). Changes in average district magnitude corre-
spond to the expected changes in the average effective number of parties 
in each constituency, though the changes over time are rather modest. But 
this is only a small part of the story. The local- level party system in the 
Philippines, for example, increased by less than .2 parties between the pre- 
and post– martial law periods, from 2.0 to 2.2. At the same time the national 
party system nearly doubled in size, from 2.3 to 4.3 parties. In Thailand the 
party electoral reforms lowers the constituency- level party system from 
3.2 to 2.3, but we see an even greater decline in the number of parties 
nationally, from 7.2 to 3.2. In short, in both countries the number of parties 
nationally has often departed quite dramatically from the number of par-




Elsewhere I have argued that the dramatic decline in the number of parties 
nationally in Thailand primarily relects stronger incentives for voters, par-
ties, and candidates to coordinate across districts in a bid to capture execu-
tive power (Hicken 2009). (Cross- district coordination is also referred to as 
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nationalization, linkage, and aggregation in the literature). Those national-
ization incentives are a function of (a) the payoff to being the largest party 
at the national level (the size of the prize) and (b) the odds that the largest 
party will capture that payoff. In pre- 1997 Thailand an appointed Senate, 
factionalized parties, and reserve domains combined to limit the size of the 
potential nationalization payoff. The practice of selecting someone other 
than the leader of the largest party as premier for much of the period also 
reduced the expected utility of nationalization.
Leaders of the largest party in pre- 1997 Thailand faced signiicant 
checks on their power, which reduced the perceived payoff to coordina-
tion and nationalization. Speciically, the presence of bicameralism, reserve 
domains, and party factionalism all reduced the size of the nationalization 
payoff (Hicken 2009). First, Thailand’s Senate reduced the potential payoff 
to large parties in the House. Strictly speaking the Senate was not a formal 
veto gate, possessing only delaying power. However, while the Senate did 
not have the formal power to block legislation, it was nonetheless dificult 
for elected governments to ignore the interests of the Senate. Until 1997 
the Senate was an appointed body. During the 1980s these appointees were 
generally former military oficials and bureaucrats. Representing as it did 
the interests of Thailand’s conservative forces— who had a long history of 
intervening to shut down democratic institutions— the Senate’s position on 
a matter carried a good deal of weight. This was especially true when the 
senators were relatively united on an issue. In effect the Senate functioned 
as a reserve domain. The existence of an unelected Senate stocked with 
representatives of the military and bureaucracy meant that the parties that 
controlled the House and cabinet still did not hold all the reins of power.
Throughout much of the 1980s another piece of executive power was 
off- limits to party leaders— macroeconomic and budgetary policy. This 
reserve domain emerged as the result of a compromise between elected 
politicians, Thailand’s conservative forces, and Prime Minister (and former 
tABLE 8.1. district Magnitude and Effective number of Parties
 
District magnitude 
(for lower tier in 
MMS)
Average effective 
number of parties / 
constituency
Effective number of 
electoral parties
Philippines (1946– 69) 1 2.0 2.3
Philippines (1987– 2010) 1 2.2 4.3
Thailand (1986– 97) 2– 3 3.2 7.2
Thailand (1997– 2006) 1 2.3 3.2
Thailand (2007) 2– 3 2.9 4.1
Thailand (2011) 1 2.2 2.8
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general) Prem Tinsulanonda.6 As part of this “pork- policy compromise” 
macroeconomic and budgetary policy was shielded from elected politi-
cians and run by Prem- backed technocrats. In exchange, the political par-
ties were given control of the sectoral ministries (e.g., Commerce, Industry, 
Education, Agriculture) and were allowed to run them as they saw it pro-
vided they avoided major scandal and respected the budgetary ceilings set 
by the technocrats (Hicken 2001).
By the early 1990s both of these reserve domains were withering away. 
In 1988 an elected politician became Thailand’s prime minister for the irst 
time since 1976 and immediately did away with the pork- policy compro-
mise by seizing control of macroeconomic and budgetary policy (Hicken 
2001). In addition, the composition of the Senate gradually changed so that 
over time business interests came to make up a larger and larger portion 
of Senate appointees. Yet, while these reserve domains were in place they 
represented a signiicant diffusion of political authority and a disincentive 
for coordination and nationalization.
Another factor contributing to weak nationalization incentives— one 
that did not change over the course of the 1980s and 1990s— was the fac-
tionalized nature of Thai parties. Similar to Japan, Thai political parties 
were extremely factionalized. Although, unlike Japan, Thai factions were 
relatively promiscuous— frequently changing parties from election to 
election. Because of the rampant party factionalism the leader of a politi-
cal party was more like a irst among equals than the head of a political 
hierarchy. The fact that the leader of the largest party might still ind his 
power checked by rival factions within his own party discouraged greater 
attempts at building larger parties. Party factionalism was a major cause of 
the frequent cabinet reshufles and short- lived governments that so charac-
terized Thailand’s prereform system as disgruntled faction leaders actively 
sought to bring down their rivals, including sometimes the nominal head 
of the party— the prime minister (see Chambers 2003). Factional conlict 
within the ruling party and/or within its coalition partners was a major 
cause of the collapse of nearly every democratic government prior to 1997 
(Chambers 2003).
During this pre- 1997 period Thai political parties were not large 
national organizations. Each governing party controlled only a relatively 
modest plurality of parliamentary seats and drew support from only one 
or two regions. Yet even these moderately sized, nonnational parties were 
unable to manage internal conlicts between factions. The lesson inter-
nalized by nearly all party leaders and politicians during the 1980s and 
1990s was that attempts to better coordinate across districts in an effort to 
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build a larger, national party would not be worth the cost to party cohesion 
(Chambers 2003).
Finally, in parliamentary systems like Thailand’s the method of select-
ing the prime minister determines the probability that becoming the larg-
est party will translate into control of government and access to cabinet 
positions. If the rules or norms of parliament are such that the leader of 
the largest party always has the irst opportunity to form a government and 
usually succeeds, then nationalization may be worthwhile. If, on the other 
hand, actors other than the leader of the largest party often form or get a 
chance to form the government, then coordination incentives are weaker.
In Thailand the leader of the largest party did successfully head a new 
government after the September 1992, 1995, and 1996 elections, but this 
was not always the norm. After the 1979, 1983, 1986, 1988, and March 
1992 elections, nonelected individuals (military igures) were invited to 
form a government either immediately after the election or after politi-
cal party leaders failed in their attempts. In 1988 the man invited to be 
prime minister, General Prem Tinsulanonda, turned down the invitation, 
and the head of Chart Thai, the largest party, became prime minister. After 
a nonelected individual was again invited to form the government after the 
March 1992 elections (resulting in mass protests) a constitutional amend-
ment was passed requiring that the prime minister be a member of the 
House of Representatives. Prior to the amendment, however, the high 
probability that the leader of the largest party would not get the oppor-
tunity to form a government undermined the incentives to try to create a 
large national party.
To summarize, the pre- 1997 institutional environment generated weak 
coordination and nationalization incentives. The existence of party fac-
tionalism together with an appointed Senate and the presence of other 
reserve domains placed checks on the power of the largest party and kept 
the potential payoff to nationalization low throughout the period. In addi-
tion, for much of the pre- 1997 period the selection procedure for the 
prime minister was uncertain. This uncertainty together with the small 
nationalization payoff undermined incentives to coordinate across districts 
to form large, national parties.
1997 and 2007 Constitutional Reforms
By 1997 most of these structural barriers had been removed. Since 1992 
the prime minister was required to be a member of the House of Represen-
tatives, and the norm was such that the leader of the largest party formed 
the government. Parts of the bureaucracy were also no longer shielded 
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from partisan control. The inal reserve domain— the unelected Senate— 
was removed in 1997 as the Senate became a fully elected body. However, 
the change in the 1997 constitution with the biggest bearing on nation-
alization incentives was increased powers for the prime minister relative 
to factions within his own party.7 This enhanced the power of the prime 
minister over intraparty factions and thereby increased the payoff to being 
the largest party in government.
The result was a sharp reduction in the number of parties. Some of 
this reduction was due to changes to the electoral system— speciically the 
reduction in district magnitude— and the accompanying decline in the 
effective number of parties at the local level. By only the second postre-
form election in 2005 competition at the constituency level was essentially 
a two- party affair (igure 8.1). However, more dramatic was the improved 
coordination across districts— consistent with the stronger nationalization 
incentives under the 1997 constitution. Figure 8.1 compares the effective 
number of parties at the constituency and national levels before and after 
constitutional reform.8 Note the narrowing of the gap between the effec-
tive number of parties nationally and the average effective number of par-
ties locally in 2001 and 2005. This is evidence of improved cross- district 
coordination. Whereas before the reforms poor nationalization accounted 
for the majority of the size of the national party system (54%), in 2005 only 
16% of the effective number of parties nationally was attributable to poor 
cross- district coordination.
The result of fewer parties at the local level (lower N
local
) and improved 
nationalization is a sharp reduction in the effective number of parties 
nationally (N
SMD
). The number of parties nationally (N
SMD
) fell to 3.8 in 
2001 and 2.4 in 2005 from an average of 7.2 prior to 1997. Better nation-
alization was a bigger factor in reducing the effective number of parties 
nationally than the decline in the average effective number of parties at the 
district level. The effective number of parties contracted by 67% nationally 
compared to only 38% at the district level.
As discussed earlier, the 2006 coup leaders attempted to refragment the 
party system via the 2007 constitution. Speciically, they sharply reduced 
the power of the prime minister, including power over party factions; split 
the national party list tier into eight regional party list elections; and rein-
troduced the block vote at the constituency level. However, the nature of 
partisanship had fundamentally changed in Thailand in the wake of the 
1997 reforms.9 As a result, the potentially fragmentary effects of the 2007 
reforms on the party system were muted. New party reputations and col-
lective partisan identities largely overrode attempts to undercut the success 
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of national parties. The result is that while we saw a modest increase in 
the number of parties in each constituency and nationally, as expected, the 
number of parties stayed well below the pre- 1997 level. Finally, the 2011 
election, held under modiied 1997 rules, produced a return to the smaller 
party system characteristic of 2001 and 2005.
The comparison between Thailand and Japan is an interesting one. 
Both are parliamentary systems that, prior to the introduction of an MM 
system, employed highly candidate- centered electoral systems. The party 
system in each country was composed of multiple, highly factionalized 
political parties— though the Thai party system was more fragmented than 
the Japanese system. The MM systems adopted in the two countries were 
also very similar. And yet the effect of the reforms on the party systems 
was somewhat different. While both countries experienced greater con-
solidation of their party systems, the move toward two parties occurred 
much more rapidly in Thailand than it did in Japan. Despite starting at a 
much higher level of party system fragmentation, a two- party system had 
emerged in Thailand by the second postreform election, as measured by 
the effective number of parties in the legislature (table 8.2). (The military 
intervention and subsequent constitutional reforms led to an increase in 
fragmentation in the third election.) By contrast, after the second postre-
form election in Japan the effective number of legislative parties was still 
more than three. Only after the last election, the ifth since the reforms 
were introduced, did Japan approach bipartism (table 8.2).
fig. 8.1. effective number of parties: district vs. national
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What accounts for the different rates of consolidation across the two 
countries? As Batto and Cox suggest in the introduction, the key lies in 
the different norms relating to competition for executive ofice. In Japan 
the 1993 election shattered the norm that the largest party in the Diet 
would form the government and capture the premiership. After the post 
of prime minister went to the leader of a party with less than 7% of the 
seats, party leaders rightly calculated that it was worth competing as a small 
or medium- sized party, given that there was still a chance that they could 
emerge as the head of government after postelectoral bargaining. This was 
not the case in Thailand, where the strong norm and practice was that the 
leader of the largest party formed the government and assumed the post 
of prime minister. There the removal of lingering structural barriers and 
the increase in the incentives to form large, national parties brought about 
by the 1997 reforms were enough to induce greater coordination across 
districts and a quick move toward bipartism.10
Philippines
The Philippines has one of the oldest democratic traditions in Asia. Under 
U.S. colonial auspices elections for both national and local ofices were the 
norm from the early 1900s. After a brief interruption during the Japanese 
occupation, elections resumed in 1946 in a fully independent Philippines. 
Elections were a mainstay of Filipino life until 1972 when President Fer-
dinand Marcos declared martial law. After 14 years of dictatorship demo-
cratic government was restored in 1986. The post- Marcos constitutional 
drafters chose to reinstate the pre- Marcos American- style presidential sys-
tem, with an elected president, a House of Representatives, and a Senate.
What has the Filipino party system looked like during the two demo-
cratic periods since independence? In many respects the parties and party 
system in the two eras look remarkably similar (Hicken 2009). Parties in 
both periods are characterized by factionalism, frequent party switching 
tABLE 8.2. the Effective number of Legislative Parties
 Thailand Japan
Last 3 prereform elections 5.6 3.1
First postreform election 3.0 2.9
Second election 1.7 3.2
Third election 2.8 2.6
Fourth election 2.6 2.3
Fifth election — 2.1
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(called “turncoatism” in the Philippines), and party labels that generally 
mean little to voters or candidates. Philippine parties are generally orga-
nized around a powerful leader, or a temporary alliance of leaders, and 
tend to be primarily concerned with distributing the spoils of government 
to themselves and their local supporters. This continuity over time makes 
sense given (a) the sociohistorical roots of the Philippine party system 
(see Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003; Landé 1965; Wurfel 1988), and (b) 
political institutions that have provided disincentives for forming strong, 
national parties (Hicken 2009).11
Prior to the imposition of martial law more than 20 years of elections in 
the Philippines had produced a relatively stable two party system— with the 
Nacionalista and Liberal parties vying for power in every election. By con-
trast, in the post- Marcos party period a multiparty system has been the rule.
So, compared to Thailand, Taiwan, and Japan, the Philippines is an 
exception. It is the only case where the move to a MM system has been 
accompanied by substantial fragmentation of the party system. From 1946 
to 1969 the average effective number of national parties (N
SMD
) was 2.3. 
Since 1987 N
SMD
 has averaged 4.3 (see table 8.1), reaching a high of 5.3 in 
the 2007 election.12 This is puzzling given the executive- centric theories 
discussed in the introduction and in this chapter. Presidential institutions 
tend to have a delationary effect on the legislative party system (Shugart 
1995; Hicken and Stoll 2011; Golder 2006). Competition for the top prize 
of the presidency drives the number of presidential candidates to two, and 
the competition between these two frontrunners casts a shadow down into 
legislative contests.13 Both within and across districts candidates, parties, 
and voters have incentives to organize themselves behind one of the front-
runners, and thus bipartism in the presidential party system tends to have a 
delationary effect on the number of parties in the legislative party system 
(Hicken and Stoll 2011).
It is this delationary effect that Batto and Cox cite as the primary rea-
son for why there are fewer parties under the Taiwanese MM system than 
we observe in Japan. Why, then, do we not see something similar in the 
Philippines? Why do presidential elections not produce the same dela-
tionary effect we observe in Taiwan? Why do the Philippines have more 
parties than parliamentary Thailand?
One possibility could be the MM system itself. As discussed above, the 
Philippines uses an unusual MM system that (1) caps the number of seats 
any party can win in the list tier at three seats, and (2) prohibits main-
stream political parties from competing for list tier seats. Thus, the sys-
tem provides ample opportunity for fragmentation and the proliferation of 
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small parties. Despite this, the MM system is clearly not the main driver of 
greater fragmentation. To begin with, while the MM provisions were part 
of the 1987 constitution the system was not implemented until 1998. In the 
three elections prior to 1998 the system operated as a simple single- seat 
district election, the same as had existed prior to martial law. And in those 
elections there was already clear evidence of fragmentation. The average 
effective number of parties before martial law was 2.1. In 1992 and 1995 
the number was 4.6 and 3.0, respectively. To make comparison easier across 
time I have excluded the party list election results from the calculation of 
N
V
 in this chapter, but even with the party list parties excluded the average 
effective number of electoral parties post- Marcos is 4.6.
To understand this increase we must understand its source. I will irst 
demonstrate that the rise in the number of parties nationally is not being 
driven by more competitors winning votes at the district level. Rather, 
post- Marcos we have a deterioration in the extent to which candidates 
coordinate across districts under the banners of a few large parties. Finally, 
I will show how changes to the 1987 constitution, particularly the imposi-
tion of a single term limit for the president, undermined the incentives to 
coordinate across districts during elections.
Table 8.3 compares the mean effective number of parties nationally 
(N
SMD
) with the average number of parties in each district (N
local
), before 
and after martial law. The table makes it clear that the growth in N
SMD
 is 
not a result of many more parties winning seats at the district level after 
1986. From 1946 to 1969 the average effective number of parties at the 
district level was 2.0. After 1986 N
local
 increased only slightly to 2.2, an 
increase of less than 10%. Indeed, a large change in N
local
 would be sur-
prising given that the electoral rules for the House remained virtually 
unchanged between the two periods. This small increase in the average 
size of the local party system cannot account for the 87% increase in the 
size of the national party system. In short, more competitors winning seats 
at the local level is not primarily to blame.
So what, then, is the cause of the post- Marcos fragmentation of the 
party system? Recall that the national party system is the product of two 
sets of interactions— within districts and across districts. It is in the area of 
cross- district coordination where we see the greatest change post- Marcos. 
This is where the party system, in short, has broken down. One way to 
measure the extent of cross- district coordination or nationalization is with 
a fragmentation score. This party system fragmentation score (F) is com-
puted by dividing the difference between the average number of parties 
per district (N
local
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. The resulting fragmentation 
score tells us what portion of the size of the national party system is due 
to poor cross- district coordination/nationalization, and what percentage 
relects what is happening within districts. If F is .10 this suggests that 
10% of the size of the national party system can be attributed to different 
parties garnering votes in different parts of the country (poor nationaliza-
tion), with the other 90% ascribable to the average number of parties at 
the district level. The larger the fragmentation score, the lower the level 
of nationalization.
Prior to martial law coordination between districts was extremely good. 
The same two parties, the Nacionalista and Liberal parties, were the front-
runners in most districts nationwide. Thus, the average inlation score was 
.098— in other words, less than 10% of the size of the national party sys-
tem was due to nationalization failures. This stands in stark contrast to the 
post- Marcos inlation score of .48 (table 8.3). Nationalization has clearly 
declined in the recent democratic period and it is this failure to coordinate 
across districts that is primarily responsible for the larger effective number 
of parties nationally.
How, then, do we explain the deterioration of nationalization post- 
Marcos? A variety of explanations have been offered in an attempt to explain 
the fragmentation of the national party system since 1986.15 I argue that 
the key change was new limits to presidential reelection. When democratic 
government made its return to the Philippines the rules and institutions in 
place before martial law were largely readopted. Within the national gov-
ernment the distribution of power remained relatively concentrated in the 
hands of the president.16 But, while there was a high degree of institutional 
continuity before and after martial law, the 1987 Constitution did intro-
duce one important change— a ban on reelection for the president. Before 
1972 Philippine presidents were limited to two terms. In the wake of the 
Marcos dictatorship the constitution drafters opted to limit presidents to 
a single term. Elsewhere I have argued that the introduction of a reelec-
tion ban was a key factor in fragmenting the party system (Hicken 2009). I 
reexamine that claim here, using new data.
Prior to 1972 incumbent Filipino presidents regularly marshaled the 
tABLE 8.3. nationalization and the number of Parties before and 
after Martial Law





Philippines I (1946– 69) 2.0 2.3 .098
Philippines II (1992– 2010) 2.2 4.3 .48
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resources and inluence of the presidency to back their reelection bids. All 
but Marcos were unsuccessful in their bid for a second term, but nonethe-
less the costs associated with challenging a sitting president weeded out all 
but the most serious of challengers and enabled voters to easily distinguish 
the frontrunners from the also- rans. This changed with the introduction of 
the reelection ban. The ban lowered the barriers to entry for presidential 
contenders and undermined the incentives for sitting presidents to invest in 
party- building. The result has been a large increase in the number of viable 
presidential candidates.17 This is clear from a comparison of the effective 
number of presidential candidates. During the 26 years before martial law 
the average effective number of presidential candidates (N
Pres
) was 2.2. By 
contrast, the effective number of presidential candidates between 1992 and 
2010 ranged between 3.2 and 5.8, for an average of 4.2 (see the N
Pres
 col-
umn in table 8.4). The end of incumbency does appear to have had the 
effect of fragmenting the presidential races.
To understand why more presidential candidates should affect the 
legislative party system, recall that the delationary effect of presidential 
elections is a contingent one. Proximate presidential elections only have 
the theorized delationary effect when there are a small number of presi-
dential candidates (Cox 1997; Golder 2006). Hicken and Stoll (2011) ind 
that beyond two candidates the delationary effect of presidential elections 
disappears, and there is some evidence that where the effective number 
of presidential candidates is very large, presidential elections may actually 
have an inlationary effect on the legislative party system.
With this in mind we can see how the differences in the competition for 
the presidency in Taiwan and the Philippines enable us to explain the dif-





 1946 2.0 3.3
 1949 2.4 2.4
 1953 1.7 2.6
 1957 3.4 2.1
 1961 2.0 2.0
 1965 2.2 2.3
 1969 1.9 2.1
Average: 1946– 1969 2.2 2.4
 1992 5.8 4.6
 1998 4.3 3.2
 2004 3.2 4.7
 2010 3.5 4.6
Average: 1992– 2010 4.2 4.3
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ferent level of consolidation in the two countries. In Taiwan “[c]ompetition 
for the presidency . . . drove the system toward two main candidates who, 
in turn, had strong incentives to organize legislators behind their candida-
cies” (Batto and Cox, introduction). In the Philippines a ban on reelection 
led to a proliferation of presidential candidates, and this has corresponded 
with the fragmentation of the legislative party system (table 8.4). Before 
martial law the effective number of electoral parties is 2.4, as opposed to 
4.3 after martial law.18
Conclusion
The cases of Thailand and the Philippines underscore the argument of 
this volume— namely, that the appeal of, and competition for, executive 
ofice shapes the legislative party system as much as, and perhaps more 
than, competition in the legislative arena. In both cases changes to the 
legislative electoral systems had predictable effects, but it was other con-
stitutional changes— a presidential reelection ban in the Philippines and 
greater incentives for cross- district coordination in Thailand— that had 
the most substantial impact on the party system.
Taken together the cases of the Philippines, Thailand, Japan and Taiwan 
suggest that while the differences between presidential and parliamentary 
systems have a powerful effect on the party system, variation within regime 
type can be just as powerful. In parliamentary Japan and Thailand differ-
ences in the norms about which party could form the government help 
explain why the Japanese party system was slower to consolidate compared 
to the Thai system, while the differences in the number of presidential 
candidates standing for ofice produced differently sized party systems in 
the Philippines and Taiwan.
n o t e S
 1. The scope and pattern of ethnic cleavages can modify these institutional 
effects (Cox and Knoll 2003; Hicken and Selway 2011).
 2. This section draws on Hicken 2006, 2009, 2013.
 3. Senators are elected from multiseat districts using SNTV.
 4. In addition, the coup leaders outlawed the Thai Rak Thai party and banned 
its top leadership, including Thaksin, from ofice.
 5. Senators are elected via the block vote within a single nationwide district.
 6. For more on this compromise, see Christensen (1993), Doner and Ramsay 
(2004), and Hicken (2001).
 7. Two changes are particularly worth noting. First, cabinet members were 
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required to give up their seats in parliament if they choose to join the cabinet. Since 
parties or ministers that chose to leave the cabinet, or are expelled by the prime 
minister, could no longer return to parliament the stakes associated with breaking 
with the prime minister were much higher. Second, the constitution placed new 
restrictions on party switching. In order to compete in future elections candidates 
had to be members of a political party for at least 90 days. The rule was designed 
to curb the 11th hour party switching by individuals and factions that tradition-
ally occurred in the run- up to Thai elections. Once the House was dissolved elec-
tions had to be held within 45 days (if the House’s term has expired) or 60 days (if 
parliament is dissolved)— not enough time for would- be party switchers to meet 
the membership requirement. The prime minister, with the power to dissolve the 
House and call new elections, gained the most from this change. The prime minis-
ter could credibly threaten to call new elections if party factions tried to bolt, thus 
forcing the members of the faction to sit out one election.
 8. Since the 1997 Thai system contains both constituency and party list votes 
one must decide whether to combine those votes to produce N
SMD
 and the inlation 
scores or to use only the votes cast in the constituency elections. There are pros and 
cons to either approach. The numbers I report in the text, tables, and igures are 
calculated using total party vote shares— that is, I combine the party list and con-
stituency votes for each party. Excluding party list votes produces slightly higher 
N
SMD
 and inlation scores for 2001 and 2005 but these inferences remain the same.
 9. See Hicken 2013 for more details.
 10. An additional difference is the effect of upper house elections. In Japan strong 
performance in upper house elections could result in smaller parties receiving a 
more favorable portfolio allocation within the government (see Lin’s chapter 2 in 
this volume). As a result, small parties who did poorly in lower house elections 
could still gain access to the cabinet if they did well in upper house elections. By 
contrast, Thai Senate elections were, by constitutional requirement, nonpartisan 
affairs— candidates for the Senate were forbidden from afiliating with a political 
party. Thus, unlike in Japan, election results for the Senate could not boost the 
fortunes of smaller parties.
 11. These institutions include a powerful presidency (see Samuels and Shugart 
2010), candidate- centered electoral arrangements for both the House and Sen-
ate, and, until 2010, ballot design that undermined the utility of party labels. See 
Hicken 2009 for more details.
 12. The 1987 elections are excluded due to the lack of comprehensive data on 
candidate and party vote shares. This rise in the number of parties has been the 
subject of much scholarly attention in the Philippine literature (see, for example, 
Kimura 1992).
 13. The shadow of presidentialism is strongest where presidential and legislative 
elections are concurrent (Shugart 1995; Cox 1997), where there are few presiden-
tial candidates (Golder 2006; Hicken and Stoll 2011), and where the president is 
very powerful vis- à- vis the legislature (Hicken and Stoll 2013).
 14. Note, this is equivalent to Cox’s Inlation score (I) (1997). Because the word 
inlation can be confusing due to its use as an economic term, I use the term “frag-
mentation.”
 15. These include a change in the structure of local politics in the Philippines, 
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the decreased importance of the board of elections, and the advent of synchronized 
local and national elections. See Hicken 2009 for a critique of these explanations.
 16. In a response to the excesses of the Marcos era a few of the president’s powers 
were curtailed, including the ability to declare a state of emergency and the ability 
to transfer “saved funds” between governmental departments.
 17. Choi (2001) also draws the connection between term limits and an increase in 
the effective number of presidential candidates post- Marcos, but does not discuss 
the implications for the legislative party system.
 18. However, a closer look at the post- Marcos presidential elections presents us 
with a few puzzles. First, while there is clearly a correlation between the rise in 
the effective number of presidential candidates and the increased number of par-
ties, the year- to- year correlation is imperfect. Second, it is puzzling that in 2004, 
post- Marcos lows in both the effective number of presidential candidates (3.2) and 
the effective number of parties in the district (1.9) correspond with a post- Marcos 
high in terms of the number of parties nationally (4.7). Something else other than 
presidential term limits is clearly at work in 2004 (see table 8.4). Finally, one won-
ders why nationalization has not improved over time. In fact, there is a noticeable 
increase in fragmentation starting in 2001 that continues through the most recent 
election. A ban on presidential term limits post- Marcos cannot account for this 
change over time. Hicken (2011) argues that the timing of decentralization reforms 
in the Philippines helps explain these puzzles.
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Political Consequences of new Zealand’s 
MMP System in Comparative Perspective
Matthew S. Shugart and Alexander C. Tan
The distinctions between single- member plurality systems and propor-
tional representation systems are well known among students of electoral 
systems. The contrast between these two “ideal” types is such that most stu-
dents can effortlessly list a litany of political consequences emanating from 
the choice of either of these systems, including the impact on the number of 
parties, coalition government, cabinet durability, and so forth. But beyond 
the ideal types, there continue to be interesting puzzles that capture schol-
arly attention. One of these puzzles, which this edited volume focuses on, is 
the question of why countries with seemingly similar electoral systems have 
different outcomes. In the introduction to this book, Batto and Cox observe 
that while Japan and Taiwan both have adopted mixed- member majoritar-
ian (MMM) electoral systems, the countries have differed in the number of 
parties in their party systems. In this chapter, we extend the discussion of 
mixed- member systems to include the Asia- Paciic’s one case of a mixed- 
member proportional (MMP) system, New Zealand.
A particular puzzle of the New Zealand experience with MMP is that, 
over the years the system has been in place, the effective number of elec-
toral parties has generally declined. This trend is evident in spite of an 
electoral system design that is highly proportional, and stands in contrast 
to the mostly similar case of Germany, where recent elections have seen a 
rise in the effective number of parties. Moreover, in New Zealand, unlike 
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both the East Asian and German cases, the number of very small parties is 
high. We argue that the persistence of these “microparties” in New Zea-
land can be understood only by taking into account both speciic features 
of its MMP system and politicians’ pursuit of ministerial posts. Thus, we 
agree with Batto and Cox, in this volume, that the electoral system and its 
effects on legislative competition provide only a partial explanation. We 
must also consider the contribution of executive- centric explanations.
In their comparison of Japan and Taiwan, Batto and Cox stress those 
two countries’ different executive formats— semipresidential in Taiwan but 
parliamentary in Japan. They also stress another factor, intraparty factions 
competing for executive posts, including at the subnational level in the case 
of Taiwan. New Zealand, like Germany, is a parliamentary system, and nei-
ther of these MMP countries has anything like the entrenched factional 
competition of Japan and Taiwan. Rather, when there are internal party dis-
agreements, they must either be worked out within the conines of the party 
or else the party splits. The establishment of new parties out of divisions 
in old ones has been a factor in both Germany and New Zealand. In the 
former case, a substantial upward push to the effective number of parties 
occurred when the leading party of the Center- Left, the Social Democrats, 
split and the defectors merged with the ex- Communists of the old East 
Germany to form the Left Party. The formation of the Left Party was thus 
the result of a policy- based split in a then- governing party.1 In New Zea-
land, however, most splinters have been ambitious seekers of ministerial 
posts who use their safe seats to launch new parties. The main exception is 
the Green Party of Aoteroa New Zealand, which emerged out of the tur-
moil of the left- wing Alliance2 in the early years of the new electoral system 
and subsequently established itself as an alternative policy- seeking party.
In this chapter, we examine the New Zealand experience of its mixed- 
member proportional system and suggest that to explain the political 
consequences witnessed in New Zealand requires us to examine both the 
mechanical effects of electoral rules, including features speciic to New 
Zealand’s variant of MMP, and the incentives of politicians to seek min-
isterial posts outside of the main parties. In the next section, we offer an 
overview of the system’s performance over its irst six elections, and then 
discuss issues relevant to the 2011 referendum on the electoral system. In 
the subsequent section, we restate the theoretical predictions of the effects 
of a shift from its former irst past the post or also known as single- member 
plurality (SMP)3 system to MMP on the party system and its competitive-
ness, on the impact on coalition formation, and the “contamination effects” 
(Herron and Nishikawa 2001) between the plurality and PR components 
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of the system. We argue that the number of parties in New Zealand under 
MMP, averaged across six elections, is consistent with what electoral sys-
tems theory should lead us to expect. However, were it not for peculiar 
features of the New Zealand system, and the presence of what we term 
“legacy politicians” seeking to obtain ministerial positions, we would be 
unlikely to observe as many very small parties as we have in New Zealand. 
We also ind that in recent elections, there is decreasing evidence of “con-
tamination” as the two tiers have diverged in their effective number of 
parties (two- party dominance of plurality races, but higher fragmentation 
in the PR tier)— a pattern quite different from what has emerged in the 
German MMP system, especially recently. Finally, we explore the “intra-
party dimension” (Shugart 2005), where we ind evidence for a different 
kind of contamination, whereby dual candidacy appears to encourage even 
legislators elected via the party lists to behave almost as if they represented 
a local district.
New Zealand under MMP
Ten years after the Royal Commission published its report, Towards a Better 
Democracy, in 1996 New Zealand conducted its irst parliamentary elec-
tions under MMP. In table 9.1, we see the results of the elections under 
MMP since 1996. It is immediately evident that many more parties have 
run for, and won, parliamentary seats under this proportional electoral sys-
tem. Moreover, no party has won more than half the seats, in stark contrast 
to the SMP system prior to 1996. Table 9.1 further shows the breakdown 
for each party between seats won via the nominal tier, which is made up of 
60– 70 (depending on the year) single- seat districts (known as electorates in 
New Zealand), and the list tier.
Under New Zealand’s MMP system, only parties that win at least 5% of 
the party vote, or at least one district, may participate in the distribution of 
list seats. The consequences of this provision can be seen also in the 2008 
results, when New Zealand First won 4.1% of the party votes, but no seats, 
yet ACT won ive seats on only 3.7% of the party vote. Both parties obvi-
ously failed to clear the 5% threshold, yet the reason ACT won seats is that 
one of its electorate candidates won his contest. Having thus qualiied for 
representation (in effect, waiving the party- vote threshold), this party was 
eligible to win full compensation via the list, electing another four MPs.
We can quickly contrast MMP in New Zealand (and the broadly similar 
system in Germany) with the mixed- member majoritarian type otherwise 
more common in the Asia- Paciic region.4 Table 9.2 compares two MMM 
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systems (Japan and Taiwan) and two MMP (New Zealand and Germany) 
on the widely accepted measure of disproportionality, Gallagher’s Least 
Squares Index, in which the lower the number, the more proportional the 
result. Germany is shown separately for both the pre- 1990 West Germany 
and the postuniication period from 1990 on, when disproportionality 
has tended to be somewhat higher. The two MMM systems have sharply 
higher disproportionality; in fact, Japan’s lowest value (8.52 in 2003) is sub-
stantially higher than the highest value observed under MMP in Germany 
or New Zealand. Thus table 9.2 shows very clearly the mechanical effect 
of MMP vs. MMM.
The 2011 Referendum on Whether to Retain MMP
Fifteen years after New Zealand adopted the mixed- member proportional 
representation system, on November 26, 2011, New Zealanders were asked 
in a referendum whether they would like to keep or replace the mixed- 
member proportional representation system. Though the referendum was 
largely overshadowed by the concurrent parliamentary election, the lead 
tABLE 9.1. new Zealand Electoral Statistics, 1996– 2011
Party  1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011
National Vote % 33.8 30.5 20.9 39.1 44.9 47.3
Seats* 44 (30, 14) 39 (22, 17) 27 (21, 6) 48 (31, 17) 58 (41, 17) 59 (42, 17)
Labour Vote % 28.2 38.7 41.3 41.1 34.0 27.5
Seats 37 (26, 11) 49 (41, 8) 52 (45, 7) 50 (31, 19) 43 (21, 22) 34 (22, 12)
NZ First Vote % 13.4 4.3 10.4 5.7 4.1 6.6
Seats 17 (6, 11) 5 (1, 4) 13 (1, 12) 7 (0, 7) 0 8 (0, 8)
ACT Vote % 6.1 7.0 7.1 1.5 3.7 1.1
Seats 8 (1, 7) 9 (0, 9) 9 (0, 9) 2 (1, 1) 5 (1, 4) 1 (1, 0)
Alliance Vote % 10.1 7.7 1.3 0.1 0.1 0.1
Seats 13 (1, 12) 10 (1, 9) 0 0 0 0
Green Vote % — 5.2 7.0 5.3 6.7 11.1
Seats — 7 (1, 6) 9 (0, 9) 6 (0, 6) 9 (0, 9) 14 (0, 14)
Progressive Vote % — — 1.7 1.2 0.9 — 
Seats — — 2 (1, 1) 1 (1, 0) 1 (1, 0) — 
United Future Vote % 0.9 0.5 6.7 2.7 0.9 0.6
Seats 1 (1, 0) 1 (1, 0) 8 (1, 7) 3 (1, 2) 1 (1, 0) 1 (1, 0)
Maori Vote % — — — 2.1 2.4 1.4
Seats — — — 4 (4, 0) 5 (5, 0) 3 (3, 0)
Mana Vote % — — — — — 1.1
Seats — — — — — 1 (1, 0)
Others Vote % 7.5 6.1 3.6 0.1 2.4 3.3
Total seats  120 120 120 121 122 121
Note: Percentages are for party- list votes. For each party, seats are given as total (electorates, list seats).
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up to the referendum and the general election created the normal buzz 
of electioneering and campaigning among proponents and opponents of 
MMP. Despite some misgivings about MMP, 57.8% of the voters voted to 
keep it.
One of the provisions of the law mandating the referendum was that, 
were MMP to be retained, there would be a mandatory review of ways 
to “improve” it. The Electoral Commission carried out an independent 
review in 2012, which included opportunities for public submissions and 
hearings on several aspects of the system. The review addressed the level 
of the threshold for earning proportional seats, the question of dual candi-
dacy (i.e., candidates running in both tiers), and several other matters (see 
New Zealand Electoral Commission 2012). It speciically was not permit-
ted to consider the size of parliament or the provisions for representation 
of the country’s indigenous Maori minority. The Electoral Commission, 
in its inal report released in August 2012, recommended modest changes: 
reducing the threshold from 5% to 4%, abolishing the alternative one- 
district threshold, and abolishing the provision of overhang seats for par-
ties not reaching the threshold.5 Any changes would have to be approved 
by parliament. We will address several of the Commission’s indings and 
recommendations in the course of this chapter.
The mean reason for holding a referendum on the electoral system is 
that the National Party had promised to review the system before coming 
back to power in 2008, and even accused Labour of having reneged on 
an earlier promise to undertake a review. That the National Party would 
have greater skepticism about the MMP system is comprehensible as 
MMP is more disadvantageous to a Center- Right party that draws its sup-
port mainly from conservative, rural, and upper middle class and wealthy 
New Zealanders in a country whose median voter is more left of center. 
Moreover, it has consolidated the Center- Right vote to the extent that it 
won 44.9% in 2008 and 47.3% in 2011, in contrast to Labour’s average 
of around 40% in the three straight MMP elections in which it was the 
largest party. Thus the National Party is in a strong position to win parlia-
tABLE 9.2. Least Squares Index Values of disproportionality
Country (time period) Electoral System Mean Min. Max.
Japan (1996– 2012) MMM 14.53 8.52 25.73
Taiwan (2008– 2012) MMM 12.98 9.07 16.89
New Zealand (1996–20 11) MMP 2.69 1.13 3.84
West Germany (1953– 87) MMP 2.20 0.50 4.69
Germany (1990– 2009) MMP 3.36 2.16 4.63
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mentary majorities under a nonproportional system, whereas such a system 
could pose coordination challenges to the Center- Left, particularly given 
the rise in strength of the Green Party since 2002 (see table 9.1).6 The 
majority support in the referendum probably closes for some time any fur-
ther consideration of replacing MMP.
Effects on the Number of Parties
New Zealand was a quintessential example of a Westminster majoritar-
ian parliamentary democracy. With the SMP electoral system, pre- 1996 
governments were solidly single- party majority governments controlled by 
one of just two dominant parties.
It is, however, important not to overstate the “two- partyness” of New 
Zealand politics from the 1970s on. Several elections under SMP resulted 
in substantial vote shares for parties other than Labour and National. 
Nonetheless, the mechanical effect of plurality seat- allocation, and the lack 
of signiicant regional strongholds for any of the smaller parties, meant 
that parliament remained almost completely the preserve of the two big 
parties. In fact, in elections via SMP after 1945, the maximum number of 
parties with seats in any election was three until 1993, when four parties 
won seats in the inal SMP election, which was concurrent with the refer-
endum in which MMP was approved. Even more to the point, in none of 
these elections did the third party win more than two seats.
In New Zealand’s elections under SMP, majority governments always 
resulted, although often based on only around 40% of the votes. Thus we 
can say that the mechanical effect was working as expected from Duverg-
er’s Law, forcing the real choice to be between just two parties. Nonethe-
less the “psychological effect” had less impact over time. In every election 
from 1960 on, the third party (usually Social Credit) won over 6% of the 
vote, and from 1984 on, with the exception of the 1987 election, the third 
largest party always had anywhere from 12% to a high of more than 20%. 
Thus voters showed some willingness to vote for third parties that had 
no realistic chance of winning signiicant numbers of seats, let alone any 
governing inluence.
Of course, as expected, a move to a proportional system starting in 1996 
has meant that many parties can earn representation, even with relatively 
small vote shares, as table 9.1 showed. New Zealand’s sixth parliament of 
the MMP era, elected in 2011, has eight political parties represented. The 
National, Labour, and Green parties account for 107 of the 121 parliamen-
tary seats, leaving 14 additional seats divided among ive parties. The 2011 
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election is not an outlier: as table 9.3 shows, the number of parliamentary 
parties has been between six and eight since 1996. This is a stark contrast 
to the two or three parties represented in elections under SMP.
The relatively high number of parliamentary parties under MMP, how-
ever, masks the imbalance in parliamentary representation among them. To 
take account of the relative sizes of parties, the most common index is the 
“effective” number of parliamentary parties (N
S
) index, presented in table 
9.3, which counts the parties by weighting them by their sizes. For New 
Zealand’s six elections under MMP, N
S
 was at its highest in the irst MMP 
election of 1996 (3.76) and was as low as 2.78 in 2008. It has averaged 
3.28. It is evident from these statistics that New Zealand, as predicted by 
theory, has moved away from two- party dominance to a multiparty parlia-
mentary system. In comparison to the raw number of parliamentary par-
ties, the lower effective number relects the presence of two strong parties, 
plus various smaller parties. As a result, coalition negotiations have always 
revolved around one of the big parties, Labour or National, and various 
smaller partners, as we discuss in detail later.
How does the presence of 6– 8 parties winning at least one seat, but 
an effective number of parliamentary parties averaging just over three 
compare to what might be expected from an electoral system like New 
Zealand’s? We will address this question from two perspectives: irst, com-
paring to the only long- established MMP system prior to New Zealand, 
that of Germany; second, by reference to theoretical work in comparative 
electoral systems.
Germany’s postwar electoral system is similar to that adopted by New 
Zealand in 1996. In elections since 1953, the voter has been allowed two 
votes, one for a candidate in a single- member district and one for a party 
list; overall proportionality is calculated nationwide based on party- list 








% seats, third party  
(and identity)
1996 6 3.76 14.2 (New Zealand First)
1999 7 3.45 8.3 (Alliance)
2002 7 3.76 10.8 (New Zealand First)
2005 8 2.95 5.8 (New Zealand First)
2008 7 2.78 7.4 (Green)
2011 8 2.98 11.6 (Green)
 Mean (6 elections) 7.2 3.28 9.7
Source: New Zealand Electoral Commission and authors’ own calculations.
254 Mixed-Member electoral Systems in constitutional context
votes for those parties clearing a nationwide threshold of 5%.7 While the 
number of parties earning at least one seat was higher in the irst elec-
tions, from 1961 on every election resulted in four parties in the Bundestag 
(Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union,8 Social Democratic 
Party, and Free Democratic Party) until 1983, when the Green Party sur-
passed the threshold for the irst time. Since reuniication in 1990, there 
have been six parties, with the former East German Communist Party, 
renamed the Party of Democratic Socialism, joining the mix. This latter 
party combined with a left- wing splinter from the Social Democrats before 
the 2002 election to form the Left Party, keeping the number of repre-
sented parties at six as of 2009.
Thus, even with the recent increase in the number of parties in the 
German parliament to six, that country continues to have fewer parties 
with parliamentary representation than New Zealand has had in any elec-
tion since 1999. Nonetheless, in Germany since reuniication the effective 
number of parties in parliament has been higher: taking the seven elections 
from 1990, N
S
 values have been 3.17, 3.45, 3.31, 3.38, 4.05, 4.83, 2.80.9 The 
generally upward trend until the last election in that sequence (2013)10 is 
notable, and contrasts with the more erratic but recently downward trend 
in New Zealand’s MMP era (table 9.3). By contrast, in the last six elec-
tions in Germany before reuniication, 1969– 87, N
S
 averaged only 2.99 
and was over 3.00 only in 1980 and 1983.11 Thus, in terms of the effective 
number of parliamentary parties, New Zealand since 2005 looks more like 
Germany in the 1970s and 1980s than like the latter country’s more recent 
elections. However, the more recent increase in Germany’s effective num-
ber, particularly in the irst decade of the 2000s, should serve as a reminder 
that an effective number near three, such as New Zealand has had recently, 
is not necessarily what we should expect as “typical” under MMP.
A further puzzle in comparing these two MMP systems lies in the fact 
that New Zealand’s actual number of parties having at least one seat is 
somewhat higher, while its effective number is, especially recently, lower 
than in Germany. The main factor driving this difference is that most of 
the minor parties in New Zealand tend to be exceptionally small parties, 
sometimes earning only one or a few seats each. As we will discuss in more 
detail below, a key reason that New Zealand has some very small parties, 
but Germany does not, is that in New Zealand a party that falls below 
the 5% party- vote threshold nonetheless qualiies for proportional repre-
sentation seats if it wins just one district. In Germany, a party below the 
threshold needs three district pluralities.12 Only once since the 1950s has 
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a party in Germany entered parliament despite not clearing the party- vote 
threshold.13 In New Zealand, there have been four such parties in each of 
the three most recent elections (2005, 2008, 2011). Except for the Maori 
Party (discussed below), each of these parties has entered parliament by 
winning just one district seat; some of these have then qualiied for any-
where from one to four additional seats from the party list.14 Only once 
has the number of parties clearing the party- vote threshold exceeded ive; 
starting in 2005, just three or four have done so. Thus, were it not for small 
parties winning districts in New Zealand, the number of parties would be 
substantially lower.
How about expectations based on the theory of electoral systems? We 
can draw on the work of Taagepera (2007), who has taken the institutional 
constraints of “simple” electoral systems as a starting point for estimating 
logically what the number of parties “should be” on average. Of course, 
a mixed- member proportional system is not simple, in that it has two 
tiers of allocation. However, ignoring the threshold for a moment, New 
Zealand’s MMP does allocate seats as if it were one district of 120 seats. 
Given nationwide calculation of seat shares from party votes, and further 
given the possibility of a party winning a seat with a vote share much less 
than the 5% threshold (by winning just one district), treating the system 
as a national district without a threshold is not wildly off, even if it is an 
oversimpliication. If we use these simple assumptions, Taagepera’s Seat 
Product15 leads to a prediction of 11 parties winning at least one seat, and 
effective N
S
 = 4.90. However, of course, there is a threshold. In a more 
recent work (Taagepera, n.d.), models are derived estimating the number 
of parties, both actual and effective, from a nationwide threshold. Applying 
these models16 to New Zealand’s 5% threshold, we get an estimate of 4.47 
parties winning at least one seat and effective N
S
 = 2.71.
Given that we don’t know which threshold is more constraining, one- 
district or 5% party- vote, a logical extension of Taagepera’s technique 
would be to take the geometric mean of the two predictions. That leads to:
Actual number of parties, sqrt(11*4.5) = 7.0
Effective number of parliamentary parties (N
S
), sqrt(4.9*2.7) = 3.6
These derived estimates closely match the observed average values 
(table 9.3): 7.2 actual parties and an effective number of 3.28. We have too 
few elections to work with here to say for sure that it is not just by chance 
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that the number of parties (effective or otherwise) comes close to predic-
tions derived from our application of Taagepera’s methods, but the conclu-
sion we can draw is that the number of parties is not “too high” in New 
Zealand, given institutional constraints.17 Moreover, as table 9.3 showed, 
the effective number of parties has not been greater than 2.98 for the last 
three elections. This value is closer to what we expect from the 5% thresh-
old itself. Such a value is also consistent with the idea of the two major par-
ties reasserting themselves via the district- level Duvergerian effect. If such 
an effect is also carrying over to the party- list ballot, it would be an argu-
ment for a “contamination” effect, which is a theme we return to below.
Effects on Government Formation
As a result of the greater number of parties in New Zealand under MMP, 
all governments since 1996 have been multiparty coalition cabinets (and 
most have been minority governments). Indeed, New Zealand’s experience 
is quite similar to Germany’s: two large parties holding positions just to 
the right and left of center and a group of smaller parties. Like Germany 
as well, the two large parties have taken turns leading the government, 
although New Zealand has not had a “grand coalition” of the two big par-
ties as Germany has experienced three times (following elections of 1966, 
2005, and 2013). A substantial difference from the German experience is 
that every government in Germany has consisted of just three or four par-
ties18 while in New Zealand most governments have entailed formalized 
cooperation between one big party and an additional two or three smaller 
parties. Often each of the small parties has only one or a few seats in parlia-
ment.
In this section, we go beyond the analysis of the electoral system to con-
sider how incentives for seeking executive posts have affected the number 
of parties. We draw on the insights of Batto and Cox (introduction, this 
volume), who aptly remind us that the pursuit of executive posts may have 
an independent effect. Batto and Cox note that in parliamentary systems 
competition for executive posts allows for a mixture of both electoral and 
postelectoral strategies. In New Zealand, postelectoral strategies have been 
common,19 as small parties, often founded from splinters off the main par-
ties, have been inluential in the government- formation process. We will 
irst outline the main features of New Zealand’s interparty bargaining, and 
then offer an explanation grounded in speciic features of the country’s 
MMP system and the pursuit of executive posts to explain these patterns.
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Coalition and Minority Governments
As can be observed from table 9.4, the number of political parties in coali-
tion governments has increased after 1999. As we will discuss later in this 
section, New Zealand parties have come up with creative arrangements 
other than outright coalition cabinets, such as the conidence and supply 
agreements20 or ministers outside of cabinet. Despite the recent prevalence 
of such arrangements, we can still speak of coalitions, of varying degrees 
of formality, between one major party and multiple smaller ones that have 
received ministerial posts. In many of these cases, the parties in coalition 
agreements have only one to three MPs, and have depended not on clear-
ing the 5% threshold, but rather winning at least one district seat, to be in 
parliament. Examples of parties with ministerial posts but less than 5% of 
the vote include Progressive in 2002 and 2005, United Future in 2005– 11, 
and both ACT and the Maori Party in 2008 and 2011. In fact, of the parties 
cooperating in government with either National or Labour since MMP 
was enacted, only New Zealand First in 1996 and 2005, Alliance in 1999, 
and United Future in 2002 have had more than 5% of the party vote.
Notably New Zealand’s Green Party has so far not obtained any min-
isterial portfolios, despite having cleared the 5% party- vote threshold in 
every election it has contested (since 1999). Only in the 1999– 2002 parlia-
ment did the Greens have a conidence and supply agreement with the gov-
ernment. Thus we can divide the parties other than Labour and National 
tABLE 9.4. Party Composition of MMP governments in new 
Zealand
Year Main party Coalition partners with ministerial positions
1996 National New Zealand First
1999 Labour Alliancea
2002 Labour Progressive, United Future
2005 Labour Progressive, NZ First, United Future
2008 National ACT, Maori, United Future
2011 National ACT, Maori, United Future
Source: New Zealand Electoral Commission.
Notes: Italics indicate parties that entered parliament via winning at least one 
district, rather than obtaining over 5% of the party vote.
All coalition partners indicated had their ministerial positions “outside cabi-
net” with the exception of New Zealand First (1996) and Alliance (1999) and Pro-
gressive (2002 and 2005), which were full cabinet partners in those governments.
aIn addition, the Green Party was in a conidence and supply agreement with 
Labour during this government, but did not have any ministerial positions.
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into two categories: “microparties” that enter parliament with just a few 
MPs and despite missing the 5% threshold, and “midsized parties” that 
clear the threshold. Some parties, such as ACT, New Zealand First, and 
United Future, have been in one category in one election and the other at 
other times. Only the Greens have consistently been a threshold- clearing 
midsized party.
Microparties and Legacy Politicians
As we saw above (see table 9.3), New Zealand under MMP has had a rela-
tively high number of parties with at least one seat in parliament, but a 
relatively low effective number of parties. In fact, microparties have been a 
consistent feature of New Zealand’s MMP- era parliaments. For instance, 
of the eight parties represented in the parliament elected in 2011, three 
(ACT, Mana, and United Future) have one seat each and one other party 
(Maori Party) has three seats. With the exception of Mana, each of these 
earned ministerial concessions from the National Party in the postelectoral 
bargaining (as indeed they had done in 2008).
Why, then, is there a large number of microparties in the New Zea-
land parliament? We argue that the answer lies partly in electoral- system 
provisions— not only the one- seat alternative threshold for proportional 
representation but also the retention of the special Maori districts even 
under MMP.21 However, these factors are insuficient to explain the mic-
roparties, the persistence of which also depends, we argue, on incentives to 
seek executive posts via anticipated concessions in postelectoral bargain-
ing. There is also another (and probably relatively minor) factor, the issue 
of parliamentary compensation, subsidy, and support for parties.
As noted above, New Zealand electoral rules require political parties 
to win 5% of the party vote or at least one district seat to be eligible for 
proportional- representation seats. The low alternative threshold allows 
for microparties to survive with ease as long as these parties have at least 
one politician with a local support base. Interestingly, these microparties 
are actually splinter parties of a large party, Labour or National. United 
Future’s party leader, Peter Dunne, was a longtime Labour politician with 
strong support in a wealthy suburb of Wellington. In 2005 the Foreshore 
and Seabed Act, directly affecting Maori customary rights, saw the creation 
of the Maori Party when some Maori politicians defected from the Labour 
Party. The National Party had politicians split from it in 1993 to create 
the New Zealand First Party led by Winston Peters and the ACT Party 
led at the 2011 election by John Banks.22 While the populist New Zea-
land First has sometimes been a microparty dependent on Peters winning 
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his electorate (Tauranga, till he was defeated in 2005) and other times has 
cleared the threshold (as in 1996, 2005, and 2011), throughout it has been 
a party dependent primarily on the personal appeal of its leader, whose 
career spans back to the SMP era. ACT Party, on the other hand, managed 
to win 6– 7% of the party vote in the irst three MMP elections, but in the 
three subsequent elections it would not have been represented had it not 
won an electorate seat. In 2011, its electorate (Epsom, in Auckland) was 
the only seat it won. The importance of the one- seat threshold and legacy 
politicians is especially observable in the career of Jim Anderton. He was 
a longtime Labour MP in the Christchurch era, irst elected in 1984, who 
split off to lead the Alliance.23 This party split during its coalition with 
Labour between the 1999 and 2002 elections, with Anderton leaving to 
form a vehicle oficially registered as Jim Anderton’s Progressive Coalition 
(rendering Alliance both without a prominent politician to win a district 
and too small to clear the threshold). Anderton’s safe seat continued to 
allow his party to win one or two seats (table 9.1) as long as he remained 
an MP, but when he retired before the 2011 election, he shut down his 
Progressive party. The one- seat threshold, then, has been a major factor in 
why New Zealand has so many microparties. Needless to say, these have 
implications for the complexity of postelection coalition negotiations that 
were depicted in table 9.4.
A second reason for microparties and legacy politicians is the nature 
of the Maori special seats. In the New Zealand system, the Maori special 
seats, which already existed under the irst- past- the- post system, are super-
imposed on the whole country; that is, every voter resides in both a general 
district and a Maori district, and if the voter is of Maori descent, he or she 
may choose which one to register to vote in.24 Currently, there are seven 
Maori district seats; the number is adjusted according to the size of the 
Maori electoral roll. A Maori enrolled voter receives the Maori district bal-
lot as well as the party vote ballot (which, counting for nationwide repre-
sentation, is the same for all voters). Maoris historically identiied with the 
Labour Party; thus, prior to 2005, Maori MPs were mainly Labour. How-
ever, in 2005 the former Labour MPs who formed the Maori Party were 
able to tap into this constituency base and the new party won four of the 
seven Maori special seats. In 2008, the Maori Party kept its four seats but in 
April 2011 a split saw one of its MPs establish the rival Mana Party, which 
retained its one seat in 2011. Similar in effect to the low threshold levels 
for the parties competing in the general electorate, the Maori special seats 
have aided in the success of these microparties in the MMP era. Without 
MMP and its mechanical effects, there may never have been one separate 
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party for Maori voters, let alone two of them. However, combined with 
the expectation that under MMP single- party majority governments are 
unlikely, having the separate Maori districts has created a further incentive 
to split off from a major party and possibly represent this constituency with 
a party that can engage in postelectoral bargaining for ministerial positions 
and policy concessions. We now turn to a discussion of how smaller parties 
have related to the major parties in government formation.
Postelectoral Bargaining over Executive Posts and Policy
The political consequences of a proportional electoral system point to the 
relative likelihood of coalition governments instead of single- party major-
ity cabinets. As such, the occurrence of coalition governments in post- SMP 
New Zealand is to be expected. Yet the electoral system is insuficient for 
explaining the types of coalition that form, or accounting for the pres-
ence of the microparties in sometimes prominent roles in government. In 
the New Zealand case, coalition arrangements are quite varied and have 
had features that present challenges in classifying them. Of the six gov-
ernments formed in the MMP era, most are technically minority govern-
ments, despite the conidence- and- supply agreements with supporting 
parties (table 9.4). Since 2005, New Zealand governments have been inno-
vative in cabinet formation with several small and microparties supporting 
the large party in a coalition but absolving themselves of collective cabinet 
responsibility by remaining outside of cabinet. The Labour government of 
2005 was a four- party coalition that included the Progressives, New Zea-
land First, and United Future. Each of the party leaders of these small 
parties (microparties in the case of United Future and Progressives) held 
ministerial posts. The United Future leader held the post of minister of 
revenue while the New Zealand First leader became foreign affairs min-
ister, yet both of them were formally not considered cabinet members in 
order for their parties not to be bound by cabinet collective responsibility 
outside the areas of the portfolios. In 2008, the National government con-
tinued this practice, entering a partnership with ACT, United Future, and 
the Maori Party. This arrangement continued following the 2011 election.
These innovative arrangements of holding ministerial appointments 
and rank but staying outside of cabinets are unique but have not neces-
sarily spared the microparties of incumbency responsibility and costs. At 
times the supporting parties have been able to vote against cabinet policy 
such as the case of the United Future voting against the emission trading 
scheme (ETS) in 2008. Miller and Curtin (2011), in their study of the costs 
of coalition, provided evidence that small parties in coalition governments 
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have paid the price by losing parliamentary seats in subsequent elections. 
Using the 2011 general election as an example, the United Future lost one 
of its two MPs and the ACT Party lost three of its four, despite not being 
bound to cabinet responsibility outside their own ministerial positions.
Why, then, does this type of minority government exist in New Zea-
land? The impact of MMP on the New Zealand model is part of the story, 
but a critical factor is the nature of the executive. As mentioned in an earlier 
section, New Zealand’s relatively low threshold for seat allocation, in partic-
ular the alternative to the party- vote threshold, has unwittingly stimulated 
the growth of microparties and thereby enhanced the leverage of legacy 
politicians. The proliferation of political parties led by ambitious seekers of 
executive portfolios has created complications for coalition formation. With 
limited options from the Left to Right spectrum and the requirements for 
coalitions of at least four parties, the innovation of creating governments 
that are technically minority governments, yet provide pivotal roles to mic-
roparties, has come to typify the New Zealand experience.
Furthermore, the consequence of New Zealand’s Westminster parlia-
mentary tradition cannot be ignored in explaining the prevalence of minor-
ity governments. As Boston (2011, 80) argues, “[g]iven the uncomplicated 
and predictable nature of government formation under the irst- past- the- 
post electoral system, New Zealand had no need to develop the kind of 
formal and informal rules that characterize the process in most countries 
with proportional representation.” As New Zealand shifted to MMP, many 
of the formal and informal rules were never revised. Boston (2011) notes 
that New Zealand coalition negotiations are unencumbered and tend to 
be “free- style bargaining environment” (82) as there are no constitutional 
provisions to the appointment of a formateur or informateur, nor are 
there explicit rules on how the interparty bargaining is to be conducted. 
In addition, there is no constitutional constraint on the duration of gov-
ernment formation or the need for an investiture vote (Boston 2011). We 
can infer from the absence of these formal constitutional constraints and 
informal rules increased incentives both to form minority governments 
and to seek innovative ways of establishing cooperation among multiple 
parties. The combination of an MMP rule allowing parties to gain propor-
tional representation seats even if they fall below 5%— provided they win 
one district— with an unusually informal parliamentary executive structure 
makes for signiicant incentives to splinter parties. All that is needed is an 
assurance of one safe seat for a microparty, and then even if its party vote 
is not suficient for a second seat, that (one- MP) party may be in a piv-
otal bargaining position. In the government following the 2011 election, 
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United Future (with one safe seat for its leader, Peter Dunne, who has held 
it since 1984), ACT (with what otherwise would be a safe National seat in 
Auckland), plus the Maori Party (which won only in Maori districts), all 
have been able to earn ministerial posts and policy inluence.
The lexibility of interparty relationships in New Zealand under MMP 
is demonstrated even further by the case of a consistently midsized party, 
by our deinition: the Green Party, which has cleared the threshold in every 
election since 1999, and in 2011 elected 14 MPs. Despite its consistent 
middle size, the Greens have never held ministerial positions. However, 
they have had various policy- based relationships with Labour- led govern-
ments and in speciic policy areas even with National.
The Greens supported the Labour– Progressive minority coalition of 
1999–20 02 via a conidence- and- supply agreement, which entailed no 
executive posts for the Green Party, but offered them policy inluence. The 
two parties diverged in a very public way over the government’s intention 
to lift a moratorium on the importation of genetically modiied crops.25 
As a result of the disagreement, Labour PM Helen Clark called the 2002 
election a few months early. In the campaign the Greens pledged that they 
would not support a government that would lift the moratorium. Follow-
ing that election, Labour and Progressives were able to obtain support on 
conidence and supply from the United Future Party (which won eight 
seats, its strongest showing to date). The Greens, who also increased their 
support from seven to nine seats, went into opposition. By standing irm on 
an issue, the Greens cemented their reputation as a policy- seeking party.
In the run- up to the 2005 election, the Greens and Labour both cam-
paigned on a series of proenvironment policies, including the possible 
introduction of a carbon tax.26 During the campaign, the Greens publicly 
indicated an intention to assume cabinet positions.27 However, the elec-
tion did not give these two parties, plus Progressives, a majority in par-
liament. Labour instead signed conidence- and- supply agreements with 
United Future and New Zealand First, both of which vetoed a Green pres-
ence in the cabinet. During the life of that government, Greens had only a 
“cooperation agreement” and a role of “spokesperson” on energy eficiency 
and a “Buy Kiwi Made” campaign.28 Thus the 2002– 5 term of parliament 
featured further examples of the sort of lexible interparty arrangements 
that we discussed above. In addition to this being the government that 
pioneered the concept of ministers outside cabinet, it also had the unusual 
situation of what was technically an opposition party (because the Greens 
were not committed to supporting the government on conidence and sup-
ply)29 serving as the government’s oficial voice on some policy issues.
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In the inal months of the government, prior to the 2008 election, the 
Green Party backed the Labour government’s emissions trading scheme 
when the United Future party invoked the “agree to disagree” clause in 
its conidence- and- supply agreement and announced it would vote against 
the scheme. The Greens undertook a consultation process with their sup-
porters over whether to accept the ETS, which was much weaker than the 
carbon tax they (and Labour) had promised in 2005. In the end, they sup-
ported the ETS in exchange for the inclusion of a provision offering cred-
its to homeowners who installed insulation.30 Even under the National- led 
government of 2008– 11, which signiicantly revised the ETS to be more 
favorable to business and farmers,31 the Greens maintained a written agree-
ment with the government to pursue some policies of mutual agreement, 
such as home insulation and regulation of natural health products.32 These 
various examples thus show a case of a midsized party that enjoys represen-
tation thanks to the MMP system— never being dependent on winning dis-
tricts to enter parliament33— and employs a wide range of different tactics 
to enhance its policy inluence despite so far never having one of its MPs 
appointed to a ministerial post.
What is distinctive about the Greens in the New Zealand party system 
is their being a policy- based midsized party. Other parties have tried to 
carve out a niche in the policy space, but have failed to remain consistently 
over the threshold (ACT, New Zealand First [NZF]). United Future once 
has surpassed the threshold, in 2002, with the aid of an alliance with a con-
servative Christian group, but its support subsequently declined. It even 
tried to reposition itself as an outdoorsman’s party in 2011 by placing cam-
paign signs on the South Island against a pesticide being used to combat 
invasive pests, but received little electoral payoff and retained only the seat 
of its leader (on the North Island).
Thus, so far only the Greens have enjoyed middle- party status. New 
Zealand’s lack of midsized policy- based parties other than the Greens stands 
in marked contrast to Germany, where in most elections since 2005 there 
have been three such parties: the Free Democrats as a liberal probusiness 
party (which has been in many coalitions dating back to the early postwar 
years), the Greens (in coalition cabinets with the Social Democrats from 
1998 to 2005), and the Left (which has not had federal ministerial posts).
As for New Zealand’s microparties, their future is uncertain. First of all, 
those that are dependent on the legacy politician who founded the party 
may not outlast the eventual retirement or defeat of that leader. As noted, 
the Progressive Coalition has already shut down with the retirement of 
Jim Anderton. United Future has so far had only one election in which it 
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could enter parliament without needing founder Peter Dunne’s district. 
New Zealand First has sometimes needed leader Winston Peters’s former 
Tauranga seat, and other times it has cleared the threshold, as it did in 
2011. (It also has a more consistent voting bloc and a policy proile.) ACT 
is an intermediate case. It has staked out a position as a more liberal (in the 
sense of promarket) party than the National Party, and has won districts 
with different politicians in different elections. It also, as we noted, was 
large enough to qualify as a “midsized” party in the irst three MMP elec-
tions (see tables 9.1 and 9.3). Nonetheless, it has not had more than 7% of 
the vote since 2002.
The other reason why the microparties might be threatened is if one 
of the recommendations of the Electoral Commission during the MMP 
Review were to be implemented: the Commission recommended abolish-
ing the one- district alternative threshold. The Commission’s inal report 
states that the existing arrangement is “arbitrary and inconsistent” because 
it “gives voters in some electorates [districts] signiicantly more inlu-
ence over the make- up of parliament than voters in other electorates” (8). 
Under the proposal— which would have to be accepted by parliament to 
become law— a party could still enter parliament by winning one or more 
districts, but doing so would not qualify it for participation in proportional 
allocation. Without the possibility of winning additional seats, the attrac-
tiveness of voting for— or even forming— a microparty might diminish. 
As a partial counterweight to eliminating the one- seat alternative thresh-
old, the Electoral Commission has recommended lowering the party- vote 
threshold from 5% to 4%,34 as in fact the Royal Commission initially had 
recommended in 1986.
Party Financing
Besides the institutional factors of MMP as adopted in New Zealand 
and the pursuit of executive posts, one other factor creates an interest-
ing incentive as it changes the utility calculation of party politicians. In 
New Zealand, the state is the primary source of party funding for many 
parties. Based on the size of parliamentary representation, political parties 
are given a subsidy in order for them to perform their elected duties and 
manage their parliamentary and electorate ofices. Salaries of members of 
parliament are also in accordance to seniority and position held as MPs. 
For example, cabinet members have ministerial salaries in addition to their 
MP salaries. A prime minister who is also a party leader receives a prime 
minister’s salary, an MP salary, and a stipend as party leader.
For the large parties, National and Labour, the sources of party inanc-
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ing are well established. For the smaller parties, on the other hand, party 
subvention by the Crown becomes their main source of income. For the 
microparties, the party leader who is also an MP receives the extra stipend 
of a party leader besides the usual inancial support that MPs receive. For 
politicians with strong local support and in tandem with the low threshold 
for allocation of parliamentary seats, utility calculation of party politicians 
can favor defecting from a major party, forming a small party, increasing 
their chances of being a party leader (if elected) as well as their chances 
of being a player in future coalition government negotiations. Since 1996 
New Zealand has seen many microparties with varied life spans but with 
a decidedly unequivocal impact on the party system and coalition forma-
tion. In fact, from 1999 onward each of the governments had at least one 
coalition partner with a ministerial appointment that can be considered a 
microparty.
In this section we have seen how various features of the MMP system, 
when combined with the country’s lexible arrangements for interparty 
cooperation in government formation, policy making, and party- inancing 
laws, have contributed to the persistence of several microparties as well as 
the growth of one consistently midsized party. We now turn our attention to 
the relationship between the two tiers of the electoral system— the issue of 
“contamination” between the SMP and list- PR systems that comprise MMP.
Contamination and Dual Candidacies
In recent years, a substantial literature has grown up around the issue of 
so- called contamination effects in mixed- member systems.35 The concept 
essentially means that the effects of one tier may affect how the other tier 
works. The main direction of contamination (or “spillover”) discussed in 
the literature has been from the list tier to the nominal, resulting in more 
parties running and winning votes in the plurality races than would be 
expected if Duverger’s Law of plurality elections were constraining. The 
argument is typically that parties might expect to receive fewer list votes 
if they abandoned the district race, but that voters are suficiently reluc-
tant to split tickets that this behavior by parties results in their candidates 
obtaining votes even where they are not competitive in the district (Cox 
and Schoppa 2002).
Another variant of the contamination thesis is that parties that have 
incumbent MPs in districts might beneit from a “personal vote” cultivated 
by their MP (Karp 2009). Again, this argument assumes many voters will 
not split a ticket, and will vote for the list of the MP’s party. This form of 
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contamination actually implies that the presence of a nominal tier with 
personal- vote- earning MPs will reduce the fragmentation of the PR tier, 
given that smaller parties rarely have the opportunity to beneit from a 
personal vote of a district MP.
Contamination Effects and the Number of Parties
How does contamination, if present, affect the number of parties? On the 
one hand, the number of parties entering and receiving some signiicant 
vote shares in the single- seat districts might tend to be inlated, relative to a 
pure SMP system, by the presence of a list tier using proportional represen-
tation. A “reverse” version of the argument is that, despite proportional rep-
resentation, the presence of SMP competition depresses the overall number 
of parties, because voters may cue on the major parties and their popular 
incumbents and then be reluctant to split their tickets. Obviously these two 
potential directions of contamination work against each other, and if both 
are present, we should see moderate multiparty competition dominated by 
the top two, and little difference in the effective number of parties across the 
two tiers. Parties other than the top two would be present in the districts, 
and would earn seats based on their party votes, but there would not be a 
large difference between the vote shares of parties in each tier. The alterna-
tive to the contamination thesis is that the two tiers behave as though they 
were separate SMP and PR systems: a multiparty system in the PR tier, but 
competition in the districts centered around two dominant parties.
The New Zealand case is especially auspicious for testing this thesis, 
given the change from SMP to MMP. Here we will do so by comparing 
prereform and postreform elections in terms of the effective number of 
electoral parties. We will consider both the average of the various single- 
member districts before and after reform, as well as the national aggregate 
vote— in the MMP era, meaning both candidate and party votes. We have 
already seen, in a previous section, that while the prereform party system 
was essentially a two- party system in parliament, there was considerable 
third- party voting especially from the mid- 1970s on. Here we will look 
closer at the trends by bringing the district level in. It is, after all, at the 
district level where most of the posited effects on voter behavior take place 
(Moser and Scheiner 2012).
Figure 9.1 shows a graph with three trends in the effective number of 
vote- earning parties (N
V
) since 1963: the national aggregate of the can-
didate (district) votes (solid circles and connecting line); the mean of the 
individual districts (open circles and dashed line); party list votes under 
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MMP (triangles). Several noteworthy observations can be made. First of 
all, there was a mostly upward trend in the effective number of electoral 
parties (N
V
) from 1975 onward, with the notable exception of 1987. (Per-
haps one might discount the 1993 rise, given that the referendum that was 
expected to approve MMP was concurrent with this election.) Moreover, 
the national aggregate and district means track each other quite closely, 
signaling that the rise was not principally a result of a deiciency in what 
Cox (1997) refers to as “linkage”; that is, it was not due to different patterns 
of district competition being inlated when we project the districts up to 
the national level. There is some greater uptick in the national aggregate 
than there is for the district mean in the 1978– 84 period, but not much. 
The two lines increase at almost the same rate again in 1990– 93. In other 
words, Duvergerian patterns of two- party competition were breaking down 
to some degree not only nationally but also in the average district during 
these times. Nonetheless, we should not exaggerate the trend, because in 
no election had N
V
 > 3.0 until 1993.
As for the MMP period, there was a major spike in N
V
 by all three mea-
sures in 1996, as we might expect. We might say there was substantial con-
tamination from the party vote to the district vote, as the average district 
sees N
V
 rise to 3.3. However, there is also an apparent reduction of linkage, 
fig. 9.1. effective number of parties over time in new Zealand
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suggesting district patterns became more distinct than they had been pre-
reform. We see evidence for this in the fact that the national aggregate N
V
 
based on candidate votes was closer to that based on party- list votes than it 
was to the district mean.
Then, with each passing election under MMP, there has been a down-
ward trend in N
V
 based on candidate votes (both aggregate and district 
mean), even in years when N
V
 based on party votes turned upward, as it did 
in 2002 and, more modestly, in the 2005– 11 period. Strikingly, the district 
mean N
V
 is lower in the most recent three elections under the MMP era 
than it was in any election in the later SMP period of 1978– 93, except for 
1987. This is, of course, evidence against one variant of the contamination 
thesis, because a case could be made that the average single- seat district is 
more “Duvergerian” under the proportional mixed- member system than it 
was during a time when such districts were the only game in town.
The overall decline in fragmentation from its high point with the irst 
MMP election suggests that the dominant trend is not so much contami-
nation as it is the emergence of separate vote patterns in the two tiers.36 
This is suggested most especially by the three recent elections when N
V
 on 
party votes has trended modestly upward again, but that based on elector-
ate votes has been lower than in most of the elections of the latter prere-
form period.
It is worth noting that the pattern we see in igure 1 in which the two 
tiers showing a distinct “psychological” effect (in Duverger’s terms) need 
not be typical of MMP. Compare igure 9.2, which replicates what we saw 
in igure 9.1, only for the case of Germany since 1953. Before uniication 
in 1990, the mean district N
V
 was generally below 2.5, and hence quite 
“Duvergerian.” Moreover, there is little difference between the aggregate 
N
V
 for either nominal or list votes, suggesting little ticket- splitting— a ind-
ing consistent with literature that directly addressed the phenomenon (e.g., 
Fisher 1973). In the 1990s and especially in the 2005 and 2009 elections, 
on the other hand, the mean district has become notably more fragmented. 
All three indicators have turned sharply upward, and the somewhat larger 
gap between nominal and list votes implies more ticket- splitting as well 
(conirmed in a study of the 1998 election by Gschwend, Johnston, and 
Pattie 2003), but not— critically— to the extent of keeping anything like 
a Duvergerian equilibrium in the single- member districts. In fact, Ger-
many’s mean district N
V
 has not been below 2.5 since 1983, and rose to 2.9 
in 2005 and 3.5 in 2009. Thus, at least over several recent elections, the two 
MMP systems seem to be diverging. Germany seems to be experiencing 
contamination from the PR tier to the nominal, whereas in New Zealand 
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the two tiers are showing distinct patterns— two- party dominance in the 
single- seat districts, but considerable third- party voting on the PR vote.37
Dual Candidacy and Personal- Vote Contamination Effects
As we noted previously, some variants of the contamination thesis imply that 
large parties beneit from the “personal vote” cultivated by their incumbent 
MPs, and that this results in those parties that win many plurality races 
also performing especially well on the party- list vote. We have already cast 
some doubt on this form of contamination, by observing a recent growth 
in the gap between N
V
 based candidate and party votes.38 There are other 
possible forms of cross- tier contamination, however, which we take up in 
this section. In particular, the practice of dual candidacy may create impor-
tant cross- tier contamination effects. We could observe contamination 
on the intraparty dimension, meaning how parties and candidates relate 
to one another and how much incentive legislators have to cultivate con-
nections to a locality (Shugart 2005). Speciically, intraparty contamina-
tion could mean either district- level electoral competition affording less 
local representation and accountability than a pure SMP system, or the 
list tier becoming “personalized” and “localized” in a way that would be 
fig. 9.2. effective number of parties over time in germany
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unusual if the system were entirely a list proportional system (assuming 
lists are closed, as they are in New Zealand). At least in the New Zealand 
context, the former direction of possible contamination— weakening of 
district- level incentives on politicians— is controversial and perceived as 
normatively “bad” due to the perceived illegitimacy of dual candidacy. The 
other direction of contamination likely would be considered “good” if it 
were perceived to be functioning. The consideration of how contamination 
works on the intraparty dimension in New Zealand is tied up in the issue of 
dual candidacy— the right of candidates to stand for ofice simultaneously 
in a district and on a party list.
In New Zealand, as in Germany and Japan but unlike in Taiwan, dual 
candidacies are allowed. In Germany, there seems little controversy over 
the practice, in contrast to the deep controversy found in Japan, where the 
“best loser” provision by which parties may choose to rank their lists may 
exacerbate the perceived illegitimacy of dual candidacy. In New Zealand, 
the major parties, Labour and National, have tended to have a majority of 
their candidates run in both tiers simultaneously; in recent elections, the 
percentage has been 70% or higher. The Green Party likewise has dually 
nominated most of its candidates, including 97% of them in 2011. The mic-
roparties’ behavior has been somewhat variable. (Data from Vowles 2012.)
Dual candidacy has increasingly come under scrutiny and criticism. In 
fact, it was explicitly one of the provisions subject to the review of MMP 
following the referendum of 2011, under the Electoral Referendum Act of 
2010. A case can be made that dual candidacy can be an eficient and desir-
able feature of a mixed- member system— “good contamination,” in a sense. 
Allowing dual candidacy means that parties have an incentive to nominate 
high- quality personnel in districts that they may have little chance of win-
ning. If dual candidacy were banned, a party might be disinclined to risk 
wasting a good candidate in a likely losing district contest, and instead 
ensure the candidate a place in parliament via a good rank on the party 
list. This risk would be especially acute for parties that expect to win seats 
only, or primarily, via the list. For instance, a party like the Greens, were 
there no dual candidacy, would be unlikely to nominate its best candidates 
in districts, because it depends on the party vote to gain seats. As the New 
Zealand Electoral Commission put it in its inal report from the MMP 
review: “Without dual candidacy, MMP elections would be poorer con-
tests” (Electoral Commission 2012, 9).
A positive feature of dual candidacy is that it may encourage greater 
local representation than either a pure SMP or PR system would do. If 
MPs elected via the list set up local ofices in the constituencies they con-
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tested but lost, then voters have representatives that they can contact for 
assistance from more than just the party that won the most votes in their 
area. Evidence from the parliament elected in 2011 appears to bear this 
out. Eleven dual- listed National Party MPs who won their seat via the 
party list maintain electorate ofices and often identify themselves by titles 
such as “List MP based in [electorate name].” Labour has eight list MPs 
who follow a similar strategy of maintaining an electorate ofice.39 Even 
the Greens, despite not coming close to winning an electorate, maintain 
several “Electorate Ofices” although in fact the ofices are shared between 
multiple MPs and the ofices are located in just a few cities where the party 
has its greatest strength. This pattern its a party that is less geographi-
cally focused in its platform, but that has mainly an urban constituency. As 
for the fourth largest party, New Zealand First, in 2011 all but the leader, 
Winston Peters, were dual nominees and all but two of their MPs maintain 
electorate ofices.40
The biggest controversy over dual candidacy stems from incumbents 
losing their district race yet remaining in parliament via the party list. That 
these legislators are sometimes referred to by names like “zombies” or 
“back- door MPs” calls attention to their perceived illegitimacy. Despite 
the controversy, there is little objective evidence that it is a major phe-
nomenon in the New Zealand experience with MMP. For example, Vowles 
(2012) shows that the overall turnover of MPs from one election to the 
next actually has been greater under MMP than it was under SMP. More-
over, from 1999 through 2011, only once has the percentage of incumbent 
MPs defeated in a district race but remaining in ofice due to the list been 
above 10% of all district MPs (in 2005); it was only 2.9% in 2011. More-
over, most of the district losers who remain by winning a list seat retire 
after just one more parliamentary term (Vowles 2012).
The controversy over dual candidacy thus does not seem based in the 
actual results of elections in New Zealand. Moreover, if New Zealand-
ers wanted to remove the possibility of district losers continuing, a simple 
“incumbent defeat assurance” provision could be inserted into the law as 
follows: a losing district incumbent whose own candidate vote trails his or 
her party’s vote in the district is skipped on the list. In this way, if the MPs in 
question lost because their party became less popular (which will often be 
a nationwide swing, and not a speciically local effect) they can retain their 
seat if they are suficiently valued by their party as to have a list rank that 
permits their election. However, if they lose because they are less popular 
than their party, they are done— the list can’t “save” them from rejection by 
their electorate. Such a proposal is discussed in the Electoral Commission’s 
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online Proposals Paper during the MMP review, although not speciically 
recommended.41 In the end, the Commission recommended no change to 
the dual- candidacy provision.
Conclusion
Fifteen years after the switch from SMP to MMP, not all New Zealanders 
are totally convinced of the merits of MMP as evidenced by the modest 
majority obtained by the current system at the referendum of 2011. The 
Royal Commission of 1985– 86, which originally proposed the MMP sys-
tem, certainly anticipated many of the well- known mechanical effects of 
MMP— particularly the high degree of proportionality— as the German 
example was available as a reference.
Yet little did anybody anticipate that, beyond the mechanical effects, 
the switch to MMP would result in some features of New Zealand poli-
tics that are distinctive. For example, the effective number of parties in 
the country has actually turned out to be somewhat lower than in Ger-
many, despite the broad similarity of the systems. In recent years, the two 
cases have diverged, with Germany becoming more fragmented in both 
the nominal and list tiers. By contrast, in New Zealand it seems that the 
tiers may be diverging from one another, as the two traditional parties, 
Labour and National, continue to dominate the district competition while 
various other parties combine for 20– 25% of the party vote and a compa-
rable share of the seats. New Zealand is characterized by many more very 
small parties than is Germany, which we attributed to the incentives of 
both the alternative threshold (one district victory being suficient to win 
proportional representation) and the attractiveness of entering cabinets or 
becoming a support partner to either major party. This latter feature may 
be subject to change in the future, as the “legacy politicians” who founded 
several of the smaller parties eventually retire and especially if the Elec-
toral Commission’s recommendation to abolish the alternative threshold 
is followed.
In surveying the effects of several mixed- member systems, Shugart 
and Wattenberg (2001b) asked whether they could offer “the best of 
both worlds.” While any such conclusions are necessarily normative, our 
overview of the consequences of MMP in New Zealand suggests that the 
answer may be yes. On the one hand, the system is overall proportional, 
as expected from its mechanical effect. On the other hand, voting in the 
single- seat districts has become relatively concentrated on the two main 
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parties, and the presence of the nominal tier appears to allow for some 
degree of personal vote. In fact, legislators appear to maintain contact with 
local constituents (e.g., through electorate ofices) even in districts where a 
different party has won the local contest. In these ways, we see the impact 
of both tiers shaping the political process in New Zealand.
n o t e S
 1. Thus far the Left has not been considered a party with coalition potential.
 2. In fact, the Green Party’s roots go back before the Alliance was formed, and 
may be found in the Values Party that contested several elections (but won no seats) 
in the 1970s and 1980s.
 3. While the term irst past the post electoral system is more commonly used 
in New Zealand to describe the single- member plurality (SMP) electoral system, 
in this chapter we use the term SMP as part of the standardized usage of acronyms 
and terminology in this volume.
 4. For a detailed typology of MMP and MMM systems, see Shugart and Wat-
tenberg (2001a).
 5. An “overhang” results when a party with less than 5% of the party- list vote 
obtains at least one district seat. Under current practice, not only does such a party 
qualify for list seats, but if its number of districts won exceeds its proportional share 
(of 120), the size of parliament is expanded to account for the overhangs. The Elec-
toral Commission proposed ending both practices. In addition, it recommended 
retaining the status quo for by- election candidacy, dual candidacy (which we discuss 
below), and the ordering of party lists.
 6. Nonetheless, the National Party, as of 2011, has actually formed three of the 
six post- MMP governments, albeit with some bargaining challenges, as we discuss 
in the section below on government formation.
 7. As in New Zealand, there is a provision for overhang seats (überhangmandate). 
A key difference in Germany is that even though overall proportional entitlements 
to parties are determined nationwide, the overhangs are determined within each 
state.
 8. As is typical, we count the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian 
Social Union as separate parties. The latter competes only in Bavaria, whereas the 
former competes in the rest of the country. The two act as a single party in parlia-
ment.
 9. If we were to count the CDU and CSU as one party, these igures would be 
about .84 as high, on average (3.97 in 2009). All but the 1990 igure (2.65) would 
remain higher than any value in New Zealand under MMP.
 10. N
S
 fell in 2013 in large part due to the Free Democratic Party failing to clear 
the threshold.
 11. Counting CDU and CSU as one, the 1969– 87 average is 2.44 and it would 
not be over 3.00 until 2005.
 12. It is worth noting that, due to the difference in parliament sizes, Germany’s 
alternative threshold of three districts won is not clearly higher than New Zea-
land’s one district. Germany’s was equivalent to about 1.2% of total districts before 
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reuniication but is about 0.5% of districts in the larger postuniication Bundestag. 
New Zealand’s is around 1.4% of districts. Nonetheless, it is presumably more dif-
icult for a very small party to ind three candidates capable of winning districts— 
assuming it is not a party focused on a regional cleavage— than it is to have one 
such candidate. In the case of New Zealand, as we discuss later, that one candidate 
is often the party founder who already held the seat with one of the larger parties 
in the pre- MMP era.
 13. In 1994, the Party of Democratic Socialism won three districts in the formerly 
Communist east, but only 4.4% of the nationwide party vote. In 1990, it won repre-
sentation with only 2.4% of the nationwide party vote, but at that election there was 
a one- time variance in the threshold: a party had to win 5% in only one of the former 
separate countries of West Germany and East Germany, rather than nationwide.
 14. In practice, a party that has one district win needs about 1.5% of the party 
vote to qualify for a second seat.
 15. The Seat Product is the average district magnitude (M) multiplied by the size 
of the assembly (S). Taagepera’s models predict that the number of seat- winning 
parties (of any size) is the fourth root of the Seat Product, while the effective num-
ber is the sixth root: N
S
 = (MS)1/6.
 16. Actual parties are approximated by the inverse square root of the thresh-
old (expressed in fractions rather than percent), and N
S
 by the inverse cube root, 
according to the logical models.
 17. In Germany, given the greater dificulty of a small party winning despite being 
below the threshold, one would want to use only the threshold- based models. An 
estimated 4.47 parties (of any size) in parliament is close to the recently observed 
5, but the observed effective number is now much higher than the estimated 2.71. 
Perhaps it is Germany, and not the newer MMP case of New Zealand, that is the 
hard case to explain!
 18. The minimum in any one cabinet has been three if we count the two Christian 
Democratic parties (CDU and CSU) separately. While they always have entered 
government or gone into opposition as if they were one party, they maintain their 
separate party organizations and leadership.
 19. This is in partial contrast to Japan and Taiwan, where preelectoral alliances 
have been more common.
 20. Such agreements state that a minor party will not vote against the govern-
ment in motions of conidence or supply, typically in exchange for some coopera-
tion on policy areas of mutual interest.
 21. As discussed in greater detail below, Maori voters under both the SMP and 
MMP systems have had the option of voting in separate single- member districts set 
aside to ensure representation of the Maori. The Royal Commission had recom-
mended abolishing the Maori districts as unnecessary under a proportional system, 
but waiving the usual party- vote threshold for parties representing Maori.
 22. A Labour defector, former inance minister Roger Douglas, was also a 
cofounder of ACT.
 23. After a brief stint with a party called New Labour.
 24. In the voter registration period, citizens are asked whether they claim Maori 
ethnicity and, if so, if they would like to be enrolled in the Maori roll.
 25. See “Greens Given GM Warning,” New Zealand Herald, March 6, 2002. The 
narrative here also draws heavily on Carroll (2005).
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 26. “Labour Takes Green Road,” New Zealand Herald, August 31, 2005; “Conces-
sions Squeezed Out of Labour,” New Zealand Herald, October 18, 2005.
 27. “Greens Demand Two Posts in Cabinet,” September 15, 2005.
 28. “Labour- Led Government Co- operation Agreement with Greens,” October 
17, 2005 (accessed by authors from Green Party website on October 20, 2005).
 29. In fact, the party went so far as to issue a press release on October 19, 2005 
saying the presence of New Zealand First and United Future meant the govern-
ment was “bad news for New Zealand workers.”
 30. “Labour Wins Crucial Votes on Emissions Trading Plan,” New Zealand Her-
ald, August 27, 2008.
 31. The amendments to the ETS secured the support of the now National- 
aligned United Future. In addition, the Maori Party was pivotal, and for its support 
obtained a provision allowing carbon credits for the planting of trees on tribal land. 
See “Emissions Trading Money Scramble,” The Press (Christchurch), November 
23, 2009, and “‘Sellout’ Claim over ETS Deal,” The Press (Christchurch), Novem-
ber 24, 2009. The staunchly promarket ACT, also a National partner, voted against 
the amended ETS (preferring no ETS at all).
 32. “Memorandum of Understanding between the New Zealand National Party 
and the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand,” dated April 8, 2009 (accessed from 
the Green Party website in November 2009).
 33. The Greens won an electorate (Coromandel) once, in 1999, thanks to some 
informal cooperation with the Labour Party, which did not withdraw its candidate 
from the district, but did encourage supporters to vote for the Green candidate in 
the otherwise National- leaning district.
 34. In fact, the Commission’s Report says that 3% would be preferable and would 
not be so low as to threaten government stability. However, it concludes such a 
change would be too drastic and politically unpalatable, thereby settling on 4%.
 35. Apparently the irst use of the term contamination to refer to concurrent 
majoritarian and proportional balloting not being identical to the respective sys-
tems when used separately is Shugart and Carey (1992, 239– 42). They refer to cases 
of presidential elections using plurality and legislative elections using PR. In the 
literature on mixed- member systems, the concept of contamination appears to have 
been used irst by Herron and Nishikawa (2001), who emphasized in a comparison 
of the Japanese and Russian MMM systems that the PR tier results in a lessened 
impact of the single- seat districts on the number of parties.
 36. Even as early as the second MMP election, Karp et al. (2002) noted that split- 
voting followed a predictable pattern, with “strategic defections” from parties that 
were not viable in the voter’s electorate.
 37. The Scottish and Welsh MMP systems appear to be in between the effects we 
show here for Germany and New Zealand: a signiicantly lower N
V
 for the nominal 
tier compared to the list, but also average N
V
 in the districts that is greater than 3.0 
(Crisp et al. 2012).
 38. Horiuchi, Shugart, and Vowles (2013), analyzing the effect of redistricting on 
the vote in New Zealand, ind evidence for a personal vote for incumbents, who 
tend to obtain fewer candidate votes from voters who were not in their district 
prior to redistricting. However, they do not ind evidence for contamination, as 
voters who are redistricted are not less likely than other voters to vote for the list of 
the incumbent’s party.
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 39. Labour and National each have a few MPs who ran only on a list. Some of 
these were recruited from the private sector for their policy expertise (e.g., trade 
or health), while others represent minority ethnic communities. Some of these list- 
only candidates set up ofices upon being elected, while others did not.
 40. The two are Peters and the MP elected in Peters’s former electorate of Tau-
ranga, Brendan Horan.
 41. See http://www.mmpreview.org.nz/proposals/dual-candidacy (last accessed 
February 27, 2013). The Commission acknowledges a submission to the MMP 
Review by Shugart as the source of this suggestion.
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Presidents and Blank Votes in the Bolivian 
and russian Mixed- Member Systems
Nathan F. Batto, Henry A. Kim, and Natalia Matukhno
Mixed- member electoral systems confront voters with two choices: a list 
tier ballot to be cast on the basis of the party and a nominal tier ballot to be 
cast on the basis of the characteristics of the local candidates. Some voters 
do not make these two choices independently, but instead use information 
about the choices in one tier to help make the choice in the other tier. 
These sorts of “contamination” effects have been the subject of a great 
deal of research (Cox and Schoppa 2002; Herron and Nishikawa 2001; 
Nishikawa and Herron 2004; and Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005).
In the introduction to this volume, Batto and Cox argue that directly 
elected executives shape the legislative party system differently than indi-
rectly elected executives. We build on this idea and argue that in presiden-
tial systems, a third consideration— what the voters know of the presiden-
tial candidates— may also shape the vote choice on the list and nominal tier 
ballots. Presidential elections typically dominate public discourse during 
an election campaign, and voters often know much more about the presi-
dential candidates than the party platforms or their local district candi-
dates. Many voters might project what they know of a presidential candi-
date onto his party’s list or district nominee. However, we argue that the 
presidential candidates do not affect list and district tier decisions equally. 
The connections between the presidential candidate and the party list are 
typically much closer and more apparent, and voters may consequently be 
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less willing to assume that the district nominee is simply a local avatar for 
the presidential candidate.
This is especially apparent in new democracies with less institution-
alized parties that do not penetrate deeply into society. When a party is 
simply a hastily constructed vehicle for a presidential candidate’s national 
campaign, local organizations are often weak, underfunded, and impotent. 
Many district candidates for such parties are likely to be unknown political 
novices without a credible chance of winning. Even people who turn out 
to support the presidential candidate and are willing to back the national 
party list may balk at voting for a completely unknown quantity with little 
chance of winning on the district ballot.
Some countries allow voters to vote “blank” or “against all,” and we 
examine patterns in these blank votes to infer how presidential candidates 
affect voting in the list and nominal tiers. An explicit blank vote can be 
interpreted as a sign that none of the candidates in that tier have inspired 
the voter to vote, so the impetus to vote must have come from elsewhere.1 
We examine two elections that took place in very different political envi-
ronments, Bolivia in 2002 and Russia in 2003, and ind that blank votes 
were much more common in the nominal tier than in the list tier. More 
important, larger numbers of blank votes were correlated with better per-
formance in the list tier by more loosely organized parties led by personally 
popular and charismatic presidential candidates. These results are consis-
tent with the idea that presidential candidates had a larger contamination 
effect on the list vote than on the district vote, and the effect was particu-
larly strong for presidential candidates of newer and less organized parties.
Contamination Effects and Presidential Candidates
The basis of the contamination effect is commonly thought to be psycho-
logical. Herron and Nishikawa suggest that voters value consistency in 
their vote choices. That is, if voters observe the same choices available on 
both ballots, they are inclined to make the same vote choices in both tiers 
(2001, 68– 69). Cox and Schoppa also argue that the physical presence of 
the district candidate campaigning locally and furnishing a “human face” 
to a race has a positive impact for a party. Such a presence helps mobilize 
what they term “either way voters,” those without a strong psychological 
or habitual commitment to that party. Moreover, the presence of a district 
candidate can increase the party’s list tier totals, even if that district can-
didate stands no chance of capturing the nominal tier seat (2002, 1031). 
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Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa (2005, 67) make the argument explicitly 
informational by explaining the effect as an informational shortcut: vot-
ers can judge the quality of all the candidates on the party list by simply 
looking at the quality of the particular candidate in their local district. In 
the presence of this contamination effect, even small parties without any 
prospect of winning the election in the nominal tier are encouraged to ield 
candidates in as many districts as they can in order to improve their list tier 
performance, thus countering the Duvergerian incentive to abstain from 
participating in unwinnable races.
These arguments all look at how the district race contaminates the 
party list race. The most compelling evidence comes from parliamentary 
democracies, such as Italy, New Zealand, Germany, and Japan. This is no 
coincidence. Parliamentary systems often lack a single, nationalized party 
politician with a separate electoral mandate from his or her legislative 
counterparts, who can furnish a distinct “face” for the rest of the party 
(Samuels and Shugart 2010). By the nature of the institution, voters in a 
parliamentary system are not asked to vote explicitly for the party’s national 
standard bearer in an election. While parties may conscientiously attempt 
to draw voter attention to their leaders, the linkage is at best indirect in the 
absence of an ability to vote directly for their standard bearers by name. 
Furthermore, party leaders in a parliamentary system often are not the 
most electorally proitable choices to act as their parties’ “human faces.” 
Party leaders in parliamentary democracies have often risen through the 
ranks on the basis of their skills as backroom operators in the legislative 
process, rather than on their ability to arouse the masses outside the cham-
ber (Samuels and Shugart 2010). In other words, the voters in a parlia-
mentary system can sometimes be confronted with a set of rather dry or 
uninspiring national party faces to base their party list decision on.
Presidential systems are qualitatively different, especially when the 
presidential and legislative elections are held concurrently. Presidential 
candidates provide a visible and recognizable face. Often, they are political 
outsiders who have built a strong, well- deined reputation of their own. 
Indeed, many successful presidential contenders, regardless of the coun-
try, are likely to have risen in politics through their ability to mobilize 
supporters through their own actions, rather than their roles in the inner 
workings of parties (Samuels and Shugart 2010). Media coverage is usually 
dominated by the presidential campaign, and the messages and reputations 
of local candidates are often drowned out amid the focus on the executive 
race. Such focus on the personal appeals of the presidential candidates is 
arguably justiied. After all, the person elected president will be the head of 
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government, and parties have no mechanism like a vote of no conidence to 
ensure that presidents from their party actually follow the party line. Quite 
the contrary, presidents almost always become the de facto party leaders 
and often decide to lead their parties in new directions chosen according to 
their personal priorities. Thus, not only is the information about the presi-
dential candidate more easily accessible than corresponding information 
about a party leader in a parliamentary system, voters are fully justiied in 
adjusting their attitudes about a particular party based on that information.
Particularly in U.S. politics, the electoral impact of the president on 
legislative elections has long been recognized in numerous studies of the 
so- called coattail effect and its impact on legislative elections (Burnham 
1975; Calvert and Ferejohn 1983; Campbell 1997; Miller 1955). However, 
the importance of the president may be even greater in other presidential 
democracies, especially where presidents enjoy greater formal power rela-
tive to other political actors or where political parties have shorter histories 
and weaker reputations. Newer and less institutionalized parties are much 
more likely to ield a reasonably charismatic presidential candidate than to 
be able to recruit a full slate of well- known candidates to run for the legis-
lature. Modern media technology can help project the faces of presidential 
candidates to the homes of voters in every district, regardless of the eficacy 
of the local party organizations in promoting voters’ familiarity with can-
didates for the legislature. In short, information from the national race, or 
more accurately, the presidential race, is likely to be much stronger, clearer, 
and more omnipresent than information garnered from the local races.
Presidential elections also affect turnout. More people turn out to vote 
in legislative elections when a presidential election is being held concur-
rently. Perhaps more signiicantly, voters in concurrent elections also turn 
out to vote for different reasons.2 Since they have been bombarded with 
information about the presidential race, they are often thinking primarily 
about the presidential race and supporting a particular presidential can-
didate. The legislative race is usually a secondary consideration. Indeed, 
many people may cast their legislative vote as an expression of support for 
the presidential candidate.
If the presidential candidate is the human face of the party, the extent 
to which this human face spills over to the list and district votes may differ. 
The presidential candidate is usually the leader of the party. Even when 
he stresses positions that are at odds with orthodox party doctrine, other 
party leaders tend to downplay these differences since highlighting intra-
party divisions during a campaign is usually a losing strategy. Hence, equat-
ing a vote for the party list with support for the presidential candidate is 
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relatively straightforward. Doing so for the district candidate, however, is 
more complicated. District races are run along different contours from the 
national campaign. Districts may diverge signiicantly from the national 
average on many dimensions, such as ethnic makeup, partisan balance, and 
economic vitality. Different issues may matter locally, and local preferences 
may be at odds with national preferences. Because of this, a local party 
nominee may not always follow the national party in lockstep. Voters in 
local districts must also consider the question of viability. Party list seats 
are distributed proportionally, and even parties with relatively low levels 
of support can win list seats. This is not the case in the nominal tier with 
single- seat districts. Disorganized, underfunded, and unknown candidates 
are usually sure losers. Strategic voters may be loath to waste their district 
vote on such a candidate, even if they support the party’s presidential can-
didate. Alternatively, they may simply decide that voting for the party’s 
district nominee is hopeless and choose not to vote at all in the nominal 
tier.3 In short, some voters will base their legislative votes on their opinions 
of the presidential candidate, and this is more likely to occur in the list tier 
than in the nominal tier.
Blank Votes and Inchoate Parties
In a number of countries, including Bolivia and Russia, voters have the 
option to vote “blank” or “against all”— to indicate that the voter does not 
want to support any of the candidates or parties. Blank votes are not the 
same as null votes, in which a voter votes for multiple candidates, does not 
mark any option, writes something inappropriate on the ballot, or otherwise 
spoils the ballot, and blank votes are counted separately from null votes.4
Why would a voter cast a blank vote? It is possible that the voter is highly 
informed about each candidate and simply dislikes all of them. However, 
most highly informed voters can eventually conclude that one candidate 
is a little better than the others, or at least that one is awful enough that it 
is worth it to vote for someone else in order to stop the worst candidate. 
Another possibility, which we suspect is more common, is that most blank 
votes relect extremely low levels of information. That is, the typical blank 
vote occurs when the voter does not know enough about any of the options 
to decide that any of them are better (or worse) than the others.
This begs the question of why such a voter would turn out in the irst 
place. Of course, it could just be that the voter has a strong sense that 
voting is a democratic duty (Achen and Hur 2011) and believes that the 
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actual choice is less important than the mere act of participation. More 
signiicantly for our purposes, a voter may turn out to vote because she 
has a strong opinion in a different race taking place at the same time. For 
example, with concurrent party list and district elections, the voter may 
have a strong opinion in the former elections but not in the latter race. In 
this case, the voter might vote for a party in the list tier and vote blank in 
the district tier.
Since information about presidential candidates is so prevalent, and 
this information leaks primarily into the list tier and only secondarily into 
the district tier, most voters should be able to make a choice in the list 
tier. Information from the presidential race is less useful in local races, and 
more voters might be unable to differentiate among the various names 
on the ballot. Some of these voters will respond by explicitly not making 
any choice, by casting a “blank” ballot. Alternatively, voters who turn out 
expressly to support the presidential candidate may vote for the party list, 
which is closely associated with the president, but not the district candi-
date, who may not be viable or may take somewhat different positions. 
More of these voters should vote blank in the nominal tier than in the list 
tier. This implies:
H1: In countries with a presidential system and a mixed- member 
electoral system, blank votes should be more common in the dis-
trict tier than in the list tier.
H1 is fairly crude; it makes only a single, national- level prediction. How-
ever, we can use the differences between more institutionalized and less 
institutionalized parties to draw a more inely tuned hypothesis. The rela-
tive degree to which the presidential candidate deines the “face of the 
party” varies from party to party. We are particularly interested in parties 
that revolve around a single leader. Where these types of parties are strong, 
blank votes should be more common.
These personal vehicle parties are often hastily organized for the 
upcoming presidential campaign, and the rest of the party is somewhat of 
an afterthought. Ironically, it may be precisely the presidential candidates 
who most thoroughly embody their party image who have the most trou-
ble extending that image and inluence voting down to the local level. It is 
often much harder for new and disorganized parties to assemble a roster of 
competent local candidates. Instead, these inchoate parties are often only 
able to cobble together a group of unknown, unimpressive, and under-
funded local politicians. Such local politicians will have dificulty commu-
284 Mixed-Member electoral Systems in constitutional context
nicating information about themselves to the voters, so they cannot com-
pete with, modify, or reshape the image projected by the national party. 
However, they might also be so anonymous that there is effectively no 
local presence for the national party face to be projected onto. The more 
invisible the local candidate, the more likely voters are to decide that there 
is no viable foot soldier for their favored presidential candidate. Almost by 
deinition, an anonymous candidate is an incompetent candidate. In such a 
district, voters might decide simply to vote for the presidential candidate’s 
party in the list tier and to vote blank in the nominal tier.
Older, more established, or less personalized parties are likely to have a 
stable of fairly well- known local candidates supported by a substantial net-
work of organizations at the grassroots level. The better the organization, 
the easier it is for politicians to familiarize and ingratiate themselves with 
their voters. Access to such organizational resources permits candidates of 
more established parties a greater opportunity than their counterparts in 
more inchoate parties to communicate to the voters and, in so doing, assert 
their viability. In such a party, the presidential candidate is not the sole 
face of the party, and local candidates may even try to present a slightly 
different platform or image. However, because of the national focus on 
the presidential race, the presidential candidate will still be the dominant 
face of the party. Even the strongest local candidates are generally happy 
to cloak themselves in the aura of their party’s presidential candidate. Vot-
ers in these situations who want to support the presidential candidate have 
a viable candidate and a clear strategy. In essence, the difference between 
more and less organized parties is that the roster of viable candidates 
ielded by the former has the capacity to soak up all the votes from sup-
porters of the presidential candidate while the roster of the latter may not.
Many parties in presidential systems are formed precisely as personal 
vehicles to promote the political fortunes of a politician with presidential 
ambitions.5 These parties are often hastily organized and lack any sort of 
organizational capacity to penetrate deeply into society. Indeed, the rest 
of the party is somewhat of an afterthought. For these parties, the pro-
jection from the presidential candidate to the party list should be quite 
strong. Since the presidential candidate dominates the party, the top spots 
on the party list usually go to his close allies or cronies, and, with a lower 
electoral threshold, viability is less of a problem. However, parties formed 
as personal vehicles are precisely the types of parties that ind it dificult 
to cobble together a full roster of competent local candidates.6 They may 
have strong local candidates in some districts, but these newer parties typi-
cally round out the roster with unqualiied, unknown, underfunded, or oth-
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erwise dismal candidates. At the extreme, they may not even be able to ield 
a candidate at all. Such local politicians will have dificulty communicating 
information about themselves to the voters, so they cannot compete with, 
modify, or reshape the image projected by the national party. However, 
they might also be so anonymous that there is effectively no local presence 
for the national party face to be projected onto. The more invisible the 
local candidate, the more likely voters are to decide that there is no viable 
foot soldier for their favored presidential candidate. Ironically, it may be 
precisely the presidential candidates who most thoroughly embody their 
party image who have the most trouble extending that image and inluence 
voting down to the local level.
In short, whereas the rosters of established parties tend to be illed with 
competent local candidates, inchoate parties have a higher percentage of 
incompetent local candidates. Since voters are more likely to vote blank in 
the nominal tier when the local candidate of their favored party is incom-
petent or missing altogether, parties that are newer, less organized, or per-
sonal vehicles should be more associated with blank votes in the nominal 
tier than older and more institutionalized parties. This leads to our second 
hypothesis:
H2: In countries with a presidential system and a mixed- member 
electoral system, blank votes in the nominal tier should be more 
common in areas in which less institutionalized parties win a 
higher vote share in the list tier.
Methodology and Case Selection
Methodologically, this paper employs a most different systems research 
design. In this research design, cases that are different on a set of control 
variables are compared. However, the independent variables of interest and 
the dependent variables of the cases should be the same. If the theorized 
process works the same way, with the same independent variables leading 
to identical outcomes, in very different contexts, this provides conidence 
that the outcome is not the result of some third variable (Przeworski and 
Teune 1970, chap. 2).
Given the preceding theoretical discussion and hypothesis, we need 
cases with directly elected presidents, mixed- member electoral systems for 
the legislature, the option to vote blank, and a party system in which par-
ties’ capacity to ield a roster of credible local candidates varies. The cases 
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should be different in as many other aspects as possible. The patterns of 
blank votes should then vary in predictable and similar ways.
We have chosen to examine Bolivia in 2002 and Russia in 2003. Both 
countries have a presidential system and elect their national legislature by 
a mixed- member system. In Bolivia, voters can vote “blank,” while in Rus-
sia, voters can cast a vote “against all.” The party systems are discussed 
below, and we argue that both cases featured some parties that could pres-
ent credible candidates in most races and other parties that did not have 
such broad- based organizations.
In the remainder of this section, we note some of the more obvious 
differences between the two cases. Russia is much larger, ecologically 
diverse, and more populous. Bolivia was a Spanish colony, while Russia 
was the heart of an empire. In the Cold War, Russia was a central player 
while Bolivia was a peripheral pawn. Following the Russian Revolution of 
1917, most property was collectivized and controlled by the state. After the 
Bolivian Revolution of 1952, land was seized from landlords and given to 
local communities and syndicates who held it collectively on behalf of the 
local peasants (Klein 2003, 214– 15). Bolivia remains a much more rural 
and agricultural society. Ethnically, both countries are diverse, but Russia 
is dominated by ethnic Russians, while Bolivia has historically been domi-
nated by its white minority rather than by the indigenous peoples who 
collectively make up a majority.7 In recent years, indigenous peoples have 
transformed their numbers into political power through extensive grass-
roots organizing by social organizations. There has been no equivalent 
wave of grassroots social movements in Russia. In Bolivia, the mobiliza-
tion of large numbers of previously inactive citizens led to an enormous 
increase in voting.8 By contrast, turnout has declined in Russia.9
There are a few notable differences in the two electoral systems. First, 
Russia had an MMM system, while Bolivia employs an MMP system. Sec-
ond, Bolivia uses a fused vote. Voters cast two ballots, and the nominal tier 
ballot elects the local district seat for the lower house. The second ballot 
is more consequential. It not only decides the seat share for each party 
in each department, it is also used to elect the president and the Senate. 
In fact, what we are calling the list tier ballot is better understood as a 
presidential ballot that is also applied to legislative seats. In this chapter, 
we assume that presidential candidates effectively become the face of their 
party. The Bolivian fused vote almost necessarily assures that this is the 
case, since a vote for the presidential candidate is indistinguishable from 
one for the party list. However, Russia does not use a fused vote. In 2003, 
voters cast three separate ballots for the district, party list, and president. A 
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third difference is that parties in Bolivia run full slates of candidates. One 
possible reason for a blank vote is that the voter’s favorite party may not 
run a candidate in the local district race. Rather than vote for another, less 
favored party, the voter might simply vote blank. This was certainly a pos-
sibility in Russia, but it probably does not drive the overall results because 
Bolivian parties present full slates of candidates. That is, every party that 
runs one candidate for president or the legislature runs a candidate for 
every seat available. In 2002, 11 parties presented presidential candidates, 
each of the 68 legislative districts had 11 candidates, and each of the e11 
parties listed 62 candidates for the 62 party list seats. Unafiliated candi-
dates were not allowed, so the partisan choice set was exactly the same for 
every voter. If a Bolivian voter had a favorite party, she could vote for that 
party on both ballots.
the Bolivian Party System in 2002
In the later part of the 2000s, the Bolivian party system underwent a dra-
matic change, evolving into a dominant party system. However, in 2002 the 
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) was just beginning its rise to power, and it 
was just one of several contenders for power. The party system was a rather 
fragmented multiparty system, and no party had won an absolute majority in 
votes or seats since the restoration of democracy in the early 1980s.
Three parties, the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), 
the Acción Democratica y Nacionalista (ADN), and the Movimiento de 
Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), dominated politics throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s. All the presidents in that era came from one of these three par-
ties, and they collectively won over half the vote in every election. The 
MNR and MIR can both trace their roots to the 1940s, while the ADN was 
formed in the 1970s by the former military dictator Hugo Banzer (Klein 
2003). Ideologically, the MIR presents itself as a leftist party, the MNR as 
a centrist party, and the ADN as a rightist party. However, all three signed 
on to the neoliberal economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, and by 
2002 there was not a great difference among the three traditional parties’ 
stances on economic issues (Singer and Morrison 2004, 174). Instead, the 
three parties’ primary focus was on distributing patronage to their follow-
ers (Gamarra and Malloy 1995; Domingo 2005, 1731).
Prior to the electoral reform of 1994, seats in the lower house of the 
legislature were elected by closed list PR. As might be expected, power 
within the traditional parties was characterized as centralized and hierar-
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chical. In particular, nominations were tightly controlled by the top lead-
ers (Gamarra and Malloy 1995, 419). Indeed, one of the main reasons for 
the electoral reform was to encourage closer ties between politicians and 
their voters (Mayorga 2001a, 201), and stronger pressures for district can-
didates to develop local reputations began to emerge after reform (May-
orga 2001b, 438– 42). At the same time, the Law of Popular Participation 
passed in 1994 marked a signiicant devolution in political power from the 
central government to localities, making it much easier for local politicians 
to establish local power bases (Van Cott 2008). By 2002, the three tradi-
tional parties had been concentrating on distributing patronage for over a 
decade. Much of this patronage went through local politicians who used 
it to build personal reputations.10 As such, by 2002 the three traditional 
parties could ield rosters of candidates who would have been quite well 
known in their local districts.
A second group of parties was quite different. In 2002, two new parties 
emerged as contenders for power, inishing second and third in the presi-
dential election. The Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR) was led by Man-
fred Reyes Villa, a former prefect of Cochabamba. The NFR was a vehicle 
for Reyes Villas’s presidential candidacy, and it declined quickly after his 
defeat in the 2002 election.
The Movimiento al Socialismo won second place over the NFR by 
fewer than a thousand votes. The MAS was dominated by a campesino 
movement headed by Evo Morales. Morales had been elected to the leg-
islature in 1997 under the banner of the Izquierda Unida, but had split off 
to form his own organization in 1998. Because the costs of establishing a 
formal political party are high, MAS agreed to let Morales and his organi-
zation run under their banner in 2002 (Van Cott 2008, 53). While Morales 
has now been the dominant force within MAS for a decade, the party in 
2002 was less a coalition of politicians than an umbrella group of heteroge-
neous social movements supporting a charismatic leader (Mayorga 2008). 
While MAS had candidates with local organizations and popularity in 
some areas, this network was patchy. Moreover, the leaders of these move-
ments were primarily social activists and only secondarily candidates for 
political ofice. These two very different challenges require very different 
types of organizations, tactics, and appeals.
A third party, the Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (MIP) vied with the 
MAS for leadership of the movement for indigenous people’s rights, tak-
ing a more aggressively proindigenous stance (Domingo 2005, 1737– 38; 
Madrid 2005, 165). Like the NFR and MAS, it was dominated by a char-
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ismatic leader, Felipe Quispe. Van Cott suggests that “the MIP is more a 
personalist vehicle for Quispe than the electoral expression of a social- 
movement organization. It is a classic charismatic party in that the leader 
determines party goals, chooses all militants and candidates, mediates all 
disputes, oversees all communications, distributes all incentives, and pre-
vents the institutionalization of structures or leadership beyond his per-
sonal control” (2008, 55).
The NFR, MAS, and MIP looked very different from the three tradi-
tional parties in 2002. Whereas the latter had networks of established local 
politicians, the former were dominated by charismatic leaders. Their ros-
ters of district candidates were almost certainly characterized by candidates 
who had not been funneling patronage resources into building personal 
followings for several years.
In the 2002 election, the three traditional parties won 42% of the list 
vote, while the three new parties won 48%. Five small parties combined to 
win the remaining 10%. In this paper, we will not consider the ive small 
parties.
the russian Party System in 2003
Not unlike the Bolivian elections in 2002, the Russian elections in 2003 
featured a fragmented mixture of parties, none of which enjoyed anything 
approaching dominant electoral support. Most of the parties were rela-
tively new, having been born in the chaotic 1990s following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Indeed, only one, the Communist Party of the Rus-
sian Federation (KPRF), the successor to the Communist Party of Soviet 
Union, could be considered an “old” established party among the con-
tenders in 2003. The newer parties differed among themselves in terms 
of the paths to party organization they adopted. Some were built around 
centralized leadership of charismatic leaders without much organization at 
the local level while others established close connections with the central 
government in Moscow and leveraged their access to power to build orga-
nizational networks that could support local candidates.
The KPRF inherited substantial organizational assets from the old 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In addition, many of its mem-
bers retained control over administrative resources in much of the coun-
try throughout 1990s, especially in the southern regions of Russia, which 
became known as the “red belt” on the account of continued strong sup-
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port that the party retained (Hadenius 2002). Its leader, Gennady Zuganov, 
was a former bureaucrat famously lacking in charisma and with little per-
sonal following (White 2005).
United Russia, the party associated with Vladimir Putin, would soon 
become the dominant party, but in 2003 it was still merely a plurality party. 
United Russia had been constructed on the foundation of earlier attempts 
to build a party of power (Gel’man 2008). In the mid- 1990s, Yeltsin sup-
porters had formed Our Home Russia as a party of power to support the 
Kremlin in the Duma. In 1999, these Kremlin insiders were challenged by 
a coalition of local governors operating under the label of Fatherland, and 
Fatherland almost won a majority in the Duma. In an effort to consolidate 
power and tie the powerful local governors to the Kremlin, Our Home 
Russia merged with Fatherland to create a new party, called Unity. This 
new party, which was later renamed United Russia, was meant to promote 
penetration into Russian society and prevent future strong challengers 
from emerging (Hale 2006). United Russia relied heavily on local gov-
ernors, other oficials supportive of the Putin administration, and on the 
country’s largest companies (White 2005). Each brought their respective 
constituencies into the coalition as well as impressive abilities to mobilize 
the electorate.
The Union of Right Forces (URF) was founded by high- level oficials 
in the Yeltsin government who had been associated with attempts to imple-
ment liberal economic reforms and continued to push for a deepening of 
market liberalization and democratization (Kara- Murza 2001). The URF 
envisioned itself as a party that would work within the power structure 
whenever possible, cooperating with the authorities to implement their 
preferred policies (Klyamkin 2004), and it continued to enjoy some sup-
port from and access to the Kremlin during the early 2000s (Sakwa 2005; 
Gel’man 2008).
United Russia and the URF thus constituted the de facto legislative 
coalition supporting the Kremlin and its program in the early years of 
Putin’s administration (Rose, Munro, and White 2001; Sakwa 2005). This 
connection to the regime likely yielded them the resources necessary to 
build organization at the local level, to recruit a superior slate of local can-
didates, and certainly to better familiarize voters with their candidates.
Three other parties, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), 
Yabloko, and Motherland, had far less organizational strength or local 
reach. The LDPR serves as a personal vehicle for its charismatic leader, 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Zhirinovsky’s appeal centers on economic issues 
and nationalism. LDPR attempted to create strong grassroots organiza-
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tions during the 1990s, but these efforts have largely failed. While it still 
maintains regional branches, caucuses, and committees, its regional leaders 
remain mostly unknown (Hadenius 2002).
Similarly, Yabloko was dominated by a charismatic leader, Grigory 
Yavlinsky. Yabloko tried to model itself along the lines of European social 
democratic parties (White 2005), but its electoral and organizational bases 
remained conined to Moscow and St. Petersburg (Hadenius 2002). Unlike 
the other major liberal force, the URF, Yabloko operated as a pure opposi-
tion party, systematically opposing government proposals, and it did not 
enjoy access to a stream of resources from the Kremlin (Gel’man 2008).
The third party of this group, Motherland, was only created a few 
months before the 2003 elections and had very little time to develop an 
organization or establish a reputation. It was founded by federal and local 
elites who were opposed to Putin and United Russia. Motherland hoped to 
siphon away supporters from the KPRF and LDPR, and the party appealed 
to nationalist voters who supported some socialist ideals but were dissatis-
ied with the Communists (White 2005).
In sum, we identify the KPRF, United Russia, and the URF as more 
institutionalized parties at the time of 2003 election, and the LDPR, 
Yabloko, and Motherland are classiied as less institutionalized.
data and results
H1 makes a simple national- level prediction, that there should be more 
blank votes in the nominal tier than in the list tier. This expectation is 
clearly realized. Table 10.1 summarizes the results of the two elections. In 
Bolivia in 2002, 12.0% of the votes in the district tier were blank, nearly 
three times the 4.4% blank votes in the list tier. In Russia in 2003, the dis-
parity was similar. Only 4.7% of the votes in the list tier were blank, but 
13.3% of voters cast blank votes in the district tier. Note that this pattern 
is not conined to the two elections we are studying. Table 10.2 shows that 
there have been far more blank votes in the district tier than in the list tier 
in all eight elections held under mixed- member rules. In fact, the trend 
was particularly dramatic in Bolivia in 2005 and 2009. In 2005, a whop-
ping 25.2% of district votes were blank, while only 4.0% of list votes were. 
In 2009, there was again an enormous disparity, with 21.4% blank in the 
district tier and 3.3% blank in the list tier. The consistently high numbers 
of blank votes in the districts tier is a stunning inding, especially from the 
perspective of mobilization. One of the old tropes of political campaigns 
tABLE 10.1. Summary of 2002 Bolivian and 2003 russian Elections
 
List tier District tier
votes % votes %
Bolivia 2002
MNR (M) 624,126 22.5 611,027 23.9
MAS (L) 581,884 20.9 373,454 14.6
NFR (L) 581,163 20.9 395,559 15.5
MIR (M) 453,375 16.3 478,614 18.7
MIP (L) 169,239 6.1 134,177 5.3
ADN (M) 94,386 3.4 190,618 7.5
Other parties 274,635 9.9 371,670 14.5
Valid votes 2,778,808 100.0 2,555,020 100.0
Null 84,572 2.8 73,417 2.5
Blank 130,685 4.4 359,380 12.0
Total votes 2,994,065 100.0 2,987,817 100.0
Russia 2003
United Russia (M) 22,776,294 40.1 14,124,122 28.6
KPRF (M) 7,647,820 13.5 6,119,161 12.4
LDPR (L) 6,944,322 12.2 1,827,716 3.7
Motherland (L) 5,470,429 9.6 1,719,147 3.5
Yabloko (L) 2,610,087 4.6 1,54,1463 3.1
Union of Right 
Forces (M)
2,408,535 4.2 1,757,146 3.6
Other Parties 8,975,297 15.8 7,173,919 14.5
Independents 15,127,780 30.6
Valid votes 56,832,784 100.0 49,390,454 100.0
Null 948,435 1.6 1,247,512 2.1
Blank 2,851,958 4.7 7,745,248 13.3
Total votes 60,633,177 100.0 58,383,214 100.0
Notes: (M) indicates party is classiied as more institutionalized; (L) indicates party is 
classiied as less institutionalized. Vote shares for parties and candidates are calculated 
using valid votes; shares of null and blank votes are calculated using total votes.
tABLE 10.2. Blank Votes in Mixed- Member 
Elections in Bolivia and russia
  List tier District tier




Russia 1993 4.2% 15.4%
1995 2.8% 9.9%
1999 3.3% 11.9%
 2003 4.7% 13.3%
Source: All Bolivian data and the Russian data for 2003 are 
from the oficial election commissions. Russian data for 1993– 
99 come from the Project for Political Transformation and the 
Electoral Process in Post- Communist Europe dataset (http://
www.essex.ac.uk/elections/).
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is that you just have to get your voters to the polls. However, in most of 
these elections, one- tenth of the voters who were at the polls chose not to 
vote for any district candidates. One imagines throngs of voters coming in 
to the polls, voting for the president, then turning to a district ballot full of 
bewilderingly anonymous names, and either voting for the candidate with 
the same party label as their preferred presidential candidate or simply vot-
ing blank to fulill their obligations as citizens to participate.
H2 states that there should be more blank votes in the district tier when 
a new and less organized party does better in the list tier. Based on the 
discussion in the previous two sections, we can crudely classify the various 
parties as more or less institutionalized.
For each country we ran two simple OLS regressions. We analyzed the 
2002 Bolivian and 2003 Russian elections using sub- district- level election 
returns. In Bolivia, we examined the 19,876 precincts, while in Russia we 
looked at the 2,756 towns. The dependent variable is the excess of blank 
votes in the district tier. This is calculated as the percentage of blank votes 
in the district tier minus the percentage of blank votes in the list tier.11 The 
independent variables are the party list vote shares of the more institution-
alized and less institutionalized parties. We expect the coeficient for the 
less institutionalized parties to be larger than that for more institutional-
ized parties, relecting a greater number of blank votes where less institu-
tionalized parties are more popular. We operationalize the independent 
variables in two different ways. The simpler method is to add all the less 
(more) organized parties together to see the overall pattern. We also exam-
ine the individual parties to make sure that the pattern applies to each party 
within the group.
The results are in table 10.3. Models 1 and 3 compare the two groups of 
parties. The coeficients for the more organized parties should be smaller 
than those for the less organized parties.12 In both models, this is, in fact, 
the case. That is, higher numbers of blank votes in the district tier (control-
ling for blank votes in the list tier) are associated with better performances 
by less organized parties in the list tier. To illustrate the magnitude of this 
effect, we might consider some hypothetical cases. In Bolivia, consider a 
precinct with 45% for the more organized parties in the list tier, 45% for 
the less organized parties, and 10% for all other parties. In Russia, consider 
a town with 60% for the more organized parties, 25% for the less orga-
nized parties, and 15% for all others. These cases, which are fairly close to 
the national averages, should yield 7.2% and 8.1% more blank votes in the 
district tier than in the list tier, respectively. If we make a modest change by 
giving the organized parties 10% more and the less organized parties 10% 
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less, the excess blank votes decline to 6.1% and 4.9% in the Bolivian and 
Russian examples, respectively. Even relatively small changes are suficient 
to produce notable differences in the percentages of blank votes.
In Models 2 and 4, we disaggregate the groups into individual parties in 
order to ensure that these results apply to each individual party. In fact, we 
ind exactly the patterns we expect. In both countries, all three of the less 
organized parties have larger coeficients than any of the more organized 
parties. Moreover, the differences between these coeficients are statisti-
cally signiicant. Table 10.4 looks at post- hoc pairwise comparisons of the 
coeficients. In Bolivia, the coeficients for all parties are signiicantly dif-
ferent at the p < .001 level. In Russia, there are pairs within each group that 
are not signiicantly different, but all pairs between groups are signiicant.
Overall, we ind clear support for our hypotheses. There are far more 
blank votes in the district tiers than in the list tiers. Moreover, higher per-
centages of district blank votes are associated with better list tier perfor-
mance by relatively inchoate parties.
tABLE 10.3. oLS regression of Blank Votes and Party List Vote 
Shares
  b s.e. t
Bolivia 2002
Model 1 Constant .120 .006 19.84
Adj R2 = .156 Less organized .002 .007 .31
N = 19,876 More organized – .109 .007 – 16.00
Model 2 Constant .127 .006 21.06
Adj R2 = .184 MIP .052 .007 7.36
N = 19,876 MAS – .028 .007 – 4.17
NFR – .009 .007 – 1.20
MIR – .084 .007 – 11.36
MNR – .121 .007 – 16.77
ADN – .182 .009 – 19.43
Russia 2003
Model 3 Constant – .053 .012 – 4.46
Adj R2 = .254 Less organized .381 .017 22.27
N = 2,757 More organized .064 .014 4.52
Model 4 Constant – .014 .013 – 1.10
Adj R2 = .277 Yabloko .599 .049 12.22
N = 2,757 LDPR .326 .027 11.92
Motherland .278 .027 10.37
United Russia .038 .015 2.63
URF – .006 .042 – 0.06
 KPRF – .065 .024 – 2.74
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Conclusion
This volume examines many ways in which the constitutional system 
affects other elements of the political system. Various chapters examine the 
effects of the constitutional system on the party system, the faction system, 
the way candidates are nominated, the ways in which candidates campaign, 
and so on. This chapter examines another facet of this theme: how the 
electoral system, in conjunction with the presidential system, shapes the 
linkage between elections for different ofices. In particular, presidential 
candidates shape the legislative elections by acting as the public faces of the 
parties that color voters’ evaluations of legislative parties and candidates.
Our perspective departs from the previous studies of contamination 
effects that have generally focused on parliamentary systems and have 
emphasized how local district candidates inluence national party list 
choices. In contrast, this chapter argues that the presidential system pro-
vides a basis for a potentially powerful contamination effect in the oppo-
site direction. Voters project what they know of the presidential candidate 
onto the party list and, to a lesser extent, local district candidates. This 
complements, rather than repudiates, the existing research by elucidating a 
broader institutional context in which such intertier electoral interactions 
take place. By virtue of having the chief executive subject to a direct elec-
tion, presidential systems encourage recruitment and development of char-
ismatic party leaders who can successfully appeal directly to the broad elec-
torate, with an independent political base of their own. The institutional 
tABLE 10.4. Pairwise Comparison of regression Coeficients  
from table 10.3
Bolivia MAS NFR MIR MNR ADN
MIP * * * * *
MAS * * * *
NFR * * *
MIR * *
MNR     *
Russia LDPR Motherland UR URF KPRF
Yabloko * * * * *
LDPR * * *
Motherland * * *
United Russia *
URF      
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates the difference between the two coeficients is statisti-
cally signiicant; the probability that they are equal is p < .0001.
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role normally required of parliamentary systems, of appealing largely to a 
relatively limited group of party elites applies comparatively less to those 
in a presidential system. Leaders in a presidential system, thus, tend to 
be better equipped to exert an inluence on the vote choices in legislative 
elections, even if the formal institutional linkages may be potentially more 
tenuous.
This chapter, however, also observes that the extent to which the presi-
dential election can contaminate the legislative election is constrained by 
the nature of the parties. Counterintuitively, the more a presidential can-
didate monopolizes the party image, the less he may be able to project 
the party face onto local candidates. We have shown that the district can-
didates representing less institutionalized parties do not appear to be as 
able to capitalize on the popularity of their own presidential candidates as 
their better institutionalized counterparts. In parties organized around a 
single presidential candidate and with anonymous local candidates, voters 
may not see the local nominee as an avatar for the presidential candidate. 
Rather, they might simply conclude that there is no viable local foot soldier 
for their favored presidential candidate. To successfully project the party 
face, the local candidate must meet a certain standard of competence. That 
is, presidents most successfully act as the face of their parties when the 
party can ield a full roster of candidates who each have their own local 
identities, resources, and networks in society. Shared party label alone, 
then, is not a suficient condition for the separation of mandates inherent 
in a presidential system to be overcome in the electoral arena. The institu-
tional separation between elections to different ofices remains signiicant: 
successfully bridging this gap requires a superior party organization at the 
local level.
n o t e S
 1. We draw distinction between an explicit blank vote, where the voter deliber-
ately chose no particular candidate, from an invalid vote, where the nonchoice of 
the voter may be due to technical reasons other than actual voter choice.
 2. This linkage is important in the pattern of “Surge and Decline” well known 
from studies of U.S. presidential and off- year elections (see Jacobson 2009 for an 
overview).
 3. The incentives to vote strategically differ in MMM and MMP. In MMM, 
standard Duvergerian logic applies. Voters have an incentive to avoid wasting their 
votes on lower ranking candidates. In MMP, the seat shares of each party are deter-
mined by the list tier vote, so incentives to vote strategically are much weaker. 
After all, if a party loses a particular nominal seat, it will be compensated with one 
additional list seat. On the one hand, this frees voters to vote sincerely for their 
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favorite party. On the other hand, if they do not have strong feelings about the local 
race, voters are also free to abstain or vote blank. While the logic differs, the critical 
point for this paper is that in both MMM and MMP there are reasons for voters 
who support a national party with an uncompetitive local candidate to eschew vot-
ing for that local candidate.
 4. In this paper, we consider both blank and null votes to be invalid votes. That 
is, they are included in calculating turnout, but they are not included when calculat-
ing the vote share of candidates or parties. This is consistent with the practice in 
Bolivia, but not in Russia. In Russia, both blank and null votes are counted in the 
divisor for the purposes of determining whether a party has passed the 5% thresh-
old to receive list tier seats.
 5. For example, Hicken notes that in the Philippines the number of legislative 
parties is inlated by the number of presidential candidates. Many of the parties are 
newly formed personal vehicles of a particular presidential candidate and are typi-
cally not highly institutionalized (Hicken, chapter 8, this volume).
 6. It is not always the case that hastily organized parties cannot recruit a large 
number of competent local igures. For example, in Taiwan James Soong’s People 
First Party was hastily organized before the 2001 legislative election and attracted 
many established politicians. We do not consider this sort of party as an incho-
ate party. The key question is not whether the party has a charismatic leader, but 
whether the leader stands alone as nearly the only politician with a popular follow-
ing in the party.
 7. In the 2006 LAPOP survey, Bolivians self- identiied as 64.8% mestizo, 19.3% 
indigenous, and 11.0% white. On a separate question asking which, if any, indige-
nous group they belonged to, 36.4% said they were Quechua, 24.2% were Aymara, 
10.9% mentioned another indigenous group, and 28.5% belonged to no indig-
enous group (Seligson et al. 2006). In general, self- identiication as indigenous has 
increased markedly since 1998.
 8. In 1989, 1.57 million votes were cast in the presidential election; in 2002, the 
number of votes nearly doubled to 2.99 million.
 9. Turnout in Russia was 54.2% in 1993, 64.3% in 1995, 61.3% in 1999, and 
55.3% in 2003 (Nohlen and Stover 2010).
 10. See Lazar 2004 for a case study of one such politician.
 11. These percentages are calculated using total votes. Party list vote shares are 
calculated using valid votes only.
 12. The constant is determined by the minor parties. These parties are outside 
the scope of this paper, so the fact that the constant is positive in Model 1 and nega-
tive in Model 3 is unimportant.
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Mixed- Member Systems Embedded 
within Constitutional Systems
Chi Huang
A concluding chapter may be expected to pull all the previous chapters 
together. Although inferring from individual chapters generally applicable 
statements about the consequences of mixed- member electoral systems is 
not easy, we can still expound upon the common threads running through 
the entire volume and briely summarize the major indings of our puzzle- 
solving efforts.
Theoretically, the most important theme that has emerged from this 
volume is that the effects of electoral systems must be considered within 
a speciic context. Whereas the conventional approach is to consider the 
effects of legislative electoral systems in isolation, hence called legislature- 
centric, this volume has repeatedly demonstrated that similar electoral sys-
tems embedded within different constitutional arrangements can produce 
very different sets of incentives. Speciically, researchers should keep both 
legislative seats and executive ofices in view while analyzing the effects of 
legislative electoral systems. Institutions matter, but the institutional con-
text within which those institutions are embedded also matters.
Starting Point: A Puzzle
Grofman (2001) suggests that political science in general and comparative 
politics in particular can advance by solving real- world puzzles. This book 
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starts with a puzzle for researchers of electoral systems: Why is it that two 
similar East Asian democracies, Taiwan and Japan, both switched from sim-
ilar SNTV to similar new MMM systems, yet displayed divergent speeds 
and degrees of approaching theoretically expected political consequences 
(see Huang 2011)? As Huang, Kuo, and Stockton point out in chapter 1, 
after the electoral reform in 1994, Japan saw a gradual evolution from a 
multiparty system toward a two- party system over ive House of Repre-
sentatives election cycles. In contrast, after Taiwan’s constitutional amend-
ment in 2005, the party system changed almost immediately to a two- party 
mold in the irst postreform legislative election in 2008 and remained so in 
the second election in 2012.
Comparative Methodology
The approach we have adopted in this book to solve the puzzle is to look 
beyond legislative electoral systems per se. Besides examining the similari-
ties and differences between each country’s electoral rules, we further embed 
each legislative electoral system within its broad political contexts, especially 
its constitutional framework of executive power (see also Grofman 1999).
At irst glance, this approach seems to complicate our task since each 
country tends to have a unique combination of electoral arrangements, 
constitutional set- ups, and party systems. Yet this broader perspective 
forces us to conduct comparative studies both within and between coun-
tries. By tracing the same country over time before and after the electoral 
reform, we can focus more on the pure effects of electoral system change 
under the identical constitutional framework, although within- case design 
also tends to lose sight of the inherent interaction between electoral sys-
tems and constitutional arrangements. This shortcoming is overcome 
by drawing comparisons between systems so as to isolate and verify the 
best candidate, that is, the coordination for pursuing executive ofices, 
to explain their differences in outcomes. The 10 chapters in this volume 
adopt, explicitly or implicitly, this joint within- system and between- system 
comparisons approach.
Solution to the Puzzle: Executive- Centric theory
Through elaborate country comparisons, all the contributors reach the 
same conclusion. That is, the electoral system is no doubt important since 
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it determines how votes cast in an election are translated into seats in the 
legislature. Yet it does not operate in vacuum. Since parties and elites aim 
at winning both executive ofices and legislative seats, whether the head of 
government is directly elected and how cabinet posts are allotted also affect 
how the legislative electoral system shapes politicians’ incentives. There-
fore, the competition for executive power shapes the party system as much 
as it does the legislative arena. To fully understand the effects of an electoral 
system, we must imbed it within the broader political contexts, especially 
the constitutional framework, of the country in question. The reason for 
this is because the appeal of and the competition for the executive ofices 
often occupy a higher priority for political parties and elites, and it is the 
combination of the legislative electoral system and the constitutional set-
 up that deines the payoffs of capturing executive ofices and the degree of 
cross- district coordination required to capture the executive ofice.
To evaluate the impacts of the mixed- member electoral systems, several 
factors should be taken into account. Legislature- centric theory indeed 
spells out clearly the impact of district magnitude, the effective threshold 
for the party list tier, the ballot structure, assembly size, and dual candidacy, 
among other factors. Executive- centric theory, on the other hand, further 
broadens our theoretical landscape by examining “embedded effects” of elec-
toral systems, including the payoffs of the executive ofices, the degree of 
coordination required to capture the executive ofices, and the sustainabil-
ity of the executive ofices (e.g., term limits). Other things being equal, 
the higher the payoffs and the greater degree of cross- district coordina-
tion required to win the executive ofices, the stronger the incentives for 
elites to form and stay in the major parties, and therefore the faster the 
country will move toward a two- party system. As Lin argues in chapter 2, 
this explains why Japan under the parliamentary system, which allows for 
some leeway in postelection bargaining, took a much longer time to evolve 
into a two- party system, while Taiwan under the semipresidential system, 
in which the winner of the presidential race takes all the cabinet posts and 
leaves no room for postelection bargaining, moved almost immediately to 
a two- party system after shifting from SNTV to MMM.
However, the comparative studies looking beyond Japan and Taiwan 
in part II caution us not to jump to a conclusion that the presidential/
semipresidential system under MMM hastens a two- party system while 
the parliamentary system does otherwise. As Hicken points out in chapter 
8, parliamentary Thailand moved from a multiparty system to a two- party 
system after adopting an MMM system in 1997 while the presidential 
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Philippines changed in the opposite direction in the post- Marcos era even 
before implementing an MMM system. This seemingly contradictory pair 
serves as a warning against treating the institutional rules mechanically and 
directs our attention to the underlying factor: the nature of the executive 
ofice, including the appeal of capturing the ofice and the sustainability of 
the ofice. Instead of generating a new puzzle, the cases of Thailand and the 
Philippines actually reinforce the executive- centric theory.
The same argument extends to a different type of mixed- member 
system— mixed- member proportional (MMP). As Tan and Shugart argue 
in their chapter 9 on parliamentary New Zealand, since MMP was adopted 
in 1993 the effective number of electoral parties rose between 1993 and 
1996 and then has generally declined since the irst MMP election in 1996 
but a high number of very small “microparties” remains. This stands out 
in contrast to the mostly similar case of Germany. Taking into account 
not only the features of the MMP system but also politicians’ pursuit of 
ministerial posts in the cabinet can help illuminate this idea. Batto, Kim, 
and Matukhno’s chapter 10 on Bolivia and Russia further indicates that the 
so- called contamination effect in the literature of MMM systems is not 
limited to the two ballots for legislators but may well also exist between 
executive and legislative ballots. In other words, what the voters know of 
the presidential candidate may also shape their vote choices on the SMD 
and PR ballots. They ind that while voters may vote for the PR list to sup-
port the presidential candidate, whether or not these contamination effects 
extend to the nominal tier depends on the level of institutionalization of 
the party. This implies that the coattail effects often considered unique to 
presidential systems combined with single- member congressional districts 
may also apply in mixed- member systems due to the visibility of the presi-
dential candidates, another example of executive- centric theory.
Extensions to other Parts of the Political Systems
The number of parties is one of the most heavily researched variables in 
comparative politics, but other facets of the political system are also crucial 
in determining the ways in which politics operate in any country. In this 
volume, contributors have examined faction systems, nominations, post 
allocation, preelectoral coalitions, and ticketsplitting and found that the 
embedded institutional context produces interesting variations in each of 
these areas.
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Faction Systems
In parliamentary Japan, the change from SNTV to MMM shifted the focus 
of competition away from intraparty competition and toward interparty 
competition. As many expected, this did somewhat weaken the LDP’s 
internal factions and strengthen the party leadership. However, Kobayashi 
and Tsukiyama argue in chapter 3 that the prime minister’s need to main-
tain parliamentary conidence gives the factions leverage and ensures that 
they will continue to exercise considerable inluence. In contrast, Batto and 
Huang ind in chapter 4 that electoral reform has had a much more mod-
est inluence on Taiwanese factions. KMT local factions are constructed to 
win control of local governments, especially city mayors and county mag-
istrates, so the change in the national legislative electoral system has not 
affected them much. DPP factions are more focused on national politics, 
but the evolution of those factions from legislative- centered to presidential 
contender- centered is primarily a result of the presidency becoming an 
achievable goal rather than because of electoral reform. The experience of 
the KMT and DPP factions also points to the limits of focusing solely on 
the electoral system in the national legislature, as both have been shaped 
by a variety of electoral rules, including those for local executives, local 
assemblies, and party ofices.
Candidate Selection, Post Allocation,  
and Preelectoral Coalitions
The centrality of executive ofices also explains some differences in intra-
party competition, nominations, and preelectoral coalitions. Yu, Shoji, and 
Batto suggest in chapter 5 that because legislators are commonly appointed 
to executive positions in Japan but not in Taiwan, the incentives to remain in 
the parliament are much stronger in Japan. The resulting different empha-
sis on incumbency implies different sets of problems that parties need to 
resolve in the nomination stage. In Japan, where the best districts are usu-
ally occupied by entrenched incumbents, parties developed the innovative 
kobo system to allocate nominations for less desirable districts. In Taiwan, 
incumbents are not protected, and the parties developed a system of poll-
ing primaries to determine hotly contested nominations in very desirable 
districts. Nemoto and Tsai point out in chapter 6 that, in both Taiwan and 
Japan, parties used cabinet positions to reward party politicians for going 
out and winning votes in elections. However, while the use of cabinet posi-
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tions as carrots was widespread in Japan, it was much more limited in Tai-
wan due to the fact that legislators could not concurrently serve as minis-
ters. Likewise, they argue that the presence of institutional features such 
as the conidence vote and bicameralism made alliances between large and 
small parties more tenable in Japan.
Voters’ Behavior
The differences in the feasibility of small parties, nomination strategies, 
and preelectoral coalition that result from differences in the constitu-
tional structures in turn deine the choice set available to voters and thus 
shape their patterns of straight- and split- ticket voting. As Wang, Lin, 
and Hsiao ind in chapter 7, in both Taiwan and Japan ticket- splitting 
takes place mainly within the two major coalition camps rather than 
across camps. Identiiers with small parties are more likely to be ticket- 
splitters when they vote sincerely in their PR ballot but support viable 
district candidates of major parties of the same alliances. This result of 
voter- level analysis meets the expectation of the conventional legislature- 
centric theory well. However, it does not mean that the legislature- centric 
perspective is suficient to explain ticket- splitting patterns. Quite the 
contrary, it further conirms the importance of understanding how pre-
electoral coalitions are shaped to begin with by both executive posts and 
legislative seats, a point our executive- centric perspective emphasizes. In 
essence, political elites structure the alternatives based on institutional 
incentives— executive as well as legislative— and then voters respond 
to the available choice set on ballots based the electoral rules. In this 
respect, executive- centric theory reminds researchers to pay close atten-
tion to how both constitutional and electoral systems impose restraints 
on the way voters can vote.
Although this volume focuses on the effects of mixed- member elec-
toral systems, especially MMM systems, we believe that our indings and 
conclusions have profound implications for the study of electoral systems 
in general. Electoral systems, important as they are, do not operate in a 
vacuum. Their origins, evolution, and impacts can be fully understood only 
when they are embedded within their constitutional frameworks.
The literature on electoral rules is indeed impressive and often con-
sidered as one of the most advanced areas in political science. Explicitly 
incorporating executive- centric theory into electoral systems research may 
be the critical next step leading to future scientiic breakthroughs.
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Implications for the Quality of democracy
This book mainly focuses on describing and explaining why similar mixed- 
member electoral systems embedded within different constitutional sys-
tems can produce quite different impacts on the party systems and faction 
systems. Yet the executive- centric theory and the empirical evidence of this 
volume also have important implications for concern about the quality of 
democracy, both inside and outside academia.
There have been ongoing debates on the trade- off between democratic 
accountability and representation. There are also advocates of political 
reforms through electoral engineering. Yet most of the discussions and 
debates are either on the relative merits of different democratic regimes or 
on the advantage and disadvantages of various legislative electoral systems. 
For example, Lijphart (1999) argues that the parliamentary system is supe-
rior in terms of the quality of democracy and democratic representation, 
while Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997) ind that presidential system 
is superior in term of fostering accountability. Meanwhile, it is well known 
that the more “permissive” an electoral system is (such as the PR system), 
the easier it is for preexisting social cleavages to manifest as political par-
ties and thus promote representation. The more “restrictive” electoral sys-
tems (such as the SMD system), on the other hand, tend to constrain the 
number of parties and thus clarify political responsibility (Taagepera and 
Shugart 1989). Mixed- member systems, despite its hope for getting the 
“best of both worlds,” unavoidably also inherit the advantage and disad-
vantages of either according to the way SMD and PR tiers are combined. 
MMM, which weighs heavily in favor of the SMD tier and against the 
PR list, tends to strengthen accountability at the cost of representation, 
while MMP, which allocated seats by the PR ballot, is relatively balanced 
between the two criteria of the quality of democracy.
Although these arguments are enlightening, they tend to miss the 
key link between the constitutional arrangements and electoral systems. 
This book bridges the gap by embedding electoral systems within their 
constitutional systems. The executive- centric theory argues that politi-
cal parties and elites seek not only to maximize seats in the parliament 
but also to seize executive ofices. It is the combination of the legislative 
electoral system and the constitutional set- up that deines the payoffs 
of capturing executive ofices and the degree of cross- district coordina-
tion required to win the executive ofices. Hence to fully understand 
the effects of an electoral system, we must imbed it within the broader 
 Conclusions 307
political context, especially the constitutional framework, of the coun-
try in question.
For example, in presidential and semipresidential systems the president 
exercises the executive authority. The ultimate goal of most political parties 
and their leaders is undoubtedly to control both executive and legislative 
branches, although the appeal of and the competition for the presidency 
often occupies a higher priority (Curini and Hino 2012). This implies that 
presidential contests often spill over to legislative elections (Huang and 
Wang 2014). Thus the conventional wisdom that the separation of power 
offers voters a better opportunity to hold politicians in different branches 
accountable for different things deserves further close scrutiny under the 
executive- centric perspective.
Implications for Electoral reform
Electoral systems do not change often, but when they do they are often 
motivated by high hopes of solving some political problems and enhanc-
ing the quality of democracy. But the executive- centric theory of this book 
implies that electoral reform alone is not a panacea. Whether and to what 
extent electoral reform achieves the advocated goals depends not only on 
the speciication of new electoral rules per se but also on the context within 
which such rules are embedded (see also Bowler and Donovan 2013). If a 
real- world electoral reformer/engineer wants to assess whether their goals 
are realistically attainable or not, be they reducing money politics, down-
sizing factions, or enhancing electoral accountability, she needs a more 
comprehensive theory to predict how politicians and voters would actually 
react to such reform. This book brings in a large part of the political pay-
off, that is, executive ofices, that reformers, just like academics, have not 
always kept clearly in mind.
For example, one of the goals of electoral reform in Japan is to break the 
importance of factions in order to shift the focus toward interparty com-
petition in policy issues. As Kobayashi and Tsukiyama point out in chapter 
3, changing from SNTV to MMM did somewhat weaken the internal fac-
tions of the LDP, but this trend has been slower and far less intense than 
initially expected. If reformers had taken into account the parliamentary 
system and the importance of cabinet posts, they would have been less 
surprised by this result. In fact, the strengthened prime minster even has 
found room to maneuver within the faction system, preserving the overall 
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system while enhancing his own power by favoring his own faction and 
giving posts to smaller rival factions. In New Zealand, on the other hand, 
the primary aim of the shift from pure SMD to MMP was to increase the 
quality of representation by encouraging stronger ties between represen-
tatives and voters. Shugart and Tan ind in chapter 9 that the results are 
indeed more relective of the voters’ preferences. Yet as mentioned earlier, 
the effective number of electoral parties has generally declined but a high 
number of very small “microparties” remain. This has contributed to one 
of the more unpopular facets of the new system, that smaller parties are 
often the kingmakers in coalition politics. This fragmentation of the party 
system can be understood only by taking account of politicians’ pursuit of 
ministerial posts in the cabinet under New Zealand’s parliamentary system.
Thailand and the Philippines constitute another pair of examples. Elec-
toral reformers in both countries desire a stronger nationalized party sys-
tem. Yet as Hicken points out in chapter 8, Thailand was successful in mov-
ing toward a nationalized politics and a two- party system after adopting the 
MMM system while the Philippines failed. Limiting the president to one 
term in the Philippines provides a disincentive for presidential candidates 
to build strong nationalized parties. Again, the competition for executive 
ofices is important and mediates the effects of electoral systems.
In short, the executive- centric perspective advanced in this book mat-
ters in the world beyond academia. Political pundits, politicians, reformers, 
and the general public alike can gain greater insight by keeping both legis-
lative and executive payoffs in mind while deliberating the relative merits 
of different democratic institutions.
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